Chapter 2 argued that the objective of the U.S. military was, for the time being, to establish a legal order in postwar Okinawa recognized by self-determining subjects at a time when its position within the Cold War regime was only starting to materialize. While fear of racialized sexual violence incited an identification with the law, it was nonetheless a tenuous one that could fall apart just as easily as it came together. The post-1952 era was a testament to the need for something more than a legal order rooted in fear amongst a war-torn people, namely, a long-term plan to care for the population so as to maintain governance in Okinawa. GARIOA had already peaked in 1950 and dwindled thereafter. The U.S. military needed Okinawa to be as economically self-sufficient as possible, if not to avoid the burden of economic aid, then to avoid communist aspirations amongst the dissatisfied islanders. The problem, however, was that it took over an Okinawan economy that was neglected by Japan and did not achieve such aims on its own accord from the prewar era.

This chapter charts the position of the sex industry amidst mass social protest as the U.S. military struggled to reintegrate the Okinawan economy from 1952 to 1958. On the one hand, a wide range of workers speaking in
different island tongues (*shima kutuba*) flooded into the main island around base towns from Okinawa’s peripheries. On the other hand, the U.S. military was compelled to confront the issue of compensation for the use of land confiscated during the war in addition to new confiscations after 1952. Amidst this radical heterogeneity of the postwar, base construction workers successfully carried out the first postwar workers’ strike, farmers ignited the “all-island struggle,” and the Ryukyu Legislature was winning seats by political radicals backed by the communist-influenced Okinawa People’s Party (OPP). If Okinawans were to recognize the legal order, then they would publicly protest for reversion to the Japanese administration through legal channels of the democratic process. Unfortunately, this was not the political message that the U.S. military wanted to hear. It not only responded with outright political repression, but also issued off-limits orders to base towns centered on the sex industry that paralyzed the Okinawan economy. While the OPP opposed the formation of the sex industry, there is little evidence to suggest that they were able to infiltrate these communities and mobilize them into public forms of protest as they did construction workers and farmers. Yet these base town workers were not only integral to the economy, but to the understanding of sex, race, nation, and class in Okinawa’s mass resistance. How was it possible to continue with popular resistance against the U.S. military under the banner of an “all-island struggle” when a significant part of the island refused to protest the very patrons that frequented their businesses?

This chapter addresses the sex worker as a subject who could not be mobilized under a political platform before the state, i.e., the lumpenproletariat. I argue that the lumpenproletariat is neither inherently subversive to nor inherently complicit with U.S. military oppression. Rather, an examination of the lumpenproletariat repositions politics as the interplay between a radical heterogeneity (i.e., alegality) attuned to the immediate struggle for life and political representation oriented toward an idealistic goal in the future. The all-island struggle of this period was more than just a struggle for land against U.S. military confiscation; it was a struggle to reclaim the power of resistance in an unofficial and nonpublic form that was opened up by OPP’s underground communist party after the U.S. military shut down other official possibilities for political expression. It was under this cover of darkness that we can locate moments of solidarity between women involved with G.I.s and Okinawans resisting U.S. military repression. Additionally, it was this solidarity that was compromised by off-limits orders that polarized Okinawan society and drove them into political factions by making a public spectacle of “pro-
Japanese reversion activists” who came up against “pro-American base town workers.”

In the end, I argue that what divided Okinawan society was not so much how the U.S. military pitted various interests against each other as it was the displacement of an understanding of representational politics as an instrumental expression of heterogeneous interests. In this sense, OPP played into the polarizing tactics of the U.S. military by pushing an ethno-nationalist identification with the Japanese state. It was this “spiritualistic” (seishinshugitekina) ethno-nationalism, much like the “mysticism” or “primitivism” described by Tosaka in Chapter 1, that fostered the biopolitical imperative to eliminate miscegenation in the base towns for the sake of an idealistic communion with Japan in a utopian future.

The Lumpenproletariat

The postwar social landscape radically changed in the 1950s as Okinawa was transformed from a countryside filled with farmers to a handful of larger base towns bustling with workers who built and serviced U.S. military bases. After plans for long-term occupation solidified at the end of the 1940s, the Okinawan economy that was sustained by GARIOA shifted to an economy sustained by “base income” that reached an all-time high in 1953.1 Workers came from Okinawa’s peripheral islands such as Amami, Ishigaki, Miyako, and Yaeyama. Of these islands, a large number came from Amami, which was officially part of the southernmost islands of Kagoshima Prefecture, but was occupied (similarly to Okinawa) by the U.S. military until it reverted to the Japanese administration on Christmas day in 1953.2 Workers also included returnees from the corners of the now collapsed Japanese empire. They built military bases, serviced base operations, and of course flooded into the base towns centered on the sex industry.

Hayashi Yoshimi, a member of the Amami Communist Party, worked closely with General Secretary Senaga Kamejirō of the OPP and organized military base workers. Hayashi was the behind-the-scenes leader of the first postwar large-scale workers’ protest known as the Nippon Road Company (Nippon Dōrosha) strike on June 5, 1952. Most of the 143 workers came from Amami3 and demanded a 30 percent pay increase, back pay, paid leave for injury or sickness, and better dormitory living conditions.4 Senaga, who was a member of the Ryukyu Legislature, brought the spirit of the strikers’ public demonstrations onto the stage of representational politics and won overwhelming public support. On June 11, the legislature unanimously
passed a resolution of support. As the Okinawa Times reported, this was an
invitation to the “100,000 Ryukyuan workers” to protest the U.S. military;
2,000 throughout the islands, in fact, participated in a rally outside of Naha
Theater on June 15. Soon thereafter on July 11, the Ryukyu Legislature
also passed a law that enabled workers to unionize.

