NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. John Herman Randall, Jr., *The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion* (Boston: Starr King Press, 1958), 140. See also Randall's *Nature and Historical Experience* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 269–70 (hereafter, NHE): "Intellectual consistency between 'scientific' and 'religious' beliefs—if the latter are taken as giving an intellectual explanation of anything—is a very great value. But it is an intellectual and philosophical value, not a 'religious' value. . . . In any event, there is a basic distinction between religious beliefs that are 'fundamental,' and perform a religious function—that are religious symbols—and those that give intellectual understanding, that construe and interpret religious insight in terms of some particular philosophy, and adjust it to the rest of man's knowledge and experience. The latter beliefs are the basis of a 'rational' or 'philosophical' theology."

2. Cf. *SPP*, 30: "The question of being is the darkest in all philosophy. All of us are beggars here, and no school can speak disdainfully of another or give itself superior airs. For all of us alike, Fact forms a datum, gift, or *vorgefundenes*, which we cannot burrow under, explain or get behind. It makes itself somehow, and our business is far more with its what than with its whence or why."


4. The hyphen instead of "and" as the connective here is deliberate and important, since it emphasizes the distinctive version of pragmatism's "experience" as a transaction between two poles of reality rather than an interaction between two essentially complete and separate entities.


8. Cf. *PU*, 123: "All the whats as well as the thats of reality, relational as well as terminal, are in the end contents of immediate concrete perception."

10. See also *VRE*, 72–73: “If you have intuitions at all they come from a deeper level of your nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits.”

11. Cf. Richard Stevens, *James and Husserl: The Foundations of Meaning* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1974), 37 (hereafter *JH*): “The task of achieving a fully coherent network of meaning is never finished, for even the most elaborate conceptual system always gives meaning only from a certain perspective, or from a limited number of perspectives.”

12. Cf. Hans Küng, *Eternal Life?* trans. Edward Quinn (New York: Doubleday, 1984), 73–74: “A responsible decision of faith thus presupposes not a blind but a justified belief in an eternal life; the person is then not mentally overpowered but convinced with the aid of good reasons.” See also, the penultimate paragraph of John Smith’s fine Introduction to James’s *Varieties of Religious Experience*: “The book stands as a necessary corrective to the fideistic tendency manifested in the religious thinking of recent decades, which has resulted in the encapsulation of religion within the walls of sheer faith, where it is divorced from any form of knowledge. James did not accept that bifurcation” (p. li).

13. Cf. Ian G. Barbour, *Myths, Models, and Paradigms* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 124 (hereafter *MMP*): “One cannot prove one’s most fundamental beliefs, but one can try to show how they function in the interpretation of experience.” See also Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Revolt Against Dualism* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing, 1960), 398: “Since our knowing is characteristically concerned with beyonds, we know by faith. But not all beyonds of which we can frame ideas are the objects of faiths for which we have motives equally persuasive, urgent, or irrepressible, equally deeply rooted in our cognitive constitution, and equally reconcilable with one another and with what—through our primary faiths in the reality of remembrance and in the existence of other knowers—we believe to have been the constant and common course of experience.” It is worth noting that neither of these thinkers considers himself a pragmatist.

14. Ian G. Barbour, theologian and physicist, has developed an exceptionally accessible viewpoint on the relation between science and religion. Though more conceptually refined and developed, Barbour’s views are strikingly similar to those found within the pragmatic tradition. See in particular his *MMP* and *Issues in Science and Religion* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971).

15. The impossibility of rationally grounding first principles is widely held by twentieth-century thinkers. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is often cited in this regard. Hans Jonas, no friend of irrationalism, has made the point in somewhat less technical language: “If there is a ‘life of reason’ for man (as distinct from the mere use of reason), it can be chosen only nonrationally, as all ends must be chosen nonrationally (if they can be chosen at all). This reason has no jurisdiction even over the choice of itself as a means. But use of reason as a means, is compatible with any end, no matter how irrational. This is the nihilistic implication in man’s losing a ‘being’ transcending the flux of becoming” (*The Phenomenon of Life* [New York: Dell, 1966], 47).

519). It first appeared in the *Journal of Philosophy* 27, no. 7 (1930). For a similar point made within a very different philosophical context, see Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, ed. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 283: "The world seems logical to us because we have made it logical."


18. Cf. John Wild, *The Radical Empiricism of William James* (New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1970), 388–89: "In such facts there is an element of opacity and 'mystery,' as James calls it. No matter how far his knowledge of existence may reach, there will be further depths beyond. Hence the radical empiricist should recognize that in these concrete investigations, he is not concerned with problems that can ever be solved once and for all. He is concerned rather with mysteries into which he may penetrate in various degrees, but which he will never be able to exhaust. This means that he will put forth his own conclusions in a tentative way, attempting at all costs to maintain that openness of mind which is so characteristic of James."


21. Cf. James, cited in *TC*, II:350: "The truth is what will survive the sifting—sifting by successive generations and 'on the whole.'"

22. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York: Dover, 1958), 7. Cf. *WB*, 112: "The thinker starts from some experience of the practical world, and asks its meaning. He launches himself upon the speculative sea, and makes a voyage long or short. He ascends into the empyrean, and communes with the eternal essences. But whatever his achievements and discoveries be while gone, the utmost result they can issue in is some new practical maxim or resolve, or the denial of some old one, with which inevitably he is sooner or later washed ashore on the *terra firma* of concrete life again."


25. In a letter to Arthur Lovejoy in 1907, James made the following concession: "Consequences of true ideas per se, and consequences of ideas qua believed by us, are logically different consequences, and the whole 'will to believe' business has got to be re-edited with explicit uses made of the distinction" (cited in *TC*, II:481).

26. See also *P*, 143: "On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is to build it out and determine it, so that it will combine satisfactorily with all


28. Cf. Randall, *NHE*, 198: "We never encounter the Universe, we never act toward experience or feel being or existence as 'a whole.'" See also Karl Jaspers, *Way to Wisdom*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960), 43: "The world as a whole is not an object, because we are always in it and we never confront the world as a whole. Hence we can not, from the existence of the world as a whole, infer the existence of something other than the world. But this notion takes on a new meaning when it is no longer regarded as a proof. Then metaphorically, in the form of an inference, it expresses awareness of the mystery inherent in the existence of the world and of ourselves in it."


30. It is important to stress that pragmatic extrapolation is rational, and while any extrapolation, such as the one relating to immortality, may be unsuccessful and fall as a result of critical analysis, it cannot be dismissed out of hand simply because it points us beyond the bounds of present experience or strict inferential reasoning. Pragmatic extrapolation does not have the dimension of irrationalism apparent in an affirmation of immortality such as Miguel de Unamuno's. The similarities and contrasts between the two approaches cannot here be delineated, but one crucial difference is that the faith-reason relation in pragmatism does not have the fierce oppositional character that it has in Unamuno. See his *Tragic Sense of Life*, trans. J. E. Crawford Flitch (New York: Dover, 1954), 114: "To believe in the immortality of the soul is to wish that the soul may be immortal, but to wish it with such force that this volition shall trample reason underfoot and pass beyond it."

31. Barbour makes one further point supportive of the kind of pluralism espoused by pragmatism: "In place of the absolutism of exclusive claims of finality, an ecumenical spirit would acknowledge a plurality of significant religious models without lapsing into a complete relativism which would undercut all concern for truth" (*MMP*, 8).

32. Plato scholar Henry G. Wolz has given what I would call a near pragmatic description of extrapolation: "The outcome of an extrapolation can, therefore, be said to be empirical in its origin, transempirical in its nature, and, in as much as it may serve as a norm or means of elucidation, once more empirical, namely, in its function" (*Plato and Heidegger: In Search of Selves* [Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1981], 132).

33. Whether an extrapolation is so "beyond" experience as to be invalidly discontinuous with it is one of the matters not able to be decided in isolation from a range and diversity of factors. Nietzsche, for example, concedes that his notion of the overman is as much a conjecture as is the notion of God, but he considers the former a valid conjecture, the latter invalid: "God is a conjecture; but I desire that your conjectures should not reach beyond your creative will. Could you create a god? Then do not speak to me of any gods. But you could well create the overman" (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann [New York: Viking, 1968], 197).
34. Throughout this essay, I will use the terms “immortality” and “resurrection” interchangeably. In another context it would be important to differentiate them, but it is not crucial from my perspective. I agree with John Hick that “if we posit the reality of God, the difference between immortality and resurrection, as variations within a theistic picture, becomes secondary” (Death and Eternal Life [New York: Harper & Row, 1976], 181).


37. Cf. Lamont, II, 251. After describing a number of such “symbolic interpreta­tion[s]” of immortality and resurrection and conceding that for him they contain “the only truth that immortality ideas ever had,” Lamont adds that these “abstruse redefinitions of immortality and the resurrection cannot be expected to have much emotional efficacy or religious value. They will appeal here and there to certain esoteric religious, philosophic and esthetic groups, but for the great masses of men they will have little significance.”


Since its origination in physics, the "field" concept has been employed in a variety of disciplines. The most notable and developed instance, perhaps, is found in the work of Kurt Lewin, who produced a highly technical social-psychological field theory. For an insightful and suggestive use of a field metaphor, drawn from physics, to illuminate the nature of poetic and religious ecstasy, see Justus George Lawler, "Ecstasy: Towards a General Field Theory," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Dec. 1974, 605-13.

3. Cf. Richard Stevens, James and Husserl: The Foundations of Meaning (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 129 (hereafter, JH): "James discovered that the most primitive data of the stream of consciousness are 'sensible totals,' i.e., ensembles of sense data which always present themselves in a focus-fringe pattern." Stevens is here discussing James's description of experience as it is presented in The Principles of Psychology. I think it evident that these "sensible totals" are an early version of "fields." The following text from Stevens suggests a similar congeniality between James's field language and his doctrine of pure experience: "The primordial field of pure experience is a vaguely pre-structured flow of loosely-linked 'sensible totals.' No totality is ever complete or self-enclosed. On this fundamental level, there is no precise line of demarcation which separates one sensible totality from another" (JH, 24).


Whitehead later adds: "We have to construe the world in terms of the bodily society, and the bodily society in terms of the general functionings of the world. Thus, as disclosed in the fundamental essence of our experience, the togetherness of things involves some doctrine of mutual immanence. In some sense or other, this community of the actualities of the world means that each happening is a factor in the nature of every other happening. . . . We are in the world and the world is in us" (pp. 225, 227).

9. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover, 1958), 208 (hereafter EN). Cf. Randall, NHE, 245: "It is not merely organisms that can be said to 'respond to stimuli,' that is, to respond to particulars as instances of ways rather than as mere particulars."


14. Bernstein, Introduction, *ENF*, xl. See also Bernstein’s *John Dewey* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1967), 83: “From a transactional perspective, an ‘element’ is a functional unit that gains its specific character from the role that it plays in the transaction. . . . A transaction does not occur with an aggregate or combination of elements that have independent existence. On the contrary, what counts as an ‘element’ is dependent on its function within a transaction.” That this radical character of “internal” change is not restricted to macroscopic realities is suggested by the following: “Thus twentieth-century science has revolutionized many fundamental ideas of the nineteenth century; the atom is not only much more complex than Dalton [the founder of chemical atomic theory] thought; it is also much more dynamic. . . . The main mistake of Dalton and other advocates of essentially mechanistic theories lay in the conviction that atoms did not undergo any internal change” (Andrew G. M. van Melsen, “Atomism,” *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1:197).


16. See also John Dewey, *Experience and Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 41 (hereafter *EE*): “The statement that individuals live in a world means, in the concrete, that they live in a series of situations. And when it is said that they live in these situations, the meaning of the word ‘in’ is different from its meaning when it is said that pennies are ‘in’ a pocket or paint is ‘in’ a can.” For a useful comparison of Dewey’s “environment” and Alfred Schutz’s version of the *Lebenswelt*, see Rodman B. Webb, *The Presence of the Past* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1975), 40ff.


18. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Modern Library, 1930), 14, 16. For what can properly be considered a field view related to James and particularly Dewey, see Randall’s “Substance as a Cooperation of Processes,” in *NHE*, 142–94. Randall notes that what he calls “Substance” can be called “the Field” (p. 149n). He later states: “Substance is what we today call ‘process.’ . . . More precisely, Substance is encountered and known as a complex of interacting and cooperating processes, each exhibiting its own determinate ways of cooperating, or Structure” (p. 152).

Given the rather broad sense in which I am understanding “field metaphysics,” one could maintain that Whitehead has constructed the most systematic field metaphysics to date. His *Process and Reality* is, needless to say, a thoroughly processive-relational view of reality. Two texts from his more accessible *Modes of Thought* indicate the deep congeniality between Whitehead and James and Dewey on the central theme of reality as “fields”: “The whole spatial universe is a field of force, or in other words, a field of incessant activity” (p. 186). “The notion of self-sufficient isolation is not exemplified in modern physics. There are no essentially self-contained activities within limited regions. These passive geometrical relationships between substrata passively occupying regions have passed out of the picture. Nature is a theatre for the inter-relations of activities” (p. 191).

simply be used, in a technical way, as the experience-matrix out of which objects of knowledge are constructed. It even has affinities with Dewey's 'experience' and it gave James as much trouble as it afterward made for Dewey. As Perry shows, James had no illusions that he had realized a definitive and finished theory. What James said concerning the mind-body question is applicable to his more general theory: "The only surely false theory would be a perfectly clear and final one" (TC, II:386). While James did not deny the importance and utility of clarity and consistency, in the final analysis, as Perry notes, "he was much more afraid of thinness than he was of inconsistency" (TC, II:668).

20. Cf. TC, II:367: "In the main . . . he was preoccupied with the 'pure experience hypothesis'—in a determined effort to resolve certain entitative differences of traditional thought into relational or functional differences." See also Stevens, JH, 15: "Thus, the traditional problem of an unbridgeable chasm between radically different entities, thoughts and things, is seen as a false question, when entitative differences are replaced by relational or functional differences within a common sphere of pure experiences."


as criteria for the physical he gives physical descriptions which would themselves have to have other criteria for being physical. For instance, he says that the physical can be distinguished from the mental if it is recognized as entering into "relations of physical influence." But it is precisely the problem of providing a rule to identify the physical that is at issue. The recognition of a relation as physical does not tell us why it is physical and not mental. Furthermore, the criteria for the mental world are not exclusive and would apply equally well to the physical world. The physical world is as transitory as the mental field, changing all the while we ourselves change, and the appeal to its "physical inertness" again begs the question.

Of course, the difficulty of finding definitive, clear-cut characteristics to distinguish the physical from the psychical is what leads both materialists and idealists to deny that there are any. For an example from the side of idealism, see Josiah Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1892), 350ff.

22. Bruce Wilshire correctly, I believe, notes that James places an excessive burden on a "pure experience" when he "conceives of a single pure experience as being both the knower and the known. This is exceedingly sparse substantively, and it puts a great theoretical load on pure experience; a single pure experience must be perceiver, perception, and perceived" (William James and Phenomenology [New York: AMS Press, 1979], 170; hereafter WJP).


24. This sentence concludes: "the philosophy of pure experience being only a more comminuted Identitatsphilosophie." Wilshire, concerned to expose the phenomenological tendencies of James's thought, relates this text to James's effort to overcome dualism by coming "to the point of saying that thought and thought's object are in some fundamental way identical" (WJP, 14–15). Cf. ERE, 263: "Can we say, then, that the psychical and the physical are absolutely homogeneous? On the contrary, they are so little heterogeneous that if we adopt the commonsense point of view, if we disregard all explanatory inventions—molecules and ether waves, for
example, which at bottom are metaphysical entities—if, in short, we take reality naively, as it is given, an immediate, then this sensible reality on which our vital interests rest and from which all our actions proceed, this sensible reality and the sensation which we have of it are absolutely identical one with the other at the time the sensation occurs. Reality is apperception itself.

