Introduction

1. I use “Euro-American white” to designate someone of European descent. Euro-American whites are perceived to be Caucasian in phenotype (i.e., physical characteristics). In this book I will at times use simply “Euro-American” or “white” as shorthand, depending on context. I agree with Marilyn Frye that the term “white” does not simply refer to phenotype but also calls into play socio-political privileges denied to those considered (by those secure in their own whiteness) not white. See, in this regard, Frye’s “On Being White” (1983, 110–27; cf. 1992, 149–52).

2. My students have reported this transformation both in reflection papers, where their name is attached to their work, and in end-of-term anonymous course evaluations. Sometimes they are very explicit in their articulation of their realization. Other times they underscore, more generally, that their eyes have been opened, presumably about racism and other forms of discrimination we address in class.

3. I view race, along the lines of Marilyn Frye and Charles Mills, as stemming from phenotype (i.e., physical characteristics) but also involving the social construction of privilege and oppression (Mills 1998, 11 ff.; Frye 1983, 113–14; Frye 1992, 149–52). Charles Mills notes that “race” does not have scientific validity, but nonetheless has social reality (1998, 11 ff.). While I will not argue the point here, I believe that “race” is real in the Peircean sense, as it is both external to the individual human being, involving communal-scale habits, and race is also a source of belief and habit formation.

4. By “consciousness-raising” I mean an epistemological shift whereby an individual becomes aware of environmental factors (e.g., natural, social, economic, and/or political) that were previously unnoticed and/or not experienced by her. My thanks to Jeff Gauthier and Alex Santana for pushing me to clarify what I mean by this term.

6. By “race theory” I mean philosophical critique that identifies and problematizes the use of race as an instrument of oppression and dehumanization. My choice of the term “race theory” to describe the race-oriented dimensions of my work in this book is indebted to personal conversations with Shannon Sullivan and Dwayne Tunstall, both of whom have given me an appreciation for how my work is not “critical race theory” in the latter’s technical, historical sense. For a formal discussion of terminological issues on this front, see Tommy Curry, “Will the Real CRT Please Stand Up? The Dangers of Philosophical Contributions to CRT” (2009).

7. “Oppression” as I will be using the term refers to socio-political structures that target certain groups, subjecting them to limited options, which all involve some sort of “penalty, censure or deprivation” (Frye 1983, 2). Individuals belonging to historically and systematically oppressed groups (such as people of color, women, etc.) can be so outnumbered as to be the only woman and/or person of color in a particular community. Thus I use the terms “individual” and “group” somewhat synonymously in the discussions to follow. It is important to keep the following point in mind, however: Individuals cannot be oppressed insofar as they are individuals. Oppression targets groups. Individuals are oppressed only insofar as they belong to an oppressed group (7 ff., 15–16). Individuals can be oppressed on multiple fronts. Women of color who are poor, for example, have historically been oppressed because of economic class, race, sex, and, often, “Third World” status.

8. A striking example of racist reasoning can be found in Peirce’s 1866 Lowell Lecture VI, where he argues against the implications of the following syllogism:

“All men are equal in their political rights
Negroes are men;
[Thus] Negroes are equal in political rights to whites.”

Noting that “[t]he Declaration of Independence declares that it is ‘self-evident that all men are created equal,’” Peirce argues: “Now men are created babies and therefore, in this case, men is used in a sense that includes babies and therefore nothing can follow from the argument relatively to the rights of Negroes which does not apply to babies, as well. The argument, therefore, can amount to very little” (W 1: 444, Peirce’s emphasis). It is beyond the scope of my project to analyze the problems with Peirce’s reasoning here. Fortunately, Peirce’s ideas can be fruitfully applied to social criticism, even though Peirce himself had shortcomings on this front.
9. My thanks to Cathy Kemp and Mitchell Aboulafia for suggesting that I highlight this point more fully for my readers, in order to help humanize Peirce. Joseph Brent’s *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life* gives a detailed treatment of Peirce’s decline into poverty in his later years; see chapters 4 and 5 (1998, 203–322). William James was instrumental in helping keep Peirce afloat during these years, eventually organizing the Peirce fund, which coordinated monetary contributions from Peirce’s friends and supporters (304–7). Peirce’s descent into poverty can be traced to such causal factors as his refusal of social conventions regarding marriage, his unconventional religious views, and other complicating factors, which contributed to a reputation so dubious that the doors to a career in academia were closed to him (136–202).

10. *The Essential Peirce*, 1:357, 362. A note on subsequent citations of Peirce’s work is in order. Hereafter references to *The Essential Peirce*, volumes 1 and 2, are referred to as “EP,” followed by volume number, then page number (Peirce 1992a, 1998). References to the *Collected Papers* are “CP,” followed by the volume number, then paragraph number. For example, “CP 5.441” signifies volume 5 of the *Collected Papers*, paragraph 441 (Peirce, 1958–65). References to the *Writings of Charles S. Peirce* conform to the standard notation “W,” followed by the volume and page numbers (Peirce 1982–86). “W 4:134,” for example, signifies volume 4 of the *Writings*, page 134. Finally, references to *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* are abbreviated “RLT,” followed by the page number (Peirce 1992b).

11. I thank David O’Hara for bringing this passage to my attention.

12. In his book *Strands of System*, Anderson explains why “the notion of strands of system is appropriate to Peirce’s life work,” drawing on the cable metaphor of reasoning, as well as on the fact that because of “his employment, travel, and marital and economic difficulties, Peirce had to work where ever and whenever he could. In a very direct way, then, readers of Peirce’s work are forced to take up the variety of strands he produced to reconstruct the architectonic he offered” (1995b, 26). My own use of the term “strands” is smaller in scope than Anderson’s. I apply it to describe the various strains of Peirce’s thought that interweave with insights of social criticism, to form a cable of compatibility that depends not on a linear linkage but rather on an “intimate connection” among the ideas presented (W 2:213).

13. My work in this book is inspired by Lorraine Code’s *Rhetorical Spaces* (1995). The compatibilities between her work and Peirce’s are as striking as they are numerous. In graduate school, I read *Rhetorical Spaces* side by side with Peirce, my first exposure to both thinkers.
Lugones’s book *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* (2003) has had a significant influence on my thinking about social criticism issues.

My definition of internalization is influenced by Amélie Rorty (1980) and Sandra Bartky (1990, 63–82).

“White privilege,” to which I will be referring often, refers to the societal benefits that are granted to those who are considered phenotypically Caucasian. See Marilyn Frye’s “On Being White” for a discussion of whiteness as an issue of social privilege, as distinct from phenotypical characteristics (1983, 110–27; cf. 1992, 149–52). See also Peggy McIntosh, “White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences through Work in Women’s Studies” (1988).

I use “GLBTQ” to refer to those who do not consider themselves heterosexual—namely, those who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered, queer, or questioning. My thanks to Devon Goss for fielding my questions about non-heterosexual groups.

For an introduction to pragmatist-feminism, see Seigfried’s *Pragmatism and Feminism* (1996) and “Feminism and Pragmatism,” the special issue of *Hypatia* that she edited (1993). Shannon Sullivan also does work in pragmatist-feminism; see *Living Across and Through Skins* (2001) and *Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege* (2006). For treatments specific to Peirce and feminism, see Marcia Moen’s “Peirce’s Pragmatism as Resource for Feminism,” which focuses especially on the feminism-compatible roles played by feeling, the body, and semiotics in Peirce’s epistemology (1991); Ann Margaret Sharp’s “Peirce, Feminism, and Philosophy for Children,” which draws extensive comparisons between feminist theory and Peirce’s conception of the self, communal inquiry, and creative love (1994); Maryann Ayim’s “The Implications of Sexually Stereotypic Language as Seen through Peirce’s Theory of Signs” (1983); and Kory Spencer Sorrell’s *Representative Practices: Peirce, Pragmatism, and Feminist Epistemology* (2004).

It should be noted that the gender categories of femininity and masculinity are Western constructions. To apply them outside of a traditional Western understanding can undermine an appreciation for the social dynamics and issues faced by non-Western cultures. My appreciation of this issue is shaped by Oyèrónké Oyewúmí’s “Visualizing the Body: Western Theories and African Subjects” (1997), as well as by Maria Lugones’s presentation “Coloniality of Gender and the Colonial Difference” at the California Roundtable on Philosophy and Race in 2008.

I borrow the term “liberatory epistemology” from Nancy Tuana, who provides a helpful introduction to feminist/liberatory epistemology in *En-

21. For readers interested in how Peirce distinguished his own pragmatism from that of his contemporaries, see his essay “What Pragmatism Is” (1905), where he introduced the term “pragmaticism” to distinguish his own particular formulation of pragmatism (EP 2:331–45).

22. For further introduction to classical American pragmatism, please see the following treatments, which were of great help to me in crafting my own brief introduction to pragmatism here: John Stuhr’s introduction to the second edition of Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy, which is an excellent collection of primary-source readings (2000, 1–9); “The Theory of Practice,” in Seigfried 1996, 3–16; and “Transactional Bodies after Dewey,” in Sullivan 2001, 1–11. Vincent Colapietro (2000) provides an excellent specific introduction to Peirce’s thought in the Stuhr collection.

23. For Peircean and other pragmatist scholars who are unfamiliar with feminist philosophy, I recommend Susan Bordo’s Flight to Objectivity, where she offers a cultural, psychological, and historical alternative read of Descartes’ Meditations that resonates with the pragmatist critique of Cartesianism (1987). In the final chapter of her book, Bordo links her project with explicitly feminist themes, thus providing a bridge of sorts for those who might need one (97–118).

24. As a by-product both of narrowing my focus to racism and sexism and of my attempt to continually gesture to other forms of hegemonic group discrimination, my treatment of racism against people of color is limited almost exclusively to whites who are also economically middle class (or richer). I regret this limitation, for it certainly does not tell the whole story. The denials about the prevalence of racism in the United States can differ between middle-class and working-class whites. It has been noted by bell hooks, for example, that working-class white adults often deny them (2003b, 30). Shannon Sullivan and Patricia Williams each discuss the well-intentioned “color-blindness” promoted by white middle-class parents/caretakers, which asserts that race/color should not and does not matter anymore in societies like the United States that have supposedly overcome racism against people of color. Both explain how such “color-blindness” acts to hide the manifestations of white supremacy that are still at play (Sullivan n.d., 22–28; 2006, 5, 61, 78–79, 123, 127, 189–92, 196; Williams 1997, esp. 3–16). It is this latter, middle-class white dynamic that is prominent in this book.
25. Peirce’s preferred spelling is “semeiotic.” I will keep the traditional spelling of this term in this book, however, for two reasons. First, I will not be fully engaging Peirce’s semeiotic system, and, second, I will be discussing sign generation in the context of Antonio Damasio’s work. Keeping the traditional spelling will be less confusing as I draw parallels between the two thinkers (in Chapter 1). For readers interested in learning about Peirce’s semeiotics, David Savan provides a nice introduction, “An Introduction to C. S. Peirce’s Full System of Semeiotic” (1987–88). Also see James Liszka’s A General Introduction to the Semiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce (1996). My thanks to André De Tienne for the recommendation of Liszka’s book, which is often easier to track down than Savan’s text.

26. My treatment of sentiment is limited here to the overlapping that Peirce highlights between instinct and sentiment, which I discuss in Chapters 1 and 4. I am well aware that more exploration of sentiment is needed than I provide in this book, exploration that builds more explicitly on sentiments as cultivated affects. See, in this regard, Hookway 2000, 223–45; Kemp-Pritchard 1981; and Savan 1981, 331–33.

27. See, for example, “Mimicking Foundationalism: On Sentiment and Self-Control” (Hookway 1993); Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism (Hookway 2000); “Peirce on Philosophical Hope and Logical Sentiment” (Kemp-Pritchard 1981); “Peirce’s Semeiotic Theory of Emotion” (Savan 1981); “Cognition and Emotion in Peirce’s Theory of Mental Activity” (Stephens 1981); and “Noumenal Qualia: C. S. Peirce on Our Epistemic Access to Feelings” (Stephens 1985). Notable exceptions regarding the embodiment theme include Vincent Colapietro’s Peirce’s Approach to the Self (1989, 69 ff.), and Marcia Moen’s ‘Peirce’s Pragmatism as Resource for Feminism’ (1991, 438–43). I also found Colapietro’s paper “Bodies in Commotion: Toward a Pragmatic Account of Human Emotions” helpful when I was first beginning to think about Peirce and affectivity (2002).

28. See, for example, “Eros and Agape in Creative Evolution: A Peircean Insight” (Hausman 1974); “Philosophy and Tragedy: The Flaw of Eros and the Triumph of Agape” (Hausman 1993); and “‘Evolutionary Love’ in Theory and Practice” (Ventimiglia 2001).

29. A small list includes his explicit linkage, in the 1866 Lowell Lectures, between feelings and the body (W 1:495). He makes consistent reference to embodied feelings throughout the rest of his corpus. The body is also strongly present in his phenomenology. In the Logic of Science essays from the 1870s, Peirce describes the human organism as a “logical animal” and suggests natural selection as an explanation for humans’ hopeful disposi-
tions and their ability to reason synthetically (W 3:244, 318–19). And in 1898 he argues that science is derived from the instincts for nutrition and reproduction (EP 2:51; cf. CP 6.500). These examples demonstrate that, for Peirce, the human organism is embodied and engages her environment with the ongoing end of survival promotion.

30. The growing interest in the compatibilities between classical American pragmatism and racism in the United States is reflected in the recent publication of *Pragmatism and the Problem of Race* (Lawson and Koch 2004). None of the articles in this book features Peirce, however, and he is given little more than a handful of passing references. On the pragmatism-feminism front, Peirce suffers neglect as well. Little has been written detailing the compatibilities between feminist and Peircean thought. Charlene Seigfried’s *Pragmatism and Feminism* provides a helpful introduction to the general compatibilities between classical American pragmatism and feminist thought, yet Seigfried primarily excludes Peirce from her project as a whole: “[Peirce] hardly figures in my own reconstruction of pragmatism” (1996, 281 n. 20). The following four important exceptions were also described in note 18 above: Marcia Moen’s “Peirce’s Pragmatism as Resource for Feminism,” which focuses especially on the feminism-compatible roles played by feeling, the body, and semiotics in Peirce’s epistemology (1991); Ann Margaret Sharp’s “Peirce, Feminism, and Philosophy for Children,” which draws extensive comparisons between feminist theory and Peirce’s conception of the self, communal inquiry, and creative love (1994); Maryann Ayim’s “The Implications of Sexually Stereotypic Language as Seen through Peirce’s Theory of Signs” (1983); and Kory Spencer Sorrell’s *Representative Practices: Peirce, Pragmatism, and Feminist Epistemology* (2004).

