Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern

B Latour - Critical inquiry, 2004 - journals.uchicago.edu
B Latour
Critical inquiry, 2004journals.uchicago.edu
Wars. So many wars. Wars outside and wars inside. Cultural wars, science wars, and wars
against terrorism. Wars against poverty and wars against the poor. Wars against ignorance
and wars out of ignorance. My question is simple: Should we be at war, too, we, the
scholars, the intellectuals? Is it really our duty to add fresh ruins to fields of ruins? Is it really
the task of the humanities to add deconstruction to destruction? More iconoclasm to
iconoclasm? What has become of the critical spirit? Has it run out of steam? Quite simply, my …
Wars. So many wars. Wars outside and wars inside. Cultural wars, science wars, and wars against terrorism. Wars against poverty and wars against the poor. Wars against ignorance and wars out of ignorance. My question is simple: Should we be at war, too, we, the scholars, the intellectuals? Is it really our duty to add fresh ruins to fields of ruins? Is it really the task of the humanities to add deconstruction to destruction? More iconoclasm to iconoclasm? What has become of the critical spirit? Has it run out of steam? Quite simply, my worry is that it might not be aiming at the right target. To remain in the metaphorical atmosphere of the time, military experts constantly revise their strategic doctrines, their contingency plans, the size, direction, and technology of their projectiles, their smart bombs, their missiles; I wonder why we, we alone, would be saved from those sorts of revisions. It does not seem to me that we have been as quick, in academia, to prepare ourselves for new threats, new dangers, new tasks, new targets. Are we not like those mechanical toys that endlessly make the same gesture when everything else has changed around them? Would it not be rather terrible if we were still training young kids—yes, young recruits, young cadets—for wars that are no longer possible, fighting enemies long gone, conquering territories that no longer exist, leaving them ill-equipped in the face of threats we had not anticipated, for which we are so thoroughly unprepared? Generals have always been accused of being on the ready one war late—especially French generals, especially these days. Would it be so surprising,
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