25. John Wild, *The Radical Empiricism of William James* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1970), 361 (hereafter *REWJ*). Wilshire expresses a similar view in describing why he finds a certain richness in *PP* which is lacking in *ERE*. In the former work, James “does not confront us *ab ovo* with a set of discrete pure experiences, but rather with a whole lived-world of experience which is experienced by a person as lived by himself. He takes the first steps toward a direct linking of modes of experiencing and modes of the experienced, and so conceives experience that it never takes place outside a context. Indeed, the founding level of meaning is a context” (*WJP*, 171). It is just this fundamental contextual character of experience that is acknowledged and safeguarded by the use of “field” or “fields” as the primary metaphysical metaphor.


27. Actually, the ambiguity to which Stevens refers is already present in *PP*; a few lines before James describes the personal character of thought or consciousness, he says: “The first fact for us, then, as psychologists, is that thinking of some sort goes on. . . . If we could say in English ‘it thinks,’ as we say ‘it rains’ or ‘it blows,’ we should be stating the fact most simply and with the minimum of assumption. As we cannot, we must simply say that thought goes on” (*PP*, 1:219–20).

28. Wild contends that James’s desire to make room in experience for both the subjective and the objective gives rise to two quite different interpretations. The first, and acceptable, one holds that “experience may have an overarching structure that is neither purely subjective nor purely objective but with a place for both of these phenomena.” On the other hand, since pure experience “has room for both the subjective and the objective, it is easy to infer that in itself, as pure experience, it must be neither the one nor the other, and in itself neutral.” This in turn leads to the view that “pure experience itself is composed of units which are themselves neither one nor the other, but neutral to the whole distinction.” Wild comments that “the dualism of mind and body needs to be overcome but this is too high a price to pay” (*REWJ*, 355–56).

29. Cf. Wilshire, *WJP*, 200: “It is in this sense of an overabounding world, too rich and fluid to be contained by any set of concepts—as truthful as that set might be—which sets James off from Husserl and which places him nearer to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.”

30. See also Stevens, *JH*, 177: “The givenness of the perceptual field is absolute in two senses: it is the absolute source from which consciousness derives the entire fabric of reality and the absolute standard of truth for all meaning.”

31. Both Stevens and Seigfried stress the fact that, for James, we never encounter a chaotic flux of pure heterogeneity. See Stevens, *JH*, 20: “James insists on the fact that the original flow of experience is not a manifold of totally heterogeneous impressions without structure or continuity. But it is, nonetheless, relatively unstructured by comparison with the ulterior patterns of organization imposed by intellectual activity. Thus the return to pure experience refers simply to the uncovering of a world of primary perceptions, considered in abstraction from the selective organiza-
tion of conception." See also Seigfried, CC, 53: "Relations in pure experience are quasi-chaotic in that they have not yet been hardened into specific identifiable relations which are attributable to a chosen context."

32. Cf. James, TC, II:381: "All that is is experiences, possible or actual. Immediate experience carries a sense of more. . . . the 'more' develops, harmoniously or inharmoniously; and terminates in fulfillment or check. . . . The problem is to describe the universe in these terms."

33. The following James text could, I believe, be accommodated within this kind of field perspective: "The paper seen and the seeing of it are only two names for one indivisible fact which, properly named, is the datum, the phenomenon, or the experience. The paper is in the mind and the mind is around the paper, because paper and mind are only two names that are given later to the one experience, when, taken in a larger world of which it forms a part, its connections are traced in different directions. To know immediately, then, or intuitively, is for mental content and object to be identical" (MT, 36).

34. Perry includes a selection from these notes as an appendix under the heading "The Miller-Bode Objections" (TC, II:750–65).

35. Cf. the frequently cited text of James: "Life is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected; often, indeed, it seems to be there more emphatically" (ERE, 42).

36. Bruce Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), 333 (hereafter RAP). Kuklick cites James's reference to "a pluralistic panpsychic view of the universe" (PU, 141). While James does say that this view is the "great empirical movement . . . into which our generation has been drawn" (PU, 141–42), he does not unequivocally make it his own, here or elsewhere in his writings. Thus the commentators are divided on whether James was a panpsychist, with the majority inclining toward the negative. For a subtle and insightful argument that James's later metaphysics was a mode of process panpsychism, see Marcus Peter Ford, William James's Philosophy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), esp. 75–89, the chapter entitled "Pure Experience and Panpsychism."

CHAPTER 2


2. Cf. John Wild, The Radical Empiricism of William James (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1970), 27: "Thus before 1890 and probably before 1885, James clearly recognized that human consciousness is not enclosed within a subjective container, but is rather stretched out towards objects of various kinds in the manner called intentional by later phenomenologists." Cf. also, Bruce Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology (New York: AMS Press, 1979), 125: "The self is not a sealed container full of intrinsically private thoughts. It is as if the self were blasted open and distributed across the face of the lived-world."

3. John Herman Randall, Jr., Nature and Historical Experience (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 173 (hereafter NHE). In a sense the characteristic of not being enclosed within the envelope of the skin is not peculiar to human selves as the following text from Dewey indicates: "The thing essential to bear in mind is that
living as an empirical affair is not something which goes on below the skin-surface of an organism: it is always an inclusive affair involving connection, interaction of what is within the organic body and what lies outside in space and time, and with higher organisms far outside" (*Experience and Nature* [New York: Dover, 1958], 282 [hereafter *EN*]. See also John Dewey, *Art as Experience* [New York: Capricorn Books, 1958], 58–59: “The epidermis is only in the most superficial way an indication of where an organism ends and its environment begins. . . . the need that is manifest in the urgent impulses that demand completion through what the environment—and it alone—can supply, is a dynamic acknowledgment of this dependence of the self for wholeness upon its surroundings.” Cf. A. E. Bentley, “The Human Skin: Philosophy’s Last Line of Defense,” *Philosophy of Science* 8 (1941): 1–19. See also Whitehead’s *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Free Press/Macmillan, 1967), 225, and his *Modes of Thought* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958), 221. For a somewhat similar view from within a different perspective, see Ralph Wendell Burhoe, “Religion’s Role in Human Evolution: The Missing Link Between Ape-Man’s Selfish Genes and Civilized Altruism,” in *Zygon* 14, no. 2: “Biological patterns and behaviors are not limited to determination by genes alone. . . . organic structure and behavior are products of the interaction of the genetic information with a particular set of environing circumstances, including culture and other non-random and enduring factors, which properly have been called ‘paragenetic’ information by such a veteran biological and evolutionary theorist as C. H. Waddington.”


5. One might note increasing evidence that some religious thinkers reject traditional dualism. See John Shea, *What a Modern Catholic Believes about Heaven and Hell* (Chicago: Thomas More Press, 1972), 47: “This dualistic view of man, so long the ally of Christian faith, does not correspond with either modern or biblical anthropology. Modern science envisions man as a psychosomatic unity. . . . The biblical view of man closely parallels the modern. For both Old and New Testament man is an indivisible whole. In biblical literature there are abundant references to body, soul, spirit, and heart but these are not parts into which man may be divided. Each of these words refers fundamentally to the whole man, although each does so in a special manner.” E. J. Fortmann, after acknowledging the nondualistic views of Karl Rahner and John Shea, proceeds to argue in favor of a mode of dualism, drawing upon science, psychology, and parapsychology as well as scripture and the magisterium. See his *Everlasting Life after Death* (New York: Abba House, 1976), 41–68, ch. 2, “Is Man Naturally Immortal?”

6. James, who struggled long and hard to find a viable alternative to dualism, was not unaware of the possibility that it was a fruitless endeavor. In one of his notes he was led to ask: “Doesn’t it seem like the wrigglings of a worm on the hook, this attempt to escape the dualism of common sense?” (cited in Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, 2 vols. [Boston: Little, Brown, 1935], II:369; hereafter *TC*).
7. While some form of materialism is the dominant intellectual perspective in a variety of disciplines, including the social sciences, Harold J. Morowitz has called attention to an interesting anomaly: “What has happened is that biologists, who once postulated a privileged role for the human mind in nature’s hierarchy, have been moving relentlessly toward the hard-core materialism that characterized nineteenth-century physics. At the same time, physicists, faced with compelling experimental evidence, have been moving away from strictly mechanical models of the universe to a view that sees the mind as playing an integral role in all physical events” (“Rediscovering the Mind,” in The Mind’s I, ed. Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett [New York: Basic Books, 1981], 34; reprinted from Psychology Today, Aug. 1980).

8. It is the James of the Principles of Psychology, primarily though not exclusively, who is often described as a materialist. Charles Sanders Peirce’s review of this work calls James “materialistic to the core—that is to say, in a methodical sense, but not religiously, since he does not deny a separable soul nor a future life” (cited in TC, II:105). See also, George Santayana’s review in Atlantic Monthly 67 (1891): 555: “Professor James . . . has here outdone the materialists themselves. He has applied the principle of the total and immediate dependence of mind on matter to several fields in which we are all accustomed only to metaphysical or psychological hypotheses” (cited by Gerald E. Myers, Introduction, PP, I:xxxvii–xxxviii).

9. As an example of how fluid and controversial the claims of materialism can be, the essays in The Mind’s I and the comments of its editors are most instructive. Hofstadter and Dennett themselves label their perspective as materialism but, significantly, describe minds as kinds of patterns or “sophisticated representational systems.” They go on to say: “Minds exist in brains and may come to exist in programmed machines. If and when such machines come about, their causal powers will derive not from the substances they are made of, but from their design and the programs that run in them” (p. 382). In his essay “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” reprinted in the same volume, John R. Searle calls such a doctrine “strong AI” [artificial intelligence]—that is, “the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind” (p. 353)—and maintains that it is a “residual form of dualism” (p. 371):

   Unless you accept some form of dualism, the strong AI project hasn’t got a chance. The project is to reproduce and explain the mental by designing programs, but unless the mind is not only conceptually but empirically independent of the brain you couldn’t carry out the project, for the program is completely independent of any realization. . . . If mental operations consist in computational operations on formal symbols, then it follows that they have no interesting connection with the brain; the only connection would be that the brain just happens to be one of the indefinitely many types of machines capable of instantiating the program. This form of dualism is not the traditional Cartesian variety that claims that there are two sorts of substances, but it is Cartesian in the sense that what is specifically mental about the mind has no intrinsic connection with the actual properties of the brain.” (pp. 371–72)


11. Two thinkers who might be mentioned are Michael Polanyi and Ervin Lazlo. For an expression of the fundamental shortcomings of any reductionism, see Thomas Nagel’s essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” In The Mind’s I, 392–93: “Any
reductionist program has to be based on an analysis of what is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves something out, the problem will be falsely posed. It is useless to base the defense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character."

12. Cf. also Randall, NHE, 224: "But the activities of the so-called 'subject' are clearly as 'real,' as 'objective,' as any other processes involved in the total cooperation. They have just as valid a claim to a legitimate ontological status in Substance." Remember we previously noted that for Randall, that "Substance" can also be called "the Field."


15. It would be more accurate, perhaps, to say that this text "clearly expresses Dewey's desire to reject reductionism," for other texts raise some doubt as to whether he succeeded. See, e.g., EN, 253–54: "The difference between the animate plants and the inanimate iron molecule is not that the former has something in addition to physico-chemical energy; it lies in the way in which the physico-chemical energies are interconnected and operate, whence different consequences mark inanimate and animate activity respectively." Dewey's awareness of a kind of inconclusiveness and ambiguity accompanying this question is indicated, I believe, in EN, 262: "While the theory that life, feeling and thought are never independent of physical events may be deemed materialism, it may also be considered just the opposite. For it is reasonable to believe that the most adequate definition of the basic traits of natural existence can be had only when its properties are most fully displayed—a condition which is met in the degree of the scope and intimacy of interactions realized." See also EN, 255.

It is clear that Dewey, along with many other twentieth-century thinkers, wishes to present a doctrine of mind and matter that avoids both ontological dualism and reductionism. It can safely be said, I believe, that to this day there remains a formidable gap between the wish and the realization. In a note appended to "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (*The Mind's I*, 403n.), Nagel touches upon one reason for this gap:

I have not defined the term "physical." Obviously, it does not apply just to what can be described by the concepts of contemporary physics, since we expect further developments. Some may think there is nothing to prevent mental phenomena from eventually being recognized as physical in their own right. But whatever else may be said of the physical, it has to be objective. So if our idea of the physical ever expands to include mental phenomena, it will have to assign them an objective character—whether or not this is done by analyzing them in terms of other phenomena already regarded as physical. It seems to me more likely, however, that mental-physical relations will eventually be expressed in a theory whose fundamental terms cannot be placed in either category.

See also p. 392: "Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless. The most important and characteristic feature of conscious mental phenomena is very poorly understood. Most reductionist theories do not even try to explain it. And careful examination will show that no currently available concept of reduction is applicable to it. Perhaps a new theoretical form can be devised for the purpose, but such a solution, if it exists, lies in the distant intellectual future."
I believe that it can be said of both James's doctrine of "pure experience" and Dewey's metaphysics of "natural events" that they were attempting to construct "a theory whose fundamental terms cannot be placed in either category."

16. EN is "metaphysical" in the descriptive rather than speculative sense of the term; that is, Dewey's aim was to describe the "universal generic traits of existence" rather than arrive at the "ultimate" principles of reality. This distinction should be kept in mind in what follows.

17. Cf. Dewey, EN, xii: "The intrinsic nature of events is revealed in experience as the immediately felt qualities of things." All events have "qualities" that characterize them, and it is the quality of an event that is immediately experienced. For a clear, concise exposition of "qualities" as understood by Dewey, see Richard Bernstein, *John Dewey* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1969), 89–101, ch. 7, "Qualitative Immediacy." What we "know," according to Dewey, are "objects" not "events." Cf. EN, 318: "When it is denied that we are conscious of events as such it does not mean that we are not aware of objects. Objects are precisely what we are aware of. For objects are events with meanings; tables, the milky way, chairs, stars, cats, dogs, electrons, ghosts, centaurs, historic epochs and all the multifarious subject-matter of discourse designable by common nouns, verbs and their qualifiers."

18. The event character of reality as Dewey understands it presents a formidable obstacle to belief in the kind of enduring self I will pose. One text expresses Dewey's view in a rather touching manner:

A thing may endure secula seculorum and yet not be everlasting; it will crumble before the gnawing tooth of time, as it exceeds a certain measure. Every existence is an event.

The fact is nothing at which to repine and nothing to gloat over. It is something to be noted and used. If it is discomforting when applied to good things, to our friends, possessions and precious selves, it is consoling also to know that no evil endures forever; that the longest lane turns sometime, and that the memory and loss of nearest and dearest grows dim in time. (EN, 71)

19. The slow rate of change, imperceptible to the ancients, was probably one reason why they were led to posit an unchanging reality.

20. Cf. James, *ERE*, 39: "On the principles which I am defending a 'mind' or 'personal consciousness' is the name for a series of experiences run together by certain definite transitions, and an objective reality is a series of similar experiences knit together by different transitions."

21. See also EN, xiii: "Mind is seen to be a function of social interactions, and to be a genuine character of natural events when these attain the stage of the widest and most complex interaction with one another." See also EN, 267–68, where Dewey, speaking of the correspondence of the "physical" and "psychical," contends that "the one-to-one agreement is intelligible only as a correspondence of properties and relations in one and the same world which is first taken upon a narrower and more external level of interaction, and then upon a more inclusive and intimate level." See also EN, 285: "In the hyphenated phrase body-mind, 'body' designates the continued and conserved, the registered and cumulative operation of factors continuous with the rest of nature, inanimate as well as animate; while 'mind' designates the characters and consequences which are differential, indicative of features which emerge when 'body' is engaged in a wider more complex and interdependent situation."
22. See also EN, 284: “To explain is to employ one thing to elucidate, clear, shed light upon, put in a better order, because in a wider context, another thing. It is thus subordinate to more adequate discourse, which, applied to space-time affairs, assumes the style of narration and description. Speaking in terms of captions familiar in rhetoric, exposition and argument are always subordinate to a descriptive narration, and exist for the sake of making the latter clearer, more coherent and more significant.”

