A Comparative Study of Deterrence A persistent problem for American politi-cal and military planners has been the question of how to defend &dquo; third areas. &dquo; How can a major power make credible an intent to defend a smaller ally from attack by another major power? Simply making an explicit promise to defend an ally, whether that promise is embodied in a formal treaty or merely in a unilateral declaration, is not sufficient. There have been too many in-stances when &dquo; solemn oaths&dquo; were forgotten in the moment of crisis. On the other hand, more than once a major power has taken up arms to defend a nation with whom it had ties appreciably less binding than a formal commitment. Some analysts like Herman Kahn maintain that the determining factor is the nature of the over-all strategic balance. To make credible a promise to defend third areas the defender must have over-all stra-tegic superiority; that is, he must be able to strike the homeland of the attacker without sustaining unacceptable damage to himself in return (Kahn, 1960). This analysis im-plies, of course, a strategy which threatens to retaliate, even for a local attack, directly on the home territory of the major power antagonist. Advocates of a strategy of limited warfare retort that, in the absence of clear strategic superiority, the capacity to wage local war effectively may deter attack.