The goal of this white paper is to introduce some issues in the philosophical and psychological literature that might be of interest to someone doing empirical research on intellectual humility: to identify areas and debates that might help us build a robust understanding of what intellectual humility is or might be. There are a number of issues that are quite pertinent; however, drawing heavily from the Science of Intellectual Humility Project’s description, we think we have chosen those topics that are nevertheless particularly germane:(a) the philosophy of intellectual virtue,(b) the psychology of the virtuous knower,(c) the philosophical import of disagreement, and (d) the psychology of virtuous belief. Regarding the philosophy of intellectual virtue, we elucidate the broad contours of two dominant accounts—two possible models for conceptually understanding intellectual humility—found within the philosophical literature surrounding virtue epistemology: virtue reliabilism and Neo-Aristotelianism (responsibilism). Drawing from these two models, we examine related issues regarding the psychology of the virtuous knower by exploring topics in heuristics and biases, motivation and cognition, intellectual humility as a trait, and the emotional components of intellectual humility. We then introduce some of the main philosophical issues surrounding epistemic disagreement—a subject that is arguably of critical importance for any viable, conceptual understanding of intellectual humility—proposing a methodology for systematically understanding when and why intractable disagreements occur. Finally, we explore the psychology of virtuous belief and related issues in the scientific literature: explicating the empirical prospects for intellectual humility in the psychological research on epistemic cognition, argumentative reasoning, epistemic beliefs and learning, and epistemic vigilance and trust.