| It is good for the soul of man that Ms errorß—or his alleged errors! i—should from time to time be pointed out to him. Sir Winston Churchill, it is true, once reinarked, am always willing to learn, but I am not always willing to be taught'. Such unregenerate reservations would, however, be unseemly in a philosopher; and I am genuinely grateful to Professor Harold R. Smart-ofCornell University for having discussed, politely yet forcefully, some of the mistak. es I am supposed to have made in Kant's Metaphysic of Experience. This he has done in an article entitled'Two Views on Kant and Formal Logic', which he published in a recent issue of the American Journal, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research1). He contrasts my Interpretation of Kants formal and transcendental logic with an alternative view which he ascribes to Professor. Kemp Smith and is inclined with soine qualifications to accept. He thus gives me a welcome opportunity to correct my previous errors, to clear up some misunderstandingsr and also to defend such of my doctrines äs I may still believe to be defensible. Furthermore, he gives me a hope of discovering what is the view that may be acceptable äs an alternative to my own.

From the very nature of the starting point it will be necessary to treat this topic more personally than I should ordinarily wish to do; but in order to reduce the personal factor äs much äs possible I will refer to my own view äs the P-interpretation and will contrast it with the S-interpretation. This does not mean tiiat I wish to hold Kemp Smith responsible for the S-interpretation? for he, like myself, may not always have been rightly understood by his critic. By a happy chance, however, the letter S may stand, not only for Smith, but also for Smart. It should not be inferred from the use of this terminology that I am here concerned only with minor disagreements between Professor Smart and myself. The question to be discussed is perhaps the most fundamental one that oan be raised about the Interpretation of the Critique