23. This “integration of organic-environmental connections” is, of course, pre-eminently present in that organic activity designated mind. Cf. Randall, NHE, 220–21, for an explicit expression of this Deweyan point:

Mind as we encounter it in “the mental situation” is rather a complex set of powers of cooperating in that mental functioning. . . . Strictly speaking, Mind in this personal sense is a power, not of operating, but of cooperating with other powers. Mind is thus, like all powers, a relational power. . . . Hence, if we take Mind as a power to act in certain ways, we must not forget that this power belongs to what is encountered as well as to the encounterer, the so-called human “agent” in thinking. . . . Mind as a power belongs to the process of encountering. . . . Consequently, the question, “What is it that thinks?” becomes the question, “What are the different powers that cooperate in the process of thinking?”

24. Cf. PP, I:277: “The mind is at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities. Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with each other, the selection of some, and the suppression of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of attention.”

25. Dewey’s debt to James concerning such notions as “the vague,” “focus,” and “fringe” is obvious.


CHAPTER 3


2. Cf. James M. Edie, “The Philosophical Anthropology of William James,” in An Invitation to Phenomenology, ed. James M. Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), 128: “James is clearest about what he rejects: the theory of the substantial soul, the associationist theory of Hume, the Transcendental Ego of Kant—all of which are rejected on ‘phenomenological’ grounds, i.e., as unsatisfactory accounts of our experience of self-identity. But on the relationship of the bodily processes to the ‘self’ which is ‘never an object to itself’ James gives, in The Principles, no clear answer and seems to hesitate between parallelism, epiphenomenalism, and interactionism, depending on his polemical concerns of the moment. He was content to leave the problem open and unsolved.”
3. The polemical thrust of much of James’s writing on the self must always be kept in mind. In a particular instance he is first of all concerned to expose the inadequacies of one or another “established” position. As Gerald E. Myers says: “James alternated between placing the burden of doubt, now upon the materialist, then upon the spiritualist. In his discussion of emotion and the consciousness of self he placed that burden upon the latter. In his theorizing about attention and will, on the other hand, it is placed upon the materialist” (PP, I:xxxiv).

4. Cf. Edie, Invitation, 128: “But here again, he does not overcome the original ambiguity; he can be read as an ‘egologist’ or as a ‘non-egologist’ (though I believe the egological interpretation is more consonant with the tenor of his philosophy as a whole particularly since he continues to speak of the experiencing ego as a unified ‘self’ up to the end of his life).”


6. There is a sense in which “feeling” is wider than “perceptual experience” and can be applied also to “conceptual experience.” It can be said that for James, all concepts are “feelings” but not all “feelings” are concepts. James was concerned to avoid assigning “feelings” and “concepts” to different orders of being. Something of this is reflected in an early article (“Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology,” Mind, Jan. 1884) a large excerpt from which is reproduced by James in a long footnote in PP, I:451–52. A few lines will indicate the direction of his thought.

The contrast is really between two aspects, in which all mental facts without exception may be taken; their structural aspect, as being subjective, and their functional aspect, as being cognitions. . . . From the cognitive point of view, all mental facts are intellections. From the subjective point of view all are feelings. . . .

The current opposition of Feeling to knowledge is quite a false issue. If every feeling is at the same time a bit of knowledge, we ought no longer to talk of mental states differing by having more or less, in having much fact or little fact for their object. The feeling of a broad scheme of relations is a feeling that knows much; the feeling of a simple quality is a feeling that knows little.


8. See also PP, I:165: “For the essence of feeling is to be felt, and as a psychic existent feels, so it must be.” I do not wish to suggest that this claim is unproblematic. As we shall see when we discuss the self-compounding of consciousness, some hold that James finally surrendered it. While he modified a particular interpretation of it, I do not think he ever denied the irreducible character of experience that it expresses; in fact, he repeated it in a work he was writing at the time of his death (Cf. SPP, 78).

9. See also PP, I:591: “A succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession.”

10. Bruce Wilshire comments on this text: “James is thus sharply critical of what we know today as behaviorism which misses these basic tendencies and is, therefore, a psychology which dispenses with the psyche; it is a self-satirizing science” (William James and Phenomenology [New York: AMS Press, 1979], 99; hereafter WJP). Wilshire goes on to argue that James’s “remaining dualistic structure” lands him in difficulties from the perspective of phenomenology (WJP, 100). These “difficulties” are not of concern here, since what is being stressed is the irreducible and distinctive character of “feelings of tendency.” Concerning the distinctive character of these feelings, Vic-
tor Lowe makes an eminently helpful comparison: "Whitehead's 'non-sensuous perception' is what James . . . called 'the plain conjunctive experience'; it has no name in the Psychology, but is described under a number of headings such as 'feelings of relation' and 'feelings of tendency'" (Understanding Whitehead [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966], 343).


12. Recall the previously cited text from Dewey in which he describes "a first-rate test of the value of any philosophy which is offered us: Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful?" (Experience and Nature [New York: Dover, 1958], 7). See also James, SPP, 33–34: "The world of common-sense 'things'; the world of material tasks to be done; the mathematical world of pure forms; the world of ethical propositions; the worlds of logic, of music, etc.—all abstracted and generalized from long-forgotten perceptual instances, from which they have as it were flowered out—return and merge themselves again in the particulars of our present and future perception."

13. Cf. Wilshire, WJP, 126: "The general point is that he does not consider the self to be a stable, isolable, and self-identical particular in the sense that a diamond is such a particular."

14. "The Stream of Thought," PP, I:219–78. In PBC, this chapter is given the title by which it is most widely known, "The Stream of Consciousness."

15. Cf. Dewey, PM, 397: "The material of the important chapter on the 'Stream of Consciousness' . . . verbally is probably the most subjectivistic part of the book." Dewey immediately adds: "I say 'verbally' because it is quite possible to translate 'stream of consciousness' into 'course of experience' and retain the substance of the chapter."

16. Cf. Wilshire, WJP, 125: "The upshot of Chapter Ten is that the self is not a sealed container full of intrinsically private thoughts. It is as if the self were blasted open and distributed across the face of the lived-world."

17. Cf. Ehman, NEP, 264: "In maintaining that our present pulse of conscious life might be selfless, James opens himself to the criticism that his interpretation of the central self as felt bodily movements is indeed reductive."

18. James concedes at least the possibility of the "feeling" that Ehman insists upon. Cf. PP, I:323: "The present moment of consciousness is thus, as Mr. Hodgson says, the darkest in the whole series. It may feel its own existence—we have all along admitted the possibility of this, hard as it is by direct introspection to ascertain the fact—but nothing can be known about it till it be dead and gone."

19. The previously cited text from James, "Whenever my introspective glance succeeds in turning round quickly—all it can ever feel distinctly is some bodily process," is similar to David Hume's well-known passage in his Treatise of Human Nature: "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception" (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2d ed., ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978], bk. I, pt. 4, sec. 6, p. 252).
believe that Roderick Chisholm’s critique of Hume is equally applicable to James: “If Hume finds what he says he finds, that is to say, if he finds not only perceptions, but also that he finds them and hence that there is someone who finds them, how can his premisses be used to establish the conclusion that he never observes anything but perceptions?” (“On the Observability of the Self,” in Language, Metaphysics, and Death, ed. John Donnelly [New York: Fordham University Press, 1978], 139). See also 144, 146: “Could it be that a man might be aware of himself as experiencing without thereby being aware of himself?” If what I have suggested is true, then the answer should be negative. For in being aware of ourselves as experiencing, we are, ipso facto, aware of the self or person—of the self or person being affected in a certain way. . . . From the fact that we are acquainted with the self as it manifests itself as having certain qualities, it follows that we are acquainted with the self as it is in itself.”

I have previously noted that a field view of the self rejects any “self as it is in itself” insofar as this suggests that the self has an essential reality independent of its relations and activities. Since there is no “self” independent of the relations or fields (including its activity fields) that constitute it, there is no “self in itself” to be known. Nevertheless, despite terminological differences, my point is not very different from Chisholm’s, since I am affirming an awareness of the self in, through, and with those activities and relations whereby it is a self.

20. 1 Corinthians 15:35–40.


To say that there is no simple and unequivocal identity between the “resurrection body” and the present body is not to deny that they must in some way be the “same.” Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, III (suppl.), Q. 79, Art. 1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1948), III:2890: “We cannot call it resurrection unless the soul return to the same body, since resurrection is a second rising. . . . And consequently if it be not the same body which the soul resumes, it will not be a resurrection, but rather the assuming of a new body.” The difference in language and metaphysical assumptions precludes any unqualified incorporation of Aquinas’s view within the pragmatic perspective of this essay. Nevertheless, there is a crucial and significant insight here that must be accounted for, as will be evident when I later speculate on the kind of transformation of the self that is necessary if the belief in immortality or resurrection is to have plausibility.

As the translator notes, "Scheler makes a phenomenological distinction between the lived body [Leib] and thing-body [Körper]. This distinction, important for the entire phenomenological movement, can be traced back to his essay, 'Die Idole der Selbstkenntnis,' 1911." (Incidentally, the Spicker volume is an eminently useful collection of essays and excerpts from a variety of thinkers, centering on the theme of the "body" in antidualistic literature.)


24. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), 98, 100. See also p. 139: "We must therefore avoid saying that our body is in space, or in time. It inhabits space and time."


27. See also Wilshire, WJP, 137: "James's talk of movements in the head is an attempt to describe his own body as a phenomenal presentation; it is not an attempt to discover the causal bases of consciousness. . . . It is true that there is a pervasive physiological aura about it all. But perhaps this is the way a physiologist and doctor of medicine sometimes experiences his own body."


29. See also JH, 142-43: after critically analyzing those texts that describe "the interpretation of bodily reaction as automatism, unrelated to the performance of consciousness," Stevens calls attention to other passages in which "James rejects the view of the body as a psychophysical thing whose transformations are automatically provoked by stimuli resulting from physical impressions."


31. For a free but accurate expression of James's notion, see Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Chaos and Context (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979), 94: "Sometimes the body is looked upon as a physical object among others, since it can be counted, its metabolic functions tabulated, and its reactions to certain stimuli accurately computed. At other times the body is considered as peculiarly personal, as a center of decision and action and an arena for spiritual, i.e., private, operations such as memory, desire, dreaming, and thinking."

32. I do not wish to suggest that Wilshire and I are using the "field" metaphor for the same purpose or with the same meaning. He is using it to support his phenomenological reading of the Principles, while I am employing it as the metaphysical metaphor that most adequately expresses the metaphysical assumptions of James as well as some other pragmatists. By distinguishing "field-like" and "stream-like" characteristics, Wilshire seems to mean something less intrinsically processive than I do. While I would not insist that all fields are processive as well as relational—mathematical fields perhaps are exceptions—I am maintaining that all existential fields are processive-relational.

33. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 98.

34. First published in the Psychology Review 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1905); reprinted with "slight verbal revision" in ERE, 79-95. All References are to the note on p. 86.
35. Stevens adds: "Husserl remarks that the body, 'reviewed from the inside,' reveals itself as an organism which moves freely and by means of which the subject experiences the external world. From this point of view, it would seem that the body cannot be spatially located alongside of other objects. Rather, the body is experienced as a zero-point, ' . . . as a centre around which the rest of the spatial world is oriented.' On the other hand, 'viewed from outside,' the body appears as a thing among others and subject to causal relationships with surrounding objects" (JH, 88).

36. The notion of the body as a "center" of relations is not confined to Husserl and James. Cf., for example, Sartre, BN, 320, who speaks of "my body inasmuch as it is the total center of reference which things indicate." See also Marcel, MJ, 334–35, who notes that when he allows "my body" to become an object, "I cease to look on it as my body, I deprive it of that absolute priority in virtue of which my body is posited as the centre in relation to which my experience and my universe are ordered."

37. Cf. William Ernest Hocking, who, though more sympathetic to philosophical idealism than James, still maintained that "without bodiliness of some sort there can be no personal living. Existence, for a person, implies awareness of events in time—a continuity of particulars, not an absorption in universals or The One" (The Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience [New York: Harper, 1957], 188).

38. Cf. Edie, Invitation, 122: "By the 'world of sense' James does not mean the chaotic mass of dumb 'stimuli' of physiological or 'sensationalistic' psychology, but the concretely experienced 'life-world' to which Merleau-Ponty, for his part, accords 'the primacy of perception.'"

39. This would have to be greatly qualified as regards science in general but particularly as regards contemporary physics: paradoxically, as its language has become more "exact," the reality of "matter" has seemed to dissolve. This has been apparent for some time as the following text written over fifty years ago indicates: "But the physicists themselves have, if the phrase may be allowed, dissolved the materiality of matter. A body is in the last resort, I suppose, now regarded as a complex system of energy." (W. R. Matthews, "The Destiny of the Soul," Hibbert Journal 28, no. 2 [Jan. 1930]: 200, cited by Corliss Lamont in The Illusion of Immortality [New York: Frederick Ungar, 1965], 53.) More recently R. Mattuck in commenting on interacting particles said: "So, if we are after exact solutions, no bodies at all is already too many" (cited by Douglas R. Hofstadter in The Mind's I, ed. Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett [New York: Basic Books, 1981], 145).

40. Cf. Ignace Lepp, Death and Its Mysteries, trans. Bernard Murchland (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 158: "I assert unequivocally that a man is truly his body. . . . But a basic intuition, anterior to all rational constructs, teaches us that we are something other, and more than our bodies." There is, for example, a belief present from earliest times and within a variety of cultures and still prevalent today to the effect that what really constitutes us cannot be touched by punishment of our bodies. That the refusal to make a simple identification between ourselves and our bodies is not merely a sentimental residue of more primitive experience is evidenced in the following claim by contemporary analytic philosopher Sydney Shoemaker: "Recent work on the problem of personal identity strongly indicates that the identity conditions for persons are different from those for bodies, in such a way as to make it possible for a person to have different bodies at different times; that persons cannot, therefore be identical with their bodies; and that at any given time in a person's life it is a contingent fact that he has
the body he has instead of some other one" ("Embodiment and Behavior," in The Identities of Persons, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976], 135n.).

41. The Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead, ed. Anselm Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 213, 212. See also p. 217: "Persons who believe in immortality, or believe in ghosts, or in the possibility of the self leaving the body, assume a self which is quite distinguishable from the body. How successfully they can hold these conceptions is an open question, but we do, as a fact, separate the self and the organism."


43. We shall see that in James's later writings he will speak of the self in terms of fields of consciousness rather than the body. Thus the "central self" which, as we have seen, is described in bodily terms in the Principles is described in terms of consciousness in A Pluralistic Universe. Cf. PU, 131n.: "The conscious self of the moment, the central self, is probably determined to this privileged position by its functional connexion with the body's imminent or present acts."

CHAPTER 4

1. The lack of a consensus concerning personal identity—whether it is, and if so in what it consists—has not changed much since James's time. "The Identity of the Self" is the title of the opening chapter of Robert Nozick's widely discussed Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981; hereafter PE). This chapter focuses on the "metaphysical question" of "personal identity through time," that is, "how, given changes, can there be identity of something from one time to another, and in what does this identity consist?" Nozick notes that "so many puzzling examples have been put forth in recent discussions of personal identity that it is difficult to formulate, much less defend, any consistent view of identity and non-identity" (p. 29). Whatever the difficulties, personal identity has not ceased to be a problem of concern to philosophers. Analytic philosophers in particular have contributed to the store of technical arguments in support of the various options—no identity, identity through bodily continuity, identity through psychological continuity, identity through some combination of bodily and psychological continuity, identity through some substantial or transcendental principle—but the options themselves have not significantly increased or decreased though there are continuing shifts in the number of supporters for a particular option. The literature on the question of personal identity is rapidly approaching the category of "vast," but two collections of essays can serve as useful introductions to the "state of the question": Personal Identity, ed. John Perry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); The Identities of Persons, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

2. Cf. Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James (Boston: Little, Brown, 1935), II:72–73 (hereafter TC): "Thus 'dualism' was a provisional doctrine by which James the psychologist hoped to eliminate and postpone a question on which James the philosopher had not made up his mind. But this question—namely, of the relation between 'the state of mind' and its 'object'—refused to be
eliminated, as James himself realized immediately after the publication of the Principles, and more and more strongly as the years passed. . . . James was perpetually being led, despite his profession of dualism and of metaphysical abstinence, to the disclosure of a homogeneous and continuous world.

