I N T R O D U C T I O N

1. Good and Shook seek to demonstrate the continuities that exist between Dewey’s earlier and later ideas. Good believes that “a clearer understanding of Dewey’s continuing debt to Hegel clarifies important elements of his thought.” He wants to show that a “‘permanent Hegelian deposit’” remains in Dewey’s later philosophy. Shook, for his part, wants to provide “a comprehensive account of the reasons for the emergence of Dewey’s empiricist pragmatism from his early idealistic philosophy.” He believes that “a satisfactory account of the progress of Dewey’s thought . . . is essential to a full understanding of his mature philosophy.” Both authors want to understand Dewey’s early philosophy in order to understand his later philosophy, and they subordinate their discussion of the early philosophy to that end. Said another way, neither author makes it his goal to provide a full-length, systematic study of Dewey’s early philosophy itself, that is, a comprehensive study that examines the manifold nuances of Dewey’s early thought independently of its impact on his later thought. See James A. Good, A Search for Unity in Diversity: The ‘Permanent Hegelian Deposit’ in the Philosophy of John Dewey (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2006), xxiv (and note the book’s subtitle); John R. Shook, Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), 1. The same point holds for their joint project in which the authors draw connections between Dewey’s earlier and later philosophies in order to advance the thesis that “Dewey’s mature philosophy can be seen to be a non-Marxist and nonmetaphysical type of left Hegelianism.” See John R. Shook and James A. Good, John Dewey’s Philosophy of Spirit, with the 1897 Lecture on Hegel (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), ix. Shook’s dissertation presents an interesting account of some key elements of Dewey’s early thought, especially his epistemology. But here again the perspective is that of trying to understand,

2. Neil Coughlan’s Young John Dewey: An Essay in American Intellectual History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975) comes close to what I am doing, but as the subtitle indicates, Coughlan’s book is a study in intellectual history, not philosophy. The book offers short sketches of Dewey’s early works, in the context of his biography and the work of his colleagues, and in relation to his later philosophy, but it does not offer a comprehensive study of Dewey’s early philosophy as such. Victor Kestenbaum’s The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal: John Dewey and the Transcendent (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) covers some aspects of Dewey’s early idealism, but Kestenbaum makes it his “central aim . . . to propose that at least one version of pragmatism, John Dewey’s, has an important place for the ideal” (1). Kestenbaum is still primarily concerned with Dewey’s pragmatism. Robert J. Roth’s John Dewey and Self-Realization (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1962), although dealing with an idea important in the early work, focuses exclusively on Dewey’s middle and later works. Once more, the primary concern is with Dewey’s mature efforts.


4. Both scholars show that Dewey’s pragmatism owes a significant debt to his idealism. This means that his idealism is much more interesting than many people suppose, for it contains, at least in germ, some of his best insights, including his overcoming of dualisms and his emphasis on social life. See James A. Good, A Search for Unity in Diversity, xxv–xxvi. See also John R. Shook, Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality, 5–6.

5. Coughlan, Young John Dewey. For a view of the young Dewey’s basic goal that is similar to my own, although I argue for his greater importance and a fundamentally different method to his position, see Robert West-

6. I borrow the term rupture, which I use throughout the present work, from Adorno. I also borrow the term harmony. See Theodor W. Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), 4–5. Key words by Dewey and others are italicized throughout the present work.

7. This position takes Dewey even beyond Good’s “humanistic/historicist Hegel.” See James A. Good, A Search for Unity in Diversity, chapter 1. The differences between my own account of Dewey’s Hegelianism and Good’s will become clearer as the work progresses, but they can be summed up by saying that my account emphasizes the concept of rupture over the union of rupture and reconciliation. The focus on rupture also distinguishes my account from Shook’s account, which holds that “Dewey’s entire philosophy” is one that insists upon “the hypothesis of continuity.” See John R. Shook, Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality, 146.

8. See, for example, Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, 4–5; Jean-Luc Nancy, Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative, trans. Jason Smith and Steven Miller (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 8; and Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London/New York: Verso, 2000), 29–32. I follow Good in comparing Dewey’s version of Hegel to more contemporary versions, but I focus on readings of Hegel coming from the Continental tradition. See Good, A Search for Unity in Diversity, xxii; 231; and also note Good’s references in chapter 1, 43–54. Good focuses mainly on recent Anglo-American interpretations of Hegel.

9. I sidestep the question of whether there are actually three different periods of Dewey’s development, the early, middle, and late. Since my focus is exclusively on Dewey’s early work, for the sake of convenience, I divide his entire efforts into the earlier work and what comes later, or simply “the later work.”

