The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950–1974 (review)

This is a penetrating discussion of the complicated relationship between the United States and one of its minor allies, by an author who displays a deep knowledge of U.S. policymaking, Mediterranean and South European affairs, and Greek history. James Miller examines the U.S.-Greek relationship from the end of the Greek civil war until the restoration of Greek democracy following the collapse of the colonels’ dictatorship (1967–1974).

The most novel feature of the book is its emphasis on the role of Andreas Papandreou, the Greek prime minister from 1981 to 1989 and from 1993 to 1996, in projecting an interpretation of contemporary Greek history (the “Andreas Version”) that opened his way to power, riding on a wave of anti-Americanism. The term “history” in the title of the book also refers to this use of a historical narrative by Papandreou as a tool in a power struggle both within Greece and between Greece and its major Western ally. The book convincingly argues that the role of the United States in shaping Greek history must be carefully assessed. The United States committed some mistakes in policies toward Greece but also strongly aided Greek modernization through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Nonetheless, the revisionist thesis that Greece was turned into a kind of U.S. protectorate is not supported by the evidence.

For example, many Greeks, influenced by the “Andreas Version,” continue to blame the United States for the imposition of the military dictatorship in 1967. In rebutting this view, Miller’s book bolsters the work of other authors (Louis Klarevas, Konstantina Maragkou, Effie Pedaliu, Theodore A. Couloumbis, John O. Iatrides) who have shown that the 1967 coup in fact came as an unpleasant surprise in Washington. U.S. policymakers did not view the military regime as compatible with U.S. interests. The main origins of the dictatorship, Miller argues, should be sought in the failures of the Greek political system rather than in the infamous “foreign factor.” However, after the 1967 coup Washington changed course and cooperated with the dictatorship, thus contributing to the radicalization of Greek anti-Americanism. Miller notes that the U.S. government was mistaken and failed to uphold its own democratic values, but he stresses that this does not mean the United States “imposed” a repressive regime.

The structure of the book is also interesting. The introduction discusses issues of Greek identity and political culture (including the long-established “underdog” mentality of the Greeks), revealing a deep understanding of major trends in Greek history. Three out of the eight chapters are devoted to the Cyprus crises from 1950 to 1974. Recent scholarship agrees with Miller that Cyprus and Cold War issues such as the U.S.-Greek relationship cannot be treated in watertight compartments. Cyprus always had the tendency to spill over to the bilateral level, as Theodore Couloumbis has shown in his The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983). Miller’s other chapters examine the U.S. role in the modernization of Greece in 1950–1952, a period of unstable center governments; discuss the peak of Greek-U.S. cooperation during the conservative domination of 1952–1963; and analyze U.S. attitudes during the collapse of Greek democracy in 1964–1967. One chapter examines the “Andreas Version,” and another deals with the reluctant yet clear U.S. acceptance of cooperation with the military regime in 1969–1974. This was, according to the author, the major U.S. mistake in dealing with Greek affairs and a departure from major principles of U.S. policy. This lapse seemingly legitimized the “Andreas Version,” allowing Papandreou to capitalize on the “underdog” mentality and on the Greek tendency to indulge in conspiracy theories. The tendency of U.S. officials, especially Henry Kissinger, to mismanage policy on Greek democracy and the Cyprus crisis in 1974 gave credence to the complaints of the...