3. Cf. Robert R. Ehman, "William James and the Structure of the Self," in New Essays in Phenomenology, ed. James M. Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), 257: "The important point to see is that identity for James is not to be regarded as a postulated condition of the flux above or behind it but rather found in an immediate felt continuity and resemblance of the phases of the flux themselves.

4. Roderick Chisholm is a formidable defender of the reality of the Ego-subject. A central notion of his defense involves what he calls "self-presenting" propositions, which I interpret as something akin to feeling. See Person and Object (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1976), 112:

What is a criterion of personal identity? It is a statement telling what constitutes evidence of personal identity—what constitutes a good reason for saying of a person x that he is, or that he is not, identical with a person y. Now there is, after all, a fundamental distinction between the truth-conditions of a proposition and the evidence we can have for deciding whether or not the proposition is true. The truth-conditions for the proposition that Caesar crossed the Rubicon consist of the fact, if it is a fact, that Caesar did cross the Rubicon. The only evidence you and I can have of this fact will consist of certain other propositions—propositions about records, memories, and traces. It is only in the case of what is self-presenting (that I hope for rain or that I seem to me to have a headache) that the evidence for a proposition concides with its truth-conditions. In all other cases, the two are logically independent; the one could be true while the other is false.

5. Cf. Gerald E. Myers, PP, I:xxxvi: “What makes the identity of a given state of consciousness? Neither James the psychologist nor James the metaphysician could provide the answer. The peculiar identity or unity of a state of consciousness consists of a ‘diversity in continuity,’ and that can only be felt. Such was the verdict of James the mystic.” It is true, as we shall see, that James does not claim to “explain” just why experience is as it is. Myers’s comment might be misleading, however, if it is understood as suggesting that “James the mystic” emerged after “James the psychologist” and “James the metaphysician” had failed. As already noted and as will be developed more fully later, James insists on taking mysticism seriously precisely because its experiential claims are consistent with his metaphysics of experience.


7. “Person and Personality,” in Johnson’s Universal Cyclopaedia (1895), VI:539, cited in Perry, SWJ, 86. Cf. SPP, 65: “Experientially, our personal identity consists, he [Locke] said, in nothing more than the functional and perceptible fact that our later states of mind continue and remember our earlier ones.”

8. Though articulated explicitly in ERE and PU, the seeds of this distinction between perceptual experience of the flux character of reality and conceptualization are already present in PP. Here James introduces the metaphor “stream” to denote the changing character of thought while also affirming the unchanging character of our concepts. The issue of the sameness of meaning that can be “intended” by a constantly changing mind is too complex to be described in a few sentences. In the chapters “Conception” and “Necessary Truths,” James seems to undermine his reputation as a philosopher of process and experience. In the former he states: “Each conception thus
eternally remains what it is, and never can become another. . . . Thus, amid the flux of opinions and of physical things, the world of conceptions, or things intended to be thought about, stands still and immutable, like Plato's Realm of Ideas" (PP, I:437). Concerning the dispute between evolutionary empiricists and apriorists over the origin of "necessary truths," James tells us that "on the whole . . . the account which the apriorists give of the facts is that which I defend; although I should contend . . . for a naturalistic view of their cause" (PP, II:1216). James would insist that in both instances he is concerned only with the meaning structures of the mind and is not positing concepts or necessary truths as ontological realities. That the only a priori acceptable to him would have to be a kind of processive a priori is hinted at in the following: "What similarity can there possibly be between human laws imposed a priori on all experience as 'legislative,' and human ways of thinking that grow up piecemeal among the details of experience because on the whole they work best?" (letter to Hugo Münsterberg, 1905, cited in TC, II:469).

9. Cf. Aron Gurwitsch, "William James' Theory of the 'Transitive Parts' of the Stream of Consciousness," in Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 305n.: "There is another modification emphasized by James himself which takes place when the stream of consciousness is grasped and objectivated instead of being simply experienced. Whereas the stream itself is continuous and is experienced as such, the acts of reflection by which certain moments or phases are grasped are discrete. Behind these discrete markings, however, the stream of experience goes on continuously." Cf. PU, 106: "The stages into which you analyze a change are states, the change itself goes on between them. It lies along their intervals, inhabits what your definition fails to gather up, and thus eludes conceptual explanation altogether."


13. Cf. James M. Edie, "The Philosophical Anthropology of William James," in An Invitation to Phenomenology, ed. James M. Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), 128: "He can be read as an 'egologist' or as a 'non-egologist' (though I believe the egological interpretation is more consonant with the tenor of his philosophy as a whole, particularly since he continues to speak elsewhere of the experiencing ego as a unified 'self' up to the end of his life)."

14. Cf. ibid., 127: "The more fundamental question involves asking who it is who identifies himself in varying degrees with these divers 'empirical' or 'objective' selves. And James here meets one of his most fundamental 'phenomenological' problems: the problem which Sartre faces in 'The Transcendence of the Ego,' which Merleau-Ponty discusses under the 'lived Body,' which Gilbert Ryle puzzles over in his chapter on the 'Systematic elusiveness of the I,' and which divides phenomenologists into 'egologists' like Husserl and 'non-egologists' like Gurwitsch."

15. James's statement here cannot be accepted without qualification. The significant difference between his understanding of experience and feeling and that of ear-
lier empiricists prohibits any identification of his philosophy with classical empiricism. This point has already been stressed and will become evident again when we consider James’s rejection of the associationist’s account of the self.

16. Cf. Milic Capek, “The Reappearance of the Self in the Last Philosophy of William James,” *Philosophical Review* 62 (1953): 536: “It would be difficult to contradict oneself more often within a single sentence. Does the ‘identifying section’ of the stream not belong to the stream itself, that is to ‘the totality of things collected’? In what sense is it superior to them? How can it collect, survey, own, or disown the past facts, as James claims in the subsequent sentence, while it remains present, that is, external to the past already gone?”

17. Robert Nozick attempts to account for identity over time by his “closest continuer theory” which, though less metaphorical, is suggestive of James’s hypothesis: “The closest continuer view holds that y at t2 is the same person as x at t1 only if, first, y’s properties at t2 stem from, grow out of, are causally dependent on x’s properties at t1 and, second, there is no other z at t2 that stands in a closer (or as close) relationship to x at t1 than y at t2 does” (*PE*, 36–37).


19. Cf. Richard Stevens, *James and Husserl: The Foundation of Meaning* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 83: “In their attempts to describe the peculiar identity of the pure ego, both Husserl and James reject the model of objective identity within a succession of perceptual perspectives. Both maintain that the permanence of the pure ego must be interpreted in terms of function rather than of content.”


21. Cf. Capek, “Reappearance,” 536, where he comments on this passage: “James did not seem to realize that this criticism applied almost verbatim to his own notion of ‘the core of sameness running through the ingredients of the Self.’ ” Indebted as I am to Capek’s article, I believe that he has missed James here. For James, the “tie” is not “inexplicable” insofar as it is verified in experience. By the same token, inasmuch as experience and/or reality is constituted of “ties” or “connections,” there is no need to go behind the phenomena to find the substance which does the tying or connecting.

22. Cf. *PP*, I:268: “There is no manifold of coexisting ideas; the notion of such a thing is a chimera. *Whatever things are thought in relation are thought from the outset in a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a single psychosis, feeling, or state of mind.*”


24. Ibid., 532–33; “The true meaning of the article ‘Does Consciousness Exist?’ . . . is a denial of the artificial separation of the act of consciousness from its content. What James denies is a timeless, ghostly, and diaphanous entity, common to all individuals and consequently impersonal.”

25. Cf. the previously cited text, *PBC*, 175: “The I, or ‘pure ego’ . . . is that which at any given moment is consciousness, whereas the Me is only one of the things which it is conscious of.” This does not, I believe, conflict with my claim that the “I” and the “me” are correlative and that it is not possible to have one without the other. The very possibility of distinguishing me-objects from non-me-objects presupposes, of course, the reality of the “me.”

wrongly translated, 'I think, therefore I am.' It is never bare thought or bare existence that we are aware of. I find myself as essentially a unity of emotions, enjoyments, hopes, fears, regrets, valuations of alternatives, decisions—all of them subjective reactions to the environment as active in my nature. My unity—which is Descartes' 'I am'—is my process of shaping this welter of material into a consistent pattern of feeling."

   The I, the I is what is deeply mysterious!
   The I is not an object.
   I objectively confront every object. But not the I.
   So there really is a way in which there can and must be mention of the I in a non-psychological sense in philosophy.

28. A simpler example: If it is correct to say that Johnny throws the ball with his arm, it is also correct to say simply that Johnny throws the ball.


31. Cf. *Edie, Invitation*, 130, where he focuses on "action as the central category of James' thought."

32. Cf. Ian Barbour, *Myths, Models, and Paradigms* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 158, where he describes the "agent model" developed under the influence of the "action" theorists: "An action is a succession of activities ordered towards an end. Its unity consists in an intention to realize a goal. . . . an action cannot be specified, then, by any set of bodily movements, but only by its purpose or intent." Cf. also p. 139: "A person is an agent as well as an activity, a centre of thought, intentionality and decision, who can reveal himself to us in deliberate communication."


34. Cf. *TC*, II:760, where Perry cites the following note written by James in 1906: "Since work gets undeniably done, and 'we' feel as if 'we' were doing bits of it, why, for Heaven's sake, throw away the naive impression."

35. See also *SPP*, 109: "Meanwhile the concrete perceptual flux, taken just as it comes, offers in our own activity-situations perfectly comprehensible instances of causal agency. The 'transitive' causation in them does not, it is true, stick out as a separate piece of fact for conception to fix upon. Rather does a whole subsequent field grow continuously out of a whole antecedent field because it seems to yield new being of the nature called for, while the feeling of causality--at--work flavors the entire concrete sequence as salt flavors the water in which it is dissolved."


CHAPTER 5

1. To get some idea of how thorny, obscure, and frustratingly elusive some of these questions were for James, see "The Miller-Bode Objections," reproduced in part in Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James* (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1935), II:750–65, Appendix X (hereafter TC). This is a selection made by Perry from notes that James kept between 1905 and 1908, dealing with objections to his doctrine of “pure experience.” I will draw liberally upon these notes insofar as I think they support the processive-relational or field metaphysics, implicit in James’s earliest writing, that becomes most unequivocally evident in A Pluralistic Universe.

2. Cf. Milic Capek, “The Reappearance of the Self in the Last Philosophy of William James,” Philosophical Review 62 (1953): 532: “James thus became a consistent *temporalist* with all the consequences implied in this attitude; temporality does belong, not only to the psychological world of the ‘stream of thought,’ but also to the whole of reality.”

3. Cf. also *PU*, 112: “But if, as metaphysicians, we are more curious about the inner nature of reality or about what really makes it go, we must turn our backs upon our winged concepts altogether, and bury ourselves in the thickness of those passing moments over the surface of which they fly, and on particular points of which they occasionally rest and perch.”

4. Cf. Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, 2 vols., trans. G. S. Fraser (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1950, 1951), I:127: “But it is precisely to the degree in which the spectator is more than simply *spectans*, it is to the degree to which he is also *particeps*, that the spectacle is more than a mere spectacle, that it has some inner meaning—and it is, I repeat, to the degree to which it is more than a mere spectacle that it can give rise to contemplation. And our term ‘participation’, even though it is so far for us not much more than a makeshift, a bridge hastily thrown across certain gaps in our argument, indicates precisely this ‘something more’ that has to be added to the simple recording of impressions before contemplation can arise.”

5. Cf. *VRE*, 341: “I do believe that feeling is the deeper source of religion, and that philosophic and theological formulas are secondary products, like translations of a text into another tongue. . . . In a world in which no religious feeling had ever existed, I doubt whether any philosophic theology could ever have been framed. . . . These speculations must, it seems to me, be classed as over-beliefs, buildings-out performed by the intellect into directions of which feeling originally supplied the hint.”

6. Cf. Elizabeth Flower and Murray G. Murphey, A History of Philosophy in America, 2 vols. (New York: Capricorn Books, 1977), 671: “If as we expect him [James] to do by this time, one substitutes a continuity over time for an identity of substance, then the conditions of continuity would be satisfied if the experience of the present in some cumulative sense captured past experience. Just as the present state of a plant incorporates its past growth, so the present thought owns or represents all that has gone before.”

7. The complex question of continuity-discontinuity cannot be entered into here. While it was a relatively unfinished question in James, Perry suggests that he was working toward a more adequate expression of the senses in which the temporal world is both continuous and discontinuous: “That he would not have left his ‘abrupt increments of novelty’ unrelieved is clear. One may surmise that he would have described a sequence of happenings in which events occur like strokes or pulses, with a thrust of their own; but in which they would at the same time be continuous—in the sense of conjunction or nextness, rather than in the sense of connection. Their continuity would not consist in the link between them, but in the absence of any such intermediary. Being thus in direct contact, they would be subject to ‘osmosis’.” (TC, II:666).
It should be noted that time is not a mathematical continuum for James; rather, it comes in discontinuous "drops" or "pulses." Cf. *SPP*, 80: "On the theory of discontinuity, time, change, etc., would grow by finite buds or drops, either nothing coming at all, or certain units of amount bursting into being 'at a stroke.'" But "discontinuity" is not the whole story, for all experiences also have a dimension of continuity, as is evidenced in James's doctrine of the specious present in which we grasp immediately the receding past and emerging future. "The tiniest feeling we can possibly have comes with an earlier and a later part and with a sense of their continuous procession" (*PU*, 128). Time, then, is continuous insofar as each moment grows immediately (without gap) out of the last moment and will grow immediately into the next. Time is discontinuous insofar as it comes in drops or strokes or pulses—in finite bits.

8. Cf. *PU*, 87n.: "I hold it still as the best description of an enormous number of our higher fields of consciousness. They demonstrably do not contain the lower states that know the same objects. Of other fields, however, this is not so true. . . . I frankly withdrew, in principle, my former objection to talking of fields of consciousness being made of simpler 'parts,' leaving the facts to decide the question in each special case."


10. It has been frequently noted that the strictures James attributes to the logic of identity do not hold against the logic of relations developed in the twentieth century. Cf. Marcus Peter Ford, *William James's Philosophy* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), 106–7:

The logic of identity presupposes that concrete actualities can be defined solely in terms of changeless universals. Consequently, concrete actualities are themselves considered to be changeless. A thing is forever just what it is. Moreover, because concrete things can be defined solely in terms of universals, the relation between one concrete thing and another is not essential to either actuality. Relations are purely accidental. . . . The logic of relations, which includes the logic of identity, affirms what the logic of identity denies, i.e., that a subject may enter into and affect another subject. Because certain kinds of relations are internal to one term and external to the other, subjects may include other subjects. The relations of knowing, loving, or hating include what is known, loved, or hated—knowing x, loving y, hating z. The effect includes the cause, or, more generally stated, the feeling-of-x must include x, otherwise it is merely the feeling-of-

11. The relevance of all this to the earlier field model of the self as a complex of conscious and nonconscious fields shifting and overlapping is obvious.

12. These passages lend support to interpreting James as a panpsychist. I have already "dodged" this question by suggesting that "panactivism" is a less problematic term for describing James's metaphysics than "panpsychism."

