Puckett, Kent.  

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Notes

Preface

1. See Favret, War at a Distance.
2. Woloch, Or Orwell, 30.
4. Favret, War at a Distance, 10.
8. Despite or rather because of the war, the cinema was more popular and successful in the 1940s than any other time in Britain, experiencing what Michael Balcon, head of Ealing Studios from 1938 into the 1950s, called a “marked renascence” (“British Film During the War,” 66). Anthony Aldgate and Jeffrey Richards write: “The war was definitely to prove ‘a golden age’ as far as domestic films were concerned. In short, British films continued to play an important and necessary part in ensuring that cinemagoing in Britain remained, as it had been through out the 1930s, an ‘essential social habit’” (Britain Can Take It, 3). Lant points to several “reasons for cinema’s increased popularity, and the increased popularity of British films in particular. For one thing, higher wartime employment freed up spending money, while competing middle-class entertainments such as pleasure motoring and dining out were curtailed by rationing. Secondly, cinema fed the desire for news and information about the war for a wider selection of the population than any other medium” (Blackout, 24). See also Miller, British Literature of the Blitz, 152–88.
9. Trevor-Roper, Wartime Journals, 91. For more on the conceptual centrality of “the summer of 1940,” see Gallagher, Telling It Like It Wasn’t (Chicago: forthcoming).
10. Reeves, Power of Film Propaganda, 181.
11. For the relation between the residual, dominant, and emergent, see Williams, Marxism and Literature.
12. Formed in 1937 by Tom Harrisson, Humphrey Jennings, and Charles Madge and influenced by a number of diverse contemporary thinkers and intellectual currents (I. A. Richards, Bronisław Malinowski, and Surrealism among others), Mass Observation sought to develop tailored methodologies—
surveys, interviews, participant observation—that could help to account for the texture of everyday life in Britain. For more on Mass Observation’s “autoethnographic” project, see Buzard, “Mass-Observation, Modernism, and Auto-ethnography,” 93–122: “The persuasion that Britain stood in desperate need of auto-anthropologizing can be understood as deriving from the fear that the forces of unreason associated with humanity in the mass, and evidently on the march across the Channel, could overwhelm British people too, making it ‘easy for others to set themselves up as their guardians.’” See also Hubble, Mass Observation and Everyday Life.

13. See Clark, "For a Left with No Future," 53–75.

**Introduction**

1. Despite its early success, The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp wasn’t released in America until after the war. When Martin Scorsese first saw the film “as a child on daytime television . . . sometime in the fifties, . . . the 163-minute running time had been mercilessly cut, and, thanks to the original ‘creative’ distributor, the flashback structure had been unraveled to present a linear narrative” (Haskell, “Life and Death of Colonel Blimp”). Ian Christie offers as clear an account as one could of the film’s several different edits (“Resurrection of ‘Blimp,’” 37). I have here to thank Doug Pfeiffer, who lent me that tape almost two decades ago. I keep meaning to return it.


3. The phrase “Colonel Blimp” would have been very familiar to British audiences in 1943. The term, used to criticize an entrenched and reactionary old guard, comes from the political cartoons of David Low, which began to appear in the Evening Standard in 1934, and featured an aged and fulminating old officer, addressing current events while taking a Turkish bath. By the time Powell and Pressburger adopted it, the phrase had become a more general term of abuse, appearing for instance in Orwell’s wartime essays. What’s striking and complicated about The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp is its effort to add nuance to what Low and then Orwell intended as a more or less straightforward insult. See Low, Years of Wrath. I’ll return to the tactical nuance of Colonel Blimp in chapter 1.


6. Mark Wollaeger has shown that the British distrust of propaganda was—in addition to its widespread and primary association with Goebbels and the Nazis—a holdover from the Great War, which seemed in retrospect to have been
almost too willing to manage the message and, as a result, to have demanded too much from both writers and readers: “Revulsion on the part of propagandists and propagandees was reinforced by official disavowal. Speaking for the Foreign Office in 1935, Sir Samuel Hoare declared that government propaganda was ‘one of the most pernicious features of modern life’” (Modernism, Media, and Propaganda, 222–23). As the war began, however, and the need to shape, share, and sometimes censor information became undeniable, the question of how to use propaganda in a democratic society without either duplicating Nazi methods or diluting a maybe decisive weapon became acute.

