IF there is any doctrine on which Kantian commentators are agreed, it is the doctrine that for Kant the forms of judgement are the forms of analytic judgement only. The question then arises," How can the forms of analytic jitdgement be a clue to the categories, which are principles of synthesis?" To the question in this form there can be no answer. It is irrelevant to appeal, as some do, to the fact that all analysis presupposes synthesis. We are forced to conclude that the metaphysical dedtiction of the categories lacks even elementary plausibility, that'it is another example of Kant's pedantic devotion to" Architectonic", and is to be explained as due to the childish desire to find parallels between formal and transcendental logic. It may seem a foolhardy and futile thing to question a doctrine so widely accepted.'I will not venture to say outright that it is false, for in the immense mass of Kantian literature there may be evidence sufficient to establish its truth. I do, however, assert that the evidence usually brought forward is inadequate for this purpose, that there is evidence working in the opposite direction, and that a very, different view is at least worthy of consideration. And in spite of the prevailing attitude towards Kant, which varies from pitying patronage to petulant rebuke, it seems to me as rash to attribute this extraordinary doctrine to the founder of the critical philosophy, as it is to suppose that his commentators may be mistaken. It will hardly be denied that the doctrine in question is an extraordinary one. The more we reflect on it, the more extra-