31. For feminist readers who are not familiar with Peirce, the term “secondness” predates Simone de Beauvoir’s work and should not be confused with the use of “second” in her title *The Second Sex/Le Deuxième Sexe* (1949). I thank Lorraine Code for raising this possible confusion in my application of Peirce’s work to socio-political issues like sexism (personal conversation, February 2007, FEMMSS2 Conference, Association for Feminist Epistemologies, Methodologies, Metaphysics and Science Studies).

32. For example, in his book *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think*, linguistics professor George Lakoff discusses “prototypes” that are dominant in the United States (2002, 8–11). He notes that prototypes are “cognitive constructions” that play a role in the reasoning process; they are not “objective features of the world” (9). This is to say that prototypes reflect human-generated categorizations, not extra-human classifications that exist
prior to human thought. In explaining the “typical case prototype,” Lakoff gives a telling description of the typical United States of American: “For example, what we consider to be typical birds fly, sing, are not predators, and are about the size of a robin or sparrow. If I say ‘There’s a bird on the porch,’ you will draw the conclusion that it is a typical case prototype, unless I indicate otherwise. If I speak of a typical American, what comes to mind for many is an adult white male Protestant, who is native-born, speaks English natively, and so on” (9, my emphasis). Lakoff has highlighted here a common dominant pattern of thinking in U.S. mainstream society. This type of classification of the typical United States of American tends, as I will demonstrate in the chapters to follow, to erase from view obstacles faced by United States of Americans who are not adult, white, male, Protestant, native-born, native English speakers. We can also add to this list able bodied, economically secure, and heterosexual.

33. This recalls a connection made by Marilyn Frye in Politics of Reality, namely that culture becomes biology through habit-taking: “Socialization molds our bodies; enculturation forms our skeletons, our musculature, our central nervous systems. By the time we are gendered adults, masculinity and femininity are ‘biological’” (1983, 37, Frye’s emphasis).

34. Lisa Heldke and Stephen Kellert offer a helpful treatment of objectivity, which includes critiques of traditional conceptions of objectivity and offers a pragmatist-feminist informed re-conceptualization of objectivity, in their article “Objectivity as Responsibility” (1995). While Peirce is not named in their discussion, their ideas are compatible with Peircean objectivity.


36. For readers interested in accessing evidence of the racism and sexism still present in the United States, the following resources are helpful. Racism-focused sources include White Racism (Feagin and Vera 1995); Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal (Hacker 1995); “Some Kind of Indian: On Race, Eugenics, and Mixed-Bloods” (Jaimes 1995); Black Wealth/White Wealth (Oliver and Shapiro 2006); and Asian American Dreams (Zia

37. For readers versed in race theory, I need to make some clarifications. First of all, I believe that there are many white people who knowingly help keep racism alive in the United States. My work in this book is not aimed at trying to convince these people to become anti-racists. My book is aimed, however, at those well-meaning white people who are ready and willing to do more work to unlearn nonconscious habits that promote racism. I do think that such white people exist. It seems that Derrick Bell does too, given his depiction of “White Citizens for Black Survival” (WCBS) in chapter 5 of his *Faces at the Bottom of a Well* (1992, 89–108). I must grant, however, that Bell’s WCBS pushes me to take my work to a more activist level than I propose in this book. My thanks to Bill Lawson for recommending this book and this connection to WCBS, as he pushed me to clarify my objectives for my book. Second, I do not deny the intransigence of racism in the United States, much as I wish the intransigence did not exist. I find convincing Charles Mills’s theory of the Racial Contract, which argues that the social contract established by the founding fathers of the United States and dominant countries of the West is, in fact, a racial contract, made by whites to enforce on peoples considered “nonwhite”: “[T]he peculiar contract to which I am referring, though based on the social contract tradition that has been central to Western political theory, is not a contract between everybody (‘we the people’), but between just the people who count, the people who really are people (‘we the white people’). So it is a racial contract” (1997, 2, 3). Mills is not endorsing the racial contract he describes, far from it (4–6). Rather he works to make explicit that a racial contract of “white supremacy” has “made the modern world what it is today” (1). The normative work done by such a “nonideal,” racial contract is done inversely: “[I]t does normative work for us not through its own values, which are detestable, but by enabling us to understand the polity’s actual history and how these values and concepts have functioned to rationalize oppression, so as to reform them” (Mills 1997, 6). I also find Derrick Bell’s “interest convergence” principle to be an accurate, albeit sobering, description of how racism reform occurs and does not occur in the United States. This descriptive principle states that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accom-
modated only when it converges with the interests of whites” (Bell 1980, 523; cf. 1992, 7–11). I do not agree with Bell that “racism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible component of [U.S.] society,” because I think that even the most intransigent of societal habits can be changed in the long run (1992, xiii, my emphasis). Nonetheless I do agree that racism in the United States is a deeply “integral” part of society that cannot be changed easily (1992, xiii). My thanks to Bill Lawson, Marc Lombardo, and Dwayne Tunstall for challenging me to think more deeply about how I am framing my project in relation to white people.


39. I agree with Marilyn Frye that, at best, white people can only be “anti-racist.” Frye explains that “as a white person one must never claim not to be racist, but only to be anti-racist. The reasoning is that racism is so systematic and white privilege so impossible to escape, that one is, simply, trapped” (1983, 126). White privilege can be resisted, though, and this resistance takes ongoing hard work (126–27).


41. My thanks to Roberto Frega for raising this objection.

42. Personal conversation in March 2007, Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy.

43. Shannon Sullivan makes a similar point about her own white privilege, and white privilege in general, in *Revealing Whiteness* (2006, 10–13, 161–63, 196).

44. As part of the JVC program, volunteers received training in social justice awareness at several retreats throughout the year of volunteer service. This training helped me understand the deeply systemic racial discrimination that still informs U.S. society, even though many white, middle-class people do not see this and are not educated to see it.

45. Jonathan Kozol’s work is helpful for white, middle-class people who are unaware of the disparities in U.S. public education between inner-city neighborhoods and suburban ones, disparities that strongly reflect race; see *Savage Inequalities* (1991).

46. Tuana 2006, 2, emphasis in original. An excellent resource for this type of epistemological critique is “Feminist Epistemologies of Ignorance,” the special issue of *Hypatia* edited by Sullivan and Tuana (2006).
CHAPTER ONE
PEIRCEAN AFFECTIVITY

1. As Peirce puts it, “The tendency to regard continuity . . . as an idea of prime importance in philosophy may conveniently be termed synecism” (EP 1:313).

2. Peirce describes Lamarckian evolution as “evolution by creative love” or agapastic evolution (EP 1:362). The Lamarckian model is distinct from the Darwinian or tychastic model (where “fortuitous variation” is the agent of evolution) and the anancastic model (where evolution proceeds according to “mechanical necessity”) (EP 1:358, 360). Agapastic evolution is fueled by habit-formation and habit change, which allows for human endeavor to be an agent of evolution. See his essay “Evolutionary Love” for a fuller discussion (EP 1:352–71, esp. 360–63).

3. In a late essay (ca. 1904), Peirce complains that the academic audiences of his time have been spoiled. They expect the essays they read to connect all the dots for them. Peirce thinks readers should be required to apply their own powers of reasoning to draw out implications of what they read. This allows the writer more freedom to present a rigorous and concise articulation of ideas (“New Elements,” EP 2:301).

4. My use of the term “affectivity” resonates with the Oxford English Dictionary’s (OED’s) definition of “affectivity” as “emotional susceptibility,” while my use also specifies an ongoing body-mind-environmental interaction that informs this “emotional susceptibility” (OED Online 2004, “affectivity, psychol.,” p. 1). According to the OED, “affectivity” is derived from “affective,” an adjective strongly associated with the emotions (2004, “affectivity, psychol.,” p. 1). Definitions of “affective” include “[o]f or pertaining to the affections or emotions; emotional” and “[o]f, pertaining to, or characterized by feelings or affects” (OED Online 2004, “affectivity,” p. 1, and “affective, a.” p. 2). The term “affect” is derived from the Latin afficere, which means “to act upon, dispose, constitute” (OED Online 2004, “affect, n.,” p. 1).

5. I follow Antonio Damasio’s use of the term “nonconscious” to encompass all processing that occurs outside of human awareness. Like Damasio, I want a term that captures more than psychoanalytic understandings of “the unconscious” (1999, 228). I will be using the term “nonconscious” in place of “subconscious” and “unconscious.” This issue will be discussed more fully below.

6. The following description of habit, found in John Dewey’s Human Nature and Conduct, is especially helpful, since it consolidates many of the
dimensions at play: “human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity” (Dewey [1922] 1988, 31).

7. Despite the compatibilities of our projects, my term usage differs significantly from that of Shannon Sullivan in her Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege (2006). She explicitly avoids the term “nonconscious,” in order to focus her project on a psychoanalytically informed treatment of unconscious habits of white privilege, a treatment that takes seriously just how hard it can be to raise to consciousness and eradicate racist habits on individual and societal levels (5–13). I agree with her that eradicating racist habits is extremely difficult. At the same time I think that, for my own project, use of the term “nonconscious” as inclusive of Sullivan’s use of “unconscious” better captures the complexity of the inquiry opened by my post-Darwinian analysis of Peircean affectivity and its contributions to social criticism.

I think this inquiry offers, arguably, a more hopeful outlook than Sullivan’s regarding the elimination of deeply entrenched racist habits, because it focuses on the importance of embracing communal feedback as a tool to catch nonconscious behavior and thus to promote habit-change. I am not convinced that Sullivan adequately engages communal feedback as a resource on this front. In the opening pages of her book, she showcases an example in which she highlights the ineffectiveness of communal feedback regarding the “slip[s] of the tongue” of audience members at her presentation of a paper about racism and the Roma: “I was presenting a paper on racism and the Roma at an international conference in Slovakia, and upon completion of the paper, a Czech member of the audience proceeded to ask critical but sympathetic questions about my analysis. When doing so, he repeatedly referred to the Roma (‘Gypsies,’ as most people at the conference called them) as ‘Jews’ without hearing his slip of the tongue” (2006, 6). When corrected by other audience members, “he, embarrassed, said that yes, of course, he meant the ‘Gypsies’” (6). Yet the same man, followed by another audience member, repeated the same slip, using the term “Jews” instead of “Gypsies” or “Roma.” In each case the speaker’s support of Sullivan’s presentation implied that, on a conscious level, he was not anti-Semitic. Nonetheless, each was engaging a habit of using the term “Jews,” instead of “Gypsies” or “Roma,” which reflects European socio-politically
derived habits of association. That is, “the slips [of the tongue] are evidence of a habit of thought in the European mind that involves the scapegoat role that Jews and Roma have been assigned in Europe for hundreds of years. The most extreme example of this role can be found in Nazi Germany’s attempted extermination of the Roma and Jews during World War II” (6). Sullivan notes that, when the second man echoed the same term switch as the first, “[t]he audience and I did not correct him since, by that time, such correction felt pointless. After five occurrences, the substitution of ‘Jew’ for ‘Gypsy’ seemed to have roots too deep and stubborn for conscious correction to eliminate” (6, my emphasis). I would argue that Sullivan need not draw so pessimistic a conclusion. Audience feedback, in fact, could have helped these men realize they had again slipped back into old speech-habits. To fail to change an ingrained habit of speech in the immediate aftermath of being made aware of it need not signal hopelessness. Rather it could merely signal that more work needs to be done to change the habit in question. Communal feedback is invaluable in this respect because, in a context like the one Sullivan describes, it brings to consciousness behavior of which one is unaware. This brings to mind people who are trying to change their speech-habits to avoid male-dominated language. Receiving feedback that one, despite conscious intent, has said “mankind” or “man” instead of “humanity,” for example, can help catch slips of tongue and thus signal that more conscious practice is needed before the new habits of inclusive language have been mastered. My project brings to the foreground the value of communal feedback as a resource for helping people, especially those in hegemonic groups, change habits that contribute to social injustice.

8. “Unconscious” has various meanings within psychoanalytic discourse, and I want to leave inquiry open as much as possible on this subject. I do, however, agree with Sullivan that an atomistic conception of the unconscious will not do. In Revealing Whiteness, Sullivan presents “a transactional conception of the unconscious” that combines insights from classical American pragmatism and LaPlanchian psychoanalysis (2006, 13, 45–62). For work specifically on Peirce and psychoanalysis, see Colapietro 1995; De Lauretis 1984, 1994; and Muller and Brent 2000.

9. As a synechist, Peirce is not concerned to draw a hard, fast distinction between human and nonhuman animals, nor am I. Peirce does note that humans differ from nonhuman animals according to the higher degrees of self-control humans are able to achieve: “The brutes are certainly capable of more than one grade of control; but it seems to me that our superiority to them is more due to our greater number of grades of self-control than it is
to our versatility” (CP 5.533). And, “All thinking is by signs; and the brutes use signs. But they perhaps rarely think of them as signs. To do so is manifestly a second step in the use of language. Brutes use language, and seem to exercise some little control over it. But they certainly do not carry this control to anything like the same grade that we do. They do not criticize their thought logically” (CP 5.534). It is beyond the scope of my project to explore Peirce’s thoughts on this issue more fully.

10. Peirce goes so far as to say that scientific development in general can be traced to the human instincts for nutrition and reproduction. Physics can be traced back to “instincts connected with the need of nutrition,” and “psychics” to those linked to reproduction (EP 2:51, 1898). “Now not only our accomplished science, but even our scientific questions have been pretty exclusively limited to the development of those two branches of natural knowledge” (EP 2:51).

11. My definition of internalization is influenced by Amélie Rorty (1980) and Sandra Bartky 1990 (63–82).


13. It is beyond the scope of my project to give a developmental account of self-control in Peirce’s corpus. Vincent Colapietro provides such an account in Peirce’s Approach to the Self (1989, chapters 4 and 5). In his discussion, Colapietro synthesizes the disparate comments Peirce makes about self and self-control, to present a coherent account that does justice to Peirce’s ideas.