10. John Dewey, “The Lesson of Contemporary French Literature,” in John Dewey: The Early Works (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975), 3: 36–42. Hereafter all Dewey citations, unless otherwise indicated, are from The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967–91). The citations will occur in text according to the following format: EW (Early Works), MW (Middle Works), LW (Later Works), followed by the volume number and page number, with the whole enclosed in parentheses. Hence the above citation, for example, would read (EW 3: 36–42).

12. This is similar to the idea of “transcendence” that Kestenbaum discusses, in that on both readings there is the search for the ideal. See Kestenbaum, *The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal*, 24ff.; 224ff. Note once more the difference between Kestenbaum’s view and my own, however, in that I develop a comprehensive account of Dewey’s early philosophy in relation to this and other ideas, whereas Kestenbaum is primarily interested in showing how this idea plays out in Dewey’s later pragmatism.


15. Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, 36.

1. **DEWEY’S PROJECT**


3. For a similar reading of Dewey, see Matthew Sanderson, “Pessimism in the Thought of John Dewey,” unpublished abstract, accessed May 5, 2009, third item at http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mlmeldrid/SAAP/MSU/PD04.html. Sanderson and I agree that Dewey confronted pessimism, and that his response to pessimism makes for an interesting contrast with Schopenhauer’s response. Our positions differ, however, in that Sanderson focuses exclusively on the later Dewey, while I focus exclusively on the early Dewey. Moreover, Sanderson sees Dewey as a pessimist who shares Nietzsche’s attitude toward life. In my view, the early Dewey, at any rate, is not a pessimist, and I see major differences between Dewey’s attitude toward life and that of Nietzsche, as I explore in chapter 7. For a discussion of Dewey’s later philos-
ophy as an alternative to something like pessimism and to modernity in general, see Melvin Rogers, The Undiscovered Dewey: Religion, Morality, and the Ethos of Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 28ff; 47–57.


5. Ibid., 4–5.

6. I will explain the meaning of these different terms and their function in Dewey’s thought as my examination of his philosophy progresses (see EW 2:259; 282; 251: 279).

7. For a previous use of the phrase “logic of rupture,” emphasizing “conflicts and tensions” and “outcomes” that are “deferred,” see Mike Gane, Auguste Comte (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 30. Good and Shook also discuss Dewey’s relation to the other idealists. Good sees Dewey as part of “the American Hegelian tradition.” Shook says that “Dewey’s early philosophy should be categorized as belonging to the Cairdian phase of idealism.” I understand Dewey’s early philosophy to be a new version of idealism, which comes closest to contemporary Continental readings of Hegel. See Good, A Search for Unity in Diversity, xxii; John R. Shook, Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), 66.


9. Ibid., 22.

10. Ibid., 28.


12. Ibid., 9.

13. Ibid., 9.


16. Ibid., 56.

17. I discuss Dewey’s relation to Royce in this regard in chapter 3.

19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 8.
34. “It is clear that Spirit has now got beyond the substantial life it formerly led . . . that it is beyond the immediacy of faith, beyond the satisfaction and security of the certainty that consciousness then had, of its reconciliation with the essential being . . . and now demands from philosophy . . . recovery through its agency of that lost sense of solid and substantial being.” G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 4.

2. CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND

The first two sections of chapter 2 are revisions of my article “Situating Dewey” published in *Americana: The E-Journal of American Studies in Hungary* 3, no. 2 (Fall 2007). The article can be accessed at: http://americana ejournal.hu/vol3no2/morse. My revision of this article is included here with kind permission from the publishers of the journal.


2. Ibid., 74ff.

3. Ibid., 74.

4. Ibid., 75.

5. Ibid., 74.

6. Ibid., 98–100.

7. Ibid., 94–96; 101–02.


9. Ibid., 224–25. See plate II and figure 43.

10. Ibid., 225.


12. As Schorske puts it, “here eros becomes pure aggression.” See Carl E. Schorscke, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna*, 335. See also figure 60 on p. 336.


16. Ibid., 110.

17. Ibid., 110–11.

18. Ibid., 111.

19. Ibid., 197–98.

20. Ibid., 197–98.

gang Huemer and Marc-Oliver Schuster (Edmonton: Wirth-Institute for Austrian and Central European Studies, University of Alberta Press, 2003), 67.


23. Schorscke, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna*, 221.

24. Ibid., 4.


28. Ibid., 124. The point immediately following this about the different “spheres” of human activity comes from the same source, Ibid., 149.

