Moral testimony and moral epistemology
A Hills - Ethics, 2009 - journals.uchicago.edu
Ethics, 2009•journals.uchicago.edu
Eleanor has always enjoyed eating meat but has recently realized that it raises some moral
issues. Rather than thinking further about these, however, she talks to a friend, who tells her
that eating meat is wrong. Eleanor knows that her friend is normally trustworthy and reliable,
so she believes her and accepts that eating meat is wrong. Many people believe that there
are strong reasons not to form moral beliefs on the say-so of others, as Eleanor does. I will
call these people “pessimists” about moral testimony. Pessimists do not think that moral …
issues. Rather than thinking further about these, however, she talks to a friend, who tells her
that eating meat is wrong. Eleanor knows that her friend is normally trustworthy and reliable,
so she believes her and accepts that eating meat is wrong. Many people believe that there
are strong reasons not to form moral beliefs on the say-so of others, as Eleanor does. I will
call these people “pessimists” about moral testimony. Pessimists do not think that moral …
Eleanor has always enjoyed eating meat but has recently realized that it raises some moral issues. Rather than thinking further about these, however, she talks to a friend, who tells her that eating meat is wrong. Eleanor knows that her friend is normally trustworthy and reliable, so she believes her and accepts that eating meat is wrong.
Many people believe that there are strong reasons not to form moral beliefs on the say-so of others, as Eleanor does. I will call these people “pessimists” about moral testimony. Pessimists do not think that moral testimony is entirely worthless. They agree that it is acceptable for children to learn most of their moral beliefs through testimony. And adults may reasonably base some beliefs on testimony, for example, about relevant nonmoral issues (who did what to whom) from which they can
The University of Chicago Press