THE STRUCTURE OF A CONCRESCENCE

(PR, Part III)

I • The Nature of Genetic Analysis

There are two modes of process operative in the universe: concrescence and transition, micro-process and macro-process. In concrescence, the many elements in the universe given for an occasion achieve the private, subjective unity of a perspective, transforming the efficient causality of the past into the final causality of an emerging viewpoint functioning with respect to its own determinateness. Transition, on the other hand, represents the functioning of an actual entity in the future—its pragmatic afterlife as causally objectified in subsequent occasions. Since both modes of process are different translations of the same entity (concrescence—in terms of its genesis from the world; transition—in terms of its efficacy as a stubborn fact for the future), they cannot be torn apart. But they can be analyzed in isolation from each other, provided each analysis is viewed as an abstraction from the twofold functioning of a concrete entity. Thus, each analysis will yield quite different sorts of information about an actual occasion. In genetic analysis, the self-creative process of the subject is traced as it grows from phase to phase. Coordinate analysis, focusing on the fully determinate satisfaction achieved in concrescence, takes as its object the spatio-temporal standpoint in the extensive continuum which the entity has actualized. The former mode divides an occasion intoprehensions, underscoring its final causality; the latter mode yields space–time regions through which chains of efficient causality are propagated.

Both modes are possible because the occasion, though essentially undivided, whether as separate subject with separate prehensions or as separate superject divided into separate regions, is yet divisible, in that its process, and hence its satisfaction, possess a complex and therefore composite unity. However, this composition is not to be viewed as additive. It is not the case that process proceeds by a linear succession of
prehensions each complete in itself, or that the satisfaction thus repre­
sents a distinct multiplicity of independent feelings externally con­
joined. Since the subjective aim realized in the satisfaction is immanent in all phases of the process, each phase and each prehension are neces­
sarily incomplete, depending for their full determinateness on the final decision giving them their determinate value in the satisfaction. For example, a conformal physical feeling originating in a high-order entity is further involved in aesthetic, propositional, and comparative feelings in subsequent phases and does not attain its significance in the concres­
cence—its full determinateness—until those “later” phases are com­
pleted. A phase or a prehension reaches “completeness” only in the satisfaction, when it has attained its perfectly definite relation to all other phases andprehensions in the one, fully determinate, and subjective feeling-of-the-universe which is the satisfied occasion. Only at this point is it a “proper entity”1 with its own character; but that character is its own because of its place in the unity of the whole. Prehensions and phases are thus separable but not separated. The separateness which seems to accrue to them stems from our inability to conceive process in other than spatia-temporal terms. For Whitehead, though process results in the superjection of a quantum of space-time, it does not run through that quantum in its “succession” of phases. Thus, in Whitehead’s con­
ception, the subject is immanent in all incomplete phases of itself, lur­
ing on its own realization. The lure, or subjective aim, forms a proposition with each incomplete phase, a proposition whose subjects are the feelings in the phase and whose potential predicative pattern is the aim at the concrescent subject—the lure for further integration. But since the concrescent subject aimed at is one unified feeling of every item in the universe and in the concrescence, its immanence in each phase makes the phases undivided from the whole although potentially divisible from it.2

II • THE NATURE OF FEELINGS IN GENERAL

With the foregoing clarifications in mind, it is possible to “divide” an occasion into stages and separable feelings, thereby “tracing” its non­
temporal genesis and enabling finite statements to be made about it.

1 “Proper entity” is not to be confused with actual entity. The former is a “completed” aspect of the latter, and hence an abstraction.

2 Analogously, a half is a half only because it is half of some whole. But if it is a real half, i.e., really divided from its other half, the whole is no longer real and the half is no longer a half but a new whole. For halves to be genuine halves of a whole, they must be actually undivided but potentially divisible structural elements in the whole.
Whitehead’s genetic account of an actual occasion enters a spiral of complexity so dizzying that it is all too easy for the reader to lose sight of its purpose and central theme: namely, to give a metaphysical account of the self-creative process of an occasion, of its experience. What is to be explicated in the account is the core of the philosophy of organism: that out of the sheer multiplicity of the past, new subjective unities emerge. Past chapters of PR, and indeed all of SMW, speak of “intertwinedprehensivenonification,” of “the many becoming one and being enriched by one,” of the subject’s emerging from its actual world as a novel, aesthetic synthesis of that actual world. However, if this romantic insight is to become metaphysics rather than mere poetic metaphor, it must achieve the precision of exact formulation, a formulation meeting and answering the metaphysical problems latent in the romantic insight. Through what mechanism can objectivity become subjectivity without destroying either or both in the process? How can novelty in the present arise when perforce it must arise within the context of a causally efficacious past? How are the primary feelings in a concrescence related to subsequent feelings so that phenomena such as the various modes of perception and the higher forms of consciousness do not lock the conscious and judging subject into a phenomenal world hopelessly divorced from the unattainable noumenon? How can freedom be a meaningful world, given the inescapability of past fact? In a word, what is the fine-grained rendition of process, of concrescence and transition, of the actual entity as subject–superject, which fills in the interstices in the coarse-grained account to make it more than a “likely story”? Whitehead’s response is the labyrinth of detail which constitutes his genetic and coordinate analyses of Parts III and IV. But the two techniques of analysis must not be taken as merely philosophical tools. If they are only that, if they are not specifications of more general analytic techniques involved in the self-formative activity of any occasion of experience, then the metaphysics of organism fails the foundational test of self-reference and is incoherent despite its protestations to the contrary. The following chapters must be read, therefore, on two levels: (a) as philosophical “divisions” or analyses of the complex structure of an actual occasion; and (b) as modalities of “division” which any actual occasion exercises on the data which constitute its past so that it may synthesize them into the unity of its subjectivity. The divisibility of an occasion therefore serves a metaphysical function over and above its epistemological value, being the condition for the possibility of one entity’s entering into the composition of other entities in its pragmatic afterlife. Specifically, the divisibility of an occasion grounds the theory of feelings; it makes possible the “eliminations”
whereby what Whitehead calls “initial data” can become an “objective datum.”

The total satisfaction of one entity cannot enter into the composition of another entity in its full complex unity without that entity’s quite literally becoming the entity absorbed. Any satisfaction is a unique, one-of-a-kind, unrepeatable perspective on the universe. Thus the initial data for any concrescence are the sheer multiplicity of past facts, each in its own self-sufficient unity: integrable because of the primordial relevance of eternal objects and of the systematic interrelations of the extensive continuum, but not integrated. To be felt into the concrescent unity of feeling of a subject, the elements in the complex unity of each past satisfaction which are inconsistent with other elements in the other satisfied occasions in the actual world relative to the concrescence must be negatively prehended, i.e., eliminated from feeling. The initial data are “felt under an abstraction” (PR 231), each objectified by means of an aspect of its definiteness—one of its component feelings—which is compatible with aspects or component feelings of the others.