The U.S. military was also facing problems with landowners. When the
1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect, the U.S. military was
compelled to legitimize its claims to the land it confiscated during the war
and its aftermath. It accomplished this with Article 3 of the treaty, which
stipulated “the United States will have the right to exercise all and any pow-
ers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and
inhabitants of these islands. . . .” Accordingly, the U.S. military issued
Ordinance No. 91 (Authority to Contract) and agreed to retroactively pay
rent from June 1, 1950, to April 27, 1952, at a rate of 1.08 B-yen for one
tsubo. Additionally, it proposed a twenty-year contract. However, 1.08
B-yen at the time was about the equivalent of a pack of cigarettes, and the
lengthy contract gave cause for concern about the future. How would these
families eke out a life in postwar Okinawa without farmland? Because of
the confiscations, Okinawans already lost 24 percent of their arable land.
Furthermore, they were compelled to make greater use of it because re-
turnees from the empire had increased the population by 21 percent. Land
was precious, food was scarce, and the future was uncertain. As a result,
only about nine hundred of fifty-seven thousand families (1.6 percent) com-
plied with the terms of the ordinance. If one considers that each family
had about five members—the average at the time—then this means that
about half of the entire Okinawan population was at odds with the U.S.
military ordinance.

Additionally, the U.S. military demanded more land. While there was
little resistance in confiscating land when Okinawans were struggling to
survive the war and immediate postwar aftermath, the political climate
had changed by 1952. To legitimize the confiscations, the U.S. military
issued Ordinance No. 109 (Land Acquisition Procedure) on April 3,
1953, that provided terms for acquiring new leases, including the ability
to take private land with armed force in the case of noncompliance. Aja
and Mekaru of Mawashi Village were taken in April 1953, Gushi of
Oroku Village in December 1953, Maja of Ie Village in March 1955, and
Isahama of Ginowan Village in July 1955. These land confiscations
were dramatic. With “bulldozers and bayonets,” they often tricked farm-
ers into signing documents they did not understand and burned down
their houses at gunpoint.
In the wake of open resistance, the U.S. military resorted to outright political repression. In 1952, the military’s governing body, the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR), established and surveilled the civilian Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) that was organized into three branches (executive, legislative, and judicial): the chief executive who was appointed by USCAR, the Ryukyu Legislature whose members were elected through popular vote, and the supreme court. Okinawans were allowed to express their democratic will through its only electoral channel, the Ryukyu Legislature. Senaga suggested that the new political infrastructure was tantamount to a “puppet government.”

Yet, even with the high degree of USCAR control, Okinawans still voted on an overwhelmingly anti-U.S. military platform led by a coalition between the OPP and Socialist Party (Shūdaitō) in a special election to fill a vacated seat belonging to the middle district (chūbu chiku) on April 1, 1953. The candidate, Tengan Chōkō, won a landslide victory supporting repeal of Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (quoted earlier); reversion to the Japanese administration; opposition to colonization and continued occupation; the immediate enactment of the labor law; opposition to land confiscations; the overthrow of the USCAR appointed chief executive of the GRI, Higa Shūhei; and public elections for the same position. After the opposing Democratic Party (Minshūtō) took advantage of the political repression by presenting USCAR with evidence of a purported scandal, the victory was rendered null and void. More than an incidental election to fill a vacated seat, it became known as the “Tengan Incident” and was emblematic of the political repression of widespread opposition to USCAR voiced through the democratic process.

Perfectly orchestrated to fall on the eve of the April 1 election, USCAR issued an off-limits order on establishments catering to U.S. military personnel on March 29. Different from the 1950 off-limits orders that aimed to contain the spread of VD, Deputy Governor David A. P. Ogden of USCAR hinted that these new orders were related to “anti-American thought.” What this means is that the U.S. military now positioned the businesses in the base towns as instruments of political manipulation. Concerned with the economic impact of the order, a resident from the entertainment district of the Shintsuji Town of Oroku contributed the following article to the Ryukyu Shimpo.

If the off-limits continues for another month or two, I think there will be a number of bankruptcies in the Yaejima District of Koza and Shintsuji Town of Oroku. Particularly in the middle district, I think
90 percent of the residents live dependent on the U.S. military. People
are incited to satisfy the ambitions of a few anti-Americanists who
sacrifice our livelihood. They don’t understand the feelings of the
middle district residents. Yet the crisis is not limited only to the
middle district. The aftershocks are felt throughout the Ryukyus and
threaten the livelihood of all Ryukyuans with collapse. If the off-limits
are semi-permanent, then all of the Ryukyus shall be assaulted with an
economic crisis within a few months.

Although the OPP protested the formation of the sex industry in Okinawa,
this article suggests that the so-called anti-Americanists named here were
not able to infiltrate the base towns. The author writes of a rift between
the “ambitions of a few” who incite the masses with public protest and the
base town workers most immediately concerned with making a daily liv-
ing (seikatsu). In simple terms, this means that the immediate life of base
town workers was sacrificed on the altar of the protestors’ higher ideals.
In more complex terms, however, it pushes the theoretical problem of what
to do with those who fail to be politically organized, i.e., the lumpenpro-
etariat. Despite the rich heterogeneity amongst the workers and farmers,
they were still able to find a voice through the democratic process before
the law. The workers of the base towns, however, were not.

