Coleridge and the Paradox of the Poetic Imperative

FB Rainsberry - ELH, 1954 - JSTOR
FB Rainsberry
ELH, 1954JSTOR
Coleridge's enthusiasm for a metaphysics of poetry originated in his early education under
the tutelage of the Reverend James Bowyer, Head Master of the Grammar School, Christ's
Hospital. From Bowyer, Coleridge learned" that Poetry, even of the loftiest and, seemingly,
that of the wildest odes, had a logic of its own, as severe as that of science; and more difficult
because more subtle, more complex, and dependent on more, and more fugitive causes. In
the truly great poets, he would say, there is a reason assignable, not only for every word, but …
Coleridge's enthusiasm for a metaphysics of poetry originated in his early education under the tutelage of the Reverend James Bowyer, Head Master of the Grammar School, Christ's Hospital. From Bowyer, Coleridge learned" that Poetry, even of the loftiest and, seemingly, that of the wildest odes, had a logic of its own, as severe as that of science; and more difficult because more subtle, more complex, and dependent on more, and more fugitive causes. In the truly great poets, he would say, there is a reason assignable, not only for every word, but for the position of every word." 1 Coleridge shared in general the conviction of the Romantic period that there was always a sense of the Infinite implicit in human life, which was the source of all man's deepest experiences. For the Romantic thinker, Philosophy was the effort" starting from the unity of experi-ence as a whole, to bring the different interests of the human spirit together so that it might feel itself at home in all of them." 2 Characteristically Coleridge states that" the prime object of all reasoning is the reduction of the many to the one and the restoration of particulars to that unity, by which they alone can participate in true being on the principle of omne ens unum." 3 This statement of Coleridge's is fundamental to the dynamic principle of imagination which he later developed. Before the metaphysical problem of Coleridge's concept of Unity can be dealt with adequately, his position with respect to Logic must be clearly established. Like Kant, Coleridge was concerned about H-ume's failure to solve the problem of synthetic a priori judgments." Suppose I see a ball moving in a streight line towards another, I immediately conclude that they will shock, and that the second will be in motion. This
JSTOR