Is Sexism the Issue?

Robertson argues that public policies prohibiting preconception sex selection (PSS) should not be implemented because they would unjustifiably infringe upon the right of procreative liberty. To support this conclusion he makes two claims:

1. Respecting the right to procreative liberty implies that use of a reproductive technique may be restricted only if the technique would cause serious harms to others.
2. There is insufficient evidence that PSS would cause such harm to justify restricting it.

Just how well does Robertson defend this second claim? He mentions four types of harm that may be caused by PSS:

1. the potential to increase or reinforce sexism;
2. the harm to children born as a result of PSS (whether the procedure is successful or not);
3. the possible sex ratio imbalances in society; and
4. the contribution of PSS to the technologization of reproduction and genetic control of offspring.

Of these four he seems to only take the sexism issue seriously, fairly quickly dismissing the remaining three. In this way he places the emphasis on the sex selection, as opposed to the preconception, and makes the question of whether we should prohibit PSS ride almost entirely on the question of whether it would contribute to sexism. I believe placing the emphasis on sexism is a mistake for two reasons. First, it is not clear that PSS raises any new issues regarding sex selection and sexism that are not raised by other reproductive techniques. Second, PSS does raise issues regarding the selection of traits prior to conception, and thus the genetic control of offspring, that deserve greater atten-tion. Focusing exclusively on the issue of sex- ismdiverts our attention away from these other issues.

I do not want to say that the potential for increased sexism resulting from the practice of sex selection is not an issue. It most certainly is a cause for concern. However, the issues raised are by no means new or unique to PSS. Sex selection, after all, can already be accomplished through prenatal or preimplantation techniques. In fact, one could use nearly all of Robertson's arguments in the section "Is Gender Selection Inherently Sexist?" to defend sex selection through these other techniques. This suggests that if the issue, as Robertson seems to think, is sex selection, then the public policy argument was over before it began. If we are going to prohibit sex selection because it harms women, then we must prohibit not only PSS, but also abortions done for purposes of sex selection or IVF in which only embryos of a certain gender are implanted. Even if such restrictions on abortion and IVF were morally justifiable, it is unlikely that they would withstand legal challenge, much less be practically enforceable. But if we cannot prohibit prenatal and preimplantation techniques for sex selection, even though they may harm women, how can we justify prohibitions on PSS?

One might argue that there are differences between PSS and sex selection through prenatal or preimplantation techniques that would justify prohibiting the former but not the latter. First, the threat of sexism is greater with PSS because it may increase the prevalence of sex selection. Assuming it can be made safe, effective, and relatively inexpensive, PSS would have advantages that may encourage more couples who have a preference for the gender of their offspring to act on that preference. In particular, as Robertson notes, it would allow women to avoid either abortions or costly and intrusive IVF procedures. If we assume that increased frequency of sex selection would lead to increased sexism, then this, admittedly, is cause for concern. However, Robertson admits that at present we do not know how many people will pursue PSS. Furthermore, the features of PSS that would make it more attractive are advantages that would be incurred primarily by women. That is, it is women who currently bear at the least the physical burden of sex selection, either through abortion or through IVF. In this sense PSS would arguably be a gain for...