14. Carl Hausman puts the point this way: “What Peirce stressed was a kind of altruism and concern for communities in contrast to a view that advocated self-interest for the individual. . . . [O]ne can treat the ideas Peirce proposed through the religious setting in ways that are, at least explicitly, nonreligious, unless religion is taken in a broad sense that excludes commitment to some institutional group or dogma and refers to any metaphysical commitment” (1999, 203). This point will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4, in conjunction with Peirce’s essay “Evolutionary Love” (EP 1:352–71); cf. Orange 1984, 48–49.

15. For discussions of these denials in the United States, see Racism without Racists (Bonilla-Silva 2003) and Speaking of Sex: The Denial of Gender Inequality (Rhode 1997).
16. There is a tension in Peirce’s references to reason’s ongoing development. On the one hand, he says, “the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have been completely perfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth” (EP 2:255, 1903). On the other hand, “the pragmaticist does not make the *summum bonum* to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable” (EP 2:343, Peirce’s emphasis, 1904). We can resolve this tension by viewing reasonableness as what Peirce would call a developmental telos—that is, an end or “destiny” that grows along with humans and the universe itself (EP 1:331; cf. Anderson 1987, 111–21).

17. The following brief list includes resources I have found helpful: *Asian American Dreams* (Zia 2000), *Yellow* (Wu 2002), *Visible Identities* (Alcoff 2006), *Borderlands/La Frontera* (Anzulúa 1987), *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* (Lugones 2003), *Custer Died for Your Sins* (Deloria 1988), and “Some Kind of Indian” (Jaimes 1995).

18. As noted in the introduction, while the social criticism connections are my own, my application of Peircean reasonableness and growth to human habits is deeply informed by Michael Ventimiglia’s work and by personal conversations with him (2001, 51–52, 60–62; 2005).

19. I thank Daniel Campos for his suggestion that I explain what I mean by “embrace.”

20. McIntosh’s work serves as a bridge to broader socio-political contexts. The passages just cited are from her article “White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences through Work in Women’s Studies” (1988), in which she addresses how those in hegemonic groups are often unaware of the societal privileges that they receive. Identifying as a white woman in academia, she speaks to male privilege and white privilege, also noting that privileges are often intertwined, based on the different groups to which one belongs (293, 298). I will return to her work in subsequent chapters.


22. I do not draw directly on Damasio’s many research publications. Readers interested in citations for these articles will find them in the endnotes to each of his books.

23. Damasio also uses the phrase “emotions in the broad sense” to describe an organism’s homeostasis-maintaining behaviors, to be described shortly (2003, 35).
24. Damasio does not seem to be familiar with Peirce’s work. The only reference to Peirce I found in the three above books is a footnote citing, without elaboration on Peirce’s ideas, the latter’s “Spinoza’s Ethic,” in which Peirce makes the point that “Spinoza’s ideas are eminently ideas to affect human conduct . . .” ([Nation 59 [1894]: 344–45; cited in Damasio 2003, 333–34 n. 5]). Damasio is, however, familiar with William James’s work in psychology. He is also well versed in philosophy and is deeply appreciative of the impact philosophy has on our worldviews. In Descartes’ Error he offers an insightful and detailed critique of the Cartesian mind-body dualism, including its effect on the practice of medicine in the West (1994, 247–52, 254–58). Peirce would likely approve of the spirit of this critique.

25. “The word homeodynamics is even more appropriate than homeostasis because it suggests the process of seeking an adjustment rather than a fixed point of balance” (Damasio 2003, 302 n. 5). Damasio credits Steven Rose for coining this term.

26. “There is abundant evidence of ‘emotional’ reactions in simple organisms. Think of a lone paramecium, a simple unicellular organism, all body, no brain, no mind, swimming speedily away from a possible danger in a certain sector of its bath—maybe a poking needle, or too many vibrations. . . . Or the paramecium may be swimming speedily along a chemical gradient of nutrients toward the sector of the bath where it can have lunch. . . . The events I am describing in a brainless creature already contain the essence of the process of emotion that we humans have—detection of the presence of an object or event that recommends avoidance and evasion or endorsement and approach” (Damasio 2003, 40, my emphasis).

27. Damasio notes that the concept of external-versus-internal stimuli is a common way of distinguishing typical examples of emotion (e.g., happiness, sadness, anger, etc.) from, say, hunger or thirst (2003, 35, 302 n. 7).

28. This awareness characterizes human feelings but not the feelings of all nonhuman animals. Technically speaking, following Damasio’s account, there are two basic levels of feelings. First, there is the feltness of the bodily commotion itself. These types of feelings occur in many nonhuman animals. A scared squirrel, say, has feelings that correspond to its emotion. Second, there is the awareness of this feltness, or the feeling of a feeling. This awareness is found in humans but is not likely to be found in all nonhuman animals. The scared squirrel is not likely to know it feels scared. To have this kind of feeling—i.e., the feltness of “I am feeling scared”—there needs to be a “second-order” representation that brings together the first-order feelings (of the emotion itself) and a sense of self (Damasio 1999, chapter 9, “Feeling
Feelings,” 279–85). Damasio explains this issue fully in his book The Feeling of What Happens (1999), but in his more recent Looking for Spinoza (2003) he leaves the issue to the side. It should be noted here that Peirce seems to use feeling in a sense that captures both of the levels of feeling that Damasio distinguishes (feltness and awareness). There is also a subtle difference in the timing each attributes to feeling and emotion. For Damasio, feelings follow immediately after emotions; feelings are neural representations of the bodily motions that occur in emotions (2003, 28 ff., 49 ff., 64–65, 80, and chapter 3, esp. 85–88 and 96–106). For Peirce, emotions in their paradigmatic form—where they “produc[e] large movements in the body”—occur immediately after feelings (W 2:230). This is because they are based on information conveyed by feelings, a topic that will be discussed in Chapter 2. This difference between Damasio and Peirce does not diminish the parallels I draw between them in my project. For both Damasio and Peirce, a feeling and its corresponding emotion involve human homeodynamics.

29. Damasio’s conception of “mind” is narrower than Peirce’s. For Damasio, it is due to the sophistication of their brains that humans have “mind,” mind being a process by which humans can “[form] neural representations which can become images, be manipulated in a process called thought, and eventually influence behavior by helping predict the future, plan accordingly, and choose the next action” (1994, 90; cf. 1999, 337 n. 7). (For more on Damasio’s treatment of “images,” see 1999, 9, 317–23.) Neural representations of objects and events in their environments allow humans to creatively adapt to environmental changes. Human behavior is thus shaped not only by the immediate presence of concrete objects and circumstances, such as experiencing a storm as it seriously damages one’s shelter. Human behavior is also shaped by representations, which make thinking possible, whereby we can plan behavior, such as building more adequate shelter once the storm is over, without the concrete presence of the objects/ circumstances in question (cf. Damasio 1994, 89–91). For Peirce, on the other hand, “mind” is inclusive of Damasio’s conception, but it is much broader, referring to the characteristics of an organic system as contrasted with a purely mechanical one: feelings, reactions, and habit-taking (EP 1:290–93). Mind is thus found everywhere in the organic Peircean cosmos (EP 1:293, 297). As for what makes humans unique in contrast to other animals, it is the higher degrees of self-control they can achieve (CP 5.533–34).

30. Damasio notes that (as of 2003) the state of research is such that it cannot be specified just what homeodynamic processes are and are not involved in background emotions (2003, 44).

32. Ultimately for Damasio, representing the self to the brain in this context also involves signals from the body (1999, 154, 168–94).

33. Two counterexamples: (1) Feeling without awareness: The squirrel probably does have awareness of its feeling, as noted above. (2) Awareness without feeling (inspired by Descartes’ Sixth Meditation): If we related to our bodies merely as a captain does to her ship, we would have consciousness (i.e., awareness) of the workings of our ship, but we would not feel them. Human feelings as the final stage of Damasio’s affective process include both awareness/consciousness and feltness of the homeodynamic processes occurring in our bodies.

34. For those knowledgeable in neurophysiology: The somatosensory regions that pertain to feelings are the insula, SII, SI, and the cingulate cortex (Damasio 2003, 105 ff.).

35. Damasio’s feeling-hypothesis has considerable experimental support (2003, 86, 96–104, 106, 123). While evidence is strong that feelings are fundamentally based on body maps originating in the brain’s somatosensory regions, it is still not clear (as of 2003) just how these maps are translated into feelings (Damasio 2003, 88, 198).

36. A note for Peirce scholars: While Peirce’s mature phenomenology does not crystallize until his later work, I would argue that reading his earlier essays (as I do in the following chapters) through a phenomenological lens helps highlight the insights these essays offer to Peircean affectivity and social criticism. My thanks to André De Tienne, whose informal critical comments on my paper “C. S. Peirce’s Embodied Phenomenology and Racism” inspired the present clarification, which is meant to ensure that I am not naïvely collapsing Peirce’s earlier and later work (2009).

37. See CP 1.212, 2.146, 7.532.

38. The sense of self underlying one’s experience, such that it feels like one’s own experience, is the topic of Damasio’s The Feeling of What Happens (1999). See also Patricia Muoio’s “Peirce on the Person” (1984, 174–75).

39. Peirce describes thirdness as “that element of cognition which . . . is the consciousness of a process . . . in the form of the sense of learning, of acquiring, of mental growth. . . . This is a kind of consciousness which cannot be immediate, because it covers a time, and that not merely because it continues through every instant of that time, but because it cannot be contracted into an instant. It differs from immediate consciousness, as a melody does from one prolonged note. Neither can the consciousness of the two sides of an instant, of a sudden occurrence, in its individual reality, possibly embrace
the consciousness of a process. This is the consciousness that binds our life together. *It is the consciousness of synthesis*” (EP 1:260, 1887–88, my emphasis).

40. In his autobiographical book *The Circuit*, Jiménez describes needing to learn English to cope with English-only classrooms in the United States (1998, 14–26, 80–83). He also describes being a migrant worker in the fields with his parents, in order to help make ends meet for the family (61–127). Throughout the sequel to *The Circuit*, entitled *Breaking Through*, Jiménez describes how he worked both before and after school to support his family financially (2001). In addition to his autobiographical work, Jiménez, who currently is the Fay Boyle Professor in the Department of Modern Languages and Literatures at Santa Clara University, has published extensively on education, literature, and social justice themes (http://www.scu.edu/ethnicstudies/fjimenez/).

41. In “El buen juego y la mala suerte: Habilidad, reacción y espontaneidad en el fútbol,” Daniel Campos gives an excellent Peircean analysis of how thirdness is the dimension of experience whereby humans cultivate new habits through training and practice (2006, 132–35). Campos also offers an insightful discussion of the collective thirdness and firstness displayed by fútbol (soccer) teams that have cultivated communal habits through working and practicing together. This discussion sheds light on how communal sympathy plays out on a Peircean scheme, even though Campos does not himself explicitly highlight the “sympathy” connection (136–37, 140–42). Peirce’s understanding of communal sympathy will be discussed at length in Chapter 4.

42. Habits can be formed through the efforts of the imagination, in addition to physical iterations of patterns of behavior. As Larry Hickman puts it, “self-training may also be conducted in the imagination” (1994, 16). Vincent Colapietro integrates this point into a wider discussion of the Peircean self (1989, chapter 5, “Inwardness and Autonomy,” 99–118).

43. My students in my Self and Identity courses at the University of Portland have helped me see that “socio-political secondness” can also be used to describe the secondness felt by people in hegemonic groups when they receive feedback that their behavior is heterosexist, racist, sexist, etc. (my thanks especially to Betsy Grasham and Alison Burke for this point). To prevent ambiguity in the present presentation, I will not use the term “socio-political secondness” to describe this type of resistance experienced by those in hegemonic groups. I want to focus on socio-political resistance that comes from exclusionary mainstream societal and individual habits. None-
theless, building on my students’ insights, I believe that a “taxonomy of socio-political secondness” could be constructed, whereby different factors such as socio-political power differentials and differing types of socio-political resistances could be tracked in their complexities and nuances. It is beyond the scope of my project to offer this taxonomy, but I raise the possibility of constructing one as an invitation to my readers. My idea for a taxonomy of socio-political secondness is inspired by the taxonomy of epistemologies of ignorance that Nancy Tuana offers in her article “The Speculum of Ignorance: The Women’s Health Movement and Epistemologies of Ignorance” (2006).

44. This racist treatment occurs, frustratingly enough, alongside assumptions in mainstream U.S. discourse that racism is a “black-white” issue and so does not significantly affect Asian Americans (Zia 2000, 156–57, 190, 290–91).

45. This is not to deny that white people can and do experience racism in the United States. While racism against people of color remains entrenched in the mainstream societal habits of the United States, white people who find themselves in the minority in a city or neighborhood, for example, may experience anti-white racism. I thank Samantha Kolinski and a former student for their feedback on this point. Nonetheless, whites who experience racism in the United States are still members of a hegemonic group who receive privileges based on their perceived skin color. Thus anti-white racism cannot be equated with racism against people of color. When I teach this distinction to my students, I use capital-R “Racism” as a designation for Racism against people of color, as the capitalization represents the societal, institutional backing of this type of racism in the United States. I use lowercase-r “racism” to designate racism directed by people of color against white people, or racism among people of color. This latter type of racism is related to “Racism” but is qualitatively different because those who perpetuate it do not themselves receive widespread validation and institutional support of their race in mainstream U.S. culture. In the present book, since I discuss only racism against people of color, I use the uncapitalized “racism” in this context.

46. Sullivan seems to be speaking figuratively here, describing white privilege as “one” habit (2006, 4). She readily speaks of “habits of white privilege” on the very next page and throughout Revealing Whiteness (2006).

47. To do so would entail the application of Peirce’s various trichotomies of signs. The level of technicality this would introduce, in my opinion, would render my project inaccessible to a more general audience.
a larger audience to Peirce’s work is imperative, if his ideas are to be applied more widely to socially salient issues, as I think they should be. David Savan gives a much more fully semiotic approach to affective issues in Peirce in his article “Peirce’s Semiotic Theory of Emotion” (1981).

