The puzzle of imaginative resistance
TS Gendler - The Journal of Philosophy, 2000 - JSTOR
The Journal of Philosophy, 2000•JSTOR
T he puzzle that concerns me here can be traced back at least as far as David Hume, but it
has received surprisingly little attention in the intervening two hundred years.'The puzzle is
this: Given that for the most part we have no trouble fictionally entertaining all sorts of far-
fetched and implausible scenarios, what explains the impediments we seem to encounter
when we are asked to imagine moral judgments sharply divergent from those we ordinarily
make? Hume poses the problem in the vocabulary of sentiments and customs. He writes:
has received surprisingly little attention in the intervening two hundred years.'The puzzle is
this: Given that for the most part we have no trouble fictionally entertaining all sorts of far-
fetched and implausible scenarios, what explains the impediments we seem to encounter
when we are asked to imagine moral judgments sharply divergent from those we ordinarily
make? Hume poses the problem in the vocabulary of sentiments and customs. He writes:
T he puzzle that concerns me here can be traced back at least as far as David Hume, but it has received surprisingly little attention in the intervening two hundred years.'The puzzle is this: Given that for the most part we have no trouble fictionally entertaining all sorts of far-fetched and implausible scenarios, what explains the impediments we seem to encounter when we are asked to imagine moral judgments sharply divergent from those we ordinarily make? Hume poses the problem in the vocabulary of sentiments and customs. He writes:
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