29. Kant, as quoted by Janik and Toulmin, *Wittgenstein’s Vienna*, 146.

30. Ibid., 146.

31. Ibid., 147–48. Note a subtle but key difference that will emerge on this point between Kantianism and Deweyan Hegelianism. Dewey will argue that these fundamental ideas are not merely regulatory, but are actually and literally true in the world to the extent that they get expressed in our experience, an expression that faith in these ideas assists and allows.

32. Ibid., 149.

33. Ibid., 149.

34. Ibid., 150.


37. Ibid., 164.


39. Ibid., 99–110; 162–65. See especially this passage: “The will itself has no ground; the principle of sufficient reason . . . extends only to the representations, to the phenomenon” (107). The will has no basis in anything solid, has no reason behind it, and is always unsatisfied, “an endless striving” (164).

40. Ibid., 408–12. These are surely some of the most sad and moving pages in all of philosophy.
41. On Kraus’s debt to Schopenhauer, see again Janik and Toulmin, _Wittgenstein’s Vienna_, 74ff. On Klimt’s relation to Schopenhauer, see Schorske, _Fin-de-Siècle Vienna_, 228–31.

42. Janik and Toulmin, _Wittgenstein’s Vienna_, 161.

43. Ibid., 155–57.

44. Ibid., 158–61; see especially 160.

45. Neil Coughlan, in _Young John Dewey_, implies that “The Present Position of Logical Theory” is an unimportant text, serving primarily as an advance notice of the work Dewey was engaged in with one Franklin Ford. Ford was “an eccentric” journalist who, with Dewey, planned to publish an ill-conceived newspaper called “Thought News,” whose goal was to be a warehouse for all the facts in the world, to help people think them through better. In fact, Coughlan does not establish the connection between “The Present Position of Logical Theory” and “Thought News”; he establishes only their simultaneous or near-simultaneous publication. See Neil Coughlan, _Young John Dewey_, 93–95; 98–100.

46. Richard Gale attributes to the early Dewey and to Hegel the position that unities of meaning are “imposed on us by some behind-the-scenes machinations by the Absolute or God.” But, as “The Present Position of Logical Theory” shows, Dewey understood the opposite position to be the case, and to have been the real strength of Hegel—namely, the position that the unities of meaning are not “imposed” but rather develop out of actual life. Gale does not discuss Dewey’s early thought at length, but he seems to share the standard view that unity is the central concept and not rupture, as I am claiming. See Richard M. Gale, _John Dewey’s Quest for Unity: The Journey of a Promethean Mystic_ (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2010), 11.


48. Ibid., xi.


3. REHABILITATING DEWEY’S PSYCHOLOGY

I presented a previous version of this chapter at the tenth annual meeting of the Midwest Pragmatist Study Group in Indianapolis, Indiana, in September 2008.

1. Tom Alexander, Jim Good, and John Shook, for example, have each discussed the _Psychology_ in their books on Dewey. However, even where their discussions are favorable, none of them ascribes to the book any great and lasting merit as a philosophical work in its own right. Alexander points

2. Throughout my analysis of the text, I will rely on the edition of the *Psychology* contained in John Dewey’s *Collected Works* (EW 2: 1–363). This edition contains some of Dewey’s revisions and, as a result, shows some indebtedness to William James and other later thinkers, as Dewey notes (EW 2: 5). However, as Herbert Schneider makes clear, in this edition “the main lines of [Dewey’s] system are maintained” as he originally presented them (EW 2: xxvi). Most of his changes are minor. As Dewey puts it, “the only change involving an alteration of standpoint is in the general treatment of sensation” (EW 2: 5), a treatment, in fact, which still finds Dewey retaining his idealistic position, as we will see in chapter 4 of the present work. For additional confirmation that Dewey’s idealism remains fundamentally intact, see John R. Shook, *Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), 102–06.


4. Ibid., 27.

5. Ibid., 28.

6. Ibid., 28.


8. William James, in a letter to Croom Robertson in 1886, as quoted by Westbrook in *John Dewey and American Democracy*, 28.


11. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, 28. Thanks to Ann Miller for the observation that James was then writing his *Psychology*. 
14. Ibid., 27.
15. This statement should not be taken to mean that just because we believe something to be true, the facts will oblige us. The statement means rather that facts are not facts independent of relations of meaning.
17. The remainder of this quote (which is not actually from the *Psychology*) says that reason also seeks unity, which shows again that disunity and unity must work together. But in my account of Dewey, the unity is never fully complete, because the concept of faith that seeks unity is only a “spur” that drives us on to make meanings, not something that demonstrates that unity has been achieved (EW 2: 358). I will explain this point more fully as we proceed.
19. Dewey may have taken to heart this passage from Hegel, and developed it in his own way: “All work is directed only to the aim or end; and when it is attained, people are surprised to find nothing else but just the very thing which they had wished for. The interest lies in the whole movement.” G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 293.
23. Since Dewey’s account of meaning making in the *Psychology* depends on the self’s striving for the Absolute, I disagree with Jim Good when he says that Dewey’s “‘perfect Personality’” or Absolute “is utterly inessential to the theories presented in the book.” The early Dewey needs the concept of the Absolute to give him an ultimate ideal to strive for, an ideal which, as ultimate, is always lacking in real life, and therefore creates an experience of need in us that forever drives us on to create human meanings at a higher level. See Good, *A Search for Unity in Diversity*, 144–145.
26. Ibid. 348.
27. Ibid., 334.
28. Ibid., 335.
29. *Idealized* and *idealization* are terms that Dewey uses throughout the *Psychology* and that I will use throughout this book. In general, these terms mean that the mind “goes beyond the sensuous existence, which is actually present, and gives this present datum meaning by connecting it with the self, and thus putting into it significance, which as bare existence it does not have” (EW 2: 122). The terms are related to *negation*, a term Dewey does not use, as far as I can tell, although the concept of negation is certainly at work in the *Psychology* (see my introduction for a discussion of negation). The relationship between negation and idealization would seem to be as follows: negation is the separating of “the sensuous existence” from its own “bare existence,” while idealization is the process by which the sensuous existence, once separated from itself, is taken “beyond” what it was to become something significant.

4. THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

1. In effect, the early Dewey is advancing the idea that, in the words of Richard Rorty, “there is nothing which is vital to the self-identity of a being, independent of the descriptions we give of it.” See Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and Social Hope* (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 235.

2. It is at this point that Dewey parts from Rorty’s conception of things. The early Dewey will see great merit in holding that, precisely because there is no given identity to things, we are entitled to believe that things have been given to us to allow room, as it were, for the endless development of perfection, the endless development of a world that ought to be rather than merely the one that is.

3. This view is not really as odd as it may at first appear. In some ways it is similar to Richard Rorty’s sensible view that “the world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not,” by which he means that there is something there that affects us, but there is no one best way of describing what that is. The truth and meaning of what is there depend on our various descriptions of it. So, to put this point in the early Dewey’s terms, brain activities (something out there in the world) may be the occasion for the occurrence of sensations, but sensations are not the same thing as brain activities; sensations depend on what we do with our brain activities, how we
invest them with our meanings, and so on, not on what is given in those brain activities as such. See Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 5.

4. Although it must be stressed again that the facts allow this virtual addition to hold for them, even if the virtual addition cannot be derived from the facts. This is precisely what it means for meaning to be produced by rupture—it must be rupture out of something, and yet a new creation from out of it.

5. I continue to use Dewey’s example of the orange in my analysis and throughout the book.

6. These interests, and hence the resulting knowledge, may accordingly be different for different knowers. As Dewey puts it, “the hog reads into the apple simply that it is good to eat; Sir Isaac Newton that it exemplifies the law of all falling bodies. Each puts self into the same sensation, and the result is a world-wide difference” (EW 2: 125).

7. In his introduction to the *Psychology*, Herbert Schneider notes that introducing this point is the main change that Dewey made in his revisions of the *Psychology*. Schneider suggests that this change brings Dewey a little closer to pragmatism than idealism, since now the interaction with things seems to play a more important role in knowledge. However, Schneider also notes that Dewey’s idealism “continued through the revisions of *Psychology*.” This is correct, because, for Dewey, even when we absorb something from “things,” we are still only absorbing what we have already put into them. Said another way, there is still never a first fact that we interact with in a direct and unmediated fashion. Instead, motions suddenly become a sensuous continuum, which suddenly becomes a series of distinct sensations, which then suddenly get unified into a single field of sensations, that is, into perceived objects or things, with which we interact, learn from, and grow, and so on. See Herbert W. Schneider, “Introduction to Dewey’s Psychology,” in John Dewey, *The Early Works, 1882–1898*, vol. 2, 1887, edited by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), xxiv.