What precisely is eliminated in the transition from data to datum requires explication. The sheer multiplicity of data given for an occasion is a multiplicity of satisfied (or completed) actual occasions, each of which is a subjective unification of its many feelings of its actual world. There is, therefore, a multiplicity of actual worlds: not such that each excludes the other, but such that each is included as a subordinate nexus in the other. This involves, therefore, that the satisfactions of the entities felt in the initial data are composed of feelings, many of which feel the same items. Thus, to use Whitehead’s example: when A arises from an actual world containing B, C, and D, it may be the case that A feels not only D as directly given for it, but also D as felt by B and C. The three feelings cannot be identical, for each is a subjective grasp of the publicity of D; nor can they be entirely diverse (inconsistent), inasmuch as the possibility for the three objectifications was “decided” by D in its own concrescent process, and hence must manifest the unity of D as subject–superject. In order for the three feelings of D to be integrated by A into one feeling of D, all aspects of the totality of D’s feelings as felt by A which are not consistent with D’s feelings as felt through the mediacy of B’s and C’s feelings must be eliminated—i.e., negatively prehended—so that the multiple D-feelings (D as initial data) can be integrated into one D-feeling (D as objective datum) playing one self-consistent role in A’s process. D is felt under an abstraction from its full determinacy, under an objectification decided by it in its own concrescence and superjected along with other possible objectifications to the future as mutually consistent elements in D’s satisfaction and hence as alternative ways in which D could be felt. What is elimi-
nated from feeling is not D as a causative agency but those of D’s feelings which cannot be meshed with A’s actual world, which includes the D-feelings incorporated into B and C.

The objective datum is thus a harmony of “mutually adjusted abstraction” (PR 210). The multiplicity of the past grows together into an actual world: “a nexus whose objectification constitutes the complete unity of objective datum for the physical feeling of that actual entity” (PR 230), “a realized pattern of the initial data” (PR 231). Since what is going on in the outgrowth of the objective datum from the initial data is a process in which one feeling out of the manifold of feelings integrated in each satisfied occasion in the data is detached to become the abstraction under which that entity is felt into the concrescent occasion, “A feeling . . . is essentially a transition [i.e., a superjective functioning] effecting a concrescence” (PR 221).

For a feeling to be thus detached from the aesthetic complex of a satisfied occasion, the component feelings in that satisfaction must be determinate, i.e., separable; for such a component feeling when grasped into a subsequent occasion to be felt as the causality of the satisfied entity and not as “just itself,” the component feelings in the satisfaction must be inseparable; otherwise the unity of the satisfied occasion explodes into a diverse multiplicity of essentially unrelated aspects. Thus, the divisibility of an occasion grounds not only the possibility of genetic analysis and finite truth, but, more fundamentally, the possibility of an occasion’s intervention into processes transcendent to itself; it is the condition for the possibility of transition. Any occasion of experience, not merely an occasion of philosophic thought, performs genetic analyses of the satisfied entities in its actual world.

The initial phase of a concrescence, that in which the objective datum is growing out of the initial multiplicity, is difficult to describe because it marks the transition between the satisfied occasions of the past and the concrescent occasion in the present. From one point of view, the objectifications of the initial data are the causal functionings of the satisfied occasions, growing together under the impetus of the creativity to elicit the self-actualization of a new perspective. From the alternative point of view, the objectifications mark the initial prehensions in the concrescence of the new entity, lured toward subjectification by its ideal of itself received from God by way of the real potentiality of the initial data. Neither point of view is complete in isolation from the other, since process intertwines the objectification of subjectivity and the subjectification of objectivity in the ongoing, organic development of the universe. Therefore, though the language used in Whitehead’s descriptions of the primary feelings is “slanted” from the side of the subject and its purposive activity, the objective efficient causality of the satisfied past
must be seen as correlatively operative. Each past actual occasion decides the ways in which it could be objectified; the present decides the way in which it is to be objectified, given its immersion in the medium of the actual world of the concrescence.

The transition from initial data, with their possibilities for objectification, to objective datum, with its actual objectification, is a decision which is part of the concrescent process of any occasion; for in actualizing itself as a synthetic experience, it superjects the elements of that experience in their relevance to the future. Thus, an actual entity is "responsible" both to and for the future use to which its achievement may be put. Herein lies the genesis of both good and evil, seasonable and unseasonable birth, sensitivity and insensitivity to the future. The disruptions which irrelevant novelty can produce provoke painful effort in the future to overcome disharmony by incorporating it into a wider harmonic pattern. Evil is not totally destructive, therefore; it may proximately hinder intensity of satisfaction, but in the long run it promotes the aesthetic growth of the universe.

The necessity for a social environment to ensure in advance some minimum of harmony among superjected decisions now becomes more obvious and adds a new dimension to the role of society in macro-process. In a social context, the initial data for a concrescence share common feelings—the inherited feelings of the defining characteristic—and hence have an aptness for synthesis not found in a disorderly environment. In a social context, even non-social occasions can be felt—not in se, but in their contrast with the sociality of their neighbors: as faint, chaotic, and irrelevant influences, if the social pole of the contrast is emphasized; or as significant suggestions for future change, if the chaotic pole is enhanced. In a purely chaotic environment, no concrescence could occur, because all objectifications would be mutually inhibiting.

Furthermore, the concrescence from initial data to objective datum cannot occur unless the "possibility for the subject" is a relevant item in the real potentiality of the actual world. If the positive feelings are to satisfy the Category of Subjective Unity\(^3\) by being integrable, they can be integrable only from a standpoint whose possibility itself is felt. The eliminations from feeling, arising so as to prevent duplication of feelings or of the roles played by objectifications, demand that the concrescence initiate from a vague grasp of the final unity of those feelings and roles in the satisfaction. Furthermore, the eliminations themselves must

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\(^3\) "The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in the process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the incompleteness of the phase, are compatible for integration by reason of the unity of their subject" (PR 39).
be mutually consistent, for any entity's refusal to admit an inimical factor into its constitution is itself a factor in its constitution and must be integrable with all other refusals and admissions. Therefore, any concrescence must originate from an initial grasp of its own possibility: the potential pattern, as yet vague and indeterminate, in terms of which its public data can be felt together into a private unity. This feeling of subjective aim is a feeling of the possibility of definiteness, the possibility-for-a-subject, given in the world for the perspective: of that aspect of God's initial ordering of the possibles "which is immediately relevant to the universe 'given' for that concrescence" (PR 225). It is therefore a hybrid physical feeling of God as objectified by the "segment" of his conceptual feelings propositionally related to the actual world for the perspective. This is to say that the real potentiality of the universe from a perspective is a set of eternal objects graded in degrees of relevance to that universe, the set being a subset of the primordial ordering of eternal objects. In any universe, therefore, God is objectified by aspects of his conceptual valuation of eternal objects—those eternal objects embodied in or relevant to that universe. An actual entity arising in that universe physically prehends God under that objectification, thereby seizing its relevant potential for self-realization, or subjective aim.

The subjective aim thus envisioned directs the positive and negative prehensions, ensuring that the Categories of Subjective Unity, Objective Diversity, and Objective Identity are unviolated in the subjectification of the data, thereby safeguarding both the unity of the subject and the unity of its objects. "The oneness of the universe, and the oneness of each element in the universe, repeat themselves to the crack of doom in the creative advance from creature to creature, each creature including in itself the whole of history and exemplifying the self-identity of things and their mutual diversities" (PR 228).