13. Cf. Ford, *James's Philosophy*, 87: "The paradox of something being both ex and co another actuality is no paradox at all when seen from a process perspective. What was once ex may be co in a subsequent moment." Cf. also Perry, *TC*, II:664: "But once the logic of identity is abandoned, it is permissible to say that two successive events both are and are not identical: the first develops into the second, the second emerges from the first. There is novelty, but it is a novelty which, when it comes, seems mutual and reasonable, like the fulfillment of a tendency. This notion of a 'really growing world' is the general theme of the latter part of the *Problems of Philosophy.*"
14. Cf. James in TC, II:757: "I find that I involuntarily think of co-ness under the physical image of a sort of lateral suffusion from one thing into another, like a gas or warmth, or light. The places involved are fixed, but what fills one place radiates and suffuses into the other by . . . 'endosmosis.' This seems to ally itself with the fact that all consciousness is positional, is a 'point of view,' measures things for a here, etc. . . ."

15. Cf. PU, 121: "The absolute is said to perform its feats by taking up its other into itself. But that is exactly what is done when every individual morsel of the sensational stream takes up the adjacent morsels by coalescing with them. This is just what we mean by the stream's sensible continuity. No element there cuts itself off from any other element, as concepts cut themselves from concepts. No part there is so small as not to be a place of conflux. No part there is not really next its neighbors; which means that there is literally nothing between; which means that no part goes exactly so far and no farther; that no part absolutely excludes another, but that they compenetrate and are cohesive; if you tear out one, its roots bring out more with them; that whatever is real is telescoped and diffused into other reals."

16. Cf. also PU, 104: "All felt times coexist and overlap or compenetrate each other thus vaguely; but the artifice of plotting them on a common scale helps us to reduce their aboriginal confusion."

17. Cf. Lewis Thomas, The Medusa and the Snail (New York: Bantam Books, 1980), 10-12: "If there is life there, you will find consortia, collaborating groups, working parties, all over the place. . . . It is beyond our imagination to conceive of a single form of life that exists alone and independent, unattached to other forms. . . . Everything here is alive thanks to the living of everything else. All the forms of life are connected. . . . We are components in a dense, fantastically complicated system of life, we are enmeshed in the interliving, and we really don't know what we're up to."

18. Cf. Gerald E. Myers, PP, I:xxxv–xxxvi: "He confessed that neither he nor anyone else could explain how the peculiar identity and unity of a state of consciousness can result from a combination of elements. In our experience we do find the concept 'diversity and multiplicity in unity' fulfilled, but we cannot explain it. This is because, in the very effort to conceptualize those moments wherein we find unity composed of diversity, we break up the unity; our concepts keep things separated, whereas our experience finds them together in a unity and continuity that cannot be conceptualized. Thus, the sort of continuity that pervades a pure experience, that characterizes the diversity of a state of consciousness, that connects human experiences to God's, cannot be described."

I have cited Myers's fine introduction to the Principles several times, for, as the citations indicate, he locates the Principles within the larger context of James's philosophy with which I am concerned. I regret that his full-length study of James, William James: His Life and Thought (New Haven, Conn., 1986), was not available during the period in which my essay was composed. Myers's impressive work is the most comprehensive treatment of James's life and thought yet written, and it is likely to remain so for some time.

19. Cf. Ralph Barton Perry, The Spirit of William James (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938), 115–16: Perry points out that James escaped the paradox of one entity being "in some sense both identical and non-identical with another . . . by taking the concrete entity as an integrated complex which by overlapping another
could be both identical with that other as regards their community, and also non-
identical as regards their individualities and private remainders."

20. See above, page 104.

21. Cf. VRE, 191: "In the wonderful explorations by Binet, Janet, Breuer, Freud, Mason, Prince, and others, of the subliminal consciousness of patients with hysteria, we have revealed to us whole systems of underground life, in the shape of memories of a painful sort which lead a parasitic existence, buried outside the primary fields of consciousness."

22. It is doubtful whether almost three-quarters of a century later we can be said to be much "further" than James. For a more recent consideration of parapsychological claims by one who like James is sympathetic but also reaches a "very open and uncertain" conclusion, see John Hick, "The Contribution of Parapsychology," in Death and Eternal Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 129–46.

23. Cf. the T. H. Huxley, "Life and Letters," I, 240, cited by James in "Final Impressions of a Psychical Researcher," MS, 185–86: "But supposing these phenomena to be genuine—they do not interest me. If anybody would endow me with the faculty of listening to the chatter of old women and curates in the nearest provincial town, I should decline the privilege, having better things to do. And if the folk of the spiritual world do not talk more wisely and sensibly than their friends report them to do, I put them in the same category. The only good that I can see in the demonstration of the 'Truth of Spiritualism' is to furnish an additional argument against suicide. Better live a crossing-sweeper, than die and be made to talk twaddle by a 'medium' hired at a guinea a Seance." In fairness, such parapsychological claims as those of extrasensory perception and clairvoyance should be distinguished from "spiritualism" and "mediumship." But apart from the question of their authenticity, there still seems to be a significant qualitative difference in the lives of those who apparently possess such powers and those recognized as "mystics."

24. William James, Talks to Teachers (New York: Norton, 1958), 34.

25. That this is not merely an anti- or nonintellectual emotive expression on the part of James is well noted by Marian C. Madden and Edward H. Madden in their comment on this text: "It was not only the will to believe which helped him embrace the free-will view but also the removal of the belief, on good evidence, in the automaton theory. Indeed, the will to believe that one is free was not enough for James by any means. That option had to be made a live one for him by honestly eliminating the automaton theory, done by hard intellectual labor. His respect for scientific evidence had to be met, and it was" ("The Psychosomatic Illnesses of William James," Thought, Dec. 1979, p. 392).

26. Cf. also P, 60: "Free will pragmatically means novelties in the world, the right to expect that in its deepest elements as well as in its surface phenomena, the future may not identically repeat and imitate the past."

27. Three of the four experiences were similar in character, the fourth being a disturbing dream that recurred over several nights. The waking experiences are the focus of my concern, but James's conclusion regarding the dreams is well worth noting: "The distressing confusion of mind in this experience was the exact opposite of mystical illumination, and equally unmystical was the definiteness of what was perceived. But the exaltation of the sense of relation was mystical (the perplexity all revolved about the fact that the three dreams both did and did not belong in the most intimate way together); and the sense that reality was being uncovered was mystical in the
highest degree. To this day I feel that those extra dreams were dreamed in reality, but when, where, and by whom, I cannot guess" (CER, 511).


29. Cf. *VRE*, 157–58. Though James here attributes an experience of metaphysical terror to an anonymous Frenchman, he later admitted it was his own.

30. Cf. *TC*, II:346: "I have no mystical experience of my own, but just enough of the germ of mysticism in me to recognize the region from which their [sic] voice comes when I hear it." See also, *TC*, II:350: "I have no living sense of commerce with a God. . . . Although I am so devoid of *Gottesbewusstsein* in the directer and stronger sense, yet there is *something in me* which *makes response* when I hear utterances from that quarter made by others." John Smith considers this last statement "the key to the resolution of whatever paradox is involved" in James being "convinced at second-hand that only first-hand experience in religion represents the genuine article" (*VRE*, xvi).

31. Cf. *WB*, 223: "No part of the unclassified residuum has usually been treated with a more contemptuous scientific disregard than the mass of phenomena generally called *mystical*. . . . All the while, however, the phenomena are there, lying broadcast over the surface of history."

32. Cf. *VRE*, 58–59: "Such cases, taken along with others which would be too tedious for quotation, seem sufficiently to prove the existence in our mental machinery of a sense of present reality more diffused and general than that which our special senses yield."

33. James will later suggest that if the word "subliminal" is offensive "smelling too much of psychical research or other aberrations," then one might speak of the A- and the B-region of personality. The A-region is "the level of full sunlit consciousness." The larger B-region "is the abode of everything that is latent and the reservoir of everything that passes unrecorded and unobserved. It contains, for example, such things as all our momentarily inactive memories, and it harbors the springs of all our obscurely motivated passions, impulses, likes, dislikes, and prejudices. Our intuitions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions, convictions, and in general all our non-rational operations, come from it" (*VRE*, 381).

34. Cf. Perry, *TC*, II:273: "Again he discovered that men find within themselves unexpected resources upon which to draw in times of danger or privation. There is thus a common thread running through James' observations on religion, neurasthenia, war, earthquakes, fasting, lynching, patriotism—an interest, namely, in human behavior under high pressure, and the conclusion that exceptional circumstances generate exceptional inner power. These phenomena have a bearing on metaphysics because such exceptional power suggests the sudden removal of a barrier and the tappings of a greater reservoir of consciousness."

35. Cf. *WB*, 237: "The result is to make me feel that we all have a potentially 'subliminal' self, which may make at any time irruption into our ordinary lives. At its lowest, it is only the depository of our forgotten memories; at its highest, we do not know what it is at all."

36. Cf. Patrick Kieran Dooley, *Pragmatism as Humanism* (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1975), 169: "Even though he felt that the existence of the self was required by man's ethical religious experiences, he maintained that the self was only *experienced* as cephalic movements of adjustment. James now proposed that this self, experienced as muscular adjustment, was only a portion of a wider self. Moreover, the
wider self was experienced in ethical and religious experiences wherein the wider self moves from the periphery (subconscious awareness) to the center (conscious awareness)."

37. From an essay on subliminal consciousness written by Frederick Myers in 1892 and published in *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research* 7:305. The congeniality of this text to the kind of field-self suggested in this essay is quite evident.

38. James was quite aware that in encouraging speculations such as Fechner's, one was opening a Pandora's box. Cf *PU*, 142: "It is true that superstitions and wild growing over-beliefs of all sorts will undoubtedly begin to abound if the notion of higher consciousnesses enveloping ours, of fechnerian earth-souls and the like, grows orthodox and fashionable. . . . But ought one seriously to allow such a timid consideration as that to deter one from following the evident path of greatest religious promise? Since when, in this mixed world, was any good given us in purest outline and isolation? One of the characteristics of life is redundancy. . . . Everything is smothered in the litter that is fated to accompany it. Without too much you cannot have enough of anything."

39. Something similar is suggested by Charles Sanders Peirce:

A friend of mine, in consequence of a fever, totally lost his sense of hearing. He had been very fond of music before his calamity; and, strange to say, even afterwards would love to stand by the piano when a good performer played. So then, I said to him, after all you can hear a little. Absolutely not, he replied; but I can feel the music all over my body. Why, I exclaimed, how is it possible for a new sense to be developed in a few months! It is not a new sense, he answered. Now that my hearing is gone I can recognize that I always possessed this mode of consciousness, which I formerly, with other people, mistook for hearing. In the same manner, when the carnal consciousness passes away in death, we shall at once perceive that we have had all along a lively spiritual consciousness which we have been confusing with something different. (*The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, 8 vols., ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931–35, 1958], VII, par. 577)

40. In a letter written shortly after the publication of *VRE*, James stated: "I think that the fixed point with me is the conviction that our 'rational' consciousness touches but a portion of the real universe and that our life is fed by the 'mystical' region as well" (cited in *TC*, II:346).

41. Cf. the British analytic philosopher, H. H. Price's "Survival and the Idea of 'Another World,'" in *Language, Metaphysics, and Death*, ed. John Donnelly (New York: Fordham University Press, 1978), 194: "If there are other worlds than this (again I emphasize the 'if'), who knows whether with some stratum of our personalities we are not living in them now, as well as in this present one which conscious sense-perception discloses?"

42. Cf. Perry, *TC*, II:676–77: "This belief was to some extent founded on normal observation, on the reports of others, and on the theory of the subliminal consciousness which he adopted from Myers. But the impression is irresistible that it was his own unusual experiences that put the seal of conviction on what would otherwise have been an alluring but open hypothesis."

43. If we read some of the more arcane Jamesian texts within such a field metaphysics, I believe we render them a bit more plausible. Try it, for example, singly and together, with two just-cited texts—"millions of years later, a similarly retrospective experience, should any come to birth . . ." and "a continuum of cosmic consciousness. . . ."
44. In a text written more than twenty years earlier, there is an anticipation of this “collectivism of personal lives,” though with a more abstract and less dynamic flavor: “If idealism be true, the great question that presents itself is whether its truth involve the necessity of an infinite, unitary, and omniscient consciousness, or whether a republic of semi-detached consciousnesses will do,—consciousnesses united by a certain common fund of representations, but each possessing a private store which the others do not share” (“On Some Hegelisms,” WB, 215).

45. Cf. also TC, I:526: “Nihilism denies continuity. Of the two elements of change it says one does not exist at all till the other has ceased entirely. Common sense lets one thing run into another and exist potentially or in substance where its antecedent is, allows continuity.” Cf. also p. 527: “Substance metaphysically considered denotes nothing more than this: ‘it is meant,’ a plus ultra the phenomenon. What this plus may be is left undecided; it may be a noumenal world, it may only be other phenomena with which the present real one is related,—it may, in a word, denote merely the continuity of the real world.”

46. In positing a substantive sameness as characterizing the self, we must keep in mind the distinctive features of James’s doctrine of personal identity described in the last chapter, in particular, the mode of “sameness” that is experientially warranted. Cf. PP, I:318: “The past and present selves compared are the same just so far forth as they are the same, and no farther.”

CHAPTER 6

1. C. Stephen Evans, Subjectivity and Religious Belief (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), 142. The most dramatic expression of the metaphysical and ethical implications attached to the God-question is Nietzsche’s famous parable of the “Death of God.” What Nietzsche so brilliantly and terrifyingly illustrates is that the loss of belief in the traditional God is not restricted in its implications to the undermining of the classical arguments for the existence of God, nor even to the denial of the existence of some transcendent Being. Rather, the “death of God” involves the dissolution of that view of reality upon which the most important and central institutions and values of Western civilization were grounded.

2. Paul Tillich, The Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958), 45: “Whatever we say about that which concerns us ultimately, whether or not we call it God, has a symbolic meaning. It points beyond itself while participating in that to which it points. In no other way can faith express itself adequately. The language of faith is the language of symbols.”

I wish to add that the symbolic character of God-language applies particularly to the use of the masculine pronouns “he” and “him.” I have followed customary Western usage throughout simply because I could think of no alternative that would not be cumbersome and distracting. Needless to say, God is no more nor less “he” than “she”; nor, perhaps, than “it.”

3. It is not only those working explicitly out of the pragmatic tradition who reject this simplistic dichotomy. Cf. the sociologist of religion Robert Bellah’s “Religion in the University: Changing Consciousness, Changing Structures,” in Claude Welch, ed., Religion in the Undergraduate Curriculum (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Colleges, 1972), 14:

For the religiously orthodox religious belief systems were felt to represent “objective” reality as it really is, and thus if one of them is true the others must be false,
either absolutely or in some degree. For the secular orthodox all religion is merely “subjective,” based on emotion, wish or faulty inference, and therefore false. For the third group, who take symbolism seriously, religion is seen as a system of symbols which is neither simply objective nor simply subjective but which links subject and object in a way that transfigures reality or even, in a sense, creates reality. For people with this point of view the idea of finding more than one religion valid, even in a deeply personal sense, is not only possible but normal. This means neither syncretism nor relativism, since it is possible within any social or personal context to develop criteria for the evaluation of religious phenomena and a consequent hierarchy of choices.

4. Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature*, trans. Erazim V. Kohák (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 476: “At this point Orphic Poetry [Goethe, Rilke, Nietzsche] leaves us unsatisfied. It conceals a great temptation, the temptation to lose ourselves as subjectivity and to sink in the great metamorphosis. . . . It is no accident that Orphism tends to a nature of worship in which the unique status of the Cogito evaporates in the cycle of the mineral and the animal.”


6. See also P, 40–41: “If theological ideas prove to have value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged.”

7. Cf. TC, II:273: “Again he discovered that men find within themselves unexpected resources upon which to draw in times of danger or privation. . . . These phenomena have a bearing on metaphysics because such exceptional power suggests the sudden removal of a barrier and the tappings of a greater reservoir of consciousness; and they have a bearing on ethics, since this power differs in degree rather than in kind from that moral power—that fighting and adventurous spirit, that heroic quality—which gives to life the color and radiance of value.”

