Intersubjectivity in perception
S Gallagher - Continental Philosophy Review, 2008 - Springer
Continental Philosophy Review, 2008•Springer
The embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition explicate many
important details for a phenomenology of perception, and are consistent with some of the
traditional phenomenological analyses. Theorists working in these areas, however, often fail
to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to perception. This paper suggests
some ways in which intersubjectivity is important for an adequate account of perception.
important details for a phenomenology of perception, and are consistent with some of the
traditional phenomenological analyses. Theorists working in these areas, however, often fail
to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to perception. This paper suggests
some ways in which intersubjectivity is important for an adequate account of perception.
Abstract
The embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition explicate many important details for a phenomenology of perception, and are consistent with some of the traditional phenomenological analyses. Theorists working in these areas, however, often fail to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to perception. This paper suggests some ways in which intersubjectivity is important for an adequate account of perception.
Springer