Marx classifies the lumpenproletariat as a form of pauperism within the
relative surplus population, below the floating, latent, and stagnant pop-
ulations. Even within the category of pauperism, the lumpenproletariat ex-
ists at the bottom as “vagabonds, criminals, [and] prostitutes.” As such,
it is a peculiar segment of the population for Marx. Ernesto Laclau points
out that the other categories of unemployment surrounding the lumpen-
proletariat are still “functional to capitalist accumulation because the com-
petition of the many workers for the few jobs pushes down the level of
wages, and in that way, increases surplus-value.” What he means is that
the industrial reserve army is predicated on the assumption of an unem-
ployed population that sustains competition for a few jobs, thereby push-
ing down wages and increasing the rate of profit. In this way, it maintains
a “functionality within the system, and as a result, these people are still
part of a ‘history of production.’” However, the lumpenproletariat is dif-
ferent in that it is unintelligible to capital; it is not part of capital’s future
commodification of labor power; or as Laclau writes, it is a “heterogeneity
which cannot be subsumed under a single ‘inside’ logic.” This points to
a heterogeneity—that this book names as the alegal—that cannot be eas-
ily mobilized into the official “history of production,” either as its workers
or as its dissidents.
Here, one may certainly be justified to argue that, contrary to Marx’s assumption, the “prostitute” as the “actual lumpenproletariat” is in fact not external to the history of capitalist accumulation, but as the author of the article quoted earlier suggests, a driving force that has the potential to “threaten the livelihood of all Ryukyuans with collapse.” While this gendered analysis is important, my concern here is not the “lumpenproletariat as a class or group that can be defined sociologically” as a problem of “occupation or income level.” Rather, I am interested in the lumpenproletariat as a potentiality omnipresent across disparate groups. It is in this way that Tomiyama argues that the industrial reserve army is based on a “faith relation” in which the unemployed are assumed to be ready and waiting for mobilization into production. By describing it as a “faith relation,” however, Tomiyama dislodges the facticity of the industrial reserve army and underscores the mechanism through which it comes to be—that is, through the management of the lumpenproletariat as “the limit where the potential of labor power for capital can turn into an impossibility.” The lumpenproletariat is the limit where the “faith relation” breaks down and marks the constant threat of crisis; it is an interruption in the teleological view of history. In this way, Tomiyama does not position the lumpenproletariat as an exception to the rule, but shows how the history of production normalizes itself by categorically excluding the lumpenproletariat. This is why he does not write about the lumpenproletariat as an absolute outside of history—as if its place has already been decided—but instead describes it as a “place of language that searches for a future.” Writing the history of the lumpenproletariat, as an unstable category that can turn into a crisis for capital just as easily as it can ensure its continued operation, is a performative process (i.e., that “place of language”) that does not lead to a teleological end but “searches for a future” in the process of its articulation.

The question of the base town worker as a lumpenproletariat subject, then, is how to write its history without silencing it in the name of giving it a voice, but allowing the articulation to be an open-ended and transformative process. This is crucial to representation before the state and the lumpenproletariat as un-representable heterogeneity because it opens up the possibility for social transformation when not tethered to state recognition. This is the power of the lumpenproletariat and the alegal: It is not in denying the existence of the state or plotting for its collapse, but in cultivating a life force that exists in its own right removed from the imperative for state recognition. This is a life force that does not have a lifetime to wait in hopes of recognition, but embraces itself in the here and now. This
is precisely the possibility that was opened up when Okinawans exhausted the official channels for protest; resistance was driven out of the blinding light of sovereignty and into the rich darkness of the underground. In the next section, I discuss the possibilities opened up by OPP’s underground communist party, led by Kokuba Kōtarō, which fostered social transformation through unofficial channels.

The Underground

After the off-limits orders in April 1953, Okinawa’s political landscape only became more dismal. In March 1954, USCAR announced plans for a lump-sum payment on lands for which the lease period was projected to be over five years. Okinawan anger was driven to a breaking point after a U.S. congressman erroneously suggested USCAR was catering to the Okinawan desire to sell their land to the U.S. military. In response, the Ryukyu Legislature unanimously passed the well-known “Four Principles for Solving the Military Land Problems” (herein referred to as “Four Principles”) resolution on April 30, 1954. It stated that (1) the United States should renounce the purchase of land and the lump-sum payment of rentals; (2) just and complete compensation should be made annually for the land currently in use; (3) indemnity should be paid promptly for all damage caused by the United States; and (4) no further acquisition of land should be made, and the land that was not urgently needed by the United States should be restored promptly. At the same time the resolution was passed, the GRI, Ryukyu Legislature, Mayor’s Association (shichōsonchōkai), and Federation of Landowners (tochirengōkai) formed the Council of Four Organizations (yonsha kyōgikai). Despite their various motivations, they unified across the political spectrum. Since Okinawa had exhausted the available channels for political redress, the Council of Four Organizations decided it had no choice but to trump USCAR altogether by going over its head to directly appeal to the United States Congress. The results of this mission would not be known until 1956 (discussed later as the Price Report). Until then, Okinawa was left with its hands tied politically.

In the wake of the Four Principles, Ogden responded with a full-scale Red Scare in Okinawa. In May 1954, he blamed any public opposition to USCAR policy on communism. By October, USCAR targeted the OPP by arresting its members, including Senaga. In Okinawan historiography, this period is known as the “dark ages” in which the possibility of expressing the will of the people through legal channels was foreclosed. The leading historian of contemporary Okinawa, Arasaki Moriteru, argues that
these “dark times of repression and plunder . . . became the fertile ground for the people’s struggle” and “planted the seeds for the eventual explosion that became the all-island struggle.”

Mori Yoshio makes an important intervention to this received historiography by filling in the blanks between the “dark times”—where political speech was repressed—and its “explosion” as the all-island struggle after the 1956 Price Report. He does not assume a natural developmental trajectory from one to the next, but instead depicts a dance between unrepresentable heterogeneity (i.e., the alegal) irreducible to the state and political representation before the state. To this end, he demonstrates how Senaga intentionally and masterfully manipulated these two registers: the unseen on-the-ground work that incited the heterogenous masses and the channeling of this energy into a political platform before the state. Specifically, he tracks the relationship between Hayashi Yoshimi (the aforementioned member of the Amami Communist Party and behind-the-scenes leader of the Nippon Road Company strike), who pushed for the formation of an underground or “nonlegal” (higōhō) communist party in Okinawa; Senaga, who capitalized on-the-ground protest on the public platform of the Ryukyu Legislature; and Kokuba Kōtarō, who worked as the leader of the underground communist party in its actualized form, from 1954 to 1957, after Senaga was arrested and Hayashi was deported to Amami during the Red Scare. Whereas Senaga saw the utility in an underground communist party as it existed for representational politics, Kokuba’s commitment to the underground enabled him to cultivate a deep suspicion of Senaga’s spiritualistic ethno-nationalist reversion politics that would later take Okinawa by storm and engulf the base town as its enemy.