5. WHAT WE KNOW

1. As Dewey sees it, science and philosophy “find their function in enriching” this basic intuition (EW 2: 212). But as Dewey explains, “the final reality for man is that which cannot be made out actually to exist. The religious life only brings this element to conscious recognition” (EW 2: 292). At most, we can only assert that God, or a complete understanding of every-
thing, exists, and this assertion is the basis of our trying to construct the kind of world in which we could understand everything. For Dewey, what prevents this intellectual search from being a vain striving is, I suspect, the persistence of the intuition, or something like hope, as well as the actual attainment of knowledge that science and philosophy do make possible.

6. FEELING, WILL, AND SELF-REALIZATION


3. “Knowledge,” Dewey insists, “is an affair not only of objective relations, but of value for me. It bears an indescribable, absolutely personal relation to me,” at least in part because I am constructing that knowledge myself (EW 2: 257).

4. I continue with Dewey’s previous orange example throughout the book.

5. Note that Dewey references a book on pessimism in this discussion (EW 2: 255).


7. For a reconstruction of the early Dewey’s possible response to death, see chapter 7. In chapter 8, I discuss how losing our sense of self is essential for the realization of culture, or the higher meaning of our self.


9. Dewey notes that we can have sympathy for the joy of others in addition to the grief of others. But he adds that “the community of sorrow seems wider than that of gladness” (EW 2: 284).

10. I differ from John Shook on this key point. Shook holds that, for Dewey, “the attainment of union with God is the experience of faith,” or more simply, “this ideal can be realized.” My position is that the union with God, for Dewey, is never attained; we only ever approximate it. Faith gives us the feeling of its attainment, but only with the explicit recognition that we do not attain it. That is to say, faith enables us to carry on and to think that our efforts, which always come up short, are nonetheless amounting to

11. I give a fuller description of this process in chapter 8.

12. There are some interesting similarities between the early Dewey and Freud, which I discuss in chapter 8, specifically with regard to the act of repression.


### 7. Beyond Modernist Culture


3. Ibid., 58–61.

4. Ibid., 58.

5. Ibid., 136–137.

6. Ibid., 139.

7. Ibid., 89–90. Here Kierkegaard uses the example of Abraham to exemplify this irrational assertion.

8. Ibid., 133–35.

9. Ibid., 58. From the side of objective reflection, he admits, “a solely subjective definition of truth make lunacy and truth indistinguishable.”

10. Ibid., 58. “However, is not the absence of inwardness also lunacy?” he asks.

11. Ibid., 136.


15. Ibid., 20. See also p. 8.

16. Ibid., 3; 6.
17. Ibid., 6.
18. Ibid., 122.
19. Ibid., 123.
29. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 12.
30. And the overman will do so even though “there is little prudence in it, least of all the reason of all men.” Ibid., 36.
35. The subtitle of *Ecce Homo* is *How One Becomes What One Is*.


39. See Hatab’s response to this objection in *A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy*, 187–91. He seems to agree with my assessment of the consequences of Nietzsche’s position, although he does not think it is a problem.


41. I am assuming that not all people are divided into the herd and the free thinkers, and that lots of different kinds of people exist from whom we might learn. I do not argue this point, because I take it that everyday experience establishes it sufficiently, although I must admit that stifling conformity also exists in contemporary life.


43. As Dewey will later put the same point, “even in the midst of conflict, struggle, and defeat a consciousness is possible of the enduring and comprehending whole” (MW 14: 226). Through recognition of this fact, he says, “we put off mortality and live in the universal” (MW 14: 227). One might perhaps think here of a poem by Dylan Thomas for a poetic equivalent of Dewey’s idea. See Dylan Thomas, “And Death Shall Have No Dominion,” in *Collected Poems, 1934–1952* (London: Dent, 1954), 68.

44. For an example of this kind of reading, see Jennifer Welchman, *Dewey’s Ethical Thought* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), 63–88.

45. As Kant puts it, “this principle of humanity . . . is the supreme limiting condition on the freedom of action of each man. . . . By this principle all maxims are rejected which are not consistent with the will’s giving universal law. The will is not only subject to the law, but subject in such a way that it must be conceived also as itself prescribing the law.” Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 2d ed., trans. Lewis White Beck (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1997), 47–48.

8. A NEW IDEALISM


2. Ibid., 21.

3. Ibid., 16–21.


6. This point is confirmed by Shook. However, Shook goes on to say that Dewey’s concern with God “seems to be an add-on without justification or need,” whereas I would say that his concern with religion per se is de-emphasized, although his adherence to the concept of the Absolute as the source of rupture is retained, even to make social meaning and experience possible. See John Robert Shook, “John Dewey’s Early Philosophy: The Foundation of Instrumentalism” (PhD diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1994), 76.