48. In addition to visual images, “there are also ‘sound images,’ ‘olfactory images,’ and so on” (Damasio 1994, 89).

49. “As organisms acquired greater complexity, ‘brain-caused’ actions required more intermediate processing. Other neurons were interpolated between the stimulus neuron and the response neuron . . . but it did not follow that the organism with that more complicated brain necessarily had a mind. Brains can have many intervening steps in the circuits mediating between stimulus and response, and still have no mind, if they do not meet an essential condition: the ability to display images internally and to order those images in a process called thought. (The images are not solely visual; there are also ‘sound images,’ ‘olfactory images,’ and so on)” (Damasio 1994, 89).

50. In later writings, Peirce uses “sensation” in conjunction with reaction/secondness (e.g., “A Guess at the Riddle,” EP 1:260, 1887–88), and with perceptual judgment/thirdness (e.g., “Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction,” EP 2:226–41, 1903). It is beyond the scope of this project to speculate on these shifts, although I think they reflect the phenomenological richness of Peirce’s scheme. Feeling/firstness is equated with sensation, which is, in turn, linked with the categories of secondness and thirdness, if we view Peirce’s corpus as a continuous whole.

51. The ideational nature of feelings—by which a physical object can be made into a corresponding idea in my mind—is not fully present in Peirce’s earlier writings. In Chapter 4, I discuss its emergence in the Monist “Cosmology Series” of the 1890s.

52. Peirce uses all three of these terms, in varying contexts, to convey the representations that the mind makes of external objects.


54. This comment is a later addition to the essay “Fixation of Belief” (EP 1:109, 377 n. 22, ca. 1910; cf. Hookway 2000, 38).

55. A second version of this 1898 lecture underscores the reliability, regarding matters of “vital importance,” of “hereditary instincts and traditional sentiments” (CP 1:661). Here he pairs religiously socialized sentiment with “practical infallibility”: “The conservative need not forget that he might have been born a Brahmin with a traditional sentiment in favor of suttee—a reflection that tempts him to become a radical. But still, on the
whole, he thinks his wisest plan is to reverence his deepest sentiments as his highest and ultimate authority, which is regarding them as for him practically infallible—that is, to say infallible in the only sense of the word in which infallible has any consistent meaning” (CP 1.661). Peirce’s Critical Common-sensism calls us to scrutinize these “practically infallible” beliefs, to see whether what holds sway “vitaly” can nonetheless become doubtful when subjected to the rigors of reason and self-control.

56. It should be noted that, in some contexts, Peirce uses the terms “instinct” and its derivatives to refer strictly to belief-habits that humans are biologically predisposed to voluntarily (versus mechanically) embrace or perform (EP 2:473, 1913). In other contexts he uses the terms “instinct” and “sentiment” synonymously, as just described, to convey deep-seated belief-habits that are socially derived, like our religious beliefs (RLT 110–11, 1898; cf. W 3:253 and EP 1:377 n. 22, ca. 1910). Peirce’s discussion of suicide uses “instinctive” in the former sense, asserting that “the belief that suicide is to be classed as murder” is “not an instinctive belief,” because it is dubitable, not acritical: “[W]hen it comes to the point of actual self-debate, this belief seems to be completely expunged and ex-sponged from the mind” (EP 2:350, 1905).

57. We should not read too much into Peirce’s use of “racial” here, as he uses the term inconsistently in his corpus. Sometimes race is used coextensively with humanity (e.g., EP 2:433, 1907). Other times he refers to races within humanity (e.g., EP 2:257, 1903). Nonetheless “race” as a socio-political reality is socialized into what is “personal” because of Peirce’s conviction of the inescapable interplay between the inner and outer worlds (CP 7.438–39).

58. The editors of The Essential Peirce, Vol. 2, note: “Words appearing in italic brackets indicate that they have been supplied or reconstructed by the editors” (EP 2:xiv).

CHAPTER TWO
THE AFFECTIVITY OF COGNITION

1. For readers unfamiliar with Peirce’s Cognition Series: It consists of three essays—“Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” (1868), “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” (1868), and “Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic” (1869).

2. Vincent Colapietro notes that, in Peirce’s scheme, “The self is distinguishable but not separable from others; indeed, the identity of the self is constituted by its relations to others” (1989, 73, my emphasis).

riority could be determined by the size of human skulls. Gould argues that an assumption of the superiority of the Caucasian race nonconsciously informed Morton’s infamous skull-measuring experiments. Morton’s work, the records of which Gould studied closely, was riddled with bad methodology that unduly favored Caucasian “superiority,” yet this same work shows no intentional fraud. There was no evidence of cover up, despite the egregiously biased and ad hoc efforts to skew the results toward white superiority (Gould 1981, 54–69). Thus Morton himself provides an example of thinking that is shaped by exclusionary, and arguably nonconscious, socio-political associations.

4. With these remarks, Damasio explicitly pits himself against the modern conception of mind-body dualism (2003, 187 ff.). The emergence of mind, Damasio argues, is grounded in representations made possible by different regions of the brain. In The Feeling of What Happens, Damasio suggests that human consciousness is the result of a triad of representations: organism, object, and their relationship (1999). This presents a striking parallel to Peirce’s conviction that the human is a (triadic) sign. It is beyond the scope of this project to pursue comparisons and contrasts between the two on this point.

5. Amélie Rorty reflects this sensitivity to individualized embodiment when she argues that the causes of a person’s experience of an emotion should include personal genetic factors—that is, “a person’s constitutional inheritance, the set of genetically fixed threshold sensitivities and patterns of response” (1980, 105).

6. Grosz’s list occurs in the context of a broader point than mine, as she highlights the socio-cultural meanings attached to these bodily functions for women and men (1993, 202). Our projects are compatible, as the individualized bodily functions I detail here occur unavoidably within social meanings. See Grosz’s “Bodies and Knowledges: Feminism and the Crisis of Reason” for an exploration of how the body matters epistemologically, as well as for a detailed critique of Western canonical portrayals of reason as transcending bodily particularities to achieve neutral objectivity.

7. Damasio references several of his own scientific publications on this front (2003, 325 n. 10; Damasio and Damasio, 1994; Damasio 1989a, 1989b). He is, however, careful to qualify that he is not claiming to know exactly how the images in question are made: “There is a major gap in our current understanding of how neural patterns become mental images. The presence in the brain of dynamic neural patterns (or maps) related to an object or event is a necessary but not sufficient basis to explain the mental images of
the said object or event. We can describe neural patterns—with the tools of neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and neurochemistry—and we can describe images with the tools of introspection. How we get from the former to the latter is known only in part” (Damasio 2003, 198, Damasio’s emphasis).

8. Cf. CP 7.259 (ca. 1900); CP 7.266 (ca. 1900).

9. Donna Beegle, who writes on how to effectively advocate for those born into generational poverty, describes feelings that those in poverty link to concepts like “Police—Police often hurt the people we love; therefore, they act/feel like the ‘enemy’: unfriendly, out to get us, and to be avoided”; “Teachers—Teachers don’t understand us. They also feel/look like the ‘enemy’ . . .” (2007, 54). Beegle’s research begins from her own experience as someone who, born into generational poverty, made her way from a GED to a doctorate degree in educational leadership (3–19).

10. Peirce does not clarify what he means by “sensations proper” in this passage (W 2:230). Presumably he is referring to sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and textures as cognitions in which the sense data itself is the prominent feature. These sensory cognitions are different from the feelings/sensations constituting the material dimension of thought, since the bodily information of the feelings/sensations in this latter case is of a more general nature (i.e., the body in general versus a specific sense organ) and is much more subtle (W 2:230).

11. As discussed in Chapter 1, in this passage neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux draws on social psychologist John Bargh’s work, where research reviews and discussion can be found (Bargh 1992, 1990).

12. It should not come as a surprise that the feeling/sensation in this case involves the synthesis of multiple factors, as one of the primary themes in “Questions Concerning” is the synthesis that informs our cognition even though we are often unaware of this synthesis (W 2:195 ff, 199). Regarding feeling/sensation, Peirce gives the following example, which was quoted earlier: “The pitch of a tone depends upon the rapidity of the succession of the vibrations which reach the ear. . . . These impressions must exist previously to any tone; hence, the sensation of pitch is determined by previous cognitions. Nevertheless, this would never have been discovered by the mere contemplation of that feeling” (W 2:197). The feeling itself, in other words, involves synthesis of a multiplicity—in this case, of “the succession of the vibrations.”

13. Technically, the secondness in this case also includes my bodily threshold for withstanding cold, since this contributes to my becoming chilled as much as the external temperature does. This is a type of internal environmental resistance.
14. Peirce makes a brief reference to these individualized connections as “association by resemblance” but does not elaborate on his use of this term in this context (W 2:238). In his later writings, he describes associations by resemblance as those involving creative connections between ideas, in contrast to the connections provided merely by experience (CP 7.392, 437, ca. 1893; CP 4.157, ca. 1897; CP 7.498, ca. 1898). Chapter 4 will discuss these ideas more fully.

15. The relationships among these stereotypes of different groups can be manipulated to pit different “nonwhite” groups against each other, with a Euro-American norm as the ultimate yardstick. For example, as noted in Chapter 1, the “model minority” stereotype of Asian Americans is used to disparage African Americans (Zia 2000, 117–18, Brown et al. 2003, x; cf. Alcoff 2006, 262–63). Linda Alcoff notes that, in U.S. mainstream discourse, “. . . Asians and Jews have been similarly grouped together in the representations of their cultures as superior, threatening, and monolithic. In other words, unlike for African Americans and Latinos, Asians and Jews are not seen as having inferior intelligence or primitive cultures, but as groups with collective goals to take over the world and/or evil intent toward those outside their groups (the ‘yellow peril’ and ‘Jewish world conspiracy’)” (2006, 258). (Alcoff also addresses how Jewish people do and do not relate to the phenotypical and political dimensions of whiteness; see 256–58.)

16. My thanks to David O’Hara for bringing this passage to my attention.

17. In her book, Black Feminist Thought, Patricia Hill Collins writes about how stereotypes can reflect oppression on several fronts (2000). In her chapter “Mammies, Matriarchs, and Other Controlling Images” she discusses how stereotypes of African American women reflect “the ways in which oppressions of race, gender, sexuality, and class intersect” (72, 69–96).


19. A point of interest for Peirce scholars: Peirce’s description of reality in “Some Consequences” comes after a considerable amount of work, on human cognition, that is presented according to an order of discovery. This means that, while Peirce’s account of reality occurs about two-thirds of the way through this three-essay series, its implications reverberate both forward and backward. Peirce does not trace these backward-glancing repercussions in the context of the Cognition Series. It is important to do so, however, in order to better appreciate the socialized, and thus politicized, dimensions of human cognition, affectivity, and child development. Tracing these backward-glancing repercussions characterizes my work in this section and in Part 3 below.
20. On this front, Damasio notes, “Frogs or birds looking at cats see them differently [than humans do], and so do cats themselves” (1994, 235; cf. 96–97).

21. See his Monist “Cosmology Series” of the 1890s (esp. EP 1.297, 310, 331). See also CP 1.141–175 (ca. 1897).

22. Erasure, in this context, refers to various types of exclusion that, historically, have rendered women nonexistent according to patriarchal standards in various cultures. This includes both literal and conceptual exclusion. An example of the latter is rendering “lesbian” conceptually nonexistent via a logically impossible definition, such as “women who have sexual intercourse” (my paraphrase) where sexual intercourse—by definition—requires a penis (Frye 1983, 156 ff, 152–73).

23. With “ultimately shaped,” I leave room for the overlap between social and physical secondness. Socio-political secondness often involves physical barriers and therefore physical secondness to this extent. Yet the physical barriers—like Williams’s being locked out of the store—exist only because of the socio-political secondness of exclusionary bias (Williams 1991, 44–45).

24. The terminology with which Peirce refers to the social principle varies throughout his writings. In later writings he uses “social impulse,” “sentiment,” and “sympathy.” The sociality to which Peirce is referring is most clearly articulated in his 1890s writings on sympathy, association, and agapic love, where we learn that sympathy can take on both exclusionary and agapic forms. Chapter 4 addresses these issues in detail.

25. Synthetic reasoning differs from deductive reasoning in that it involves risk. Deductive reasoning does not, for it involves drawing conclusions based strictly on the information contained in the premises of an argument. Synthetic reasoning involves moving beyond what can be known in the premises into the unknown. For example, reasoning that the future will conform to the past, or that a particular hypothesis explains a surprising or puzzling phenomenon, involves going beyond what is known. The Kantian contrast between synthetic and analytic judgments is implicit, for Peirce, in this distinction.

26. Humanity’s uncanny success in its synthetic reasoning defies the odds. Mathematically speaking, humans should be wrong in their inductions and hypotheses about the external world far more often than they are. Natural selection must have something to do with all this, although Peirce is not exactly sure what (W 2:263–64). In his later work, Peirce argues that instinct is the source of guidance for human abduction (hypothesis formation). See EP 2:217–18 (1903) and EP 2:443 (1908).
27. This is similar to Peirce’s well-known cable metaphor, because it refers to epistemological security. Like the insurance metaphor, the cable metaphor underscores the fruitfulness of an epistemological model that relies on many strands, any one of which can break without the whole structure collapsing. The cable is meant to replace “a chain [of arguments] which is no stronger than its weakest link” (W 2:213, “Some Consequences”).

28. My thanks to Samantha Kolinski for helping me think through Chris McCandless’s story in relation to Peirce’s ideas (personal conversation).

29. See especially the chapters "Oppression," "Sexism," and “In and Out of Harm’s Way” (Frye 1983). See also Bartky 1990, 75, 77.

30. Peirce seems to reflect a blind spot common to white, propertied male philosophers in the West. The blind spot involves failing to see the “disconnect” between theory and practice. Following Charles Mills’s lead on this topic, we can take John Locke as a prime example of a white, propertied male philosopher (in the Western tradition) who argued for the equality of all human beings and who argued against slavery. At the same time, Locke invested in the African slave trade in the Americas (Mills 1998, 4 ff.; Farr 1986, 267). For more detail on the paradoxical relationship between Locke’s writings against slavery and his involvement in the African slave trade in the American colonies, see James Farr’s article “‘So Vile and Miserable an Estate’: The Problem of Slavery in Locke’s Political Thought” (1986).

31. My appreciation of the importance of Peirce’s discussion of child development is indebted to Vincent Colapietro’s insightful treatment of the same in Peirce’s Approach to the Self (1989, 69–75).

