Saito, Naoko and Stanley Cavell.
The Gleam of Light: Moral Perfectionism and Education in Dewey and Emerson.

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CHAPTER ONE
IN SEARCH OF LIGHT IN DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION
Deweyan Growth in an Age of Nihilism


16. For example, Japanese moral education has recently taken a conservative turn. In this context Yutaka Okihara criticizes liberal, progressive education for creating an “excessively tolerant society” and the moral decline of youth both in Japan and America (Yutaka Okihara, *Shin Kokoro no Kyoiku* [New Education of the Heart], Tokyo: Gakuyo-Shobo, 1997).


24. The contrast between philosophies of totality and philosophies of infinity is drawn most powerfully by Emmanuel Levinas. For a succinct expression of this, see especially: Emmanuel Levinas, *Collected Philosophical


Chapter Two
DeWey Between Hegel and Darwin


and Neo-Pragmatism” (lecture given at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 17 Apr. 2000), tape recording; also in Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, 62.


33. Nel Noddings, “Thoughts on John Dewey’s ‘Ethical Principles Underlying Education,’” *The Elementary School Journal* 98 (May 1998): 485–87. In conversation, Noddings mentions that she is convinced that on non-moral matters, we can establish criteria by use of Dewey’s method of intelligence, by testing and predicting consequences. She emphasizes, however, that she does not see how we can do this with all moral matters since “the question often is pressing whether we should seek certain outcomes.” Therefore, she clarifies her position that her objection is not to missing criteria for growth, but to “missing a criterion for moral judgment” (my conversation with Noddings [Oct. 26, 1999]).


35. Ibid., 292.


40. Ibid., 305.

41. Ibid., 304.


46. Ibid., 83–84.


48. Ibid., 387.

49. I thank Hilary Putnam for helping me interpret the implication of this passage of Rorty’s.


54. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, 540–42. In response to Westbrook’s criticism that Rorty dissipates “the general ‘ground maps’ that philosophers could provide,” Rorty insists that Dewey’s attempt to provide ground maps to human experience is futile (Rorty, “Dewey between Hegel and Darwin,” 295).


57. Ibid., 89.


64. Hilary Putnam, Realism with Human Face (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 165.


67. In his recent book, The Collapse of the Fact / Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, Putnam reiterates the point that the position he defends concerning the relationship between facts and values is commensurate with Dewey’s, namely, the attack on “fact/value ‘dualism.’” In this book Putnam tries to expand upon “the ways in which factual description and valuation can and must be entangled” (Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, 9, 27).

68. Putnam, “Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity,” 172–73. Putnam asserts that it is the social and cooperative dimension of inquiry in Dewey’s scientific method that distinguishes itself from the scientific inquiry of logi-


71. Conant, Introduction to *Realism with a Human Face* by Hilary Putnam, xxxi.


73. Ibid., 229.


75. Ibid., 190–91.


77. Earlier versions of parts of this chapter were published in *Gendai-Shiso* (*Contemporary Thoughts*) (“Owari Naki Seicho he no Chosen: Hegel to Darwin no Aida no Dewey” [“A Challenge to Growth without Ends: Dewey between Hegel and Darwin”]) 28, 5 [2000]: 167–89).

Chapter Three

Emerson’s Voice

Dewey beyond Hegel and Darwin


10. Ibid., 83.


12. Rockefeller, John Dewey, 58–63. To support Dewey’s trust in the power of the rational mind, Dykhuizen points out that Dewey, in opposition to intuitionism, “dimly felt that reason would confirm valid intuitions and that valid intuitions would function as hints or clues to reason as to where truth might lie” (Dykhuizen, Life and Mind of Dewey, 17). Dewey’s appreciative regard for Marsh’s and Coleridge’s view of the active and rational power of mind based upon spiritual intuition and will suggests that he found hope in the particular view of “intuition” that they proposed.


