The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

J Haidt - Psychological review, 2001 - psycnet.apa.org
Psychological review, 2001psycnet.apa.org
Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral
judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for
considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather,
moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been
reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models.
The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by …
Abstract
Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.(PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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