The transition from the public character of a datum to the private character of a prehension is accomplished through the rush of private feelings with which the datum is met: the subjective forms of feelings—how the feelings feel. The subjective form of a feeling, when it reaches full definiteness in the satisfaction, bears within it the history of its origination within the subjective process. "The way in which the feeling feels expresses how the feeling came into being. It expresses the pur-

4 "There can be no 'coalescence' of diverse elements in the objective datum of an actual entity, so far as concerns the functions of those elements in that satisfaction" (The Category of Objective Diversity, PR 26). "There can be no duplication of any element in the objective datum of the 'satisfaction' of an actual entity, so far as concerns the function of that element in the 'satisfaction' " (The Category of Objective Identity, PR 26).
pose which urged it forward, and the obstacles which it encountered, and the indeterminations which were dissolved by the originative decisions of the subject” (PR 232). The fully matured subjective form of any component feeling a satisfaction, therefore, embodies the genesis of that feeling in the process, from the time the subject encountered the data, eliminated any inconsistencies, and, through a series of integrations, decided the role the feeling should play in the satisfaction and for the future. The subjective form is both the private and the pragmatic aspect of the feeling: “the datum is felt with that subjective form in order that the subject may be the superject which it is” (PR 233). It is therefore the seat of novelty for the subject–superject, the private appropriation of objectivity which becomes a public possibility for objectification in the future.

“The subjective form is the ingression of novel form peculiar to the new particular fact, and with its peculiar mode of fusion with the objective datum” (PR 233). It is an eternal object structuring the datum into the private unity of the subject. But the datum itself is a feeling with its own novel subjective form, which form cannot be lost in the transition to the new subject. The novelty in any emergent subjective form consists, therefore, not in its content (the subjectively formed feeling felt) but in its subjectification of that content. What begins as subjective re-enactment acquires patterns of emotional quality and intensity derived only in part from the feeling felt and assuming more and more importance as the concrescence advances from stage to stage—always under the aegis of the subjective aim, which is the ultimate determinant of subjective forms. The subjective form of a fully matured feeling in the satisfaction is a synthesis of the re-enactment and emotional supplementation it has undergone in the concrescence.

Thus, in summary, any feeling is analyzable into five elements: (a) its subject—immanent in the feeling and that at which the feeling aims; (b) its initial data—the insistent “stuff” out of which it arises; (c) its elimination of incompatibilities through negative prehensions in order to make the initial data capable of further synthesis, which negative prehensions add their own traces to the developing emotional complex; (d) its objective datum—the actual world as a unity for feeling; and (e) its subjective form—“how” the datum is felt. With this generalized discussion of feeling as a backdrop, the more specific kinds of feelings can be explicated more clearly.

III • The Primary Feelings

Primary feelings are distinguishable from subsequent feelings in a concrescence in virtue of the fact that their object is an element in the actual
world of the concrescence and not a "prior" feeling in the concrescent process. Via simple physical feelings, the efficient causality of a past occasion is incorporated into the concrescence under an objectification. As seen before, one of the aspects whereby the object made itself to be what it is becomes one of the aspects whereby the subject makes itself to be what it is becoming. The subject is conditioned by the object as a result of the subject’s initial physical functioning, and past-to-present-to-future continuity is grounded. The primary phase of a concrescence, the phase dominated by simple physical feelings, “constitutes the machinery by reason of which the creativity transcends the world already actual, and yet remains conditioned by that actual world in its new impersonation” (PR 237).

The re-enactive subjective forms of simple physical feelings guarantee the effective transfer of energy from past to present. The feelings felt are felt as alien—as originating, vector-like, from the there-then of the object—and do not lose their alien character when initially felt into the here-now of the subject. The same eternal object structures the subjective feeling as structured the objective feeling, thereby effectively transferring the causality of the object into the subject. Since the object is felt under an abstraction from its own definiteness, physical feelings of an object will differ as a function of what sort of element in the object is serving as its objectification. If the objective feeling felt is itself a physical feeling, the subjective feeling is purely physical—a simple case of energy transfer. If, on the other hand, the objectification is one of the object’s conceptual feelings, the subjective feeling is termed “hybrid.” But in both cases the feeling felt is an abstraction from a past, satisfied occasion which is being re-enacted in the concrescence.

In contradistinction to a physical feeling, a conceptual feeling is a direct grasp of an eternal object as a pure potential selected for realization in the concrescence. In no way can a conceptual prehension be likened to a passive “vision” of the eternal object. Just as a physical feeling is the incorporation of the causality of a satisfied entity into the constitution of a subject, so a conceptual feeling is the admission of an eternal object as a structural element. Conceptual functioning is appreciation, not contemplation. The subjective form of a conceptual feeling is therefore valuation, concerned with how the eternal object is to be utilized in structuring the data of the physical prehensions and with what importance it will have in the resultant structure. As a function of their relevance to the nexus physically felt and to the subjective aim of the subject, eternal objects will be “valued” (either admitted into the concrescent subject or negatively prehended) and valued “up” or “down,” as important or insignificant structural elements. The subjective form
of a conceptual prehension is therefore not a re-enactment as it is in the case of a simple physical feeling—it is not object-conditioned. The valuation of an eternal object given as relevant to a concrescence is a function sheerly of the subjective aim of concrescence.

But “where” are the eternal objects which are conceptually felt? Whitehead is not maintaining a crude Platonism of direct vision of a world of forms by finite occasions. This can occur just once—in God’s primordial envisagement which structures the eternal objects into gradations of mutual relevance. For a finite occasion, all conceptual feelings are derivate from physical feelings. *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.* The hybrid physical feeling of a datum elicits a conceptual feeling of the eternal object whereby the datum is objectified. The subject derivatively feels the same eternal object the datum is objectified as feeling, but with a different subjective form, for the valuation of the eternal object is proportionate to the perspectival aim of the subject.

Thus, in accordance with the Category of Conceptual Valuation, every physical feeling initiates a conceptual feeling of the eternal object exemplified in the datum felt. This initial activity of the mental pole of any occasion is its “conceptual registration of the physical pole” (PR 248). Through conceptual feeling, the brute causality of the actual world is overcome, for the question answered by conceptual valuation has to do with the possible role of the felt eternal objects in the constitution of the subject. Conceptual feeling introduces purpose into the concrescence; eternal objects can be grasped as lures for a self-creative activity which is not mere re-enactment of objective functioning. “The mental pole introduces the subject as a determinant of its own concrescence. The mental pole is the subject determining its own ideal of itself by reference to eternal principles of valuation autonomously modified in their application to its own physical objective datum” (PR 245). Thus, the original physical feelings, whose subjective forms were reiterations of the subjective forms of the feelings felt, can, by integration with the conceptual feelings, acquire subjective forms determining the importance of those physical feelings for the concrescent subject. It is

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5 "From each physical feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum is the eternal object determinant of the definiteness of the actual entity, or of the nexus, physically felt" (PR 26).

6 At first glance, this would seem to preclude the emergence of novel (unexemplified) forms in the universe. However, if it be remembered that according to the principle of relativity God’s primordial nature is a datum for every finite concrescence, then the appearance of novel forms can be seen as justifiable. Unexemplified eternal objects are ideally together in the primordial nature, and graded in degrees of relevance to finite perspectives through the integration of God’s conceptual and physical feelings.
not so much the case that new subjective forms have arisen, as that the forms re-enacted have been valued up or down relative to the ideal of the emergent subject. Genuinely novel forms enter initially through conceptual operations subsequent to these initial valuations.