8. The passage elided reads, “So a ‘god of battles’ must be allowed for one kind of person, a god of peace and heaven and home, the god for another.” I have dropped it because it distracts from the richness of James’s pluralistic perspective by giving the impression that all gods must be allowed. This is in sharp opposition to his view that we must evaluate all claims, including religious ones, on the basis of their experiential fruits. I submit that whatever limited fruits belief in a “god of battles” brought forth at an earlier time, the overwhelming historical evidence points to its now being an unacceptable belief.

9. For a recognition of God’s pluralistic relationship to the human community from a biblical perspective, cf. Clark M. Williamson, *Has God Rejected His People? Anti-Judaism in the Christian Church* (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon, 1982), 164: “If one assumes that God affects the world by offering different possibilities to different peoples in different times and places, then we may affirm that God wills diversity and pluralism.” While not in conflict with a pluralism such as that suggested by Williamson the pluralism presented by James is more personalistic than cultural. It is the diversity of personal needs present even at the same time and in the same culture that James refers to several times in the *Varieties* (in addition to *VRE*, 384, just cited, see also pp. 115, 136, 127). Further, James does not restrict pluralism to that of “religious” types. In a passage left out of earlier published versions of the *Varieties*, James states: “The first thing that strikes us is that the religious man in the sense used in these lectures is only one type of man. Round about him are other men who say
they cannot realize this experimental commerce with the divine; and taken collectively there is no flagrant difference of worth in the two classes of persons. . . . No one type of man whatsoever is the total fullness of truth immediately revealed. Each of us has to borrow from the other parts of truth seen better from the other's point of view" (VRE, 383).

10. This is a variation on the following: "But rationality has at least four dimensions, intellectual, aesthetical, moral, and practical; and to find a world rational to the maximal degree in all these respects simultaneously is no easy matter" (PU, 55).

11. "The best fruits of religious experience are the best things that history has to show" (VRE, 210). "Religious rapture, moral enthusiasm, ontological wonder, cosmic emotion, are all unifying states of mind, in which the sand and grit of selfhood incline to disappear, and tenderness to rule" (VRE, 225). Hans Küng takes a position similar to that of James when he points out that the existence of needs, desires, and wishes do not prove that there is a fulfilling reality corresponding to them, but neither does their existence exclude such a possibility: "To be more precise, could not the sense of dependence and the instinct of self-preservation have a very real ground, could not our striving for happiness have a very real goal?" Küng then cites a text from Edward von Hartmann which denies that the psychological dimension of a belief renders it untrue: "It is quite true that nothing exists merely because we wish it, but it is not true that something cannot exist if we wish it. Feuerbach's whole critique of religion and the whole proof of his atheism, however, rest on this single argument; that is, on a logical fallacy" (Hans Küng, Eternal Life? trans. Edward Quinn [New York: Doubleday, 1984], 30–31).

12. For a contrary view presented within a semi-playful context, see Stanislaw Lem, "Non Serviam," in The Mind's I, ed. Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 313: "Living, we play the game of life, and in it we are allies, everyone. Therewith, the game between us is perfectly symmetrical. In postulating God, we postulate a continuation of the game beyond the world. I believe that one should be allowed to postulate this continuation of the game, so long as it does not in any way influence the course of the game here. Otherwise, for the sake of someone who perhaps does not exist we may well be sacrificing that which exists here, and exists for certain."

13. For a strikingly similar image constructed by a thinker who is at the opposite pole from James concerning the value of religion, see Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 40: "Disintegration characterizes this time, and thus uncertainty: nothing stands firmly on its feet or on a hard faith in itself; one lives for tomorrow as the day after tomorrow is dubious. Everything on our way is slippery and dangerous, and the ice that still supports us has become thin: all of us feel the warm, uncanny breath of the thawing wind; where we walk, soon no one will be able to walk."

14. Cf. VRE, 367: "The genuineness of religion is thus indissolubly bound up with the question whether the prayerful consciousness be or be not deceitful. The conviction that something is genuinely transacted in this consciousness is the very core of living religion."

15. John Smith claims that "the importance to James's argument of this extension of faith to include God and the ideal order has not been sufficiently appreciated." According to Smith, "James was calling attention to the pervasive religious belief
that the 'More,' however conceived, is never thought of as present only in the experience of the individual but is envisaged as at work in the cosmos in the form of a divine order" (*VRE*, xlvii-xlix).


18. In a letter to James commenting on religion in *A Pluralistic Universe*, Bertrand Russell noticed "one purely temperamental difference: that the first demand you make of your God is that you should be able to love him, whereas my first demand is that I should be able to worship him" (In James, *MT*, Appendix IV, 303).

19. Cf. *PU*, 28: "The doctrine on which the absolutists lay most stress is the absolute's 'timeless' character. For pluralists, on the other hand, time remains as real as anything, and nothing in the universe is great or static or eternal enough not to have some history."


21. As early as 1882, James questioned the need for an all-inclusive God. In a letter to Thomas Davidson, he wrote: "It is a curious thing this matter of God! . . . I find myself less and less able to do without him. He need not be an all-including 'subjective unity of the universe.' . . . All I mean is that there must be some subjective unity in the universe which has purposes commensurable with my own, and which is at the same time large enough to be, among all the powers that may be there, the strongest. I simply refuse to accept the notion of there being no purpose in the objective world. . . . In saying 'God exists' all I imply is that my purposes are cared for by a mind so powerful as on the whole to control the drift of the universe" (TC, I:737).

22. Cf. Marcus Peter Ford, *William James’s Philosophy* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), 100: "This process view of the relations between God and a given individual, or God and the World, which both James and Whitehead ascribe to, necessarily implies that God has an environment and that God is in some respects limited in power and knowledge. Both James and Whitehead accept this view of God, but for different reasons. Whitehead’s understanding of God’s limitations follows from metaphysical principles whereas James’s understanding of God (at least as developed in *A Pluralistic Universe*) is merely an ad hoc solution to the problem of evil." I would strongly disagree with Ford on this. Granted that James does not present his case with the systematic metaphysical rigor of Whitehead, I think it is clear that even in *PU* the metaphysical pluralism advanced by James leads to a finite God. Even apart from the problem of evil, an infinite God would seem to undermine the autonomy and freedom of human activity, creativity, and novelty.

23. "Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here below to their own poor over-beliefs may not actually help God in turn to be more effectively fruitful to his own greater tasks" (*VRE*, 408). "I confess that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world may not in part depend on the personal response which any one of us may make to the religious appeal" (*WB*, 55).

24. Cf. Levinson, *RIWJ*, 205: "James wanted to articulate a pantheism that admitted real chaos on the one hand but real reparation of chaos on the other."

J. Hollingdale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 52–53: "God's honesty.—A god who is all-knowing and all-powerful and who does not even make sure that his creatures understand his intention—could that be a god of goodness? Who allows countless doubts and dubieties to persist, for thousands of years, as though the salvation of mankind were unaffected by them, and who on the other hand holds out the prospect of frightful consequences if any mistake is made as to the nature of truth? Would he not be a cruel god if he possessed the truth and could behold mankind miserably tormenting itself over the truth?"

26. Bonnell Spencer, O. H. C., God Who Dares to Be Man: Theology for Prayer and Suffering (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 4. It is significant, I believe, as David Griffith notes in his review of this work, that Spencer balks at positing a finite God. Instead he justifies God's actions on the basis of divine self-limitation and respect for the integrity of human self-determination (Process Studies, Fall 1983, 238). I suspect that this is an example of an unresolved conflict between an existential insight and a desire to maintain the traditional understanding of God.

28. Williamson, Has God Rejected His People? 150.

30. Cf. Lem, "Non Serviam," 316. "He who is almighty could have provided certainty. Since He did not provide it, if He exists, He must have deemed it unnecessary. Why unnecessary? One begins to suspect that maybe He is not almighty. A God not almighty would be deserving of feelings akin to pity, and indeed to love as well; but this, I think, none of our Theodicies allow." If Lem gives us a playful version of the situation, Thomas Hardy gives us a more cynical one:

He did sometimes think that he had been ill-used by fortune. . . . But that he and his had been sarcastically and piteously handled in having such irons thrust into their souls he did not maintain long. It is usually so, except with the sternest of men. Human beings, in their generous endeavor to construct a hypothesis that shall not degrade a First Cause, have always hesitated to conceive a dominant power of lower moral quality than their own; and, even while they sit down and weep by the waters of Babylon, invent excuses for the oppression which prompts their tears. (The Return of the Native [New York: Harper & Row, n.d.], 455)

31. Cf. James's reply to a questionnaire concerning his views of God and religion: "God" to me, is not the only spiritual reality to believe in. Religion means primarily a universe of spiritual relations surrounding the earthly practical ones, not merely relations of "value," but agencies and their activities. I suppose the chief premise for my hospitality towards the religious testimony of others is my conviction that "normal" or "sane" consciousness is so small a part of actual experience. What e'er be true, it is not true exclusively, as a philistine scientific opinion assumes. The other kinds of consciousness bear witness to a much wider universe of experiences, from which our belief selects and emphasizes such parts as best satisfy our needs. (LWJ, II:213)


34. God as a presupposition for personal immortality is, of course, the view of almost all who have in any way affirmed the latter doctrine. "Almost" but not all—a
notable exception is the late nineteenth-century Hegelian philosopher, J. M. E. McTaggart; see his *Human Immortality and Pre-existence* (London: E. Arnold, 1916).

35. Cf. also *WB*, 111: “In every being that is real there is something external to, and sacred from, the grasp of every other. God’s being is sacred from ours. To cooperate with his creation by the best and rightest response seems all he wants of us. In such co-operation with his purposes, not in any speculative conquest of him, not in any theoretic drinking of him up, must lie the real meaning of our destiny.” Levinson expresses James’s view here as follows: “When they [Theists] characterized the world as ‘thou,’ they pictured its deepest power as formally personal, individuated, and caring; fighting for righteousness as men understood it and recognizing each individual for the person he is. God was a ‘power not ourselves’ who helped people realize their best intentions because he meant to” (*RIWJ*, 41).


38. Ralph Harper, *The Existential Experience* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 122, 123. Harper sees the threat, if not the already realized reality, of the loss of transcendence and presence as placing the very life of the self in jeopardy. Thus he states: “Proust meant to be shocking when he said, ‘We exist alone. Man is the creature that cannot emerge from himself, that knows his fellows only in himself; when he asserts the contrary he is lying’ (*Remembrance of Things Past*, 2:698).” Harper maintains that “no more frightening judgment has ever been made of human existence, not even the announcement that God is dead, for it is tantamount to saying that man is dead also” (p. 82).


41. The possibility of a continued existence apart from the body is acknowledged by Whitehead: “How far this soul finds a support for its existence beyond the body is:—another question. The everlasting nature of God, which in a sense is non-temporal and in another sense temporal, may establish with the soul a peculiarly intense relationship of mutual immanence. Thus in some important sense the existence of the soul may be freed from its complete dependence upon the bodily organization” (*Adventures of Ideas* [New York: Free Press/Macmillan, 1967], 208).


CHAPTER 7


2. Cf. John Herman Randall, Jr., *Philosophy after Darwin*, ed. Beth J. Singer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 18 (hereafter *PAD*): “Science had already destroyed the faith in personal immortality. It could of course not disprove the belief, but it could and did make it seem irrelevant to the kind of being man is.” See also, Louis Dupré, *Transcendent Selfhood* (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), 80: “Indeed, even to religious believers today the thought of a future life remains far from the center of their faith, if they do not reject it outright.”
8. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, trans. D. F. McGuinness and B. F. McGuinness (New York: Humanities Press, 1961), 151. Cf. also Wittgenstein’s *The Blue and Brown Books* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 45: “The difficulty in philosophy is to say no more than we know.” Perhaps at least one benefit and one liability would result from literal adherence to this injunction: The benefit would be that most of us, in particular philosophy professors, would be rendered almost mute; the liability might be that unless we continually strive to say more than we know, we will never know more than we now say.
10. Cf. Ian Barbour, *Myths, Models, and Paradigms* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 180 (hereafter *MMP*): “There is a ‘holy insecurity,’ as Buber calls it, in our lack of certainty about the finality of our formulations. There is a risk in acting on the basis of any interpretative framework which is not subject to conclusive proof. Faith, then, does not mean intellectual certainty or the absence of doubt, but rather a trust and commitment even when there are no guaranteed beliefs or infallible dogmas. Faith takes us beyond a detached and speculative outlook into the sphere of personal involvement.”
11. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Self and Its Dramas* (New York: Scribner, 1955), 94: “The elaboration of the meaning of the Christian revelation demanded from the very beginning that the truth about life and God apprehended in an historical revelation be brought into conformity with the truth which may be known by analyzing the structures and essences of reality on all levels.”
12. Cf. Richard Neuhaus’s description of Wolfhart Pannenberg’s theology: “A critical faith is not a compromise with modernity. It is, rather, a more radical commitment which takes the risk of making one’s faith vulnerable to refutation by further evidence” (“History as Sacred Drama,” *Worldview*, April, 1979, p. 23).

The risk accompanying critical thinking is not restricted to Christians or even to “religious” believers. Cf. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York: Dover, 1958), 222: “Let us admit the case of the conservative; if we once start thinking no one can guarantee where we shall come out, except that many objects, ends and institutions are surely doomed. Every thinker puts some portion of an apparently stable world in peril and no one can wholly predict what will emerge in its place.”


16. The following text of Wittgenstein's is, I believe, a response to a situation similar to the one under consideration:

   There are, for instance, these entirely different ways of thinking first of all—which needn't be expressed by one person saying one thing, another person another thing.

   What we call believing in a Judgement Day or not believing in a Judgement Day—the expression of belief may play an absolutely minor role.

   If you ask me whether or not I believe in a Judgement Day, in the sense in which religious people have belief in it, I wouldn't say: “No. I don't believe there will be such a thing.” It would seem to be utterly crazy to say this.

   And then I give an explanation: “I don’t believe in . . .”, but then the religious person never believes what I describe.

   I can't say. I can’t contradict that person. *(Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, ed. Cyril Barrett [Berkeley: University of California Press, n.d.], 55)*

17. While not asserting that Paul Ricoeur is advancing a position identical in all respects to the one here presented, I do believe that his commentary on the following Goethe citation points in the same direction:

   If you have not understood
   The command, “Die and become!”
   You are but an obscure transient
   On a shadow of an earth.

   “Highly coded language” says Ricoeur. “The incantation suggests that we dare not translate: The *no* and *yes* are bound in all things according to a dialectic law which is not at all one of arithmetical composition but one of metamorphosis and transcendence. The universe travails under the hard law of ‘Die and become’” *(Freedom and Nature*, trans. Erazim V. Kohák [Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966], 473).


19. Is this something of what Nietzsche is calling for in the following? “The needful sacrifice.—These serious, excellent, upright, deeply sensitive people who are still Christians from the very heart: they owe it to themselves to try for once the experiment of living for some length of time without Christianity, they owe it to their faith in this way for once to sojourn 'in the wilderness'—if only to win for themselves the right to a voice on the question whether Christianity is necessary” *(Daybreak*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982], 37).

20. Of course, I am employing a paradoxical mode, no novelty in questions of this sort. One might argue that in such questions as God and immortality, anything less than paradox is trivial; anything more is impossible.


(New York: Dover, 1954) (hereafter TSL). Unamuno not only refuses to accept immortality belief and tragedy as mutually exclusive but goes a long way toward making tragedy the essential character of such belief. Unamuno's style is much too florid and superheated to suit the laid-back contemporary philosopher; nevertheless, I must admit that I find myself engaged by his metaphysical wail. Indeed, without suggesting any comparison between my halting, all too tentative words and those of Unamuno, my effort might be entitled: "Unamuno without Tears." I am struggling to sing the same song, though in a much lower key and with immeasurably more prosaic music.


25. William Ernest Hocking and Ralph Barton Perry, both sympathetic to belief in immortality, assert that such belief does not remove the pain of death. "No doctrine of survival in any case escapes the fact of death," Hocking tells us, "nor the suffering that goes with it; these remain the data of every argument" (MI, 9). According to Perry, "The belief in a future life mitigates but does not destroy the menace of death, and while it provides reserves of hope it leaves abundant room for fortitude" (*The Hope of Immortality* [New York: Vanguard Press, 1945], 26; hereafter HFI).

26. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 261: "Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, including books, than he already knows. For what one lacks access to from experience one will have no ear. Now let us imagine an extreme case: that a book speaks of nothing but events that lie altogether beyond the possibility of any frequent or rare experience—that it is the first language for a new series of experiences. In that case, simply nothing will be heard, but there will be the acoustic illusion that where nothing is heard, nothing is there."


28. Cf. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 3rd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 102: "To escape nihilism which seems involved both in asserting the existence of God and thus robbing this world of ultimate significance, and also in denying God and thus robbing everything of meaning and value—that is Nietzsche's greatest and most persistent problem."


30. Cf. *WP*, 3: "What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism."

31. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in PN, 125. See also the Nietzsche note cited by George Morgan, *Nietzsche* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), 313: "We must take upon us and affirm all suffering that has been suffered, by men and animals, and have a goal in which it gets reason."
"We justify all the dead subsequently and give their life meaning, when we form the superman out of this material and give the entire past a goal." See also texts cited by Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, trans. Charles F. Wallroff and Frederick J. Schmitz (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1965), 167: "In spite of all, he must come to us sometime, this redeeming man . . . who gives the earth its purpose . . . this victor over God and nothingness. . . . God has died, our desire is now that the superman live."

32. Cf. Joan Stambaugh, *Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Return* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 88: "The superman is the man who is able to affirm eternal recurrence, the man who experiences eternal recurrence as his own inner being. The superman is a possibility which appears with the death of God."

33. For an insightful development of eternal return as the affirmation of the depth of the moment, see Stambaugh, *Nietzsche's Thought*.

34. I think that Bernd Magnus is right when he claims that Nietzsche does not escape a version of eternalism in his effort to overcome that kronophobia that appears to be an inescapable feature of the human condition; see Magnus, *Nietzsche's Existential Imperative* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 195–96.

35. Rainer Maria Rilke, himself touched by Nietzsche, wrote of his own *Duino Elegies* and *Sonnets to Orpheus*: "To presuppose the oneness of life and death . . . to know the identity of terror and bliss . . . is the essential meaning and idea of my two books" (Briefe, Wiesbaden, 1950, II, 382, 407; cited in Erich Heller, *The Disinherited Mind* [New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1957], 148).


39. See also SE, 98: "Yet this was precisely what American classical philosophical tradition was proposing, namely that the very transient character of our human lives enhanced, rather than denigrated, the profound inferential character of our values, decisions, and disabilities."


42. That "all shall be well" is, of course, the essence of religious hope. The fifteenth-century mystic Julian of Norwich expresses this as a divine revelation: "At one time our Lord said: 'All things shall be well'; and at another she said: 'Thou shalt see thyself that all manner of things shall be well'" (*The Revelations of Divine Love of Julian of Norwich*, trans. James Walsh, S. J. [New York: Harper, 1961], 98).


45. Cf. Yeager Hudson, "Death and the Meaning of Life," in *PAT*, II:98: "A play or novel which did not end would be completely unsatisfactory." Hartshorne and
Hudson might find support for their position on esthetic grounds in the examples of "endless" soap operas. For many, however, the lack of a final ending does not seem to diminish the interest.


47. For a diametrically opposed view, see Hocking, *MI*, 150: "The true meaning of the deed is what it means to the self which performs it; without this self the deed has no meaning at all . . . And if this self vanishes, and all like it, meaning vanishes out of the world. No achievement can keep the person alive, but the continuance of the person is a guaranty that such values as that shall not reduce to nothing. It is the person who perpetuates the achievement, not the achievement the person."


50. The *locus classicus* for this view of immortality is in Pericles' Funeral Oration, Thucydides 2.43–44. Andy Warhol somewhere said something to the effect that "in the future everyone will be famous for fifteen minutes." This would hardly have satisfied the Greeks and is not likely to satisfy any present or future fame seekers. The essence of belief in fame-immortality is that one will achieve or create something that will continue to endure after one's death. The radical discrepancy between the living experience and what remains is poignantly captured in the opening lines of James's "Address at the Emerson Centenary in Concord": "The pathos of death is this, that when the days of one's life are ended, those days that were so crowded with business and felt so heavy in their passing, what remains of one in memory should usually be so slight a thing. The phantom of an attitude, the echo of a certain mode of thought, a few pages of print, some invention, or some victory we gained in a brief critical hour, are all that can survive the best of us" (MS, 19).


52. It must be conceded that James comes very close to agreeing with the view that survival of values or ideals is more important than survival of individuals. In *VRE*, he tells us that he did not discuss immortality because it seemed to him "a secondary point . . . If our ideals are only cared for in 'eternity,' I do not see why we might not be willing to resign their care to other hands than ours" (*VRE*, 412). In a letter to James, Carl Stumpf, after declaring that "personal immortality stands for me in the foreground," cites the foregoing passage and comments that it "seems to me to contain a sort of inner contradiction. The realization of ideals is only possible on the presupposition of individual immortality." James responds: "I agree that a God of the totality must be an unacceptable religious object. But I do not see why there may not be superhuman consciousness of ideals of ours, and that would be our God. It is all very dark. I have never felt the rational need of immortality as you seem to feel it; but as I grow older I confess that I feel the practical need of it much more than I ever did before; and that combines with reasons, not exactly the same as your own, to give me a growing faith in its reality" (cited in Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, 2 vols. [Boston: Little, Brown, 1935], II:343, 345). James here converges with and diverges from the views of Hartshorne and Jonas. He converges insofar as he makes survival of ideals the important matter; he diverges insofar as he does not exclude the possibility of personal survival.


55. For an apparent counterchoice, see Mary McCarthy's novel, *Cannibals and Missionaries* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), 293–94. A group of hijackers are in process of exchanging hostages for some great works of art. One of the hostages, sympathetically portrayed, reflects upon the "strategic genius" of this undertaking: "If a hostage or two got killed, it had to be seen in the perspective of the greater good of the greater number. But works of art were a different type of non-combatant, not to be touched with a ten-foot pole by any government respectful of 'values.' It was in the nature of civilians to die sooner or later . . . while works of art by their nature and in principle were imperishable. In addition, they were irreplaceable, which could not be said of their owners. . . . The lesson to be derived . . . was that paintings were more sacrosanct than persons."


57. Perhaps the most laid-back response to "the absurd" is that of Thomas Nagel in "The Absurd," in *Language, Metaphysics, and Death*, ed. John Donnelly (New York: Fordham University Press, 1978), 114: "I would argue that absurdity is one of the most human things about us. . . . It need not be a matter of agony unless we make it so. Nor need it evoke a defiant contempt of fate that allows us to feel brave or proud. Such dramatics, even if carried on in private, betray a failure to appreciate the cosmic importance of the situation. If, *sub specie aeternitatis*, there is no reason to believe that anything matters, then that does not matter either, and we can approach our absurd lives with irony instead of heroism or despair."

58. Cf. Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being*, 2 vols., trans. G. S. Fraser (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1950–51), II:155: "What we have to find out is whether one can radically separate faith in a God conceived in His sanctity from any affirmation which bears on the destiny of the intersubjective unity which is formed by beings who love one another and who live in and by one another. What is really important, in fact, is the destiny of the living link, and not that of an entity which is isolated and closed in on itself. That is what we more or less explicitly mean when we assert our faith in personal immortality."

59. Even bracketing the question of God, the cessation of human persons must be lamented. "It is absurd for us to insist," Bixler points out, "in line with the present mood, on an educational process in which personality shall be developed and an economic order in which it can be maintained, and to profess at the same time indifference to its extinction" (IPM, 35). Cf. Perry, *HFI*, 11: "Whatever philosophy praises the creation of man must deplore its annihilation."

60. Cf. William Styron's novel, *Sophie's Choice* (New York: Random House, 1979), 218–19. Styron's protagonist, evidently speaking for the author, argues against George Steiner's suggestion that confronted with an evil on the magnitude of the Holocaust, "silence is the answer"; he adds that "Steiner has not remained silent" but has stated that "the next best is 'to try and understand.'"

61. Cf. *IPM*, 63, where Bixler cites the British idealist Bernard Bosanquet to the effect that "we shall never get a popular conception of religion that is clear and sane until this perpetual hankering after a future life as a means of recompense is laid to rest."
62. For an interpretation of resurrection that does not separate individual and community, cf. Charles, *Eschatology*, 164: "Not to a future of individual bliss, even though in the divine presence, but to a resurrection to a new life (Is. xxvi. 19) as members of the holy people and citizens of the Messianic kingdom, did the righteous aspire. The *individual* thus looked forward to his highest consummation in the life of the righteous community" (italics added). For a more recent personalist version of resurrection, cf. Rosemary Haughton, *The Passionate God* (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), 196: "Jesus talked to people about eternal life, or life in the kingdom of God, in ways which make it clear that he thought of them as being still and always 'themselves.' They would not 'merge' into the kingdom, they would 'inherit' it, live in it, have 'mansions' in it."

63. Cf. Hans Küng, *Does God Exist?* trans. Edward Quinn (New York: Doubleday, 1980), 659: "There can be a true consummation and a true happiness of mankind only when not merely the last generation, but all men, even those who suffered and bled in the past, come to share in it."

64. I am not, of course, suggesting that this constancy of belief in eternal life has been an identity of belief in all ages of the Christian community. The different modes in which this belief has been expressed through art, literature, reliquaries, altar-pieces, death rites, and funerary practices is brilliantly detailed by Philippe Aries in *The Hour of Our Death*, trans. Helen Weaver (New York: Knopf, 1981).

65. Cf. James B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness* (New York: Macmillan, 1928), 253: "As the belief in miracles and special answers to prayer and in the interference of the supernatural within the natural has gradually disappeared, almost the only pragmatic value of the supernatural left to religion is the belief in a personal future life" (cited in Lamont, II, 6). See also Lamont, II, 5: "But in this fundamental identity between God and immortality priority still belongs to immortality. God would be dead if there were no immortality."

CHAPTER 8


2. H. D. Lewis, *The Self and Immortality* (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 196 (hereafter *SI*). See also William Ernest Hocking, *The Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience* (New York: Harper, 1957), xi–xii (hereafter *MI*): "Unless an Idea has or can have an intelligible basis in the constitution of things it is illegitimate, whether for postulate or for faith: we must be able to say what it is we postulate or believe."


8. Such a view is antithetical to any interpretation of Jesus' teaching that sees no comparison possible between present and future life. For a representative example, see Franz Mussner, "The Synoptic Account of Jesus' Teaching on the Future Life," in Immortality and Resurrection, ed. Pierre Benoit and Roland Murphy (Herder & Herder, 1970), 53: "It is Jesus' teaching that the coming life bears no comparison with the present life. To make Jesus a witness to a point of view that saw this life as one evolving towards the coming life, would be to misrepresent the synoptic account of his teaching."

9. Cf. Denis Goulet, "Is Economic Justice Possible?" Cross Currents, Spring 1981, 47: "Can any religion offer a convincing rationale why men and women should build history even as they strive to bear witness to transcendence? . . . One vital arena is how any religion values time itself: is earthly life simply a means to some paradise beyond this world, or is it rather some end having its own dignity and worth?"

10. Cf. James, SPP, 116: "If we do our best, and the other powers do their best, the world will be perfected"—this proposition expresses no actual fact, but only the complexion of a fact thought of as eventually possible."

11. For a critique of Teilhard de Chardin on just this point, see, George Maloney, "Death and Omega: An Evolving Eschaton," in PAT, I:143: "Thus two great weaknesses of Teilhard's system (he never comes to serious grips with the problems) are (1) he fails to continue the evolutionary process beyond the Omega Point and (2) he does not answer how the majority of the human race, all those billions who have lived in the past, our present majority and a good deal of the future to come, how will they reach the Omega Point?"

12. Cf. Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 23–24: "That which, in the language of religion, is called 'this world' is the universe of reduced awareness, expressed, and, as it were, petrified by language. The various 'other worlds,' with which human beings erratically make contact are so many elements in the totality of the awareness belonging to Mind at Large."

13. See also WB, 51: "But the inner need of believing that this world of nature is a sign of something more spiritual and eternal than itself is just as strong and authoritative in those who feel it, as the inner need of uniform laws of causation ever can be in a professionally scientific head."

14. Though he would be outraged by the use James and I make of it, a somewhat similar phenomenon is suggested by Nietzsche: "We discover an activity that would have to be ascribed to a far higher and more comprehensive intellect than we know of. . . . Of the numerous influences operating at every moment, e.g., air, electricity, we sense almost nothing: there could well be forces that, although we never sense them, continually influence us" (The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, ed. Walter Kaufmann [New York: Vintage Books, 1967], 357).

15. There is a highly technical question attached to the notion of a plurality of worlds: namely, the possibility or conceivability of plural times, or plural spaces, or plural space-times. Speculation on this question is not confined to "tender-minded" or "romantic" thinkers. See, for example, Hocking's reference (MI, 210) to "Minkowski's Memoir of 1908, in which he vigorously assaulted the doctrine of monism (though chiefly for the purposes of calculation), making the radical assertion that 'from henceforth we shall speak no more of Space and Time, but of spaces and times.'"

John Hick (DEL, 279–95) speculates on the plurality of spaces as a prerequisite for
a doctrine of bodily resurrection. The distinguished psychologist Gardner Murphy asks, "Is there a possibility that general psychology would say, 'We don't yet have a time-space reference for the study of death any more than we have a time-space reference for the study of personality?'" (The Meaning of Death, ed. Herman Feifel [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965], 339).

The conceivability of plural spaces is defended by Anthony Quinton in "Spaces and Times," Philosophy, April 1962. And working from a radically different philosophical and cultural context, P. T. Raju states: "I think that the Upanishads are right in saying that there are different levels of space and time. There is space between one book and another; but what is the space that separates ideas of cause and effect when I think of the law of causation? What is the space that separates me and my mental images? Certainly, I am not my mental images. And what is the time that separates me as observing the first instant of a duration of five seconds and me as observing the last instant? How many problems arise here? ("Self and Body: How Known and Differentiated," Monist 61, no. 1 [Jan. 1978], 153–54).

16. Cf. John Shea, What a Modern Catholic Believes about Heaven and Hell (Chicago: Thomas More Press, 1972), 21 (hereafter HH): "Hope is rooted in the actuality of things. . . . If personal immortality is a true hope and not a mere wish, in some way it must be intimated in the experience of men."

17. Extrapolation is an act of imagination that should be sharply differentiated from idle fantasy. Cf. William Lynch, S. J., Images of Hope (New York: New American Library, 1965), 27, 209: "For one of the permanent meanings of imagination has been that it is the gift that envisions what cannot yet be seen, the gift that constantly proposes to itself that the boundaries of the possible are wider than they seem. . . . The first task of such an imagination, if it is to be healing, is to find a way through fantasy and lies into fact and existence." Lynch also develops this theme, that the imagination is essentially reality-oriented, in Christ and Apollo (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961).

18. Recall the previously cited statement of James: "I have no mystical experience of my own, but just enough of the germ of mysticism in me to recognize the region from which their [sic] voice comes when I hear it" (cited in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 2 vols, [Boston: Little, Brown, 1935], II:346; hereafter TC).

I have made no reference to a large body of claims which are often cited as supporting immortality—those of spiritualism and other paranormal psychic experiences. The evaluation of these claims is an undertaking in itself and one that I make no pretense of doing in a footnote. Let me simply say that I share with many who have sympathetically investigated these claims the conclusion, "not proved." That is not their greatest weakness, however, for pragmatism neither asks nor expects "proof" in such instances. What it does seek are fruits in the form of the deepening, illumination, and expansion of human life. Such fruits can reasonably be said to issue from the lives of many if not all mystics but are decidedly less evident in the case of "spiritualists," particularly in their claims of communication with the dead. James, himself deeply sympathetic with and professionally supportive of such efforts, concluded, as we saw earlier, that "the spirit-hypothesis exhibits a vacancy, triviality and incoherence of mind painful to think of as the state of the departed" (CER, 438–39).

