Specifying norms as a way to resolve concrete ethical problems
HS Richardson - Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1990 - JSTOR
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1990•JSTOR
Starting from an initial set of ethical norms, how can we resolve concrete ethical problems?
We may try to apply the norms to the case, and if they conflict we may attempt to balance
them intuitively. The aim of this paper is to show that a third, more effective alternative is to
specify the norms. The problems that I am concerned with are of a sort typically ranged
under the rubric of" applied ethics"-that is, relatively particular questions about what should
be done in individual cases (eg, Baby Doe's) or concretely described types of cases (eg …
We may try to apply the norms to the case, and if they conflict we may attempt to balance
them intuitively. The aim of this paper is to show that a third, more effective alternative is to
specify the norms. The problems that I am concerned with are of a sort typically ranged
under the rubric of" applied ethics"-that is, relatively particular questions about what should
be done in individual cases (eg, Baby Doe's) or concretely described types of cases (eg …
Starting from an initial set of ethical norms, how can we resolve concrete ethical problems? We may try to apply the norms to the case, and if they conflict we may attempt to balance them intuitively. The aim of this paper is to show that a third, more effective alternative is to specify the norms. The problems that I am concerned with are of a sort typically ranged under the rubric of" applied ethics"-that is, relatively particular questions about what should be done in individual cases (eg, Baby Doe's) or concretely described types of cases (eg, Baby Doe cases). Although some who have worked most fruitfully on concrete ethical prob-lems have begun to chafe at the" application" label,'no alternative met-aphor has taken hold. 2 I aim to develop an alternative metaphor-that of
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