Kokuba was a student of economics at the University of Tokyo when he became involved in the movement for Okinawa’s reversion to mainland Japan. Upon his return to Okinawa, Hayashi had already successfully convinced Senaga to start construction of an OPP underground communist party after the success of the Nippon Road Company strike in 1952. Kokuba quickly learned that its role was to augment the OPP by covertly infiltrating the pockets of society that the OPP could not reach publicly. This shed light on the character of the OPP as a true people’s party of the masses that was radically different from the JCP in mainland Japan.

Kokuba turned to the farmers of Isahama in 1955, who were suffering an “intense sense of isolation” in their struggle against land confiscations by USCAR. Although they initially rejected him, he gained their trust after working with them in the fields. He facilitated meetings between
farmers from different villages so as to build solidarity amongst them, and then facilitated a roundtable discussion between the farmers and politicians.\textsuperscript{41} Nishime Junji, a Socialist Party member who would later serve as Okinawa's governor from 1978 to 1990, was deeply moved by the women in particular, a contingency least likely to participate in representational politics as the most outspoken in the movement. The women argued:

> While the village men may have been forced to accept [a lease that] came through coercion, they do not understand the pain of raising children. Men probably recklessly accepted thinking they can just die, but women aren’t afforded the luxury.

> We are driven to madness when thinking of what will happen to the children. Even if we want to die, we can’t when thinking of the children.\textsuperscript{42}

The women were resolute in their rejection of negotiations with USCAR because the futurity of the land was connected to the futurity of their children like an umbilical cord. Death was a luxury of escape that they could not afford; instead, they were pressed to confront the immediacy of life.

At the same time, Iejima was also facing ruthless land confiscations by armed force. The farmers decided to sit in before the USCAR and GRI building in Naha after their homes were burned to the ground. At this time in March 1955, members of the underground communist party that Kokuba had been working with in the Ryukyu Legislature sent the farmers an anonymous letter which was to be burned after it was read.\textsuperscript{43} It stated:

> We are in the midst of a most painful battle. This is because the opponent is an absolute power backed by the greatest military force ever. No matter how much they appeal to military force . . . the U.S. military’s land seizures rob humans of life and rob humans of the freedom to live. This cannot be rationalized by anything. . . . This is where their weakness lies. The people of Isahama and Iejima who are risking their lives expose these unjust acts and weakness. Their call to arms is not an act of strength, but rather a manifestation of their weakness. . . .

> . . . If the struggle continues to consolidate the power of all Okinawan prefectural citizens and quickly win over the support of the people who love justice and humanity, then solidarity will deepen and alienate the American military.\textsuperscript{44}
The beauty of this letter lies in its auto-subversion. It undermines itself, transforms, and takes on a new life. If starving farmers from an agrarian village receive a letter from faceless individuals associated with an underground communist party who combat a perceived U.S. military dictatorship, one might expect to find explicit instructions for some sort of call to arms. What? When? Where? How? Yet this letter’s only instruction, “Burn after reading!,” incites the reader to do the exact opposite: Ahagon Shōkō is compelled to “hold it ever more closely to [his] heart.” Language as a means to a greater end, i.e., the communication model, is subverted. Furthermore, it is not the authorship that gives it legitimacy, but rather its anonymity that gives the farmers a sense of the infectious nature of the agreement in which it became difficult to discern where it came from. The power of the letter gave courage to the farmers who would go on to take to the streets and lead a “beggar’s march” from July 1955.

Ahagon writes that “[n]o one came up with the idea” for the beggar’s march, but it organically emerged through conversation amongst the farmers. Without thinking to make a donation box, they used only what they had at hand—their hats—to collect donations as they marched across villages throughout the island. In this way, they did not make something new in order to fulfill a purpose, but the materiality already surrounding them morphed into new purpose. Their march furthermore transformed the people they touched. He writes:

Women and others listened to our plea as they shed tears. People who didn’t have money with them went all the way back home to retrieve their wallets. Police officers who thought it would be unsuitable to make a donation entrusted women listening next to them to do it [on their behalf]. Also, even though they didn’t do it [directly] themselves, there were Americans who donated by slipping their honeys (lovers) money.

This passage is significant because it shows how women, in particular, women involved with the “Americans,” were used by the representatives of institutional violence (i.e., police officers and most likely “American” soldiers) as mediators. They were useful precisely because they were thought to be the farthest removed from representational politics. This solidarity was only possible under the cover of darkness.

Mori argues that in taking on the most powerful military in the world, the farmers were armed with nothing but a public display of their own vulnerability. Instead of internalizing the shame of becoming beggars, they
revealed how the U.S. military had stripped them down to bare life. As a result, they performed a “reversal of values” in which the “weak can overcome the strong.” It was this redefinition of strength amidst conditions of utter powerlessness that reinvigorated Okinawa’s body politic. The people were no longer dominated by values determined by their oppressors. For Mori, this is the possibility of revolution cultivated within the ground, out of plain view of representational politics, which takes the title of his book, *Revolution within the Ground*.