32. As noted in Chapter 1, Peirce describes this category as “a consciousness in which there is no comparison, no relation, no recognized multiplicity . . . no imagination of any modification of what is positively there, no reflection. . . . [A]ny simple and positive quality of feeling would be something which our description fits,—that it is such as it is quite regardless of anything else” (EP 2:150, 1903).

33. In these early essays, Peirce does not use “habit” to refer to these instinctive patterns of behavior and physiology, preferring to associate habit-taking with conscious awareness. His later writings, however, expand habit to include both conscious and nonconscious domains, better enabling us to see a spectrum of habit-taking that spans from nonconscious instinct to human self-control (see, for example, EP 2:336–37).

34. Colapietro adapts the term “second moment” from James Crombie’s discussion of Peirce’s treatment of child development, where Crombie notes that “testimony gives the first dawning of self-consciousness” (Crombie 1980, 80; cited in Colapietro 1989, 72, with emphasis added).
35. As noted in Chapter 1, the sense of self underlying one’s experience, such that it feels like one’s own experience, is the topic of Damasio’s *The Feeling of What Happens* (1999). See also Patricia Muoio’s “Peirce on the Person” (1984, 174–75).

36. It should be noted that Peirce’s discussion of child development in the Cognition Series, structured as it is on the specific question of “[w]hether we have an intuitive self-consciousness” (W 2:200), does not extend beyond his answer to this question. He thus leaves it to the reader to extrapolate the stage ushered in by the child’s inference that her unique self must exist. I provide this extrapolation as the thirdness stage of child development. As Colapietro notes, “in order for the self to function as an agency of self-control, he or she must be something more than a locus of error and ignorance; he or she must be a center of purpose and power” (1989, 74, emphasis in original). For Colapietro’s extended and insightful discussion of Peirce’s account of the self, see chapters 4 and 5 of *Peirce’s Approach to the Self* (1989).

37. My thinking on this front is deeply informed by Marı ´aL u gones’s work in *Pilgramages / Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition against Multiple Oppressions*, especially her chapter “Playfulness, ‘World’-Traveling, and Loving Perception” (2003, 77–100). See also “Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism, and the Demand for ‘the Woman’s Voice,’” cowritten with Elizabeth Spelman (Lugones and Spelman 1990).

38. A note of interest for Peirce scholars: My reexamination of Peirce’s account of child development in light of the politics of reality, the social principle, and the coercive survival dilemma is supported by a comment Peirce makes at the end of his discussion of child development: “The only essential defect in this account of the matter is, that while we know that children exercise as much understanding as is here supposed, *we do not know that they exercise it in precisely this way*” (W 2:203, my emphasis). At this point in the Cognition Series, Peirce has not yet addressed the communal articulation of reality or the social principle, which are discussed in essays 2 and 3, respectively. In light of Peirce’s disclaimer about the accuracy of his account of child development, it makes sense to reexamine his account in light of these insights from the second and third essays in the Cognition Series.

39. For readers interested in pursuing the topic of madness more deeply than I can treat it here, the following selective list of titles can serve as a springboard: *Women and Madness* (Chesler 1989), *Madness and Civilization* and *History of Madness* (Foucault 2001, 2006), *The Faber Book of Madness* (Porter 1991), *Madness and Modernism* (Sass 1992), *Social Order/Mental Dis-
order (Scull 1989), The Myth of Mental Illness (Szasz 1974). My thanks to Jeff Gauthier and Norah Martin for their suggestions for this list.

40. I am referencing the *Oxford English Dictionary (OED) Online*—see the second entry for “mad” used as an adjective: “2. Of a person, action, disposition, etc.: uncontrolled by reason or judgement; foolish, unwise. Subsequently only in stronger use (corresponding to the modern restricted application of sense 4a, from which it is now often indistinguishable): extravagantly or wildly foolish; ruinously imprudent” (*OED Online* 2009). This “sense 4a” is also listed under “mad, adj.”: “4. a. Of a person: insane, crazy; mentally unbalanced or deranged; subject to delusions or hallucinations; (in later use esp.) psychotic.”


42. Mills describes “global white supremacy” as “itself a political system, a particular power structure of formal or informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms for the differential distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights and duties” (1997, 3, Mills’s emphasis).

43. Sandra Bartky’s piece, “On Psychological Oppression,” is also helpful in explaining how those in oppressed groups can come to believe messages about their “inferiority” (1990, 22–32).

44. Patricia Williams discusses the impression among many whites in the United States that this is indeed the case, when in fact whites perform the majority of the crimes in the United States: “Actually U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics for 1986 show that whites were arrested for 71.7 percent of all crimes; blacks and all others (including American Indian, Alaskan Native, Asian, and Pacific Islander) account for the remaining 28 percent” (1991, 73).


46. This example was brought to my attention in Sullivan’s “Reproducing Whiteness” (n.d., 25–26).

47. Van Ausdale and Feagin’s research was based on Van Ausdale playing the role of a “non-sanctioning” adult, for about a year, in a preschool/day-care center for three- to five-year-old children (2001, 38). The school used a “popular antibias curriculum” and was fairly diverse: “The school’s official data on children in the classroom we observed was as follows: white (twenty-
four); Asian (nineteen); Black (four); biracial (for example, Black and white; three); Middle Eastern (three); Latino (two); and other (three)” (39). Van Ausdale established trust with the children, who felt free to engage in behaviors with each other that they would hide from the view of their teachers, who would punish children for engaging in racist speech or actions (40). Also, “In no case did [Van Ausdale] ask the children predetermined questions about race or ethnicity or overtly demonstrate that she was interested in researching these concepts. She kept her involvement with the children relaxed and nonadversarial, generally responding to [the] children’s questions and requests in a conversational manner” (40). As they discuss throughout their book, Van Ausdale and Feagin’s findings show that very young children are extraordinarily savvy regarding issues of race and racism, in contrast to prevailing research and common-sense assumptions that young children simply do not understand race: “We argue that children as young as three and four employ racial and ethnic concepts as important integrative and symbolically creative tools in the daily construction of their social lives” (26).

48. “Schools are linked to neighborhoods, which are in turn linked to employment and patterns of crime and crime perception. One cannot understand the problems of schools in the absence of understanding economic or community problems. The proper unit of analysis, for an understanding of racial or ethnic oppression, is the entire society. In many cases, one component institution enables or constrains yet another institution, and all institutions enable or constrain the individuals operating within them. All U.S. institutions are shaped by racial and ethnic histories and concerns. This is a fact of American life. Children are certainly important actors in this broad expanse of societal activities, and they often experience many of the contradictions and quandaries that adults experience. Children are not ordinarily disconnected from the larger social worlds” (Van Ausdale and Feagin 2001, 206).

49. In Rock My Soul: Black People and Self-Esteem, hooks discusses the low self-esteem issues faced by African Americans living in United States, with its history of slavery and its present forms of racist oppression. Here too hooks sends a message of hope in the midst of these issues, suggesting resources for African Americans to build empowered self-esteem (hooks 2003a).

50. Another helpful article is Alison Bailey’s “Locating Traitorous Identities: Toward a View of Privilege-Cognizant White Character” (2000).

51. Resistance to being oppressed is a prominent theme in Maria Lugones’s Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition against Multiple Oppressions (2003).
CHAPTER THREE

THE AFFECTIVITY OF INQUIRY


2. The term “concept” brings Peirce into better dialogue with feminist thinkers like Susan Babbitt and Marilyn Frye, and it helps convey the extent to which our beliefs inform the way we view the world around us, including other people. For a technical discussion by Peirce of the term “concept” and its derivatives, see CP 5.4.02 n. 3.

3. Peirce discusses belief and doubt in the first two essays of the Logic of Science series, “Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.”

4. Other references in this context: “belief is of the nature of a habit” (in “Fixation of Belief”) and “[t]he essence of belief is the establishment of a habit” (in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”) (W 3:248, 263, my emphases). Belief is both habit and habit-taking, because thought is an ongoing process. Any habit is a “rule for action,” which is consistently challenged by its surrounding environments (W 5:263).


6. Patricia Williams cites a 1988 case where “[t]wo white men . . . heaved a six-pound brick and a two-pound stone through the front window of a black couple’s house. They did so, according to the U.S. attorney, ‘because they felt blacks should not be living in their neighborhood and wanted to harass the couple because of their race’” (1991, 118–19).

7. There are fruitful connections to be drawn between socio-political doubt and what María Lugones describes as the lack of “playfulness” that she often experiences as a Latina woman in the United States (2003, 77–78, 93–96). In addition, her discussion of various ways of “being at ease in a ‘world’” can be used to illuminate how the absence of socio-political secondness is experienced by those in privileged positions (90). For example, knowing the language and norms of the culture where one lives, agreeing with those norms, being in the midst of loved ones, and sharing a history with others are different ways of feeling at ease (90–91). For each of these types of ease, I would argue, there corresponds an absence of socio-political secondness.
8. In the present essay series, Peirce shifts from “the social principle” to the use of several terms conveying human sociality: “the social impulse,” “sympathy,” and “sentiment.”

9. Peirce acknowledges that some forms of divergence from authority are tolerated as long as they are not considered too threatening (W 3:255).

10. This second comment is a later addition to the essay, ca. 1910, found in manuscript 334 (EP 1:109, 377 n. 22; cf. Hookway 2000, 38).

11. Recall that, for Peirce, humans cannot have immediate knowledge of the external world. Efforts to know this world are always semiotically mediated.

12. The scientific method utilizes the sophistication of human abstraction and self-control, whereby we are not dependent on being surprised by experience as an impetus for learning. We can also anticipate how experience will play out. We can be proactive in our conversation with nature, not merely reactive (cf. EP 2:369–70).


14. By “fated,” Peirce means “can nohow be avoided. . . . We are all fated to die” (W 3:273 n. 2).

15. In his essay “What Pragmatism Is” (1905), Peirce discusses truth in terms of human belief and doubt: “All you have any dealings with are your doubts and beliefs, with the course of life that forces new beliefs upon you and gives you power to doubt old beliefs. If your terms ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ are taken in such senses as to be definable in terms of doubt and belief and the course of experience (as for example they would be, if you were to define the ‘truth’ as that to a belief in which belief would tend if it were to tend indefinitely toward absolute fixity), well and good: in that case, you are only talking about doubt and belief. But if by truth and falsity you mean something not definable in terms of doubt and belief in any way, then you are talking of entities of whose existence you can know nothing, and which Ockham’s razor would clean shave off. Your problems would be greatly simplified, if, instead of saying that you want to know the ‘Truth,’ you were simply to say that you want to attain a state of belief unassailable by doubt” (EP 2:336).

16. Shannon Sullivan, for example, outlines a pragmatist-feminist account of truth, in her book Living Across and Through Skins (2001). Drawing on Dewey, she argues that “[t]ruth occurs when humans and their environments respond to and transact with one another in such a way that flourishing is achieved for both” (144, 133–56). My thinking about truth in Peirce’s
thought has been shaped by challenges posed by Ken Stikkers (Summer Institute for American Philosophy, 2006) and Roberto Frega (personal correspondence, 2008). I have also benefited from talking with Judith Green about related issues (Summer Institute for American Philosophy, 2008). In addition, my interpretation of Peirce’s conception of truth is influenced by Doug Anderson’s discussion of the developmental teleology of the Peircean cosmos (1987, 111–21). I think that Peirce’s conception of truth is a developmental telos that grows along with communities of inquiry pursuing it and along with the universe itself. For Peirce’s description of developmental teleology, see his essay “Law of Mind” (EP 1:331, 1892).

17. Krakauer admits that it is not certain that this is why McCandless died, but Krakauer has done extensive research into McCandless’s final days, including botanical and chemical research of the properties of plants that would have been available for McCandless to eat. See his extended discussion for the details (Krakauer 1996, 189–95).

18. An organism’s complete lack of interest in its environment would mean it had no attunement to the regularities of that environment, so that it would have no sense of how the world works. Peirce notes that the world is “almost a chance-medley to the mind of a polyp” (W 3:312).

19. Recall that synthetic reasoning, in contrast to deductive reasoning, involves risk. Deductive reasoning is not risky, because it involves drawing conclusions based strictly upon the information contained in the premises of an argument. Synthetic reasoning involves moving beyond the premises into the unknown. For example, reasoning that the future will conform to the past, or that a particular hypothesis explains a surprising or puzzling phenomenon, involves going beyond what is known. The Kantian contrast between synthetic and analytic judgments is implicit, for Peirce, in this distinction.

20. He explores the possibility of instinct but does not ultimately appeal to it, in “The Order of Nature,” as an answer regarding human accuracy in making guesses about nature (W 3:318–19). He leaves the question open: “[I]t is probable that there is some secret here which remains to be discovered” (W 3:319). As noted in Chapter 2, in his later work Peirce does endorse instinct as the source of guidance for human abduction. See EP 2:217–18 (1903) and EP 2:443 (1908). Peirce also speaks of the instinctive nature of reasoning in general (EP 2:427, 1907; EP 2:470 and 472, 1913).

21. As discussed in Chapter 2, the domain of Western philosophy provides abundant examples of an exclusionary vision of humanity. See Charles Mills’s The Racial Contract and Blackness Visible (1997, 1998). Nancy Tuana’s
Woman and the History of Philosophy, also noted in Chapter 2, demonstrates that, among the most influential philosophers of the Western canon, the paradigmatic human was, in fact, a man: “[W]oman is seen as lacking in just those areas judged as distinctively human: the rational and moral faculties” (1992, 13). One of the most striking examples is Aristotle. In his Generation of Animals, he describes women as “mutilated male[s]”; they are “monstrosities” since they depart from the “proper form” of humanity—i.e., male (quoted in Tuana 1992, 25). Tuana includes discussions of Plato, Descartes, Rousseau, Kant, Hume, Locke, and Hegel. She also addresses, to a lesser extent, the latent classism and racism in many classic Western philosophical texts (1992). See also Tuana’s The Less Noble Sex: Scientific, Religious, and Philosophical Conceptions of Woman’s Nature (1993).

22. This is not to say there were no white propertied men who opposed such exclusionary views but rather to stress that members of this elite class who were exclusionary held power sufficient to enforce an exclusionary view of humanity (Mills 1998, 8–9).