17. Ibid., 69.
18. Ibid., 103.
19. Ibid., 100.
20. Ibid., 21, 24.
22. Ibid., 103, 112.
23. Ibid., 103.
25. Ibid., 12–13, 22.
29. Cavell’s criticism of Dewey’s concept of intelligence as the method of problem solving is also revealed in his comparison of Dewey’s philosophy to Wittgenstein’s. Cavell characterizes Dewey’s problem of “human superstition, unintelligence, dogma, rigidity, expressed socially as well as intellectually” as his “monster” which rationality and science should combat. In contrast, Wittgenstein’s monster is “despair and a false sense of human limitation, a false sense of human powers,” to which science and intelligence do not answer. “We are confused beyond the place where reason can help us” (Stanley Cavell, “Nichijosei he no Kaiki: Watashi no Koe, Amerika no Koe” [“Return to the Ordinary: The Voice of Myself and the Voice of America”], interview and translation by Naoko Saito (11 Nov. 1997), *Gendai-Shiso [Contemporary Thoughts]*, 26.1(1998): 50–59).
30. Cavell, “Nichijosei he no Kaiki.” Cavell goes on to say: “if we are at odds with others [in polemics] we are also at odds with ourselves and we have to somehow take the mind apart further in order to see what lies at the bottom of this distress.”
31. This is one of the fundamental claims in *The Claim of Reason*, particularly in Part Three, where Cavell says that morality hinges on “what position you are taking responsibility for,” and “the nature or quality of our relation-
ship to one another,” not “the validity of morality as a whole” (Stanley Cavell, *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979], 268). In the interview Cavell also says: “that sense that the human being expresses itself, and expresses itself in a voice, and must express itself or it falls ill, and drives itself mad, that was the release that I felt explicit in Austin and Wittgenstein” (Cavell, “Nichijosei he no Kaiki”).

32. Cavell says that even if Dewey’s essay on Emerson is “one of the best written about [Emerson], [Dewey] cannot let it be philosophy for him, not all of philosophy” (Cavell, “Nichijosei he no Kaiki”).


35. Ibid., 75.

36. Ibid., 76–77.


39. Ibid., 69, 82.

40. Ibid., 83.

41. Ibid., 85.

42. Ibid., 82.

43. Ibid., 73.

44. Ibid., 82.

45. Hilary Putnam, “Pragmatism and Neo-Pragmatism” (lecture given at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 17 April 2000), tape recording. The following summary of Putnam’s position is based upon the recorded lecture with the permission of Putnam.

46. More recently, Putnam has advanced his position in terms of a “pragmatist enlightenment”—a third enlightenment beyond that of the “rationalist wing” and that of the “empiricist wing.” In contrast to their presumption of “a priori,” Putnam claims that Dewey’s enlightenment is one that is “fallibilistic and antimetaphysical, but without lapsing into skepticism” and that is shaped by his concern to apply “scientifically disciplined intelligence to the problems of social reform.” (Hilary Putnam, *Ethics without Ontology* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004], 7, 98, 99, 110, 129)

47. In *Ethics without Ontology*, Putnam reinforces this point by saying that for Dewey social science is “in the service of ordinary people.” In re-
sponse to Cavell’s charge that Dewey was a “social activist” in his “What’s the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?”, Putnam states: “The most objectionable statement about Dewey, in an essay I find uncharacteristically insensitive for Cavell, is this one (on p. 79): ‘But what Dewey calls for other disciplines can do as well, maybe better, than philosophy.’” (Putnam, *Ethics without Ontology*, 99, 133–34.)


49. Parts of this chapter were published in *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* (“Reconstructing Deweyan Pragmatism in Dialogue with Emerson and Cavell,” 37.3 [2001]: 389–406).

**CHAPTER FOUR**

**EMERSONIAN MORAL PERFECTIONISM**

*Gaining from the Closeness between Dewey and Emerson*


6. Ibid., 6.


9. Goodman claims that there is a “perfectionistic telos” to these features of Emerson’s idea (Goodman, “Moral Perfectionism and Democracy,” 166). Lawrence Buell’s reading of Emerson is teleological not in Cavell’s perfectionist sense. Buell claims that Emerson’s cosmopolitanism relies on the “spirit that potentially includes the whole world” and “faith in a common spirituality behind the veils of difference” (Lawrence Buell, Emerson [Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003], 188).

10. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The American Scholar,” in Ralph Waldo Emerson, 52 (hereafter cited as “AMS”).

11. George Kateb, Emerson and Self-Reliance (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2000). In general Kateb’s writing style, in contrast to Cavell’s, is more restrained, a well-balanced analysis of the complexities of Emerson’s idea.

12. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self Reliance,” in Ralph Waldo Emerson, 133 (hereafter cited as “SR”).