Because the eternal objects are ordered in a relevance independent of the relevance introduced by joint exemplification in the concrete, an occasion can have what Whitehead calls “reverted feelings” of eternal objects which are relevant alternatives to those which it conceptually registers, and thus can admit new forms into its constitution. In order for a conceptual reversion to take place, however, a ground of identity must exist between the registered eternal object and the reverted eternal object. Since any concrescence aims at an aesthetic unity, a totally novel form—one completely “disconnected” from and irrelevant to the objective datum—would be an incoherent element diminishing that unity or rendering it impossible to attain. Novelty can be admitted only on the basis of its relevance to and contrast with the given. “All aesthetic experience is feeling arising out of the realization of contrast under identity” (RM 111). It is the deepening of intensity provoked by contrast which lures reverted feelings.

Intensity in satisfaction is further enhanced through the combined width and narrowness of its formal structure. If the sheer multiplicity of initial physical feelings is to be overcome so as to rescue the satisfaction from triviality, those feelings must be simplified: the many feelings of elements in a nexus reduced to one feeling of the nexus. This simplification is achieved through transmuted feelings. If it is the case that a plurality of physical feelings are “registered” as analogously exemplifying the same eternal object in the initial conceptual valuation, the manifold can be synthesized under the unity of the eternal object. Through the integration of the physical and conceptual feelings, the many physical feelings of the many actual entities in the nexus are transmuted into one physical feeling of one actuality—the nexus. Without the intervention of conceptual feelings, all that could be felt in the multiplicity is the mutual implication of its contained members—a vague many-in-oneness. Because of the intervention of transmuted feelings, the many-ness disappears, leaving only the unity of the nexus as the datum for physical feeling. If the eternal object making the transmutation possible is initially grasped in a reverted feeling rather than in a valuation, pathways both to novel integration of the nexus and to possible error are opened.

An entity in which transmuted feelings achieve a degree of importance is on its way toward consciousness, for it is already simplifying its world via abstraction. No longer is it a low-grade organism, “merely the summation of the forms of energy which flow in upon it in all their
multiplicity of detail” (PR 254). It has introduced order and intelligible system into its actual world—the right kind of vagueness which makes further integrations possible. Note how transmutation is the basis of perception in the mode of presentational immediacy. Perception is never the reception or display of an actual entity functioning in the past or present; it concerns itself always with a nexus unified by the analogous exemplification of an eternal object among its members. In some cases, the total nexus is characterized by an eternal object derived from a segment of its constituency; in others, an eternal object derived from one part is used to characterize another part. In both instances, the “generalization” of the partially shared characteristic is justifiable on the basis of the mutual implication of the members of the nexus. When a transmutation leads to a physical feeling of a nexus-as-one, the qualifying eternal object is felt as the sensum received from the past nexus (this is the basis of causal efficacy). However, the nexus includes by implication members which are not experienced because they are contemporaneous with the concrescing subject. The same eternal object is integrated with the contemporary “part” of the nexus and displays it in presentational immediacy. Furthermore, it is only because of this sort of transmutation that symbolic reference can take place: that it can be “affirmed” that the unexperienced part of the nexus (the present) is analogous to the part experienced (the past).

Out of this interplay between physical and conceptual feelings, an interplay in which simple physical feelings give rise to conceptual feelings which in their turn give rise to further physical feelings all concerned with the same datum, the types of decision characterizing the aesthetic supplement arise. The conceptual feelings arising from the initial physical feelings adjust the importance of the physical feelings for the concrescence, valuing them up or down. If they are valued up and transmuted into a physical feeling of a nexus, the subjective form of that feeling is intensified as aversion. If valued down, the transmuted feeling is either attenuated or eliminated from the concrescence with a subjective form of aversion. A further categorial obligation is laid upon the complex of valuations which constitutes conceptual functioning: the Category of Subjective Harmony.7 Just as the Category of Subjective Unity controls the process of objectification whereby the past is enabled to enter the present with no loss of identity to either, so the Category of Subjective Harmony norms the valuations so that they are compatible for synthesis into an emotional complex with a maximum of aesthetic

7 “The valuations of conceptual feelings are mutually determined by the adaptation of those feelings to be contrasted elements congruent with the subjective aim” (PR 27).
intensity. The subject is therefore responsible for both the matter and the forms out of which it creates itself, while, at the same time, both are derived from the settled world. Whitehead’s view of micro-process as the subjective appropriation and structuring of what is objectively received enables him to view an occasion as both determined and free, objectively conditioned and subjectively functioning—as a union of efficient and final causality.

However, the ultimate determinant of the latitude of autonomy open to a concrescence is a function of its environment. The complex order given for an occasion is the basis for the simplifications and intensities of conceptual feeling achievable in transmuted and reverted feelings. Hence consciousness as the subjective form of more autonomous feelings can arise only in the environment of a bodily organism providing highly ordered data for the conscious monad. In a disorderly environment, the inconsistencies among its members dominate and must be negatively prehended, leaving only trivial aspects to be used as objectifications. In such a situation, the maximum intensity open to a concrescence is that of a mere subjective summation or reiteration of the objectively given.

IV • Propositions and Feelings

It is unfortunately all too easy to slip back into a non-process understanding of the nature of a proposition, thereby hopelessly muddying Whitehead’s genetic analysis of propositions and propositional feelings. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that a proposition is not a fact given for prehension the way an actual entity or a nexus is given: as a state of affairs which must be grasped into a concrescent subject under an objectification of itself. A proposition is, rather, a way in which a nexus could be felt; it is a potential type of entity, proposed for feeling as a lure for feeling, differing from an eternal object because it has a determinate reference to a set of actual entities, differing from an actual entity or a nexus in that it is realizable rather than realized. It is “the potentiality of the eternal object, as a determinant of definiteness, in some determinate mode of restricted reference to the logical subjects” (PR 257). Its realization is indeterminate: i.e., a proposition need not be prehended into the constitution of a subject; whereas a nexus, by the principle of relativity, must be felt.8 Furthermore, the mode of a propo-

8 The obvious implication of this statement is a denial of the possibility of negative physical prehensions—a position I tend to hold. However, my position can be readily misinterpreted if read simplistically. I am not implying that all causal agencies in the
sition's realization is indeterminate. Is it to be realized imaginatively? Perceptively? Intuitively? This is left to the decision of the concrescent subject feeling the propositional lure, a decision which is a function of the "past history" of the concrescence. Moreover, a proposition is indeterminate as to its truth or falsity. In fact, it is true or false (i.e., realized in the members of its locus or not), but its truth or falsity is not relevant to its propositional status. In itself, that is, in abstraction from a concrescent occasion, it is merely "particular facts in a potential pattern" (PR 194), the "germaneness of a certain set of eternal objects to a certain set of actual entities" (PR 188).

