Kant, non-conceptual content and the representation of space
L Allais - Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2009 - muse.jhu.edu
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2009•muse.jhu.edu
Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences. For in order
for certain sensations to be related to something outside me (ie, to something in another
place in space from that in which i find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as
outside and next to one another, thus not merely different but as in different places, the
representation of space must already be their ground. Thus the representation of space
cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer …
for certain sensations to be related to something outside me (ie, to something in another
place in space from that in which i find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as
outside and next to one another, thus not merely different but as in different places, the
representation of space must already be their ground. Thus the representation of space
cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer …
Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me (ie, to something in another place in space from that in which i find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside and next to one another, thus not merely different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground. Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation.(A23/B39) 1
Project MUSE