23. Recall in this vein the passage from Charles Mills, quoted last chapter, describing the Euro-American white articulation of reality that leaves to one side the experience of African Americans: “The peculiar features of the African-American experience—racial slavery, which linked biological phenotype to social subordination, and which is chronologically located in the modern epoch, ironically coincident with the emergence of liberalism’s proclamation of universal human equality—are not part of the experience represented in the abstractions of European or Euro-American philosophers. And those who have grown up in such a[n] [African American] universe, asked to pretend that they are living in the other [Euro-American universe], will be cynically knowing, exchanging glances that signify ‘There the white folks go again’” (1998, 4).

24. María Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman discuss how conceptual domination has occurred within traditional feminist scholarship, because of the fact that “some women’s voices are more likely to be heard than others”—namely, “in the United States anyway, those of white, middle-class, heterosexual Christian (or anyway not self-identified non-Christian) women” (1990, 20). Charles Mills’s discussion of the “peculiar moral and empirical epistemology” of the “Racial Contract” is also relevant to a discussion of conceptual domination (1998, 17–19).


27. In “Reproducing Whiteness: How To Raise a White Child,” Shannon Sullivan notes that “deliberate lectures are not the only, or perhaps even
primary way that children learn from their parents.” Rather, “everyday, non-thematized activities and practices” teach racial lessons (n.d., 9–10). Her paper is a good resource for ideas about how to raise issues of race with white children in ways that challenge the unconscious perpetuation of white privilege in U.S. culture. See also chapter 3, “Seductive Habits of White Privilege,” in Revealing Whiteness (Sullivan 2006, 63–93).


29. As noted in the introduction to the book, Sullivan and Williams each discuss the well-intentioned “color-blindness” promoted by white middle-class parents/caretakers, which asserts that race/color should not and does not matter anymore in societies, like that of the United States, that have supposedly overcome racism against people of color. Both explain how such “color-blindness” acts to hide the manifestations of white supremacy that are still at play (Sullivan n.d., 22–28; 2006, 5, 61, 78–79, 123, 127, 189–92, 196; Williams 1997, esp. 3–16). Bell hooks notes that working-class white adults are comfortable discussing the everyday manifestations of racism in the United States, while economically privileged white adults often deny them (2003b, 30).

30. Depending on the context, the habits ruptured could include the habit of trusting her own judgment over that of her caretakers, the habit of unrestricted movement, and the habit of expectation that her actions will not result in pain.

31. McIntosh does not cite a specific work from Minnich on this point, but Minnich’s book Transforming Knowledge is a good resource (1990). Toni Morrison’s novel The Bluest Eye points a finger at homogenized white reading primers, as each of Morrison’s chapters—in the tragic, powerful story about an African American girl who longs for blue eyes—begins with an excerpt from the chronicles of Dick and Jane (1993).

32. Michael Moore’s Bowling for Columbine calls attention to the mainstream U.S. media’s portrayal of people of color as committing most crimes in the United States. He also calls attention to white-collar criminals who are not perceived as “true” criminals, like people of color supposedly are (Bowling for Columbine 2004; cf. Van Ausdale and Feagin 2001, 203–6). Patricia Williams discusses the impression among many whites in the United States that this is indeed the case, when, in fact, whites commit the majority of the crimes in the United States: “Actually U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics for 1986 show that whites were arrested for 71.7 percent of all crimes; blacks and all others (including American Indian, Alaskan Native, Asian, and Pacific Islander) account for the remaining 28 percent” (Williams 1991, 73). See
also Angela Davis’s discussion in her essay “The Prison Industrial Complex” (2003).

33. I cite and discuss this example from Lerner in “Attunement to the Invisible” (Trout 2008, 71–72). Discussing women’s oppression, motherhood, and race, Audre Lorde notes: “Some problems we share as women, some we do not. You [white women] fear your children will grow up to join the patriarchy and testify against you, we [Black women] fear our children will be dragged from a car and shot down in the street, and you will turn your backs upon the reasons they are dying” (1984, 119).

34. I thank students in my summer 2007 Self and Identity course at the University of Portland for noting that the runner might not have simply been falsely universalizing in the manner Lerner seems to assume.

35. I thank Devon Goss for providing these personal examples.

36. This theme is understated in the original version of “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878). Peirce’s 1893 and 1906 comments on the essay draw out these implications (cf. CP 5.402 nn. 2–3).

37. Peirce added the latter phrase “no matter if contrary to all previous experience” in 1894 (MS 422; see editors’ notes: EP 1:324, 378 n. 7).


39. I thank Samantha Kolinski for providing this example (personal conversation).

40. For a historical portrayal of the economic realities of the New World colonies, such that African slavery became institutionalized as a Euro-American answer to the problem of labor, see Winthrop Jordan’s White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550–1812 (1968, 47–63). See also Mills 1997, 21, 31–40. In a literary study of whiteness and blackness in American literature, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, Toni Morrison observes, “The rights of man . . . , an organizing principle upon which the nation [of the United States] was founded, was inevitably yoked to Africanism. Its history, its origin is permanently allied with another seductive concept: the hierarchy of race. As the sociologist Orlando Patterson has noted, we should not be surprised that the Enlightenment could accommodate slavery; we should be surprised if it had not. The concept of freedom did not emerge in a vacuum. Nothing highlighted freedom—if it did not in fact create it—like slavery” (1992, 38).

42. As noted in Chapter 2, I borrow the term “subperson” from Charles Mills, who uses it in the context of race: “[T]he peculiar status of a subperson is that it is an entity which, because of phenotype, seems (from, of course, the perspective of the categorizer) human in some respects but not in others. It is a human (or, if this word already seems normatively loaded, a humanoid) who, though adult, is not fully a person. And the tensions and internal contradictions in this concept capture the tensions and internal contradictions of the black experience in a white-supremacist society” (1998, 6–7). Mills does not limit his discussion to the “black” experience but also includes any race considered “nonwhite” (1997, 11, 16–17). Cf. Tuana 1992, 1993.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE LAW OF MIND, ASSOCIATION, AND SYMPATHY

1. The socio-political application that I make of Peircean spontaneity, sympathy, and agape is my own. Nonetheless, my appreciation for and reading of Peirce’s cosmological writings and agapic evolution is influenced by the work of Doug Anderson, Carl Hausman, and Michael Ventimiglia. See in this regard Doug Anderson’s *Creativity and the Philosophy of C. S. Peirce* (1987), “Realism and Idealism in Peirce’s Cosmogony” (1992), “Peirce’s Agape and the Generality of Concern” (1995a), and “Peirce’s Horse: A Sympathetic and Semeiotic Bond” (2004); Carl Hausman’s “Eros and Agape in Creative Evolution: A Peircean Insight” (1974), “Philosophy and Tragedy: The Flaw of Eros and the Triumph of Agape” (1993), and “Evolutionary Realism and Charles Peirce’s Pragmatism” (1999); and Michael Ventimiglia’s “‘Evolutionary Love’ in Theory and Practice” (2001). My appreciation of communal sympathy has also been enriched by Daniel Campos’s essay (which I also cited in Chapter 1) “El buen juego y la mala suerte: Habilidad, reacción y espontaneidad en el fútbol” (2006), in which he offers an insightful Peircean analysis of the collective thirdness and firstness displayed by fútbol (soccer) teams that have cultivated communal habits through working and practicing together. Campos’s discussion sheds light on how communal sympathy plays out on a Peircean scheme, even though Campos does not himself explicitly highlight the “sympathy” connection (136–37, 140–42).

2. The *Monist* “Cosmology Series” essays were published between 1891 and 1893. They include “The Architecture of Theories” (1891), “The Doctrine of Necessity Examined” (1892), “The Law of Mind” (1892), “Man’s Glassy Essence” (1892), and “Evolutionary Love” (1893). My focus will be on “The Law of Mind” and “Evolutionary Love.” The specific association writ-
ings that I am using include the following: Peirce’s ca. 1893 writings on association (CP 7.388–467) (These writings are part of a project Peirce entitled *Grand Logic*. Paragraphs CP 7.451–62 are from a book on logic aimed at a younger audience. They are undated but bear such close resemblance to the ca. 1893 association writings that I class them under this date. See editors’ note in the *Collected Papers* [7.451 n. 25]), a passage (ca. 1897) on association that appears in his mathematical writings (CP 4.157), and passages on association that occur in a ca. 1898 manuscript on habit (CP 7.495–504).


4. Peirce equivocates on what he means by “outer world” (or “external world”). In some contexts, he seems to refer to a world outside the body of the human organism (e.g., EP 2:419, 550 n. 49). In other contexts, he seems to refer to the ideas deriving from this “outside” world (e.g., EP 2:412–13, 369–70). For my purposes, this equivocation is not problematic, since we can have access to an “outside” world only by means of our ideas about it, in Peirce’s scheme (CP 7.408 n. 19). I will be using the term “outer world” of the human organism in the second sense just noted—that is, as an intramental dimension of ideas that derive from the world external to the organism.

5. Peirce prefers not to use a verb form of “association” when referring to one idea suggesting another, as in “I associate A with B.” This preference is due to his respect for the English associationalists, whom he credits for being the first to use “association” as a scientific term and who were “careful never to extend it to the operation or event whereby one idea calls up another to the mind” (CP 7.495).

6. Cf. CP 7.392 (ca. 1893), CP 4.157 (ca. 1897), CP 7.498 (ca. 1898)

7. In a ca. 1905 discussion of Critical Common-sensism, Peirce notes that humans differ from nonhuman animals in the higher degrees of self-control that humans are able to achieve (CP 5.533–34).

8. I thank Daniel Campos for helping me appreciate this point in its richness (personal conversation). Resemblance is the source of the spontaneity involved in creative, scientific, or everyday abduction, whereby the answer to a problem and/or an aesthetic insight arises for an individual. When the abduction occurs, it is not by means of deductive or inductive reasoning but rather involves a qualitative leap beyond known arguments and habits (CP 7.498). It is beyond the scope of this project to trace out these abduction themes more fully.


12. Peirce does not have business in mind when he uses the descriptor “corporate” (EP 1:351). His primary focus in this context is the religious community found in Christian communities (EP 1:350–51).

13. Sympathy can be attributed to God only analogically, since sympathy occurs through feelings, and feelings involve both body and mind. Peirce is loath to attribute to God human attributes as specific as “mind” or “body.” He is wary of “God” as an overly determined conception with colloquial connotations. In an 1898 account of his cosmogony, he addresses those who would attribute creative “firsts” to the “mind of God”: “I really think there is no objection to this except that it is wrapped up in figures of speech, instead of having the explicitness that we desire in science. . . . To apply such a word to God is precisely like the old pictures which show him like an aged man leaning over to look out from above a cloud. Considering the vague intention of it, as conceived by the non-theological artist, it cannot be called false, but rather ludicrously figurative” (RLT 259–60, Peirce’s emphasis).


15. Peirce borrows the phrasing “gentle force” from Hume, appreciating the latter’s depiction of the gentleness with which the law of mind operates (CP 7.389).


17. What is ideal for God cannot be considered ideal for humans in the same way, since humans and God are different in significant ways. While Peirce does not conceive of God in a strictly definable way, he does see God as infinite and therefore unlimited in ways that humans are limited (CP 8.262; RLT 259–60; EP 2:447). Agape as a divine ideal must be modified on the human plane. Unfortunately Peirce does not address this discrepancy (Hausman 1974, 22). It is beyond the scope of my project to fully take on this lacuna in Peirce’s thought. See Peirce’s “The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (EP 2.434–50). For a developmental study of Peirce’s ideas about God, see Donna Orange’s Peirce’s Conception of God (1984).

18. A version of the manipulation I have in mind is discussed by both Marilyn Frye and María Lugones. They do not address agapic love specifically, but they do discuss how “love” can be manipulated as an ideal that keeps certain people in subservience to others. Frye focuses on how women
have historically been taught that, to be properly loving, they must surrender their own interests to the interests of men: “Under the name of Love, a willing and unconditional servitude has been promoted as something ecstatic, noble, fulfilling and even redemptive” (1983, 72, 66–83). This type of love, which is “proper” to women, however, is the product of a patriarchal “arrogant” perception that views others only through the lens of its own interests, wishing to acquire “the service of” women (67). Lugones, building on Frye’s work and also highlighting the racism of white women toward women of color, notes that women too can hold an “arrogant gaze” toward others (2003, 77–100). Both Frye and Lugones want to reconceive “love” in order to avoid its being co-opted by arrogant perception that promotes hierarchies of sex, race, and economic class (Frye 1983, 72–76; Lugones 2003, 78–83). It is beyond the scope of this project to detail the extent to which their respective reconceptions compare and contrast with Peirce’s account of agapic love. I will note that Lugones’s revisioning of love seems more Peircean than Frye’s in that Lugones insists on the interdependence of the lover and beloved, while Frye focuses on their independence (Lugones 2003, 78–83; Frye 1983, 74–75). Lugones discusses this contrast between her revisioning of love and Frye’s (2003, 82–83).

19. It should be noted that a community of inquiry does well to examine exclusionary beliefs, not in order to embrace them, but rather with the aim of learning about them in order to better resist their effects in thought and practice. This point requires more attention than I can give it here, and it is inspired by Timothy Beneke’s framing of his essay “Intrusive Images and Subjectified Bodies: Notes on Visual Heterosexual Porn,” where he says, “In what follows I attempt to shed light on heterosexual men and their visual experience of women, their sexual distress, their difficulty identifying with women’s experience, and their use of porn[ography]. Since I seek to understand certain forms of male suffering that I take to be real and that men use to justify sexism and rape, I want to be clear: To understand or even to empathize with someone’s distress is not to legitimate what it is used to justify or what may appear to issue from it. Any such attempts to understand male sexual distress must be undertaken with an eye to gaining insight as to how men might finally stop doing the many horrible things they do—to women, to each other, and to themselves” (1991, 169, my emphasis). I do not agree with all of Beneke’s points in his essay, but I appreciate his efforts to engage and understand ideas and practices he disagrees with, as a means of ultimately mitigating the harm that may stem from such ideas and practices. I also appreciate that he admits: “My biases are white, middle-class, and no doubt
unconsciously inform the picture of men I present’’ (169), a qualification that reflects the spirit of my project.

20. Peirce makes this comment about the color spectrum in relation to the three types of evolution he discusses in “Evolutionary Love,” tychasm, anancasm, and agapasm (EP 1:363). He notes that tychasm and anancasm are really “degenerate forms of agapasm,” as agapasm involves both chance (which is tychastic) and development toward an end (which is anancastic) (EP 1:362). This color metaphor is fruitfully applied to the ideal community as well, which makes sense, as it is a metaphor to explain synechism or continuity, which Peirce believes pervades the cosmos.