In the concrete, propositions are both given for and created by the concrescent occasion entertaining them. As "given for," they are elements in the actual world of a concrescence—hybrid entities; but their givenness is not the sort describable in terms of a simple location metaphysic. It is not the case that propositions are independent realities, over against a concrescent subject which grasps them as "others," as objects in the classical sense of the term. They are "given for" the concrescence precisely because they are "created by" the subject. But again, the "created by" is to be interpreted not as a pure subjective origination—a figment of the subject—but rather as an aspect of the process whereby the subject, via the elimination of incompatibilities through negative prehensions and selective objectifications, transforms the multiplicity of fully determinate facts which constitute the past world (the initial data) into an objective datum, an actual world, apt for subjectification. This process produces both the worldliness of the world and the uniqueness of the perspective, so that it is true to say that, although all actual entities arise from the same universe, no two entities share the same actual world. Each entity can rightly proclaim "This actual world is mine." Yet, at the same time, the uniqueness of each actual world and of each actual entity does not spell their absolute isolation. There can be no "simply located" actual worlds or actual entities, for the ground of all world construction—the patterns for worldliness—is to be found settled world are efficacious in each concrescent occasion. On this reading, I would be hard put to justify Whitehead's insistence on the uniqueness of an occasion's actual world. As I see the situation, each element in the initial multiplicity ("the universe distinctively") is initially grasped as a causal element in the initial physical feelings. When the subjective forms structuring the causal feelings felt are conceptually registered and undergo conceptual valuation, that valuation can result in the negative prehension of those forms and in the consequent elimination of the causal feelings vis-à-vis subsequent efficacy in the concrescence. I am maintaining, therefore, that while there can be no negative prehensions of initial data, through the intervening mental operations involved in the concrescence of initial data to objective datum, derived negative physical prehensions (hybrid prehensions) can and do occur. A total denial of negative physical prehensions would result in the tacit affirmation of a block universe—an intolerable assertion.
in God, who for that reason can be called “creator” of each actual world and of each actual entity. In virtue of his primordial valuation of eternal objects, they are graded in relevance to every possible finite perspective, which infinity of gradations is synthesized into an overarching harmony of finite possibilities—the Whiteheadian analogue of Plato’s Form of the Good. Each finite concrescence initiates from a hybrid physical feeling of God objectified via the primordial valuation relative to its perspective—feels the subjective aim whereby it begins the subjectification of the initial data.

With these qualifications in mind, Whitehead’s genetic account of the origination of propositions and propositional feelings becomes less subject to misinterpretation. To take the simplest case as a paradigm: consider the situation of an actual entity’s arising out of an actual world containing only one satisfied entity—X—which constitutes the initial datum for the concrescent entity. In order to admit X into its own constitution, the complete determinate pattern achieved by X’s synthesis of its many feelings (for the sake of illustration, a, b, and c) must be abstracted from. The concrescent occasion, under the lure of its subjective aim as received from God, negatively prehends X’s b and c feelings and objectifies X by a, one aspect in its determinateness, one separable yet inseparable feeling in its final aesthetic unity of feeling. X_a is then the objective datum which the concrescent occasion feels via a simple physical feeling which grasps a sheer matter-of-fact—what Whitehead calls an “indicative feeling.” But the fact felt is not a bare fact but a formed fact—a, the objectification is one of X’s feelings, felt by X with a subjective form consonant with X’s other feelings because of the Category of Subjective Harmony. Consequently, the indicative feeling of X_a develops into a “physical recognition” of the eternal object structuring a—A. This derivative feeling is a further physical feeling of a hybrid type—i.e., a physical feeling which objectifies its datum by one of the datum’s conceptual feelings. By the Category of Conceptual Valuation, every physical feeling gives rise to a pure conceptual feeling of the eternal object structuring the objectification; therefore, the physical recognition leads to pure conceptual prehension of the eternal object A. The concrescent subject feels A as a pure potential; it “conceptually registers” its physical pole in a “predicative feeling.” The predicative feeling may limit itself to reproducing the A-ness of a, or, by the Category of Conceptual Reversion, may originate a new eternal object, relevant to but diverse from A. In either case, the valued or reverted eternal object is the proto-predicate of the evolving proposition. Its proto-subject is X_a as felt in the indicative feeling. (This is the same as saying that the indicative feeling is proto-subject and the valuation or reversion
is proto-predicate, for the object felt is not concretely separable from the feeling which feels it.)

In order for X and A to achieve the unity of a proposition, their incompatibilities must be overcome. With respect to A, this incompatibility is the universality of A’s relevance to realization. In X’s case, it is the predicate already inscribed in it by the initial objectification—i.e., its a-ness. Both incompatibilities are overcome in a double elimination which negatively prehends the “any-ness” of A, limiting its possibility to possibility-for-structuring-X (Aₓ) and negatively prehends the a-ness of X, its actual predicate, rendering it a bare fact, an “it,” an X, with the potentiality for realizing the predicative pattern. The potential togetherness of this “naked X” and Aₓ (the predicative pattern) is a proposition, a lure for the concrescent occasion to realize that togetherness in its own constitution by a propositional feeling which feels X and Aₓ together in one feeling.

The ideally simple case used for purposes of illustration is unexemplifiable in fact, for one-member actual worlds are non-existent and propositions normally concern the togetherness of an indicated nexus and a predicative pattern. In the more realistic cases of propositional prehension, the initial data are a multiplicity of occasions mutually implicated in the unity of a nexus. In this instance, a transmutation occurs whereby the nexus is physically prehended as one fact because the multiplicity of actual entities within it exemplify the same eternal object in their definiteness. In place of the simple indicative feeling described above, a plurality of X’s is felt in the unity of a determinate pattern. The determinate plurality must be stripped of its determinations and must become an indicative system (then—there, Caesar—Rubicon) which is subject of the proposition before the further phases of propositional prehension can emerge.

The feelings whereby propositions are grasped may take one or the other of two subjective forms: they may be perceptive feelings or imaginative feelings, depending on the past histories of their subjects, specifically (a) on the relation between the indicative feeling and the physical recognition, and (b) on the presence or absence of significant reversions in the predicative feeling. Note that in neither of the two cases does the subjective form involve consciousness.

In the case of perceptive feelings, the indicative feeling and the physical recognition are the same feeling (i.e., their objective datum is the same); hence this form of propositional feeling “predicates of its logical subjects a character derived from the way in which they are physically felt by that prehending subject” (PR 262). If the predicative feeling has involved no significant reversions, then the perceptive feeling is authentic: i.e., the predicate of the proposition is realized in the nexus
of actual entities which are its subjects. This is not to say, however, that
the propositional feeling is de facto true. If a transmuted feeling has
intervened, the subjects in the nexus have been synthesized into the
unity of a nexus physically felt on the basis of a shared eternal object
in the definiteness of each, which eternal object is felt initially in a
hybrid physical feeling and then in a pure conceptual feeling. But the
resultant perceptive feeling does not reveal the manner in which the
eternal object was felt by the members of the nexus. It could have origi-
nated via a hybrid physical feeling on the part of the members, and
hence be a physical fact in the nexus. On the other hand, it could have
originated as a conceptual reversion in the subjective processes of the
members of the nexus. In the latter case, a perceptive feeling may
wrongly attribute to the propositional subjects the physical enjoyment
of what was in fact only conceptually entertained. It may exemplify
mere concept as physical fact. (For example, a nexus characterized as
utopian in a perceptive feeling may consist not of citizens ideally happy
in an ideal state, but merely of utopian theorists in a less-than-perfect
society. Concept has been transmuted into physical bond. 9 If no such
reversions have taken place in the perceived nexus, the perceptive feel-
ing is both authentic and direct: authentic, in that no subjective distor-
tions have intervened; direct, in that a genuine physical bond in the
nexus has been seized. When a reverted feeling in the members of the
nexus has been transmuted to characterize the nexus, the perceptive
feeling, though authentic, is deemed indirect. But when the reverted
feeling arises from the predicative feeling in the concrescent subject,
the perception is inauthentic: imaginative, in the sense that a novel eter-
nal object has entered the universe; inauthentically imaginative, in that
it enters as tied to an object in the actual world. Thus a subjective distor-
tion of the genuine state of affairs in the nexus has occurred.