13. Buell emphasizes the “cosmopolitan” dimension of Emerson’s thought—namely, its cross-cultural, even universal influence. In opposition to the connection of Emerson’s thought merely with the American context, Buell claims that “a national ideology of personal or collective particularism suppresses Emerson’s cosmic monism” (Buell, Emerson, 195). While Cavell praises Buell’s attempt to situate Emerson in a broader context beyond American cultural life, he suggests that his own way of reading Emerson with regard to the American context is to show that the “power of [Emerson’s] thinking” is not acknowledged adequately in his own country, America, and that Emerson shows “a doubt to America,” to its “terrible arrogance” (ETE, 5–6). I would claim that Cavell’s “American” interpretation is thoroughly contextual, and hence that it resists a universalization of Emerson’s language and thought. They are embedded in America, articulating America’s voice, echoing its peculiar needs and hopes, and its question of democracy. This does not make Emerson’s thought parochial or exclusive, but rather, helps its American voice engage in dialogue with other cultural voices—facing and
acknowledging difference and separation, rather than relying on the anticipation of common ground from the beginning.


15. Supporting Kateb’s interpretation of Emerson, Goodman claims that Emersonian self-reliance has “an internal relation to democracy” as its presupposition. In Kateb’s words, “[Emerson] is presenting and defending the aspirations of the mind of democratic culture.” Goodman finds in Cavell’s idea an Emersonian representative figure who functions as a provocative defender against cynicism, and who shows others the ideal standpoint of democracy. Mulhall also highlights “Emersonian representativeness” in Cavell’s conception as the condition of democratic morality (Goodman, “Moral Perfectionism and Democracy, 172”; Kateb, Emerson and Self-Reliance, 6; Mulhall, Stanley Cavell, 282).


17. Goodman supports this position of Cavell by saying that in Emersonian perfectionism “the potential for original existence or insight is not confined to one or only a few selves” (Goodman, “Moral Perfectionism and Democracy,” 169).

18. Goodman also pays attention to this participatory dimension of Cavell’s thinking. EMP is democratic as it involves the issues of the “self’s duties or responses to others” (ibid., 168).

19. In contrast, Cornel West emphasizes the aspect of individualism in Emerson’s thought. He characterizes it as what promotes “separateness over against solidarity, detachment over against association, and individual intuition over against collective action” (Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989], 18). Buell divides Emerson into the “Pragmatist Emerson” (in association with public citizenship) and the “Nietzschean Emerson” (the “anti-social” and “anti-popular” thinker) (Buell, Emerson, 223). In Cavell’s EMP, such a dualistic scheme as West’s and Buell’s is implausible. The private and the public, in Cavell and Emerson, are inseparable; they are always together in process, from the inmost to the outmost.

20. Goodman also pays attention to the idea of representativeness in EMP: “[I]n Emerson’s democratic rendition of perfectionism, each person may be a representative” (Goodman, “Moral Perfectionism and Democracy,” 174).

22. Emerson suggests the idea of a relationship based upon representativeness in such writings as “The American Scholar,” “Self-Reliance,” and “Friendship” (in *Ralph Waldo Emerson*) Kateb discusses at length Emerson’s idea of friendship as a crucial condition of self-reliance. He characterizes it as the paradoxical relationship between antagonism and complementation, separation and union, distance and closeness, and exclusiveness and openness. He also associates it with the notion of “sincerity” as a matter of “mutual intellectual nakedness” (Kateb, *Emerson and Self-Reliance*, 96–129). In opposition to Kateb’s interpretation of Emerson’s idea of friendship as a “small circle of friends,” Cavell says that “there is, as I imagine it, no intuitive size of the figure enclosing us, since each of us keeps on encountering, here and there, and always with surprise, other Emersonian ears.” Furthermore, in opposition to the typical interpretation of Emerson’s distance to others, Cavell claims: “No reader of Emerson is a priori closer to him than a true reader.” Cavell expresses this relationship in the imagery of Emerson’s expanding circles: “[Emerson] makes a circle with each reader; and in a sense he and the reader make two circles, each around the other, depending on whose turn it is” (*ETE*, 188–89).


26. Steven C. Rockefeller, *John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 353–54. Rockefeller attributes this style to Dewey’s Vermont religious upbringing that made it difficult for him to express his emotions. He points out that Dewey tended to avoid “direct personal encounters” due to his shyness, and disliked introspection because of his childhood aversion to puritan moral thinking which demanded inner purity (ibid., 35, 38).


32. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Circles,” in *Ralph Waldo Emerson*, 175.


**CHAPTER FIVE**

**DEWEY’S EMMERSONIAN VIEW OF ENDS**


9. Dewey says: “MANKIND likes to think in terms of extreme opposites. It is given to formulating its beliefs in terms of Either-Ors, between which it recognizes no intermediate possibilities” (John Dewey, *Experience and Education* [New York: Macmillan, 1938], 17) (hereafter cited as EE).


12. I thank Hilary Putnam for suggesting this terminology.

Pragmatism, they argue, is a good first step, but not as insightful as Buddhism (Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience* [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993], 234). Steve Odin also discusses the Mahayana Buddhist philosophy of the “Middle Way” and the “nondual worldview of Japanese Buddhism,” with its concomitant notion of the “embodied self,” in terms of their common ground with American pragmatism (Steve Odin, *The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism* [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996], 302, 362–63).


15. In *The Quest for Certainty*, Dewey says that “nature, including humanity, with all its defects and imperfections, may evoke heartfelt piety as the source of ideals, of possibilities, of aspiration in their behalf, and as the eventual abode of all attained goods and excellencies” (John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, in The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 4, ed. Jo Ann Boydston [Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984], 244).

16. In *Art as Experience*, Dewey also refers to the concept of means as the middle: “‘Medium’ signifies first of all an intermediary. The import of the word ‘means’ is the same. They are the middle, the intervening, things through which something now remote is brought to pass” (*AE*, 201).


18. Addressing Dewey’s concept of ends-in-view, Hilary Putnam says as follows: “Dewey, then, is not just talking about finding better means to pre-existing ends-in-view (about what Habermas calls ‘means-ends rationality’—Zweckmittelrationalität—or about what Kant called ‘hypothetical imperatives’). Dewey is really talking about learning through experimentation and discussion how to increase the amount of good in our lives” (Hilary Putnam, “Are Moral and Legal Values Made or Discovered?”, *Legal Theory*, 1 [1995], 9).


22. Though Emerson’s idea of expanding circles is progressive and forward-looking, it is not a simple negation of the past as he says: “The new position of the advancing man has all the powers of the old, yet has them all new. It carries in its bosom all the energies of the past, yet is itself an exhalation of the morning” (“Circles,” 174).

23. Cornel West cites Emerson’s phrase, “the only sin is limitation,” as a symbol of Emerson’s optimistic theodicy of extolling human power and the rejection of “a tragic vision” (Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989], 17, 35).


CHAPTER SIX
GROWTH AND THE SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF CRITERIA
Gaining from the Distance between Dewey and Emerson


9. With respect to Dewey’s view of a teacher, Robert B. Westbrook states that “a teacher had to be capable of seeing the world as both a child and an adult saw it” (Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991], 101).


17. Stephen Mulhall points out that a dialogue between “the older and younger friends” is a common theme running in Cavell’s various writings (Stephen Mulhall, *Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1994], 266).


19. Interpreting Wittgenstein’s concept of criteria, Cavell says: “Criteria are ‘criteria for something’s being so,’ not in the sense that they tell us of a thing’s existence, but of something like its identity, not of its being so, but of its being so. Criteria do not determine the certainty of statements, but the application of the concepts employed in statements” (*Claim*, 45).

20. This position is inherited in Cavell’s later idea of EMP when he says: “A moral advance on the journey may not be measurable from outside, so to speak, since a crisis may take the form of a refusal to yield to the acclaim
of a false, or falsifying step” (Stanley Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994], 142).

21. This again reflects Cavell’s view of skepticism, when he says: “Our relation to the world as a whole, or to others in general, is not one of knowing, where knowing construes itself as being certain” (Claim, 45).


24. This is a part of the criticism that Richard Rorty directs against Dewey’s “metaphysics” (Richard Rorty, “Dewey’s Metaphysics,” in Consequences of Pragmatism [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982]).


CHAPTER SEVEN

THE GLEAM OF LIGHT

Reconstruction toward Holistic Growth


4. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Circles,” in Ralph Waldo Emerson, 172 (hereafter cited as “Circles”).


of Emerson’s unique revision of Kantian transcendental idealism, Goodman discusses Cavell’s interpretation of Emerson’s “epistemology of moods,” a mood as a way of constructing the world beyond Kant’s twelve categories.


