The ontological argument fails because of an operator order switch between (1) “necessarily there is an (existentially) perfect being” and (2) “there is a being which necessarily is (existential‐ly) perfect”. Here (1) is trivially true logically but (2) problematic. Since Kant's criticisms were directed at the notion of existence, not at the step from (1) to (2), they are misplaced. They are also wrong, because existence can be a predicate. Moreover, Kant did not anticipate Frege's claim that “is” (“ist”) is ambiguous between existence, predication, identity, and class‐inclusion. To restore the ontological argument, an extra premise is needed to the effect (roughly) that it is known who the existentially perfect being is. The question is raised whether Kant could have meant the failure of this extra premise by his thesis that existence is not a real predicate.