JLr IS A matter OF fact that logic in the modern age was concerned to a much greater extent with the workings of the mind, that is, with epistemic and even doxastic themes, than with formal problems. Un der the heading of logic'scholars from Ramus to Kant conceived a sort of melting pot containing not just formal logic but also methodol ogy, theory of knowledge, psychology, rhetoric, grammar, aesthetics, hermeneutics, and so on. From the point of view of formal logic all these were informal disciplines. Yet they were also part of the core of logic as a whole. It is necessary, then, to put some question marks upon the arguments adopted for privileging formal against epistemic logic by Bochenski, the Kneales, and Risse in their contributions to the history of logic in the modern age. 1 Kant's distinction between general and transcendental logic provides us with the most crucial case study. One would say, it is a book on the theory of knowledge containing many metaphysical sections as well as logical ones. 2 Yet,