This article examines Bruno Latour’s defense of a more realistic approach toward science and the relations between humans and objects. It concentrates on the main roles that pragmatism plays in Latour’s ontology and it proposes understanding his perspective toward reality as ‘pragmatic realism’. On this basis, the article explores Latour’s relationship with pragmatic realism in four ways. Firstly, it presents the central claims of pragmatic realism expressed in the works of William James and Hillary Putnam. Secondly, it analyzes Latour’s concept of ‘circulating reference’as a concrete approach to relating language and objects in a sense that is compatible with pragmatic realism. Thirdly, it explores the connection between circulating reference and Latour’s broadest ontological claims. Finally, the article concludes arguing that ‘pragmatic realism’is a formula that may also be used to describe Latour’s own realistic ontology.