M t/rost contemporary discussions of free agency could be described more accurately as discussions of free action. They do more to explain what it is to act freely than to illuminate what it is to be a free agent. They typically set about constructing an account of free action by first noting various kinds of impediment or restraint that prevent free action. The powers that enable agents to act freely are then characterized as those which would secure the absence of those impediments.

In this paper, I develop a challenge to most current theories of free agency by showing that they systematically overlook a mode of unfreedom that does not involve the sorts of impediment they have sought to characterize. I propose, specifically, that free agents must have a certain sense of their own worthiness to act, or of their status as agents, which is not guaranteed by their abilities to act freely by reflectively authorizing their wills and their actions. The neglected dimension of free agency I explore here is especially instructive for recent theorizing in two respects. First, it reveals difficulties for the''content-neutral"'approach that has long dominated the literature and clarifies how conditions of free agency can incorporate normative components without being subject to the difficulties that normally attend such a position. 2 Second, the discussion brings to light a social dimension of free agency that can help to explain why