21. See also Lugones 2003, 14–15, 72–74.

22. The wording of this passage may seem universalist regarding whites. Mills’s general depiction of the historical and philosophical picture, however, allows room for white social reformers. He refers to the moral contradictions and silences perpetrated by “a lot” of whites, and he names especially problematic thinkers rather than simply lumping all white people together (1998, 3–5). In The Racial Contract, Mills also notes, “[T]here have always been praiseworthy whites—anticolonialists, abolitionists, opponents of imperialism, civil rights activists, resisters of apartheid—who have recognized the existence and immorality of Whiteness as a political system, challenged its legitimacy . . .” (1997, 107).


24. The communal embrace of agapic sympathy can be also be fruitfully applied in the classroom. Agapic sympathy creates an environment in which each student’s voice is valued, and creativity is embraced. In this atmosphere students are more likely to take risks in expressing themselves and growing in their sense of themselves as empowered agents. Michael Ventimiglia has discussed this issue. The following papers are helpful: “Three Educational Orientations: A Peircean Perspective on Education and the Growth of the Self” (Ventimiglia 2005); “Agape and Spiritual Transformation” (n.d. [a], 9–10); “Three Models of Personal Evolution Derived from the Cosmology of C. S. Peirce” (n.d. [b], 15–16). See also Sharp’s discussion of the compatibility of Peirce’s agape and a community of inquiry in the classroom. Her ideas are tailored to the Philosophy for Children program, where philosophical discourse is explicitly engaged in the classroom (Sharp 1994, 203–10). Maxine Greene writes about an agapic classroom atmosphere (although not
by this name and not in reference to Peirce) in “The Passions of Pluralism: Multiculturalism and the Expanding Community” (1997). She promotes classrooms in which the diversity of students is embraced.

25. I thank Roger Ward for pushing me to highlight that Peirce wrote about agape during years in which he was coping with intense isolation from communities of inquiry.

26. As noted in the book’s introduction, I thank Cathy Kemp and Mitchell Aboulafia for suggesting that I highlight the poverty suffered by Peirce, as a way to help humanize Peirce for my readers. Joseph Brent’s Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life gives a detailed treatment of Peirce’s decline into poverty in his later years; see chapters 4 and 5 (1998, 203–322). William James was instrumental in helping keep Peirce afloat during these years, eventually organizing the Peirce fund, which coordinated monetary contributions from Peirce’s friends and supporters (304–7). Brent also provides excellent documentation and discussion of the various factors that led to Peirce’s descent into poverty (136–202).

27. “Among animals, the mere mechanical individualism is vastly reinforced as a power making for good by the animal’s ruthless greed. As Darwin puts it on his title-page, it is the struggle for existence; and he should have added for his motto: Every individual for himself, and the Devil take the hindmost!” (EP 1:357). Lest his readers misunderstand him, Peirce makes it clear that Darwin’s ideas did not precede the culture of greed but rather that his work emerged within this culture and was readily embraced “because of the encouragement it gave to the greed-philosophy” (EP 1:359).

28. Cf. RLT 121. This parallels, to some extent, Damasio’s discussion of the “social homeostasis” that characterizes human communal life (2003, 166 ff.).

29. My thanks to Doug Anderson for bringing to my attention the relevance, in this context, of Peirce’s critique of Pearson’s work.

30. Peirce’s later critique of Pearson’s eugenic spirit is foreshadowed here.

31. “The Conservation of Races” was not Du Bois’s last word on race. For a study of the development of Du Bois’s ideas on this matter, see Tommy Lott’s “Du Bois’s Anthropological Notion of Race” (2001).

32. Nussbaum continues, “Thus we do not find staircases built with step levels so high that only the giants of Brobdingnag can climb them, nor do we find our orchestras playing instruments at frequencies inaudible to the human ear and audible only to dog ears” (2004, 306).

33. As noted in Chapter 3, for an extended discussion of the historical mistreatment of Native Americans by the U.S. government, see Vine Deloria Jr.’s Custer Died for Your Sins (1988). See also Sullivan 2006, 129–36, 142. For
a historical portrayal of the economic realities of the New World colonies such that African slavery became institutionalized as an Euro-American answer to the problem of labor, see Winthrop Jordan’s *White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550–1812* (1968, 47–63). See also Mills 1997, 21, 31–40. In a literary study of whiteness and blackness in American literature, *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination*, Toni Morrison observes, “The rights of man . . . , an organizing principle upon which the nation [of the United States] was founded, was inevitably yoked to Africanism. Its history, its origin is permanently allied with another seductive concept: the hierarchy of race. As the sociologist Orlando Patterson has noted, we should not be surprised that the Enlightenment could accommodate slavery; we should be surprised if it had not. The concept of freedom did not emerge in a vacuum. Nothing highlighted freedom—if it did not in fact create it—like slavery” (1992, 38).

34. Two articles that are helpful in introducing these issues, especially as they affect women of color, are Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s “Women Workers and Capitalist Scripts: Ideologies of Domination, Common Interests, and the Politics of Solidarity” (1997) and Ofelia Schutte’s “Feminism and Globalization Processes in Latin America” (2002).

35. It is unclear from Alcoff’s story whether the department as a whole was white, except for Alcoff’s friend, or whether the “White-only” descriptor applied only to the department majority that voted for the demotion. The relevant passage: “Against her account, and without speaking to anyone but the disgruntled student, the department majority formed the opinion that my friend was not a good teacher. . . . [S]he enjoyed not the slightest presumption of credibility with much of her department when it came to problems of discrimination in the classroom. They assumed that they, a White-only amalgam of faculty, could assess the situation” (Alcoff 2001, 66–67). Either way, a white-only majority has dismissed the hypothesis of racism/sexism by a woman of color, without subjecting it to fair testing.

36. “In riding a horse; rider and ridden understand one another in [a] way of which the former can no more give an account than the latter” (CP 7.447).

37. Regarding the learning of slang, Maryann Ayim analyzes the use of terms such as “chick” and “girl” (among others) to refer to women, applying Peirce’s semiotic scheme to highlight the demeaning, exclusionary nature of such usage. See her article “The Implications of Sexually Stereotypic Language as Seen through Peirce’s Theory of Signs” (Ayim 1983). Regarding the human-horse example, setting aside the problematic issues linked to the
taming and domestication of nonhuman animals, I give Peirce the benefit of the doubt and portray his relationship with his horse as agapic. For a general discussion of human-(nonhuman) animal sympathy in Peirce’s work, see Doug Anderson’s “Peirce’s Horse: A Sympathetic and Semeiotic Bond” (2004). For examples of exclusionary sympathy toward nonhuman animals, we can note the blatant and cruel exclusionary sympathy that underwrote vivisection historically and currently underwrites the barbaric treatment of many nonhuman animals. Recall that vivisection is the practice of live dissection of nonhuman animals without anesthesia (Pence 2004, 247–48).

38. Chapter 3 addresses this point too. Recall that in “Fixation of Belief” (1877) Peirce says that “sentiments in their development will be very greatly determined by accidental causes” (W 3:253). He says this in his discussion of the a priori method, in which he also uses “instinct” and “sentiment” synonymously, later adding to the essay this comment about the a priori method: “Indeed, as long as no better method can be applied, it ought to be followed, since it is then the expression of instinct which must be the ultimate cause of belief in all cases” (EP 1:377 n. 22, ca. 1910).

39. Peirce’s neologism “percipuum” signifies the percept plus the perceptual judgment (CP 7.629). This awkward term is designed to capture the phenomenon that discursive access to the percept comes only through the perceptual judgment. Richard Bernstein’s “Peirce’s Theory of Perception” gives a helpful treatment of the development of Peirce’s theory of perception (1964).

40. Peirce links control with consciousness in a comment about perceptual judgments: “[T]he perceptive [i.e., perceptual] judgment is the result of a process, although of a process not sufficiently conscious to be controlled, or to state it more truly, not controllable and therefore not fully conscious” (EP 2:227).

41. Recall, from Chapter 1, that we should not read too much into Peirce’s use of “racial” here, as he uses the term inconsistently in his corpus. Sometimes “race” is used coextensively with “humanity” (e.g., EP 2:433, 1907). Other times he refers to races within humanity (e.g., EP 2:257, 1903). Nonetheless, “race” as a socio-political reality is socialized into what is “personal,” because of Peirce’s conviction of the inescapable interplay between the inner and outer worlds (CP 7.438–39).

Chapter Five
Critical Common-Sensism, 1900s

1. I am grateful to many people for their critical comments on the material in this chapter. Thank you to Doug Anderson, Cornelis de Waal, Peter
Hare, Lisa Heldke, Robert Lane, Shannon Sullivan, Dwayne Tunstall, and an anonymous reader. I also benefited from audience feedback at conference presentations of this material at Feminist Epistemologies, Methodologies, Metaphysics and Science Studies (FEMMS 2, February 2007); the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy (March 2007); and the Pacific Division of the Society for Women in Philosophy (October 2006). Finally, I received helpful audience feedback at a presentation I gave at Lewis and Clark College in Portland, Oregon, in November 2006.

The “critical” of Critical Common-sensism has additional meanings for Peirce too, including an indication of CCS’s Kantian legacy (EP 2:353–54; CP 5.525).

2. A note to Peirce scholars: In a discussion of Critical Common-sensism (CCS), in the Monist article “Issues of Pragmaticism” (1905), Peirce comments that he can only address about “two percent of the pertinent thought which would be necessary in order to present the subject as I have worked it out. I can only make a small selection of what it seems most desirable to submit to [the reader’s] judgment. Not only must all steps be omitted which he can be expected to supply for himself, but unfortunately much more that may cause him difficulty” (EP 2:348–49). My efforts in this chapter take seriously that Peirce’s CCS writings were only the tip of the iceberg. I present a proactive reading of Critical Common-sensism through a social critical lens. I do not pretend to present exactly what Peirce may have had in mind. Nonetheless the interpretations and applications I offer are supported by the text and by Peirce’s ideal of an infinitely inclusive, agapic community of inquiry that is open to self-correction and growth.

3. For additional information on Peirce’s Critical Common-sensism, see Hookway 1990, 1993, and 2000, esp. chapters 7 and 8. In “Mimicking Foundationalism: on Sentiment and Self-control,” Hookway explains how Peircean epistemology sharply opposes Cartesian foundationalist epistemology while also “Mimicking Foundationalism” (1993). Any satisfactory epistemological model, Hookway argues and I agree, must acknowledge that some kind of foundation is needed in order for humans to have the confidence to reason at all. Without this, we would “feel estranged or alienated from our ways of carrying out investigations and deliberations” (1993, 170; cf. 2000, 225, 233 ff.). Critical Common-sensism calls for an examination of the background beliefs that form the platform from which reasoning proceeds.

4. On the relationship between scientific testing and common-sense beliefs, see Hookway 2000, 150–51, 192.

5. Peirce explicitly links dubitability and falsehood at the conclusion of a Critical Common-sensist scrutiny of the belief “that suicide is to be classed
as murder": He explains that this belief is “substantially confined to the Christian world” and does not withstand “actual self-debate” (EP 2:350). He concludes: “This belief, then, should be set down as dubitable; and it will no sooner have been pronounced dubitable, than Reason will stamp it as false” (EP 2:350).

6. For a discussion of the role vagueness plays in Peirce’s thought, see “Vagueness, Logic, and Interpretation” in Hookway 2000, 135–58.

7. This quote is from an 1865 translation of the 1795 edition of On the Natural Variety of Mankind (Blumenbach 2000, 27, editors’ notes).

8. This line is found in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (cited in Mills 1998, 202 n. 8).

9. This line is found in a footnote in the essay “Of National Characters” (cited in Mills 1998, 202 n. 8). Mills’s catalog also includes John Stuart Mill, Hegel, Marx and Engels, and Voltaire (202 n. 8).

10. I do not intend to overlook the Euro-American whites who argued for the equal humanity of nonwhite races. It is, however, beyond the scope of my project to detail their efforts.

11. Those interested in promoting colonialist racism could manipulate this comment, by insisting that they can determine the degrees of self-control of peoples different—and therefore “inferior”—from themselves, using this difference/inferiority to justify colonization, slavery, or genocide. Peirce himself might have sympathized with such manipulation, from a personal perspective. Nonetheless, we must set aside Peirce’s own racism and focus on his philosophical ideas themselves. On these terms, it is clear that such a manipulation of “levels of self-control” would be unreasonable, because it would involve exclusionary, circular reasoning about “inferiority” of self-control (i.e., assuming inferiority to prove inferiority). This is the type of circularity just highlighted, which characterized nineteenth-century racist pseudoscience. On Peircean terms, it is not acceptable to project inferiority onto others in order to exclude them from inquiry, as discussed last chapter.

12. A hopeful point can be inserted here. Because specified beliefs are illegitimately indubitable common-sense beliefs, it makes sense that they can undergo change more quickly than our original common-sense beliefs can. Presumably regarding original beliefs, Peirce notes, in “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life” (1898), that “[i]nstinct is capable of development and growth,—though by a movement which is slow in the proportion in which it is vital; . . . The soul’s deeper parts can only be reached through its surface. In this way the eternal forms, that mathematics and philosophy and the other sciences make us acquainted with will by slow percolation gradually
reach the very core of one’s being, and will come to influence our lives . . .” (RLT 121–22). On the other hand, he also cryptically notes, in a 1905 discussion of Critical Common-sensism, that “[instincts] can be somewhat modified in a very short time” (EP 2:349). It is unclear what particular context Peirce had in mind with this later comment. Nonetheless, given his broad conception of instinct, it is plausible that Peirce believed that some of our instincts, such as specified ones that are a product of socialization, are amenable to a relatively quicker change than our original beliefs are. For a model of this quicker change, we can look to his description of Lamarckian evolution in the “Cosmology Series” essay “Evolutionary Love” (1893). Peirce’s account of this type of evolution describes human effort as an agent of personal evolution, by way of intentional habit-change (EP 1:360). My presentation of this issue—namely, the speed with which instincts might change—is indebted to the questions and insights of both the audience and commentator, Robert Lane, for my paper presentation, “Colorblindness and Paper Doubt: A Socio-political Application of Critical Common-sensism,” at the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy (SAAP), Annual Meeting, March 2007.

