No one definitive cause has been pinpointed as the cause of the 2008 financial crisis; rather, multiple theories have abounded. The theory that ultimately influenced the regulatory reform enacted in the wake of the crisis, however, is grounded in the notion that there existed a pervasive failure of market discipline among all players in the financial system. This theory points in large part to the government's historical use of bailouts as perpetuating a market assumption that certain financial institutions were" too big to fail"(" TBTF"). 5 As a result of the TBTF assumption, management teams of large financial institutions made poor investment choices and the creditors of those institutions failed to accurately monitor risk, 2 creating a market distortion known as moral hazard.'Moral hazard was then compounded by the further erosion of market discipline due to an increased reliance of the financial system on derivatives and repurchase agreements (" repos")-financial instruments that enjoy special treatment under the Bankruptcy Code, giving their holders even fewer incentives to monitor counterparty risk. 4 Once various financial institutions began failing in 2008, regulatory agencies claimed they had no true ability or authority to handle the problems, s and thus, the solutions they parsed together were created on an ad hoc, ex-post basis, fuel-