Mori succeeds in intervening in Arasaki’s historiography that too quickly passes from the dark ages of political repression to a new age of popular dissent by failing to see how the work of the underground communist party prepared the soil for the people’s empowerment. However, while farmers turned the idea of weakness into a weapon against itself, it still left open the question of whether or not it led to what James R. Martel calls “subversion rather than just more delusion.” After all, Ahagon’s pacifism was very much informed by religious beliefs in Christianity. Did the Nietzschean reversal of values simply reproduce the delusional hope for recognition through a universal ideal—that of a Christian-inspired nonviolence—or did it subversively dispense with the desire for redemption through a different universal ideal altogether? By valorizing nonviolent forms of protest as representative of the “Okinawan heart” that perseveres to this day, there is a risk of reinscribing it as a universal ideal and imparting it with “just more delusion.” Rather, as Masaki Kinjo has shown, neither nonviolence nor violence is inherently good or bad; what makes either powerful is the particular way each is deployed in relation to the state so as to reclaim the state’s power over life.

As the letter written to the farmers by the underground communist party suggests, the power of the farmers lies in the immediacy of their fight for survival. They succeeded in exposing the idolatry of mythic violence that does not exist to protect human life, but only exists to protect itself. In other words, while the rest of the world may believe the U.S. military exists to protect the weak—a mantra it continues to recite in the face of Okinawan protest, i.e., “we are here to protect you”—the farmers simply revealed this fallacy with their life. They did not become something other than what they already were in order to be recognized by the state, but by simply being themselves, they altered their relationship to the state. Like Benjamin’s notion of allegory, they simply performed what they already were and, by doing so, infused nonhuman and human things of the world with new purpose. Instead of replacing one universal for another, they
formed a new community liberated from the onus of sovereign recognition. As an unintended consequence of forgoing a polity that waits to be saved, the responsibility of the decision—however imperfect it may have been—fell upon the individual. Kokuba describes the contagious force of the people who made decisions unmoored from the clear guidance of an authority figure. He writes:

... What is important is becoming unintelligible to America. In doing so, the people's movement will come forth with an explosive force. Not knowing who is behind it is the most important thing.

That's why after arresting Senaga, arresting the party leaders, crushing all of the unions, incapacitating the movement for reversion, Iejima and Isahama were nothing but a second thought for them. And then before they knew it, the counterblow came from that direction, and before they knew it, it spread like wildfire. Certainly, they would try to sniff out how it was [the handiwork] of someone who did something. But no one knows. That is the meaning of having an underground organization. ... If it is managed to function this way, then I think there is no need for something like an iron rule. 54

Here he suggests how the law, or “iron rule,” becomes superfluous. It was not overcome, but disengaged. Furthermore, women involved with the G.I.s were not alienated from this social order hidden from view of the state, but were its active agents. When Kokuba traveled from village to village every other night so as to not be detected by the U.S. Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) that was actively hunting him down, he says it was these women who helped keep his cover.

... at that time, there were people amongst the Isahama farmers called G.I. “onlies” or “honeys,” and amongst them, some who went on to marry them. There were places where those people were renting rooms. When I was around, they would sometimes come and tell me “the CIC is coming now” or “the CIC was over there just now.” And you know how the American military would show up bearing arms, right? About a day in advance, the G.I.s would tell their honeys “I think something’s gonna go down. They’re getting ready.” And then, through the honeys, they would tell us agents. This is how close we got: the locals living there and the party members.

In that way, I was assisted to some degree and was able to carry on the entire time while avoiding the eyes of the CIC. It must have been a surprise for the CIC because [the all-island struggle] exploded with such a bang. 55
Women involved with the G.I.s (i.e., Okinawa’s lumpenproletariat) were not indifferent or hostile to the struggle, but under the cover of darkness, they transformed into mediums and covert agents of solidarity. It was precisely because they stood in the shadow of history that they were able to help make it.\textsuperscript{56} Different from the reportage examined in Chapter 1, and articles on Okinawa by the JCP newspaper \textit{Red Flag} at the time,\textsuperscript{57} the Okinawan underground communist party newspaper \textit{For the Freedom and Independence of the Nation} is markedly absent of depictions of women who work the base towns.\textsuperscript{58}

With the aid of the women, Kokuba was able to move in a modality “unintelligible to America.” Stuck in their sovereign modes of thought, USCAR automatically assumed Okinawa would ape its decision-making process of mobilizing a collection of individual wills toward a common goal decided by a charismatic figure. The unexpected “counterblow” that came from Iejima and Isahama was the anonymity of the decision that “spread like wildfire.” Released from the mediation of representational politics to deliver their will, the decentralization of power had the unintended consequence of empowering the people. They did not defer to the decision of another, but precisely because there was no identifiable authority figure, they were empowered to make the decision themselves. It was this energy that ignited the all-island struggle a year later.

\textit{Into the Blinding Light of Sovereignty}

The results of the Council of Four Organizations that sent a mission directly to the United States Congress were in. After a six-member House Committee on Armed Services headed by Charles Melvin Price directly visited Okinawa, they responded with the Price Report on June 9, 1956. Although it attempted to concede with better compensation for the land, it still maintained the intention of a lump-sum payment.\textsuperscript{59} This was the trigger that unleashed widespread protest that took the name “all-island struggle” as described here by Arasaki.

On June 9, when the outline of the Price Report was announced, fifty-six of the sixty-four cities, towns, and villages throughout Okinawa, or more than 20 percent of the total Okinawan masses, united and held a residents’ rally\textsuperscript{60} on June 20. Then in Naha and Koza, the people\textsuperscript{61} held a second residents’ rally of 100,000 and 50,000 each on June 25. This was the process through which the energy of the people had reached a boiling point and explosively sprung into action.\textsuperscript{62}
The momentum of the all-island struggle did not stop with the farmers, but swept across many sectors of Okinawan society that had grievances with the U.S. military. But how would this mass protest be channeled through the political process?