9. Buell, Emerson, 172–73, 179. Buell thus claims that Emerson’s influence transcends America, and opens up “cosmopolitanism” with “a common spirituality behind the veils of difference” (ibid., 188).

10. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Transcendentalists,” in Ralph Waldo Emerson, 97.


13. Steve Odin suggests that in Kitaro Nishida’s Japanese philosophy, this theme is developed as “immanent transcendence.” This is an idea that “transcendence moves not in the direction of an other-worldly beyond, but in the direction of bottomless depths in the absolute present” (Steve Odin, The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996], 432).


15. Paul F. Boller, Jr., notes that Emerson and other transcendentalists discarded the idea in Scottish philosophy of an intuitive moral sense, popular in New England in Emerson’s time. Instead, New England transcendentalism was influenced by Kant’s transcendental idealism, though it stressed the intuitive rather than the rational elements in Kant’s philosophy. The English romantic poet, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, is a significant influence. According to Boller, Coleridge, who studied Kant, makes an original distinction between Reason and Understanding. While understanding is a “faculty for dealing with material objects,” reason is the one for “apprehending spiritual truths” through immediate intuition. Emerson’s idea of intuition or the gleam of light is associated with the faculty of Reason in Coleridge’s sense. Boller cites the following passage of Emerson: “Reason is the highest faculty of the soul, what we mean often by the soul itself: it never reasons, never proves; it simply perceives, it is vision” (Paul F. Boller, American Transcendentalism, 1830–1860: An Intellectual Inquiry [New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1974], 42, 44–46, 50). Steven C. Rockefeller points out that
the young Dewey also was rebellious against New England intuitionism and identified with Coleridge, whose *Aids to Reflection* had influenced him (Steven C. Rockefeller, *John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1991]: 51–65).


17. The approach to Emerson’s idea of self-reliance from the perspective of the gleam of light, I believe, is more holistic than George Kateb’s approach in a division between “mental self-reliance” and “active self-reliance” (George Kateb, *Emerson and Self-Reliance* [Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2000], 33).


30. In “Qualitative Thought,” Dewey discusses the qualitative whole as the background of thinking, as “the directive clue in what we do expressly think of.” In the qualitative background, he says, “intuition” is “inarticulate and yet penetrating” and it underlies “all the details of explicit reasoning.” In this regard, he supports Bergson’s view of intuition and claims: “Reflection and rational elaboration spring from and make explicit a prior intuition. . . . Thinking and theorizing about physical matters set out from an intuition, and reflection about affairs of life and mind consists in an ideational and conceptual transformation of what begins as an intuition.” What Dewey says here about intuition can be reinterpreted as referring to the central and penetrating force of experience (John Dewey, “Qualitative Thought,” in *The Later Works of John Dewey*, vol. 5, ed. Jo Ann Boydston [Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984], 248–49).


32. Versluis discusses the Emersonian concept of time in connection with Zen Buddhist wisdom of the affirmation of the present instant, the idea that “every day is the best day in the year” (Versluis, *American Transcendentalism and Asian Religions*, 67, 109).

33. Richard Poirier also discusses Emerson’s circles as the movement of the soul, saying that “individuals have the freedom and power to break out of a circle,” and that “the soul knows that it is creating only a new orbit or limit as it surges past and sweeps up the boundaries of an old one.” Poirier interprets Emerson’s idea of the soul not as “an entity” but as “a function.” Poirier also says: “Soul repeatedly finds itself in a circle, a circle which is already one of its creations, one of its texts one of the governing principles that it has helped bring, or is in the act of bringing, to consciousness” (Richard Poirier, *Poetry and Pragmatism* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992], 23–24).
34. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Poet,” in *Ralph Waldo Emerson*, 208 (hereafter cited as “Poet”).


37. Supporting Darwin’s view of individual variations in evolutionary development, William James claims the significance of the power of individual initiative exercised upon social environments. “The community stagnates without the impulse of the individual. The impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community” (William James, “Great Men and Their Environment,” in *The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* [New York: Dover, 1956], 232).


42. Garrison highlights the significance of “an affective, intuitive background and imagination” and the qualitative context in Dewey’s concept of inquiry. Imagination, in his interpretation, is the function of exploring alternative possibilities for action with selective interests (Garrison, *Dewey and Eros*, 96).


44. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Over-Soul,” in *Ralph Waldo Emerson*, 155.