A propositional feeling of the authentic imaginative species (as op-
pposed to the inauthentic) does not necessarily introduce an objective
distortion of the nexus felt, because the predicative feeling derives its
eternal object not from the indicative feeling, but rather from a physical
recognition which has a different datum. This is to say that two distinct
physical feelings originate the genuinely imaginative feeling: one, the
indicative feeling grasping the nexus of logical subjects; the other, a
prehension of a nexus in some sense different from the indicated nexus.
It is this latter physical feeling which spawns the physical recognition
and the consequent conceptual registration and valuation which yield

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9 The example should be taken as illustrative only, not as an instance of a perceptive
feeling.
the predicate. The S–P unity is therefore felt as imaginatively realized (i.e., realized in the concrescent subject), not as a fact in the nexus of the factual past. It cannot be said categorically that an imaginative feeling is always false, however. Its truth or falsity depends on the presence or absence of analogous similarities between the two nexuses physically felt. Even if the proposition is false, it has introduced a novelty into the world, a proposition which may have to “wait” for its logical subjects, but which may further the creative advance of the universe: “in the real world, it is more important that a proposition be interesting [luring the world onward to embody new forms] than that it be true [reiterating what has already been factually achieved]” (PR 259).

V • Comparative Feelings

With the appearance of propositions in an actual world and of propositional feelings in concrescent subjects, the way is paved for higher forms of synthesis, more complex integrations, and consequently more intense and immediate satisfactions for concrescent occasions entertaining them. These modes of integration concern not so much new modes of togetherness of items in the actual world as more complex unifications of prior phases in the concrescent subject. Their data are not entities (actual entities, eternal objects, or propositions) per se, but generic contrasts between or among feelings in the concrescence.

To speak of a contrast is to speak of the antithesis of incompatibility. A contrast is a unity achieved in a multiplicity, which unity does not eliminate the multiplicity of the unified items but rather joins those items in a higher unity. A proposition itself is a contrast—a hybrid entity, a new existential type, resulting from the contrasted unity of its subjects and the potential predicative pattern. Such unities, such “new creatures,” may themselves enter into contrasts with other unities, yielding structures whose structural pattern reveals depth as well as breadth, intensity rather than triviality, a deepening of the aesthetic character of the result. In order for contrast to overcome incompatibility, however, some ground of congruence must be present—some common element must play a role in each of the opposites to be contrasted. This element may either be an actual entity or a nexus (as in the case of “this is a dog” and “this is black” integrated in the contrast “this is a black dog,”11 where the contrast is between two eternal objects func-

10 See Figure 4.

11 Although verbal propositions will be used as illustrations throughout this section, the reader is reminded that they are to be taken as representing propositional feelings and contrasts in the constitution of a concrescent subject.
tioning in the same nexus) or an eternal object (as in “a gorilla is an anthropoid ape,” “an orangutan is an anthropoid ape” integrated in the contrast “gorillas and orangutans are anthropoid apes,” where the contrast is between two nexuses sharing the same eternal object). By the principle of objective identity, however, one element cannot play two roles in a concrescence without violating the unity of the universe; therefore Whitehead must speak of the common element as one element with a two-way functioning in the contrast—which is not to say that the common element is felt twice in the concrescence, but to say that it is felt once initially, and that the feeling has undergone various modifications which reveal its two functions.

The nature of such two-way functioning is revealed most clearly in Whitehead’s analysis of the genesis of intellectual (conscious) feelings. In such feelings, the contrasted items are (a) the propositional feeling (resulting from the synthesis of the indicative feeling and the predicative feeling derived from the physical recognition as conceptually valued or registered) and (b) the original indicative feeling. The common element in both feelings is the actual entity (or entities) whose causal functioning in the prehended nexus provoked the indicative feeling and which was stripped of all character save “this-ness” in the eliminations which produced the subject of the propositional feeling. It is the same entity (or entities) in both feelings. The contrast lies in the twofold functioning of that actual entity: as realized in the nexus and as a potential item integrable in the predicative pattern. This contrast between the facticity and possibility of the same entity (or entities) is termed the affirmation–negation contrast: between what is and what is not but might be.

It is the contrast between the affirmation of objectified fact in the physical feeling, and the mere potentiality, which is the negation of such affirmation, in the propositional feeling. It is the contrast between “in fact” and “might be,” in respect to particular instances in this actual world [PR 267].

For Whitehead, the subjective form of feeling this contrast is consciousness. Note here the close analogy to Bergson’s analysis of consciousness in Matter and Memory. Bergson sees conscious perception as the moment of hesitation between causality received and causality exercised, a hesitation brought about when more than one response is appropriate to the stimulus, when there is a juncture of actuality and possibility. Perception thus delineates for him the outlines of possible actions in the world. Whitehead’s notion of conscious perception, though less pragmatic than Bergson’s, supplies the ontological basis lacking in Bergson’s psychological account. It is the “feeling of what
is relevant to immediate fact in contrast with its potential irrelevance” (PR 268).

In general terms, perception is the integration of a perceptive feeling and an indicative feeling. As we have already seen, however, perceptive feelings fall into two species, only one of which is always factually true—the direct authentic species. In the instance that such a perceptive feeling undergoes integration (or is “compared”) with the original indicative feeling, the factual nexus is confronted “with the potentiality derived from itself, limited to itself, and exemplified in itself” (PR 269). In a word: perception in the mode of symbolic reference has arisen—the vivid display in the present of eternal objects felt as derived from past functionings, the vision of what could be because it was, of “what the nexus really is in the way of potentiality realized” (PR 269). Conscious perception is, therefore, the synthesis via contrast of was and could be into the immediacy of is—the experience of the present as confluence of past (affirmation) and future (negation).