As we have seen, the U.S. military government (USCAR) had said “no” to the people. Okinawa’s civilian government (GRI) had said “yes” to the people, but it was vetoed by USCAR and turned into a “no.” And now, the United States Congress had said “no” to the people. Okinawa turned to option number four and found another gate to the law left to knock on: the Japanese administration.

Because Okinawa was boxed in on three sides, the Japanese government appeared as the only remaining gate leading to justice. On June 18, 1956, the Council of Four Organizations announced it would send four representatives to mainland Japan to plead its case. Furthermore, the Council of Four Organizations announced a seven-point platform on June 16, 1956, that was oriented toward the Japanese mainland. It moved to (1) form an organized body in solidarity, (2) transcend individual interests with an ethno-nationalist consciousness to protect the land and territorial sovereignty, (3) renounce all forms of violence in resistance, (4) struggle against the policies of the United States and not individual Americans whose human rights and character must be respected, (5) eradicate all forms of criminal activity, (6) exercise self-governance amongst the people, and (7) overcome complications in strict adherence to the Four Principles.

Generally speaking, support for the Four Principles was framed in terms of support for Okinawa’s reversion to the Japanese administration. Popular support for reversion to Japan was already clear by 1950 and formalized with the inauguration of the Association for the Promotion of Reversion to Japan (Nihon fukki sokushin kiseikai) in 1951, but frowned upon by USCAR throughout the years of political repression. Point two of the platform, in particular, explicitly drew a distinction between “individual interests” and “ethno-nationalist consciousness.” This suggests recognition of the heterogeneity within Okinawa that was “transcend[ed]” by “ethno-nationalist consciousness.” The crucial point here—particularly in light of our consideration of the position of the base town workers as the lumpenproletariat—is the way in which this transcendence takes place. As the leader of the underground communist party, Kokuba was extremely sensitive to this point and how it informed the meaning of “nationalist consciousness.” For example, in an interview, he states:
What we called nationalism was not a question of a feeling of oneness that [comes with a sense of being] the same as all other Japanese. That is the part that seems to be difficult for people to understand.

As a Marxist, Kokuba did not see the ultimate goal of revolution as the recuperation of state power. Rather, after socialist revolution, it was assumed that the state would exhaust its utility. This is why Kokuba identifies with the state as a political platform that can only instrumentally represent the “individual interests” of the masses. In other words, the “individual interests” are instrumentally “transcend[ed],” thereby suggesting an awareness of the inevitable failure of transcendence toward an all-encompassing idealist totality.

However, this instrumental identification became increasingly replaced with a spiritualistic one as USCAR made a spectacle of public political divisions by polarizing Okinawan society with more off-limits orders. Once placed under the spotlight, Okinawans became divided as “protesting subjects,” coded as pro-Japanese who protested the U.S. military, and “petitioning subjects,” coded as pro-American who petitioned for their right to participate in the base economy.

The off-limits order issued on August 8, 1956, was catastrophic. In 1955, 57 percent ($74.8 million) of Okinawa’s gross national product (GNP) came from outside sources. Of this figure, 27 percent ($20 million) came from the purchase of “consumption goods” by the U.S. military, or in other words, entertainment-related expenses in the base towns. When students of the University of the Ryukyus and Okinawan students in Japanese universities planned a rally opposing the lump-sum payment in Koza, where many of the bases were concentrated, the Okinawa Federation of Night Clubs Association (Okinawa fūzoku eigyō kumiai rengōkai, herein referred to as OFNCA) opposed the demonstration.

The next day on August 9, President Ōshiro Seiji of OFNCA issued a petition translated into English to USCAR. I could not locate this document, but instead found a supplementary report and petition submitted on August 13. OFNCA stated that they stood by the Four Principles and pleaded to “[s]eparate clearly Off Limits from the land problem.” However, they were not shy to demonstrate their open hostility toward the growing leftist faction of the popular movement, in particular, the platform put forth by the Land Protection Association at the June 18, 1956, prefectural rally. The document:
accused Yara Chōbyō of co-opting the Land Protection with “Anti-American Ideology,” and suggested those “Okinawan future leaders” and “pure-minded students” were corrupted from “being under the [sic] bad leadership”; boasted of their attempt to “stop the meetings and demonstrations” directed by Chief Yara of the Land Protection Association; reported their resistance to representatives of the board of directors of the Land Protection Association; advocated the “[e]stablishment of [sic] Pro-American underground organization and Intelligence . . . under the cooperation of Military Intelligence and CID” to counter the “people’s party and other bad ideologists” that “have an underground organization”; articulated a plan to “stud[y] measures against” “Mr. Senaga and Mr. Kaneshi” as they “make an [sic] Anti-American Propaganda”; stated that they would “not call our representative Democrats legislators from now if they don’t make any reflection [sic].”

What is impressive about this document is that it shows how protesting subjects came to appear as enemies to their own brethren who were constituted as petitioning subjects. In order to secure the right to participate in the base economy, which essentially meant the right to sell sex, OF-NCA was willing to go so far as to advocate the “[e]stablishment of Pro-American underground organization and Intelligence” since they emerged as a threat to their very survival. This is far removed from the days when Okinawan women in relationships with G.I.s tipped off underground communist party members by warning them of CIC raids just one year prior.