13. Recall that Peirce coined the term “pragmaticism” and its derivatives to name his own particular formulation of pragmatism (EP 2:331–45).

14. “Surely whatever I had admitted until now as most true I received either from the senses or through the senses. However, I have noticed that the senses are sometimes deceptive; and it is a mark of prudence never to place our complete trust in those who have deceived us even once” (Descartes 1998, 60; ATVII 18). Analyzing Descartes’ Meditations within the historical-cultural milieu in which they were written, Susan Bordo highlights that trust in the senses was deeply undermined by the invention of the telescope, which revealed the sun as so much larger than unaided human senses previously reported (1987, 13, 34–38). Her Flight to Objectivity makes a strong case for taking Cartesian doubt—as a whole—much more seriously than traditional scholarship on Descartes usually does (14–16). Drawing on psychoanalytical, historical, and cultural insights from Descartes’ era, Bordo argues that Cartesian doubt reflects the sincere epistemological anxiety that resulted from the painful shift in worldview that occurred in the transition from the medieval world to the modern one.

15. Passages that support paper-doubt as having sincere and insincere forms include the following. Peirce notes that “man possess[es] no infallible introspective power into the secrets of his own heart, to know just what he believes and what he doubts. The denial of such a power is one of the clauses
of critical common-sensism” (CP 5.498). This comment can refer to both sincere and insincere doubt, as two ways in which a person may lack insight into her ability to sufficiently doubt beliefs. Peirce also notes, “The Critical Common-Sensist . . . [attaches] great value . . . to doubt, provided only that it be the weighty and noble metal itself, and no counterfeit nor paper substitute. He is not content to ask himself whether he does doubt, but he invents a plan for attaining to doubt, elaborates it in detail, and then puts it into practice . . .” (EP 2:353, my emphasis). Once again, one can assure oneself of doubting in a sincere or an insincere fashion, just as Descartes does. Both insincere and sincere paper-doubt neglect the depth of work that is needed to achieve the type of doubt that CCS values. My thanks to Robert Lane, once again, whose commentary on my paper “Colorblindness and Paper Doubt” helped me formulate a more rigorous textual grounding for my broadened conception of paper-doubt (Trout 2007).

16. At the historical time this belief held sway, it would have been inconceivable to most people that the earth was otherwise than flat. Note, however, that the belief’s “inconceivability” was contextual historically. For Peirce all beliefs are ultimately doubt-able—that is, conceivably other than what they presently are. This reflects his fallibilism.

17. Code notes that she derives “hegemonic imaginary” from Cornelius Castoriadis, who “characterizes the instituted social imaginary as follows: ‘The socialization of individuals—itself an instituted process, and in each case a different one—opens up these individuals, giving them access to a world of social imaginary significations whose instauration as well as incredible coherence goes unimaginably beyond everything that ‘one or many individuals’ could ever produce. These significations owe their actual (social-historical) existence to the fact that they are instituted’” (Code 2001, 280 n. 11, Castoriadis’s emphasis; Castoriadis 1991, 62).

18. Recall Peirce’s comment about self-control from the third Cognition Series essay, “Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic” (1869): “Self-control seems to be the capacity for rising to an extended view of a practical subject instead of seeing only temporary urgency” (W 2:261 n. 6).

19. As noted in Chapter 3, the reader can consult Stephen Jay Gould’s and Nancy Tuana’s work on racism and sexism in nineteenth-century science for discussions of the prevalence of these socio-political biases (Gould 1981, chapters 2–4; Tuana 1993, 34–50).

20. In addition, excluding groups from membership in communal inquiry makes it more likely that socio-political action of some kind will have to occur in order for the membership “rules” to change (cf. Babbitt 1996; Gauthier 2004, 9–11).
21. Hookway notes that cognitive habits (like the capacity to doubt) "guide us in recognizing when an inference is a good one, when evidence is sufficient for belief in some proposition, _when hypotheses are so implausible that we need not take steps to eliminate them before accepting a rival, and so on_" (2000, 254–55, my emphasis). I would argue that nonconscious racism (and other forms of discrimination) can shape the determination of implausibility that Hookway describes here. The result of such shaping is that testimony from people of color and other non-hegemonic groups can be deemed implausible by white people and others in hegemonic groups who do not recognize the discrimination they are perpetuating, because the discriminatory habits in question are functioning nonconsciously.


23. This reasoning is often naively premised on a colorless or unraced standard of whiteness. White people often do not understand or experience themselves as having a race (Williams 1997, 6–16; hooks 2003b, 26 ff.; Sullivan n.d., 1–2, 13–16, 22–28; Mills 1997, 53 ff.; Mills 1998, 9–10).

24. "Colorblindness” is not always used with good, although naive, intentions. It can also be used with racist intentions, as a strategy for cloaking racist thinking. See Charles Mills’s _The Racial Contract_ (1997, 76–77); Sullivan 2006, 5, 127; Bonilla-Silva 2003.

25. For sociological research on this phenomenon regarding antiblack racism, see _Racism without Racists_ (Bonilla-Silva 2003). Bonilla-Silva’s research indicates that “colorblind” whites often allow that some racism occurs but at the same time deny its systemic impact on education, employment, and residential choices for African Americans (see especially chapter 2: “The Central Frames of Color-Blind Racism,” 25–52). Bonilla-Silva acknowledges that many _well-intentioned_ whites subscribe to “colorblindness” (13–14, 15, 54).

26. For some Peirceans, it might be tempting to limit the CCSist diagnosis of the “colorblindness” issue to the fact that the well-intentioned white people to whom I continually refer have _false beliefs_ about their successful elimination of racist common-sense beliefs from thought and behavior. While I agree with this diagnosis as far as it goes, I would argue that it should not be seen as a stopping point in a CCSist analysis of “colorblindness.” Critical Common-sensism has so much more to offer. It can help us understand _why_ racist beliefs can find their way into a well-intentioned anti-racist
white person’s conduct. In addition, the white people in question often deny that they have false beliefs about their successful elimination of racism from their thought and conduct. The expanded CCSist inquiry I offer, supplemented with insights from social criticism, helps make sense of this point as well.

27. Note that I am not saying that all whites do not understand the continued presence of racism and that all people of color do. In “Talking Race and Racism” in Teaching Community (2003, 25–40), bell hooks discusses the complexity of the issues of awareness of racism and internalized racism for whites and people of color. Nonetheless it is common enough for there to be only one person of color in a room full of whites and for feedback from that person about racism to be dismissed by the white majority (27).

28. They are also in a position to internalize disempowering beliefs about themselves based on race, sex, and so on. Commenting on her novel The Bluest Eye, Morrison notes that it is based on a true experience in her life. As a young child, Morrison was horrified to hear the confession of a female classmate who, like her, was African American. The classmate wished she had blue eyes. Morrison writes: “Implicit in her desire was racial self-loathing. And twenty years later I was still wondering about how one learns that. Who told her? . . . Who had looked at her and found her so wanting, so small a weight on the beauty scale? [The Bluest Eye] pecks away at the gaze that condemned her” (1993, 210). See also hooks 2003a; 2003b, 37–38; Mills 1997, 118–20; Williams 1997, 119–20.

29. Cf. Mills 1997, 109 ff.; Alcoff 2006, 179–94. This point, and work in this chapter more generally, threads the needle for a Peircean contribution to pragmatist-feminist standpoint theory, whose ground has been laid by Charlene Seigfried and Shannon Sullivan. It is beyond the scope of my project to fully discuss this point. See Pragmatism and Feminism (Seigfried 1996) and “Transactional Knowing: Towards a Pragmatist-Feminist Standpoint Theory” in Living Across and Through Skins (Sullivan 2001, 133–56). For a general introduction to feminist standpoint theory in its various forms, see The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader (Harding 2004). Standpoint theorists often use standpoint in a technical sense, which does not signify mere “view-point or perspective” but rather “an achieved (versus ascribed) collective identity or consciousness, one for which oppressed groups must struggle” (Harding 2004, 14 n. 11). My own discussion of feedback from non-hegemonic groups, however, does not necessarily require an achieved standpoint, because such feedback can result from experiences of socio-political secondness that are obvious within one’s experience. I see the often dismissed, phe-
nomenologically derived feedback from non-hegemonic groups as an important epistemological resource. My thinking on this front is influenced by Linda Alcoff’s article “The Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment” (2006, 179–94).

30. Personal conversation, April 2009. Cf. Terri Elliott’s “Making Strange What Had Appeared Familiar” (1994). It should be noted that able-bodied people can neglect to take into consideration the perspective of those who use wheelchairs. For example, a wheelchair-using student with whom I worked in the 1990s told me stories of having to repeatedly assert her right to navigate unimpeded to class as a college student, as her university repeatedly overlooked obstacles, such as snow accumulation, that blocked her path. Her needs were not fully grasped by the able-bodied university staff with whom she was dealing and thus were repeatedly not anticipated by them, making her self-advocacy necessary.

31. See also Lugones and Spelman 1990, 21–24.


33. Cf. Williams 1991, 8–9. Susan Babbitt also notes that those in power have themselves defined the conceptual schema by which perspectives are articulated in the first place. Historically these schema have made it impossible to even conceptualize the humanity and thus personhood of people of color and women. This can force the marginalized to act against the systems that create this impossibility. These defying actions seem outrageous within the conceptual scheme itself but are in fact the only means for asserting personhood for those whose humanity/personhood is refused by the very conceptual scheme in question (Babbitt 1996; cf. Gauthier 2004, 9–11).

34. Regarding the requirement that persons in non-hegemonic groups pay heed to hegemonic perspectives, see Lugones and Spelman 1990; Mills 1998, 8.

35. The Kantian moral agent applying the categorical imperative relies on “background moral knowledge” (Gauthier 2004, 4). More specifically, rules of moral salience (RMS) underwrite the application of the categorical imperative by determining, for example, which situations are moral in nature and which elements in particular are morally charged. They help us “grasp why tying a noose around my neck raises moral questions that tying my shoes does not” (Gauthier 2004, 4) These rules, however, can reflect deep-seated prejudices, in which certain groups of people are not viewed as ends-in-themselves in the first place. This is reminiscent of Susan Babbitt’s points, raised in Chapter 3, regarding who, historically, has been included in “humanity” (1996, 2, 14–16). When RMS reflect exclusionary socio-political bias,
a conscientious Kantian moral agent can commit, as Barbara Herman puts it, “errors of moral judgment that will not be caught by the CI [categorical imperative] procedure” (quoted in Gauthier 2004, 6). Gauthier disagrees with Herman’s position that Kant’s moral theory can withstand this critique, which highlights its vulnerability to perpetuating racism, sexism, etc. Herman maintains that RMS are always subject to critique and are themselves subject to the demands of the categorical imperative. As social change occurs, RMS must—on Kantian principles—be revised to reflect sensitivity to newly identified social ills (Gauthier 2004, 5–11). Yet, as Gauthier notes, Kant does not allow for the discovery of discrimination in the RMS in the first place (8–11).

36. See also Lugones 2003, 14–15, 72–74.

**Conclusion**

1. My thanks to Dwayne Tunstall and Amanda Mosher for their critical comments on earlier drafts of this conclusion.

2. As noted in Chapter 4, I thank Roger Ward for pushing me to highlight the isolation from community that Peirce experienced at the time he was writing about agape.

3. This suggestion is borrowed from a project in which I bring Paulo Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* ([1970] 1997) into conversation with Dewey’s conception of habit. Much of the following discussion, through my treatment of Martha Nussbaum’s work, is adapted from my article “Attunement to the Invisible: Applying Paulo Freire’s Problem-Posing Education to ’Invisibility’ ” (Trout 2008) from *The Pluralist*. Copyright 2008 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Used with permission of the University of Illinois Press.

4. My thanks to Claire Katz for helping me deepen my appreciation of this point (personal conversation).

5. Ann Margaret Sharp notes the compatibility of Peirce’s ideas with the creation of a community of inquiry in the classroom (1994, 201–10). She is not merely interested in the relevance of Peirce’s work to the education of children in general. She draws extensive parallels between Peirce’s thought and the Philosophy for Children paradigm in particular, where philosophical discourse is explicitly incorporated into primary education classrooms (195–210).

6. Lorraine Code notes: “The role of the imagination in cognitive and moral lives is often underestimated in philosophical discussion. But the very impossibility of knowing everyone intimately and well points to the cognitive and moral importance of an educated imagination as a way for moral
agents to move empathetically beyond instances they have taken the trouble to know well to other, apparently related, instances” (1995, 92–93).

7. In this context he also hints at the importance of an agapic spirit indirectly, by saying that conservatism is not the proper disposition for the scientist, because it is not open to change (CP 1.50–51, ca. 1896). Moreover, in a 1903 manuscript, Peirce makes a passing comment that to give “support to the imagination” is to serve science (EP 2:185).


9. Martha Nussbaum describes empathy as “the ability to imagine what it is like to be in [another] person’s place” (1997, 91).

10. This is an important point, as studying the experience of others can be undermined by a naive (and arrogant) sense of mastery regarding another’s life. Code discusses the extent to which we can know or identify with another (1995, 120–43, “I Know Just How You Feel”).

11. Nussbaum argues that exposure to other perspectives by means of literature can help raise one’s consciousness toward people who are “invisible” to society in general as a result of the stereotypes that block an authentic seeing, as Ralph Ellison describes in Invisible Man (1980), which Nussbaum references in this context (1997, 87 ff., 95 ff.). On the themes of learning via characters who are different from oneself and of becoming familiar with invisible perspectives, I recommend the entire chapter “The Narrative Imagination” (Nussbaum 1997, 85–112).

12. These and related issues are discussed by bell hooks in Teaching to Transgress (1994, esp. chapters 3, 10, and 12) and Teaching Community (2003, esp. chapters 3 and 4).

13. Nussbaum’s Poetic Justice discusses how the development of narrative imagination bridges into the sphere of political criticism and action, as students become attuned to the oppressive circumstances of characters and may become motivated to change these circumstances as they occur in real life (1995, 87, 90 ff.).

14. I learned from María Lugones’s talk, as well as from her comments on the papers of other participants at the 2008 Roundtable on Philosophy and Race, Berkeley, California. I also benefited from Sarah Hoagland’s paper, “Colonial Practices/Colonial Identities: White Academic Feminist Deployment of Gender,” and from a personal conversation with her at this same conference.