This same character marks conscious perceptions arising from indirect authentic and inauthentic perceptive feelings as well, leaving as an open question how such perceptions, whose truth value is at best uncertain, can be discriminated from direct perceptions, whose truth is infallible. An absolute test is impossible, leaving all conscious perceptions open to fallibility. However, certain criteria are available to enable the perceiver to place relative confidence in those of his perceptions which satisfy the norms. In the first place the “force and vivacity” of a percept—its compelling character—provides some testimony as to its directness and authenticity. This in itself is not, however, sufficient to separate an authentic experience from an experience which is the result of subjective pathology, for delusions can at times feel overpoweringly real. This difficulty can be partially overcome inasmuch as the “insistence” of a percept is a result of its derivation from more primitive feelings within the concrescence, notably the indicative feelings and physical recognitions which initiate and supply the data for the later propositional and perceptual feelings. The vivid consciousness of presentational immediacy indirectly and vaguely illumines these earlier phases, revealing at least the causal efficacy of the end organ as an intensification of the causality of the environment; but even this vague awareness does not vitiate the possibility of a reversion of the sensum transmitted from the environment through the end organ to the conscious occasion. Nor does it raise to consciousness any evidence for the possibility that the entity provoking the indicative feeling may lie within the nexus of the organic body rather than within the external environment, or that the end organ itself is victim to some pathology. The ultimate test of the authenticity of a perceived pink elephant is the ocu-
list, Alcoholics Anonymous, or the plaster cast on an elephant-tromped foot. The ultimate test, in serious terms, is pragmatic: i.e., whether future experience bears out present expectations. From the standpoint of the perceiver, a percept is an hypothesis to be verified inductively in a future occasion of his historic route.

The defining characteristic of conscious perception is, as has been analyzed earlier, the felt unity of the indicative feeling and the physical recognition which initiate the proposition, which, in its turn, is integrated with the indicative feeling to form the percept. The “this” indicated and objectified is the same “this” from which the propositional predicate is derived. In the case of an intuitive judgment, the second species of comparative or intellectual feeling, such an identity is not present. The data integrated in such a judgment are an indicative feeling and an imaginative feeling whose datum is a nexus in some degree different from the nexus seized in the indicative feeling. The predicate of the imaginative feeling, that pattern in which the subjects of the indicative feeling are integrable, has been derived from the physical recognition of a different nexus. For example, in the intuitive judgment “this appears to be a platypus,” the “this” is an index of the nexus physically felt in the past environment. By the category of conceptual valuation, a complex eternal object is grasped: “furry, duck-billed, oviparous, etc.” From the integration of this eternal object with the indicative feeling, a perceptive feeling emerges, which when integrated with the indicative feeling yields a conscious perception of a curious creature swimming around in its zoo environment. In another physical feeling, a signboard on the wire enclosure is grasped, which, via a physical recognition, is conceptually registered as a picture of a furry, duck-billed, etc., animal with the word “platypus” lettered beneath it. A predicative feeling is formed: an eternal object “platypus” is grasped as a possible pattern exemplifiable in a nexus of actual entities. The resultant propositional feeling of the imaginative species integrates the predicate derived from the sign with the “this” (or indicative feeling) of the furry creature in its pool. It is this initial disconnection—of the logical subjects of the indicative feeling as involved in their factual pattern, and of the predicative pattern derived from the sign—which must be overcome; otherwise two sets of actual entities are playing identical roles in the intuitive judgment and the Category of Objective Diversity has been violated. The indicative feeling and physical recognition of the sign are negatively prehended, and replaced in the intuitive

12 Obviously, several intervening steps are skipped over here for the sake of simplicity: those which would evaluate the picture as a representation or symbol of a kind of animal, and the configuration of letters as a word conventionally signifying the pictured animal.
synthesis by the indicative feeling of the animal, potentially unified by the predicate "platypus." Like any negative prehension, the negation of the sign-feeling adds its subjective form to the synthesis: the platypus-watcher—sign-reader knows that the eternal object "platypus" did not float into his mind ex nihilo. Therefore, there is again a two-way functioning of actual entities in the intuitive judgment: the prehended nexus is also subject of the predicative pattern of the imaginative feeling; hence the two feelings are integrable. The affirmation—negation contrast is manifested in the twofold function of the nexus: as actually involved in the furry animal pattern, and as potentially structurable in the "platypus" pattern. In the case that the indicated nexus and the nexus from which the predicate is drawn are virtually identical (e.g., the platypus recognized vs. the platypus presentationally objectified) the intuitive judgment approaches a conscious perception. On the other hand, when in conscious perception there are significant reversions in the perceptive feeling integrated with the indicative feeling, conscious perception approaches intuitive judgment.

A similar two-way function of an eternal object is possible in certain modalities of intuitive judgment. In the instance that the pattern exemplified in the prehended nexus (and conceptually registered via a derived physical recognition) and the predicative pattern derived from the physical feeling and recognition of the alternative nexus are identical (e.g., the eternal object "platypus" grasped yesterday and today), the proposition (imaginative feeling) is felt as cohering with the nexus physically felt in the indicative feeling. The absence of any contrast between the two eternal objects over and above the exemplification—potentiality, affirmation—negation contrast renders the intuitive judgment a "yes-judgment" characterized by the subjective form (emotional pattern) of belief. In the event, however, that additional material contrast exists between the two eternal objects, a pseudo-contrast without a concomitant ground of identity, the judgment is a judgment of the "no" form. "This animal in the platypus pool is not a platypus." The subjective form of the "this is a platypus" judgment in this case is disbelief—a feeling of the falsity of the proposition, its lack of coherence with the primary feelings in the propositional feeler. The feeling of explicit negation, of "what might have been and is not," restores to the

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13 It should be carefully noted that "truth" and "falsity" are in no way characteristics of intuitive judgments. As has been remarked earlier, only propositions can be true or false: true if the predicative pattern is actually exemplified in the nexus of propositional subjects; false if it is not. The "yes"-judgment judges "S is P" believingly; the "no"-judgment disbelievingly. In both cases, the result is heightened intensity in experience and heightened importance for elements in the data.
propositional predicate what had been eliminated from it in the negative prehension which had rendered the original valuation (e.g., "platypus") apt for synthesis in a proposition: namely, its full scope of potentiality as unbound by the exigencies of particular modes of ingression. To express this phenomenon in the language of classical logic: whereas the predicate of an affirmative proposition is particular (that is, the subject set is part of the predicae set), the predicate of a negative judgment is always universal (the subject set having been excluded from any coincidence with the predicate set). The eternal object is seized in its full, abstract, indeterminate potentiality: not as having been derived from a physical feeling as in conceptual valuation, not as potentially exemplifiable in a physical nexus as in a proposition, but in its pure character as an eternal object. Thus, the negative judgment, the judgment of propositional falsity, constitutes the peak operation of the conceptual pole of an actual entity.

In the more common case, the instance that the nexus pattern and imaginative predicate exemplify both partial identity and partial diversity in their compared structure, judgment is suspended. This is not to say that no judgment is made, for then the concrescence would reach the stalematated situation of an unresolvable opposition between physical and conceptual feelings. An affirmative judgment cannot be made because of the elements of diversity in the two eternal objects; a negative judgment cannot be made because of the identical features in the two patterns. What confronts the concrescent subject is the ground for a compatible contrast between the two patterns and an opportunity for grasping additional information about the nexus pattern, the seed ground for novel hypotheses: "Could this be a female platypus? An immature animal? a mutant?" etc. The suspense forms allow knowledge to grow beyond hard and fast limits imposed by the objectivity of conscious perception.

