(DSM). I agree that people with different backgrounds and interests are likely to assess problems differently and that it would be a good idea for a more diverse body of people to have some involvement in revising the DSM. I agree that philosophers might usefully play a role when the DSM is being revised.

Overall, however, I am not convinced that Kayali Browne’s committee would be a good idea. In her vision, such a committee would constitute a group of wise moral experts who would help to make the value judgments implicit in the DSM as well-informed as possible. Along with many others I am skeptical of the idea that philosophers should be construed as moral experts in the sense of being particularly good at making practical moral decisions (see, for example, Archard, 2011; Engelhardt, 2002). I worry that philosophers may not actually be able to make all that much progress in addressing the sorts of deep moral question that Kayali Browne envisages being addressed (eg, how to weight the diffuse social harms caused by medicalization against the benefits that particular individuals might gain from treatment, how to distinguish between willful wrongdoing and disordered behavior). Although philosophers have