8. Ibid., v.

9. Ibid., vii.

10. Ibid., 1–19.

11. Ibid., 51.

12. Ibid., 51.

13. Ibid., 52.

14. Ibid., 52.

15. Ibid., 52.

16. Ibid., 52.

17. Ibid., 53.

18. Ibid., 54.

19. See chapter 1 for a discussion of Green’s philosophy.


21. Ibid., 251.

22. Ibid., 73; 103.

23. Ibid., 103.

24. Ibid., 102.

25. Ibid., 103.

26. Ibid., 103.

27. Ibid., 1. Though Morris uses “the rock of ages” metaphor to talk about “intelligence” and “religion” in general, what he later goes on to say about these things, especially religion, would seem to be identical with what he wants to say about the eternal nature of the Absolute as well. See also *Philosophy and Christianity*, 103.


33. Ibid., 6.


36. Ibid., 4–5.


40. Ibid., 4.

41. This is why some commentators insist on Hegel’s realism, as opposed to seeing him solely as an idealist. As Adorno puts it, “To the extent to which one can speak of realism in Hegel, it is to be found in the path followed by his idealism; it is not something heterogeneous to it. In Hegel the tendency of idealism is to move beyond itself” (*Hegel: Three Studies*, 5).


43. Ibid., 8.

44. Ibid., 7.

45. Ibid., 9.

46. Ibid., 10.

47. Ibid., 9.

48. Ibid., 70–71.

49. Ibid., 76.

50. Ibid., 78.

51. In my view, it should not surprise us that Dewey’s late-nineteenth-century position could resemble postmodernism. For, as Lyotard reminds us, postmodernism always occurs within modernism. “The postmodern,” he says, “would be that which, in the modern . . . searches for new presentations.” See Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 81.
53. Ibid., 59.
54. Ibid., 61.
55. Ibid., 63–64.
58. Ibid., 25.
60. See this comment in particular: “Instruction in what to do next can never come from an infinite goal, which for us is bound to be empty. It can be derived only from study of the deficiencies, irregularities, and possibilities of the actual situation” (MW 14: 199). This view is fundamentally different from the early Dewey’s idea that an infinite goal is precisely the end of our actions, although we do not know what it is; we know it only by the harmonies it produces. The whole discussion surrounding this passage could, in fact, be read as the later Dewey’s critique of his former position. This discussion would then contain a good deal of insight into why Dewey ultimately shifted his position—namely, his early philosophy eventually made him feel “discouragement and despair” because it meant “every attained satisfaction is only forever bound to be only a disappointment.” In the end, he craved unity in a way that his earlier self, with his philosophy of rupture, would not endorse. See MW 14: 199. Kestenbaum also discusses this passage and the division it represents in Dewey’s work. See Victor Kestenbaum, *The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal: John Dewey and the Transcendent* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 25.
61. He also retains continuity in his theory of inquiry, I would argue, because inquiry involves the reorganization of existing elements in the indeterminate situation, never an outright negation of any element and a leap away from it toward a new formation.
63. Ibid., 36.
64. Ibid., 35.
65. I do not mean to imply that the early Dewey anticipated the distinct views of Freud or Lacan. The point to take away is rather that certain elements may have already been in place for such conceptions in the idealist tradition, especially the concept of negation.
66. Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, 36.

67. As the later Dewey says, “suppression is not annihilation” (MW 14: 109). Given his whole approach, it seems safe to assume he believes the same thing about sublimation.

68. Dewey reiterates this point about impulses when he insists that their meaning is “not native” and that by themselves they are “as meaningless as a gust of wind on a mudpuddle” (MW 14: 65).

69. For a similar account of the two different roles that imagination can play, but an account with different consequences and implications than I draw out here, especially since the account attributes both roles to the later Dewey, whereas I would not, see Kestenbaum, *The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal*, 223–25. I also draw out the larger cultural implications of both roles and emphasize the latent Freudian elements involved in the one role, while Kestenbaum focuses on the different functions of the imagination as such.

70. Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, 34; 36.

71. Ibid., 36.

72. Ibid., 34–35.

73. Ibid., 35.

74. Ibid., 35.

75. I am grateful to Britt-Marie Schiller for this insight.

76. Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, 34.

77. Ibid., 34.


79. Ibid., 13. Johnson believes such a thing can be achieved; and I agree with him. But the position does present a certain difficulty, as Johnson notes.