In this regard, only with the substantive implications foregrounded, the present argument complements that ‘‘Telling in Time’’series. Here, as there, vested group interests come second to my interest in narrative at large. Of the groups involved to date, I will show, the cognitivist latecomer has most flagrantly and self-defeatingly reversed this hierarchy, especially in its contact, or lack thereof, with the poetic tradition. It exhibits too much self-sealing, too little achievement by common standards, and less impact on the mainstream treated, or most often ignored, as outgroup. The selfstyled Cognitive Revolution has therefore failed either to rival or to reorient the practice of narratology—let alone interests other than theoretical—not even at a time when the major Structuralist paradigm eventually began to crumble there. As before, the reorientations discernible there since, in and against the mentalist line, not excepting the occasional tie-up with cognitivism proper, have mainly issued from lights and changes and pressures, alternatives and shifts of balance, within the established discipline. Moreover, though the group’s apartness widely typifies its approach to text at large, these minuses vis-à-vis narrative and narratology have a special claim to attention. Nowhere else has the renovated mind science invested so heavily since the s, in a discourse kind so central and congenial as well as so researched within the humanities. Next to it by such criteria, the work done on figurative language under the new banner, since Ortony () and Lakoff and Johnson (), has relatively more to show, and more will to show it, with a fairer chance of being heard without—in special issues of Poetics Today (:,:,:), for example. Accordingly, perhaps, its amnesia and separatism have also drawn more fire.