A figure who might be an exception here, and who commands the respect of a number of serious thinkers, is Rudolph Steiner. While I find the details of his otherworld descriptions bordering on the fantastic, there is an element of insight in his writings that I think should not be dismissed. Two passages from his autobiography
might be cited as most congenial to the kind of extrapolation or model herein offered: “I have tried to show in my book that nothing unknowable lies behind the sense-world, but that within it is the spiritual world. . . . I insisted that a person who deepens his view of the world as much as lies within the scope of his powers, will discover a universal process which encompasses the true reality of nature as well as morality” (Rudolph Steiner, An Autobiography [Blauvelt, N.Y.: Rudolph Steiner Publications, 1977], 215, 213). There is one other group of phenomena that I can only mention in passing—“clinical death” experiences such as those described by R. A. Moody in Life after Life (St. Simons Island, Ga.: Mockingbird Books, 1975). These are instances in which persons judged clinically dead, “return” to life and proceed to describe “out of body” experiences, usually as beautiful and reassuring. While these experiences might support a view of the self that avoids identifying it with the body narrowly understood, I find nothing in them that can be cited as evidence for immortality. Since the definition of “death” presupposed is suspect, there is no difficulty in accounting for these phenomena in “materialistic” terms. I share Hans Küng’s conclusion concerning such cases: “What then do these experiences of dying imply for life after death? To put it briefly, nothing! . . . Experiences of this kind prove nothing about a possible life after death: it is a question here of the last five minutes before death and not of an eternal life after death” (Eternal Life?, trans. Edward Quinn [New York: Doubleday, 1984], 20).

19. Cf. Gottfried Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George R. Montgomery (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1947), 58: “Suppose that some individual could suddenly become King of China on condition, however, of forgetting what he had been, as though being born again, would it not amount to the same practically, or as far as the effects could be perceived, as if the individual were annihilated, and a king of China were the same instant created in his place? The individual would have no reason to desire this.” A similar insight is found in Aristotle: “No one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become someone else . . . he wishes for this only on condition of being whatever he is” (Nichomachean Ethics 9.4.1166a, ed. Richard McKeon [New York: Random House, 1941], 1081).


But eternity and immortality are by no means necessarily exclusive terms: on the contrary, our experience here and now may carry in it “the power of an endless life”, and be in truth the only earnest or guarantee of such a life. . . . It does not follow that the attainment of religious insight in the present life involves the surrender of any hope of a personal life beyond. Why should not the apprehension of the eternal rather carry with it the gift of further life and a fuller fruition? . . . Throughout the New Testament, accordingly, even in the passages which most clearly treat “eternal life” as realized here and now, the present experience is never taken as foreclosing the possibility of a future life, but always rather as a foretaste, as an assurance, indeed, of a fuller realization hereafter.

Time," in PAT, I:233: "The point Kierkegaard wants to make is that the eternal is the present or better that the present is the eternal."


25. See also MI, 71: "But if lastingness is a mark of value, is it not an absurdity of a universe in which the everlasting things are things which do not know and cannot become aware of their post of honor?" For a diametrically opposed interpretation of the endurance of inorganic entities, see Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life (New York: Dell, 1966), 276: "If permanence were the point, life should not have started out in the first place, for in no possible form can it match the duration of inorganic bodies." Though Camus does not believe in its reality, he does recognize the efficacy of a life that endures: "It appears that great minds are sometimes less horrified by suffering than by the fact that it does not endure. In default of inexhaustible happiness, eternal suffering would at least give us a destiny" (The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower [New York: Vintage Books, 1956], 261).


29. John Baillie, And the Life Everlasting (New York: Oxford University Press, 1934), 204. Cited in Louis Dupré, Transcendent Selfhood, (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), 81. Cf. Owen Barfield, "Matter, Imagination, and Spirit," Journal of Religion, Dec. 1974, 627: "I would wish to emphasize that I mean important . . . for the whole future of humanity. The issue of survival after death today has, I believe, that kind of importance as well as the personal one. But I am not very fond of the word 'survival' in this context. It has too strong a suggestion of a mere prolongation of the life we are so familiar with. I prefer 'immortality' as suggesting transition to a new and very different kind of life."


31. William Frost, "Religious Imagination," Ecumenist, March-April 1980, 44. Also relevant is Frost's description (p. 43) of the interpretation that the Marxist Ernst Bloch gives to "Christ's saying that he who loses his life will find it and he who seeks his life will lose it. Only those who are willing to follow the life of the soul which vibrates beyond the body and the mundane are made free for an immortality which is more than the existing form of reality. It is the trans-cosmological."

32. This, I believe, is the fundamental thrust of his The Phenomenon of Man, trans. Bernard Wall (New York: Harper, 1959). Teilhard also implies that human beings would not participate in a process that they knew was a dead-end one: "Man will never take a step in a direction he knows to be blocked. There lies precisely the ill that causes our disquiet" (p. 229). See also p. 231: "Without the taste for life, mankind would soon stop inventing and constructing for a work it knew to be doomed in advance."

we apprehend only the one aspect which is in tune with our own organo-psyche structure."


37. See also, Fortman, *ELD*, 135, where he describes Karl Rahner's and Ladislaus Boros's process views of purgatory. While Fortman himself is not completely antagonistic to a processive purgatory or heaven, he balks at the notion of a processive God.


40. See also Norton, *Personal Destinies*, 237: "Goethe said to Eckermann that he would not know what to do with an afterlife if it did not provide new tasks and new opportunities. This extrapolative propensity is supported by certain distinctive theories of immortality as exemplified in the thought of Immanuel Kant and Josiah Royce."


42. It should be noted, however, that the relation between "fitness" and immortality was not a late-life afterthought for James. See PP, I:330: "The demand for immortality is nowadays essentially teleological. We believe ourselves immortal because we believe ourselves fit for immortality. A 'substance' ought surely to perish, we think, if not worthy to survive; and an insubstantial 'stream' to prolong itself provided it be worthy, if the nature of Things is organized in the rational way in which we trust it is."

43. Cf. James L. Muyskens, *The Sufficiency of Hope* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979), 72: "Unless one's sense of self and one's potential are very limited or one is uncommonly blessed with favorable conditions and knows it, death blocks one's path to genuine fulfillment. . . . At the time of one's death, self-fulfillment normally has not been attained. Much of one's potential remains untapped. If, then, death is the final curtain, it destroys the possibility of a truly meaningful life to a great many. For them, it would be reasonable to desire a life after death in the form of personal survival."

44. Cf. Marcel, *MB*, II: 153–55: "First let me quote again what one of my characters says, 'to love a being is to say, 'Thou, thou shalt not die.' . . . [This] prophetic assurance . . . might be expressed fairly enough as follows: whatever changes may intervene in what I see before me, you and I will persist as one: the event that has occurred and which belongs to the order of accident, cannot nullify the promise of eternity which is enclosed in our love, in our mutual pledge."

45. Thomas Hardy, *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* (New York: Signet, 1964), 416. Prince Andrew in Tolstoy's *War and Peace* responds differently to the separation consequent upon the death of a loved one: "All I say is that it is not argument that convinces me
of the necessity of a future life, but this: when you go hand in hand with someone and all at once that person vanishes there, into nowhere, and you yourself are left facing that abyss and look in. And I have looked in..." (trans. Aylmer Maude [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1942], 422).

46. Gabriel Marcel Creative Fidelity, trans. Robert Rosthal (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1964), 152. For a fine exposition of Marcel’s views on death, see Barbara E. Wall, “The Doctrine of Death in the Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel,” in PAT, II:223–35. For a description of a “phenomenon” similar to Marcel’s but interpreted radically differently, see Vivienne Thaul Wechter, “A Time to Live—A Time to Die?” in PAT, I:244–45: “As an addendum must be added, that though my own understanding—or wish—for death as ‘the end,’ has I suspect seeped through, there must be an admission of the ambivalence which is a common affliction. Though I choose to think, to intellectualize, to indeed wish for that kind of death as in the words of Epicurus ‘when death is come we are not’—nevertheless I find myself relating to loved ones who have died as though they have migrated into some kind of discarnate existence, which still is in some mysterious way related to me here. And my dreams indicate that I wish to encourage this relationship.”


For a subtle and unsettling suggestion of the way in which man-made mass death impacts upon the social or transactional self, cf. Edith Wyschogrod, Spirit in Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger, and Man-Made Mass Death (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), 211: “The conception of a linguistic and corporeal transactional self holds in equipoise the individuating aspect of self, the I pole, and the objectified me. With the advent of man-made mass death this more or less harmonious unity is broken: the I pole is shattered resulting in a negative and apocalyptic subject. Each I experiences the possibility not only of its own coming to an end but also of human extinction in toto as a result of human acts.”

48. Josiah Royce’s ideal of the “Beloved Community,” developed in The Problem of Christianity (1913; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968) would be a rich resource for an extrapolation along the lines of the one I am suggesting. One text will indicate the direction of Royce’s efforts:

The ideal Christian community is to be the community of all mankind,—as completely united in its inner life as one conscious self could conceivably become, and as destructive of the natural hostilities and of the narrow passions which estrange individual men, as it is skillful in winning from the infinite realm of bare possibilities concrete arts of control over nature and of joy in its own riches of grace. This free and faithful community of all mankind, wherein the individuals should indeed die to their own natural life, but should also enjoy a newness of positive life,—this community never became, so far as I can learn, a conscious ideal for early Buddhism. (p. 195)
49. The metaphysical character of "struggle" is suggested by James: "The facts of struggle seem too deeply characteristic of the whole frame of things for me not to suspect that hindrance and experiment go all the way through" (TC, II:379).

50. Cf. Anne Carr, "The God Who Is Involved," Theology Today, (Oct. 1981, 314: "There is today a theological insistence, rooted in interpretations of the Bible and of contemporary experience, that the God of Christian faith, while remaining God, is intimate to the joy and the pain, the victory and the defeat, the struggle of human existence, and comes to be known precisely there." See also David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 177: "Is not the God of the Jewish and Christian scriptures a God profoundly involved in humanity's struggle to the point where God not merely affects but is affected by the struggle?"

51. "For it is not against human enemies that we have to struggle, but against the Sovereignties and the Powers who originate the darkness in this world, the spiritual army of evil in the heavens" (Ephesians 6:12).

52. Cf. Hans Küng, Does God Exist?, trans. Edward Quinn (New York: Doubleday, 1980), 665: "The biblical God is not a God without feeling, incapable of suffering, apathetic in regard to the vast suffering of the world and man, but a sym-pathetic com-passionate God." See also, Tracy, Blessed Rage, 177: "Is Bonhoeffer's famous cry that only a suffering God can help merely a rhetorical flourish of a troubled man? Can the God of Jesus Christ really be simply changeless, omnipotent, omniscient, unaffected by our anguish and our achievements?"


CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS


7. Cf. VRE, 263: "We can never hope for clean-cut scholastic results. . . . Decide that on the whole one type of religion is approved by its fruits, and another type condemned. 'On the whole'—I fear we shall never escape complicity with that qualification, so dear to your practical man, so repugnant to your systematizer!"

8. Jeanne Hersch, "Jasper's Conception of Tradition," in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1957), 603-4. Of course, Hersch is not suggesting—nor am I—that it is either possible or desirable to return to an earlier mode of religion, whatever the richness of life that ensued from it.

of which a certain sort of spiritualism is guilty, lies in denying to death this gravity, this at all events apparent final value, which gives to human life a quality of tragedy without which it is nothing more than a puppet-show. There is a mistake which balances this one; it is even more serious and much weightier with consequences; it is that which lies in a dogmatic affirmation of the final character of death."

10. Cf. Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 71: "Wittgenstein once suggested that a way in which the notion of immortality can acquire meaning is through one's feeling that one has duties from which one cannot be released, even by death."

11. See James's letter to Perry in Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1935), II:475: "Certainly a doctrine that encouraged immortality would draw belief more than one that didn't, if it were exactly as satisfactory in residual respects. Of course it couldn't prevail against knock-knock-down evidence to the contrary; but where there is no such evidence, it will incline belief."

12. Ecclesiastes 9:3. Cf Max Horkheimer, *Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen*, an interview with commentary by H. Gumnior (Hamburg, 1970), 61–62; cited in H. Küng, *Does God Exist?*, trans. Edward Quinn (New York: Doubleday, 1980), 491: "Theology . . . is the hope that this injustice which characterizes the world is not permanent, that injustice will not be the last word . . . that the murderer will not triumph over his innocent victim."


14. Cf. *The Brothers Karamazov* by Dostoevsky and *The Plague* by Camus for an example of two persons perceiving with great insight, intensity, and sensitivity the irreducible absurdity of the sufferings of innocent children but responding with different modes of hope.


16. Glenn Cunningham, the great miler, through persistent effort, overcame severe leg burns suffered as a youth.

17. Cf. the reflections of Hans Jonas, who, though unable to accept personal immortality, nevertheless desired that the victims of Auschwitz achieve some mode of immortality through being a spur to an effort that will transform human life. The refusal to forget them serves as the way in which they are incorporated in the living process.

18. Some years ago, I concluded an essay on "Faith and Metaphysics" with the following:

The Christian of today, unlike his believing forerunners, will no longer expect or seek superficial aid or comfort from the Other, not even the certain assurance of His existence. It might be suggested that a distinct advantage of such an approach would be the avoidance of the characteristically Christian mode of self-deception, i.e., the affirmation of the noblest values as a blind for a spiritual egotism, for a selfish individual obsession with personal immortality which the contemporary world has quite properly designated as unworthy of man. This last will jar Christians, but if we were to put it simply we might ask which is the more noble, a man who loves his fellowman in order to avoid hell-fire or one who loves him because he is his fellow-man. This is by no means a radically new insight, for it is already
contained in the story of the saint who encountered an angel walking down the road with a torch in one hand and a pail of water in the other. When asked what they were for he replied, “The torch is to burn down the castles of heaven and the water to put out the flames of hell and then we shall see who really loves God.” (Cross Currents, Winter 1966, 39–40)

19. Something along these lines seems to be suggested in the letter Peirce wrote to James’s son on James’s death: “I think we have a full logical right to entertain high hopes of a future life, a life of work, long or perhaps endless. But it is clear to me that it has not been intended (so to speak) that we should count upon it too implicitly” (cited in Thomas Knight, Charles Sanders Peirce [New York: Washington Square Press, 1965], 23).

20. The priority of life over meaning is expressed in the following exchange in Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov:

“I understand too well, Ivan. One longs to love with one’s inside, with one’s stomach. You said that so well and I am awfully glad that you have such a longing for life,” cried Alyosha. “I think everyone should love life above everything in the world.”

“Love life more than the meaning of it?”

“Certainly, love it regardless of logic as you say, it must be regardless of logic, and it’s only then one will understand the meaning of it. I have thought so a long time. Half your work is done, Ivan, you love life, now you’ve only to try to do the second half and you are saved.”

“You are trying to save me, but perhaps I am not lost! And what does your second half mean?”

“Why, one has to raise up your dead, who perhaps have not died after all.”


It is this passage that Camus probably had in mind when he remarked: “One must love life before loving its meaning, says Dostoevsky. . . . Yes and when the love of life disappears, no meaning can console us” (Notebooks 1949, cited in Germaine Brée, Camus [New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1959], 57).

21. No one has expressed this charge more passionately and vividly than Nietzsche. See The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 23: “Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally, life’s nausea and disgust with life, merely concealed behind, masked by, and dressed up as, faith in ‘another’ or ‘better’ life.”

22. For a similar call from one located at the other pole of the dialogue, see Michael Harrington, The Politics at God’s Funeral (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1983), 197, 202: “Can Western-Society create transcendental common values in its everyday experience? Values which are not based upon—yet not counterposed to—the supernatural? . . . My answer is clear by now: there is no way back—or forward—to a religious integration of society on the model of Judeo-Christianity in any of its manifestations. But there is a need for the transcendental. That is why the conflict between religious and atheistic humanism must now be ended.”