Senaga understood the off-limits order to be a desperate measure taken by USCAR that was astounded by the “breadth and depth of the resistance that enveloped all classes and all areas” of Okinawan society. He paraphrased the sentiments of a speaker from the base town as follows:

I know that we have to protect the land by following through with the Four Principles. But what about life? today, much less tomorrow? Shouldn’t the one protecting territorial sovereignty be the Japanese government? Shouldn’t it be the Japanese people? They say that they are our brethren, but have they done a single thing for us? I support Japanese reversion. But wait. Isn’t it the case that we don’t know when reversion will happen? How are we supposed to go on living until then? What’s wrong with relying on Mr. America to get by?
The speaker repeatedly points to the here and now, “life today, much less tomorrow,” and getting by in the base town instead of looking beyond to the Japanese government and Japanese people to do what both neglect to do. The statement is allegorical in structure because it interrupts the idealism of the reversion movement that makes promises toward the future and points to the failure of total unification by revealing that the “all-island struggle” really did not encompass “all” of the island to begin with. Senaga is at a loss as to what to do with these “bastards (otoshigo) of military colonial rule,” or as he calls them, “Okinawa’s ‘lumpenproletariat,’” and asks when they will be “washed away.” By use of this verb “washed away,” or “kiyomeuru,” language commonly used for religious purification, he suggests an ethnic cleansing from contamination of a social or moral evil. He is interested in Okinawa’s underground only to the extent that it can be brought up to the light of representational politics and therefore locks the lumpenproletariat in a position outside of history. This is why for him, “[t]he most horrifying thing in the world is military colonial domination...whereupon shameless exploitation by capital comes to bear upon those thrown outside of production and allowed to fall into prostitution.” In this sense, Senaga performs the sovereign power of exclusion of sex workers from a political enclosure—ironically couched in his plea for reincorporation into the Japanese administration—much like anti-base activists appealed to the elimination of the occupation baby in mainland Japan during the 1950s.

Yet, with this quotation, Senaga’s ambivalence is apparent since he also demonstrates an understanding of how the base town workers instrumentally deployed a pro-American stance out of the immediate concern for making a living. The problem, however, is when an instrumental identification becomes confused with what Kokuba calls a “spiritualistic” (seisin-shugitekina) one. In other instances, Senaga increasingly evoked a spiritualistic ethno-nationalism as he rallied against “rule by a foreign race” (iminzoku sibai) toward Japan in which Okinawans were “connected by blood to the fatherland.” Kokuba faults Senaga for crossing this line by stating that his “appeals to ‘ethno-nationalism’ rooted in spiritualism in 1958 lacked the power to move the Okinawan masses” toward revolution and only delivered them to the door of Japanese monopoly capital. I will return to this point at 1958 in terms of the development of capitalist relations in Okinawa shortly, but first, what is significant here is how this spiritualism complicated the mixed-race issue.

Whereas Senaga only made gestures to this here, the prominent Okinawan historian, Higashionna Kanjun, lodged a public attack on the
Solidarity under the Cover of Darkness

base towns framed in an explicitly spiritualistic ethno-nationalism amidst the all-island struggle. In a 1957 newspaper article entitled “Mixed-Race Children,” he identified the problem specifically as the type of miscegenation that occurs as a result of extraterritoriality, and not “international marriage.”

The mixed-race children that creep out of the present red-light districts are nothing but scars of war damage that have inherited the inferior genes of both parents. Of course, these children are not guilty of sin or blame. However, regarding their birth, they are nothing but the crystallization of disgrace that was not planned for nor hoped for. They will eternally be an enormous liability to society. Letting such a liability go—or worse yet, letting [the population grow] larger in numbers—will condemn our communal life to darkness. We probably have no choice but to look after those already born. But it is to our greatest dissatisfaction that in these times where a limitation on the number of births in the healthy sector of society is recommended, there is no check on these unhealthy births.

And:

When the representative petitioners traveled to Tokyo last year to advocate the Four Principles, the occupying U.S. military ordered the soldier’s red light district off-limits on the grounds that it would reduce friction with the locals. Accordingly, the district’s business owners fell onto hard times. When I heard them complaining that this was the revenge tactic of economic pressure, I thought as people who purport to protect the land and protect their everyday life, their argument was suicidal. Rather, we became livid and felt that these types of unhealthy businesses should be completely eliminated. Nonetheless, they countered that ideals and reality are different. These kinds of businesses are proof that they have come to think it is a natural given that mixed-race children are growing in numbers every year primarily out of these kinds of districts.

In these passages, Higashionna’s writing is spiritualistic because the merely instrumental identification of heterogeneous “individual interests” with ethno-nationalism is replaced by the imperative for all individuals to identify with the future of an idealistic “communal life.” The allegorical structure of an instrumental nationalism that is reminded of the ultimate failure of identification is replaced with a symbolic structure of ethno-nationalism in which the integrity of the family unit is substituted for the
integrity of the community and, by extension, state. In other words, similar to protest against extraterritorial miscegenation in Japan, Higashionna does not take issue with racial mixing per se, but with the racial mixing that occurs as a result of extraterritoriality. These are the “unhealthy births” that occur outside of the state’s ability to manage the population. Furthermore, Higashionna’s spiritualism, similar to what Tosaka Jun described as “mysticism” or “primitivism,” beckons forth a biopolitical mechanism of social defense: It becomes the imperative of so-called good Japanese to eliminate these “unhealthy births” for the sake of the entire Japanese community. This is why Higashionna expressed his “greatest dissatisfaction that . . . there is no check on these unhealthy births” and disapproved of the thought in which “it is a natural given that mixed-race children” grow in numbers every year.

For Kokuba, however, this kind of spiritualistic ethno-nationalism was not only ineffective, but in fact played directly into the hands of the global political economy after 1958. While the United States became the world’s strongest economic power after World War II, the relative strength of the dollar propelled by military expenditures during the Korean War was losing ground. The U.S. balance of payments resulted in debt in the late 1950s. Europe and Japan, which had focused on reconstructing the war-torn infrastructure of their economies, were now transitioning into export economies. As a result, Eisenhower opened a new chapter in the story of American empire in which the U.S. military and global economic policy became even more intimately intertwined. This new economic policy aimed to first, integrate the economies of the United States and its allies through free trade, and second, promote burden-sharing of military security.

