The costs of caring: Who pays? Who profits? Who panders?

LM Fleck - The Hastings Center Report, 2006 - JSTOR
LM Fleck
The Hastings Center Report, 2006JSTOR
Avastin, a widely used colon cancer drug manufac-tured by San Francisco-based biotech
company Genentech, has proven a somewhat effective treatment for lung and breast cancer
when administered at twice the normal dose. In February, the New York Times carried a
story about Avastin's extraordinarily high price when used in this alternative way: $100,000
for one year's treatment-a figure fully twice the price of the nor-mal dose, even though
producing the higher dose costs the company little additional money. And the treatment …
Avastin, a widely used colon cancer drug manufac-tured by San Francisco-based biotech company Genentech, has proven a somewhat effective treatment for lung and breast cancer when administered at twice the normal dose. In February, the New York Times carried a story about Avastin's extraordinarily high price when used in this alternative way: $100,000 for one year's treatment-a figure fully twice the price of the nor-mal dose, even though producing the higher dose costs the company little additional money. And the treatment yields only an average gain in life expectancy of five months-very modest relative to the cost. What garnered media attention, however, was Genentech's novel justification for the price:" the inherent value of these life-sustaining technologies."'Rather than mak-ing the usual appeal to high research costs, the company cited the pricelessness of human life, implying a moral reason for the pricing decision. I will pass in silence over the obviously self-serving disingenuousness of this appeal. The fact is that many in our society-and perhaps a substantial majority-think human life should be thought of as priceless. That assertion can be taken in three very different ways. We can take the pricelessness of human life to mean that the social worth of an individual (their social status or contribution to the national economy) should be completely irrelevant when it comes to determining how much society should spend to save or prolong that indi-vidual's life in the face of a life-threatening illness or acci-dent-a worthy moral principle. Likewise, we should af-firm the nonutilitarian view that the cost of saving either a life or a life-year should not determine by itself what will count as a just allocation of limited health resources when we cannot afford to save all the life-years medical technology may salvage. But we need to reject the view that we have a moral obligation to spend any amount of money to save all lives and life-years that medical technology permits. The result of adopting this view would be a gross distortion in our society's health care priorities that would not be just, compassionate, or prudent. To see why this is true, let us look at some facts and reasonable projections. Health spending in the United States topped $1.8 trillion in 2004, roughly 16.3 percent of our gross domestic product (GDP), compared to 5.2 percent in 1960. Projections to 2015 show us spending more than $4 trillion on health care then-almost 20 percent of expected GDP. 2 Medicare spending in 2005 was about $330 billion. With deployment of the prescription drug benefit in 2006, spending will be about $424 billion-a price tag expected to rise by 2014 to $747 billion. Over the ten-year period ending in 2015, Medicare spending will exceed $4 trillion. 3 These figures are socially and politically problematic, especially in light of growing federal deficits.
Health policy analysts generally agree that emerging medical technologies drive escalating health costs. 4 Yet they and the public feel medical innovation should not be slowed or stopped-a conclusion I endorse as well. However, if we couple this belief with that third sense of the pricelessness of human life, the results are morally and economically disastrous.
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