The subjective form of all variants of the intuitive judgment is characterized by "attention to truth" (PR 275; emphasis added); that is, by attention to the coherence, incoherence, or partial coherence of the nexus pattern and the imaginative predicate. Not all judgments need to be so preoccupied with the world; if they were, then a concrescence could never escape its bondage to the facts, could never initiate novelty. If, however "belief," "disbelief," "suspense"—the subjective forms of "attention to truth"—are not the relevant qualifiers of a judgmental feeling; if, instead, it is qualified by "inattention to truth" (PR 275; emphasis added), the concrescence takes flight on the wings of imagination. In the imaginative judgment, a break with nature as exemplified in the actual world is effected, a readiness to negatively prehend the patterns in the actual world enters the concrescent subject as a result of its
subjective aim, and the wellsprings of genuine creativity are opened, a creativity not rigidly controlled by objective data and given free reign to fathom the depths of limitless possibility. In the imaginative judgment, the universe moves forward in creative advance, new forms luring new data to exemplify them—genuinely creative, non-imitative art which elicits new universes, new concrete values, new civilizations, theoretical breakthroughs. The readiness to break with the past, with tradition, and to envision what could be even though it is now impossible, draws the advancing cosmos toward richer and deeper satisfactions of the creative urge. Without such untied imagination, progress is merely the better mousetrap, the more thoroughly explicated theory—elaborated traditionalism, with its ultimate consequences of staleness, boredom, and triviality.

Intellectual feelings generally characterize high-grade organisms, those in which the flickerings of consciousness assume important roles in their satisfactions. As has been seen already, that which makes such feelings capable of being grasped with the subjective form of consciousness, or, to put the matter in an alternative mode of expression, that which *presences* such feelings, making them reveal a contemporary world rather than record past facts, is the functioning of significant affirmation–negation contrasts in the concrescence, by means of which the illumination of past fact by future possibility consciously realizes the present nexus.

Less sophisticated comparative feelings characterize lower-grade organisms, actual entities lacking sufficient complexity in their actual worlds to elicit affirmation–negation contrasts and yet capable of grasping contrasts of a less abstract modality. Such comparative feelings are termed “physical purposes”: “physical” because of the more important role played by physical feelings; “purposes” because intellective function, in its integration with physical functioning, intensifies the degree to which the concrescent subject becomes a private, self-creative creature rather than a perspectival re-enactment of the environment.

The principal differentiation between the mode of functioning in any of the sorts of physical purposes and that characterizing intellectual operations of the conscious variety lies in the manner in which the valued eternal object is grasped. As analyzed earlier, in the conceptual valuation propaedeutic to propositional feeling, the eternal object is stripped of its determinate reference to the data exemplifying it and seized in its full indetermination as a form for *any* possible fact. It is this elimination of the particularity of the eternal object which renders the affirmation–negation contrast possible between the eternal object as exemplified and as a germane form-of-definiteness. In the conceptual functioning which initiates physical purposes, this negation-of-exemplifi-
fication is absent, leaving only a pure affirmation of the eternal object as exemplified in the data, its indeterminate aspects valued as negligible or insignificant to the concrescence. Note the functioning of the Category of Subjective Harmony here. A more abstract seizure of the eternal object would be inconsonant with the subjective aim of the concrescence, and would vitiate the emergent superjective value, in the same manner as blatant incompatibilities in the initial data and resultant physical feelings would, according to the Category of Subjective Unity, yield a trivial satisfaction.

In the conceptual feelings involved in physical purposes, the eternal object is prehended as a pure potential in this mode of ingress: as the warmth of this fire, the thirst-quenching character of this glass of water, etc. With this understanding of the mode of conceptual operation involved, the schema of integrations in physical purposes becomes easy to trace.

Two principal modes are implicated, determined by the absence or presence of reversions in the conceptual feelings. In the most primitive sort of physical purpose, no conceptual reversion intervenes. The nexus is physically felt, its pattern grasped in a hybrid physical feeling of the eternal object constituting the pattern; the pattern itself is conceptually felt as the pattern-in-the-fact, and this conceptual feeling integrated with the original physical feeling. As an integration of two feelings, some ground of unification, some identity (contrast), must be present; otherwise the integration would be an incoherent summation. The contrast lies in the two-way functioning of the eternal object: as felt in the physical feeling and as valued in the conceptual feeling. The subjective form of the integration (its value in the concrescence and its pragmatic value to be superjected to the future) can be either adversion or aversion. If adversion, the integration has been valued up as a result of its contribution to the “fleshing out” of the subjective aim of the concrescence, and that valuation tends to secure the propagation of like integrations in future occasions of the same historic thread. But if the integration has been valued down, if its subjective form is aversion, the propagation of like integrations is weakened for the future; change is called for. Aversional purposes might therefore seem to serve a valuable function for an historic route of occasions. They do not, however, because the change called for is of a negative sort—one characterizable as a loss of data for the future, an impoverishment of the environment which abandons relevant possibilities—rather than the creative momentum introduced by negative or imaginative judgment which lures the world onward toward novelty.

The second species of physical purposes serves the function of deepening the intensity of satisfaction in lower-grade entities, because such
feelings introduce additional levels of conceptual functioning: namely, reversions. Two categories are operative here: (a) the already mentioned Category of Conceptual Reversion whereby the valuation of the exemplified eternal object generates a grasp of an eternal object relevant to but not embodied in the data;\(^{14}\) and (b) the Category of Transmutation, whereby what is merely conceptually entertained in a superject is physically felt by subsequent subjects. By the Category of Subjective Intensity, any subject’s aim is at intensity: in its own satisfaction and in the relevant future, particularly in future occasions of its own route. Such intensity is gained through the integration of data via contrasts and lost when incompatibilities must be negatively prehended. When eternal objects can be felt together in contrasted unity, intensity deepens; hence the subjective aim of any concrescence is at the realization of more and more complex contrasts, which themselves can be synthesized into systematic structures of contrasted contrasts, yielding aesthetic satisfactions evidencing both balance and complexity.

The appearance of reverted feelings in physical purposes provides the data for such complexity even on the level of relatively low-grade occasions. When a reverted feeling is derived from a conceptual valuation, the two feelings have a common ground which makes their contrasted unification possible, and have as well the conceptual diversity which makes the contrast significant for the concrescence. The integration of the initial physical feeling and the contrasted eternal objects deepens the intensity of the comparative feeling. Furthermore, for actual occasions involved in the historic routes termed personal orders, what is felt as a conceptual reversion in one occasion of the route is physically felt by its successor, which, upon conceptually registering the prior reversion, initiates its own reversion: a conceptual grasp of the physically recognized eternal object grasped by the initial occasion. The result of this repeated “swing” from physical grasp of an eternal object as factually realized to a conceptual reversion of a related eternal object, which reversion itself becomes fact for future physical feelings, introduces a periodic character into the route, an overarching rhythmic pattern of “vibrations” between the two eternal objects in the contrast. The rhythmic pattern itself provides additional contrasts for occasions in the route, and hence additional intensity and complexity in the individual satisfactions composing the personal order. It serves the same function as meter in poetry or rhythm in music—deepening the aesthetic experience through unity in diversity, diversity in unity. The occasion has

\(^{14}\) E.g., the instinctive reversion of the valuation of water-as-thirst-quenching to water-as-soothing-a-burn.
the weight of repetition, the intensity of contrast, and the balance between the two factors of the contrast. . . . An intense experience is an aesthetic fact, and its categorial conditions are to be generalized from aesthetic laws in the particular arts. . . . "All aesthetic experience is feeling arising out of the realization of contrast under identity" [PR 279].