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The American Journal of Bioethics 3.3 (2003) Web Only (2003)



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The Humane Imperative:
A Moral Opportunity

Kimberly A. Urie, J.D

Alison Stanley, Ph.D

Jerold D. Friedman

Jason Scott Robert and Françoise Baylis (2003) demonstrate scientifically, politically, and morally that the existing arguments against transgressing species boundaries are flawed. The key objection they raise is one of moral confusion. However, we believe the significant question is much more basic. Is it humane? The danger of hybridizing human-source genes with nonhuman-source genes 1 is not in the "moral confusion" regarding novel beings but in the myopia of defining humanity through biochemistry.

According to Robert and Baylis, "the unique identity of the human species cannot be established through genetic or genomic means." There is no single scientific method for identifying species, and the concept of species is itself subject to biased interpretation, reflecting current political and cultural assumptions. We are unable to define, precisely, the bounds of our own species, and it is incorrect to base what is human on our DNA. Accordingly, there is no unbiased rationale for using the human species or genome as the basis for moral standing. Continuing to pursue a line of research to separate human beings from nonhumans is to continue asking the wrong question. The real issue involves commonality, not difference.

The notion of human uniqueness is a myth or a convenient and comforting fabrication by human beings. So rather than a discussion of the confusion and lack of consensus around definition, perhaps we must ask, "Who will be hurt? Who will suffer?" Robert and Baylis point out that, "This gap between science and morality requires critical attention." Morality, moral definitions, social conventions and institutions are what require critical attention. Serious considerations about pain and suffering, which transcend arbitrary distinctions such as species, gender, race, and class, are the compelling issues.

The prevailing protections against human transgression apply exclusively to human beings, to whom value is ascribed inherently and automatically. Yet one can successfully argue that the species identity of human beings is not "genuinely fixed" but made sacred by convention. This arbitrary distinction remains the most stable foundation upon which our anthropocentric and superior human identity rests. And it prevails simply because we unquestioningly accept it as a social convention. In turn, we afford ourselves all of the arbitrarily-manufactured privileges of a dominant group, similar to institutional domination of male gender over female, light skin over dark, rich over poor. Yet, as history informs us, the institutional power to dominate others does not render such exploitation morally or ethically acceptable.

Robert and Baylis urge us to examine other historical contexts for guidance. "There was a time when many whom we in the West now recognize as undeniably human ... were not accorded [the same] moral status. We were able to resolve this moral confusion." We are compelled to point out that the moral confusion of the day was resolved only with great difficulty, violence, and social uprising—hardly with reason. So, can we really be "trusted to do the same with the novel beings we create"? We will have to "confront the possibility that humanness is neither a necessary nor sufficient" condition to qualify for personhood (a being with full moral standing). But humaneness might be.

A more meaningful standard would be based on what rights are valued and what interests are to be protected. Common, moral rights exist for the interests and preferences human beings share with nonhumans, including, for example, a right to bodily integrity. This standard allows genetic research to continue subject to public-policy limits, so long as no harm is done to either patient or donor and no foreseeable harm is done to the created novel being. "Do no harm" is the least-restrictive standard permitted, regardless of species. A better standard, we believe, would require full disclosure and informed consent prior to any scientific or medical procedure, because the higher standard recognizes the mental and emotional interests in bodily integrity, regardless of species. This standard embraces an...

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