Part I of this article discussed the rationale for the new Orderly Liquidation Authority in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the perceived inadequacies in a Bankruptcy Code approach to the resolution of large financial companies, the work of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in implementing Title II, including the single-point-of-entry strategy, and the role of resolution planning under Title I. Part II discusses the various proposals to revise the Bankruptcy Code to make it a more viable alternative for resolving large financial companies, the contending views on such efforts, and the effects of such efforts on the prospects for the use of the Title II process.

Title II has been said by one observer (and critic) to be at the heart of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the" Dodd-Frank Act").'This sentiment appears to have been shared by other observers (and supporters) of the Dodd-Frank Act. These observers and supporters saw Title II as the answer to the too-big-to-fail problem presented by large interconnected financial institutions. 2 In the hierarchy of Dodd-Frank Act provisions, these observers and supporters viewed the resolution plan requirement in Title I principally as an adjunct or auxiliary to Title II. As discussed in Part I of this article, in the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, there has been a shift in emphasis away from resolution under Title II toward resolution under the Bankruptcy Code. The fulcrum for this shift is in fact the resolution plan requirement in Title I. The shift has gained momentum as commentators, legislators and regulators have come to appreciate the import of the credibility analysis required under Section 165 (d)(4) of Title I and the uses to which the credibility analysis can be put.