45. Earlier versions of parts of this chapter were published in *Philosophy of Education 2001* (“Education for the Gleam of Light: Emerson’s Transcendentalism and Its Implications for Contemporary Moral Education” [2002]: 144–52).
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE GLEAM OF LIGHT LOST
Transcending the Tragic with Dewey after Emerson


6. Ibid., 179.

7. Ibid., 165.


10. In fact, in his contributions to The Educational Frontier (1933), Dewey’s preference is for the phrase, “a planning community” (in The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 8, ed. Jo Ann Boydston [Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1986]), 70. I thank Jim Garrison for drawing this to my attention.


15. Ibid., 380.
17. Ibid., 476–77.
18. Ibid., 478, 480.
19. Comparing Dewey’s *Ethics* (1932) to *Ethics* (1908), Robert B. Westbrook asserts that while the fundamental principle of the growing self remained unchanged, a tragic view of experience had crept into the former, and that Dewey had started to recognize the rarity of consummatory experience and growth (Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991], 416). Boisvert is opposed to this interpretation, claiming that the change was peripheral (Boisvert, “The Nemesis of Necessity,” 154).
22. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” in *Ralph Waldo Emerson*, 133.
28. Paul Standish, “Democratic Participation and the Body Politic” (a paper to be published in *Educational Theory*).
15. Ibid., 380.
17. Ibid., 476–77.
18. Ibid., 478, 480.
19. Comparing Dewey’s *Ethics* (1932) to *Ethics* (1908), Robert B. Westbrook asserts that while the fundamental principle of the growing self remained unchanged, a tragic view of experience had crept into the former, and that Dewey had started to recognize the rarity of consummatory experience and growth (Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991], 416). Boisvert is opposed to this interpretation, claiming that the change was peripheral (Boisvert, “The Nemesis of Necessity,” 154).
22. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” in *Ralph Waldo Emerson*, 133.
28. Paul Standish, “Democratic Participation and the Body Politic” (a paper to be published in *Educational Theory*).

30. More recently, however, there have been reactionary measures in response to concern over declining levels of knowledge.


32. As of 6 Jan. 2001, its name was changed to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology.


36. Manabu Sato, “Kodomotachi wa Naze ‘Manabi’ kara Toso Suru ka?: Nishihira Tadashi also points to the phenomenon of nihilism among Japanese youth today from the perspective of the crisis of their soul. (Tadashi Nishihira and René Vincent Arcilla, “Nihilism and Education” [lecture given at the University of Tokyo, Tokyo, 21 July 1999]).


43. Santayana makes a similar point when he says “ground is lost as fast as it is gained” in Emerson’s idea of the “ascending effort” of the universe. Santayana indicates that Emerson’s worldview is characterized not so much as progress as “succession” (*George Santayana’s America*, 74).


50. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Circles,” in *Ralph Waldo Emerson*, 167.


52. Earlier versions of parts of this chapter were published in the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* (“Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense: Deweyan

**Chapter Nine**

**The Rekindling of the Gleam of Light**

Toward Perfectionist Education


16. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Considerations by the Way,” in Ralph Waldo Emerson, 396.

17. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Fate,” in Ralph Waldo Emerson, 345.


19. Steve Odin discusses Dewey’s critique of “artistic detachment” and emphasis on “participation” (Steve Odin, Artistic Detachment in Japan and the West: Psychic Distance in Comparative Aesthetics [Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001], 78–88.)


22. In connection with the theme of conversation for democracy, Garrison discusses the importance of listening as a mode of democratic listening (Jim Garrison, “A Deweyan Theory of Democratic Listening,” Educational Theory, 46.4 [1996]: 429–51).


32. Steve Odin points out that William James’s idea of the self in stream of consciousness and pure experience is characterized by “a focus / fringe pattern grounded by the datum of felt wholeness.” The Jamesian idea of the “focal self with the center” in the whole field that Odin discusses matches Dewey’s idea of the self as the center in the field (Steve Odin, *The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism* [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996], 157).

33. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Experience,” in *Ralph Waldo Emerson*, 228.

34. Parts of this chapter were published in different versions in the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* (“Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense: Deweyan Growth in an Age of Nihilism,” 36.2 [2002]: 247–63) and in *Teachers College Record* (“Education for Global Understanding: Learning from Dewey’s Visit to Japan,” 105.9 [2003]: 1758–1773).