Anselm's ontological arguments
N Malcolm - The Philosophical Review, 1960 - JSTOR
N Malcolm
The Philosophical Review, 1960•JSTORI BELIEVE that in Anselm's Proslogion and Responsio editoris there are two different pieces
of reasoning which he did not distinguish from one another, and that a good deal of light
may be shed on the philosophical problem of" the ontological argument" if we do distinguish
them. In Chapter 2 of the Proslogiont Anselm says that we believe that God is something a
greater than which cannot be conceived.(The Latin is aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit.
Anselm sometimes uses the alternative expressions aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest …
of reasoning which he did not distinguish from one another, and that a good deal of light
may be shed on the philosophical problem of" the ontological argument" if we do distinguish
them. In Chapter 2 of the Proslogiont Anselm says that we believe that God is something a
greater than which cannot be conceived.(The Latin is aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit.
Anselm sometimes uses the alternative expressions aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest …
I BELIEVE that in Anselm's Proslogion and Responsio editoris there are two different pieces of reasoning which he did not distinguish from one another, and that a good deal of light may be shed on the philosophical problem of" the ontological argument" if we do distinguish them. In Chapter 2 of the Proslogiont Anselm says that we believe that God is something a greater than which cannot be conceived.(The Latin is aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit. Anselm sometimes uses the alternative expressions aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest, id quo maius cogitari nequit, aliquid quo maius cogitari non valet.) Even the fool of the Psalm who says in his heart there is no God, when he hears this very thing that Anselm says, namely," something a greater than which cannot be conceived," understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding though he does not understand that it exists.
Apparently Anselm regards it as tautological to say that what-ever is understood is in the understanding (quidquid intelligitur in intellect est): he uses intelligitur and in intellect est as interchangeable locutions. The same holds for another formula of his: whatever is thought is in thought (quidquid cogitatur in cogitatione
JSTOR