In Okinawa, the political unrest from the all-island struggle combined with the overall global trend of defense spending cuts and liberalization of the markets of the free world resulted in a decisive policy change in the political economy. USCAR announced the abandonment of the lump-sum payment proposal, agreement for payment on a yearly basis, reassessment of lands every five years, and agreement for payment of more than six times for rent than was originally agreed upon in the Price Report. This created a military base land lessor class that became immune to the spiritualistic ethno-nationalism of the all-island struggle. Kokuba argued that this led financiers and entrepreneurs hungry for capital into believing the trickle down of rental income could be used to fund growth in industry. Cultivating this sector of the political economy could further neutralize discontent in the base towns. Kokuba writes:
At the height of the “all-island struggle,” the U.S. military implemented off-limits measures in which G.I.s were prohibited from entering the entertainment districts in Okinawa’s middle district around U.S. military bases. This started to put economic pressure on the residents who were directly dependent on base income for their livelihood. . . . In other words, they were opposed to the Price Report. . . . but the Okinawan economic structure replete with a social stratum considered lacking in future prospects after the loss of base income became conspicuous as a weak point when moving forward with an ethno-nationalist resistance movement.

In suturing this gap, some finance industries or various business managers scraped together the residents' military land rent. Thinking that they could exploit the capital for the establishment or expansion of new industries, enthusiastic supporters of the lump sum payment for military use of the land started to come forward.

The “entertainment district” exemplified the “weak point” of the “ethno-nationalist resistance movement” because the everyday life of its workers could not sustain on spiritualism alone. In addition to the economic sanctions, the introduction of the A-sign system in 1956 also shifted the cost of managing the spread of VD to base town establishments. Even though the U.S. military made prostitution illegal, there were no corresponding laws effective enough to enable the local Ryukyu police to punish offenses. Hence, VD was controlled through a combination of off-limits orders and regulations that imposed expensive standards to be “Approved,” thereby warranting it an “A-sign” establishment. This meant that the establishments required more startup and running capital, and drove struggling establishments into bankruptcy.

At the same time, even though the original dream for reversion to mainland Japan was rooted in a dream to return to Japan as part of a global proletariat and not a bourgeoisie state, Kokuba detected that the larger aim of the resolution to the all-island struggle was to further the reintegration of Okinawa into the Japanese political economy. Money would not go into supporting the growth of Okinawan industry, but it would flow into Japan. Much of this infrastructure had already been laid by the 1952 Japan-Ryukyu Trade Memorandum that allowed Okinawa’s main industries in sugar and pineapple to be subject to special treatment on exports to Japan. In other words, these industries were treated as domestic, not foreign, from the perspective of Japan. This enabled Japanese businesses to take advantage of the government protection of Okinawan industries.
by importing sugar and pineapple at a low price. At the same time, Okinawan imports vastly exceeded exports, resulting in a balance of payments deficit. Furthermore, 70 to 80 percent of the imports were consumption goods, and not materials for the promotion of industry. The gap was offset by base income; base income, as Kokuba argued, centered on the entertainment industry. In this way, Kokuba formulated what would become known as a “colander economy” (zaru keizai). Dollars that flowed in from the U.S. military bases passed through the hands of Okinawans and into the coffers of Japan as Okinawans used the dollars to purchase consumption items from the mainland. Takazato Suzuyo added a feminist analysis to this tripartite arrangement: “Japan came to the end of the war by using its ‘Okinawan’ daughter as a breakwater of flesh and then subsequently sold her body to gain economic prosperity.”

In order to further win over the industrial sector, USCAR implemented a series of ordinances to open Okinawa up to the global economy in September 1958. Ordinance No. 11 encouraged foreign investments in the Ryukyus, Ordinance No. 12 encouraged foreign trade, and Ordinance No. 14 regulated the conversion of the B-yen military notes to U.S. dollars. While the aim of the 1958 ordinances was to encourage investments in Okinawan industries, Kokuba understood as early as 1962 its limitations. Without production subsidies from Japan, he saw little hope for their development. Indeed, as he predicted, imports continued to far surpass exports, leaving the difference to be offset by the base economy. As others have noted, tertiary industries (tourism, restaurants, transportation, retail, and the service industries) came to dominate the structure of the Ryukyuan economy with renewed vigor. Although the Ryukyus were technically open to foreign investments globally, imports and exports were largely to and from Japan.

In place of substantial economic development, the United States instead created yet another type of petitioning subject. The United States Congress directly passed Public Law 86–629, “An Act to Provide for Promotion of Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands,” that provided a legal basis for “improving the welfare” of the Ryukyu people through economic aid. This was reinforced by the Ikeda-Nixon Joint Statement of 1961 in which the United States agreed to increase funding of the Ryukyus and also accept funding from the Japanese government in preparation for the eventual reversion to the Japanese administration. In 1962, GRI received significantly increased aid from the United States and newly introduced aid from the Japanese government. This aid concentrated primarily in funding educational facilities and public works.
By 1971, a year before the reversion, aid from the Japanese government was more than double the aid from the United States.

The spiritualistic ethno-nationalism, which Senaga (and the JCP before him) hoped would resist capitalism, ironically went on to become the voice that petitioned for Okinawa’s reintegration into the Japanese economy. Even though the workers and farmers were pitted against the base towns—giving the illusion of a binary between pro-Japanese protestors and pro-American petitioners—Kokuba understood that this dialectic could be readily sublated. In order to “break through this ‘imperialist’ ideology generated by Japanese monopoly capital and the ‘utilitarianism’ of Okinawa’s local capitalists,” Kokuba argued for an “organization of workers and farmers based on class into a revolutionary movement.” The possibilities and limitations of this new class-based movement through New Left activism, along with its implications for the base towns, is the topic for the next chapter.