7. With this, we can see Colonel Blimp as an effort to realize the seemingly tautological promise of “democratic propaganda.” In a short book he wrote for the Ministry of Information, the Cambridge psychologist Frederick Bartlett sought to draw a nuanced line between what he identified as “democratic propaganda” and “dictator propaganda,” between what he, in other words, thought Britain should do and Goebbels was in fact doing. According to Bartlett, democratic propaganda “does not despise the intelligence of those whom it addresses, as the dictator propaganda does. It does not go all out to short-circuit reason, as the dictator propaganda does. It recognizes that men act where their affections, sentiments, and emotions are concerned, but that these must and can be led by intelligence without losing their strength. It knows that the stability of a social order does not depend upon everybody’s saying the same things, holding the same opinions, feeling the same feelings, but upon a freely achieved unity which, with many sectional and individual differences, is nevertheless able to maintain an explaining and consistent pattern of life” (Political Propaganda, 153). See also Chapman, British at War, 44–46.

8. Sitwell, English Eccentrics, 22.

9. Ibid. It is, perhaps, worth noting that Sitwell’s sense of eccentricity as gesture recalls an argument that the young Georg Lukács makes about Kierkegaard’s doomed and eccentric effort to use the gesture as a kind of lived aesthetic form to manage the real complexities of his life: “Is it not self-delusion—however splendidly heroic—to believe that the essence of the gesture lies in an action, a turning towards something or a turning way: rigid as stone and yet containing everything immutably within itself?” (Soul and Form, 29).


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid. This sense of a healthy national culture as an internally differentiated whole persists from Mill’s Victorian moment into World War II. We can see efforts to imagine Britain in just these terms with figures as different as George Orwell and T. S. Eliot. For Orwell, England was, at its best, “a nation,” at once various, eccentric, and whole, “of flower-lovers, but also a nation of stamp-collectors, pigeon-fanciers, amateur carpenters, coupon-snippers, darts-players, crossword-puzzle fans” (George Orwell: A Collection of Essays, 255); and, for Eliot, the fact that Britain was a culture, which is to say a collection of real differences,
which together added up to a robust national whole, meant that it was best defined paratactically: “It includes all the characteristic activities and interests of a people: Derby Day, Henley Regatta, Cowes, the twelfth of August, a cup final, the dog races, the pin table, the dart board, Wensleydale cheese, boiled cabbage cut into sections, beetroot in vinegar, nineteenth-century Gothic churches and the music of Elgar” (“Notes Towards a Definition of Culture,” in Christianity and Culture, 104). In both cases, the British national character was imagined more as a structure—differences held loosely suspended within a heterogeneous whole—than as any single characteristic or set of characteristics.


14. In what follows I move consciously between the terms British and English. When I use the term British, I’m usually referring to a set of historical, political, and geographical facts; when I use the term English, I’m usually referring to an ideological idea that was variously and incompletely deployed before and over the course of the war. Indeed, the concept of eccentricity can be seen as one difficult part of a larger tactical effort to reduce the complex geopolitical fact of Britain to a manageable and lovable if factitious idea of England.


16. Lean, quoted in Wimmer, Cross-Channel Perspectives, 100.


18. Dyer, Brief Encounter, 55.


20. Clark, Farewell to an Idea, 376.

21. Stephen Spender anticipated Clark’s account in 1935; referring to Henry James, he writes, “as always with great aestheticians there is a certain vulgarity in his work, and this vulgarity found its expression in violence.” Vulgarity erupts in James when style can no longer hold itself back. For Spender, the Jamesian style is a result of James’s efforts to control his writing, to repress sexual contents or urges that would otherwise upset its sheer and lovely surface. As a result, when, as it must, that sexual repressed makes its return, it does so as a style that is itself the structural answer to and expression of the earlier repression. Vulgarity is, in other words, both a cause and an effect of style. For Spender, style is dialectical: although James’s style is largely the negative impress of what he rejects or represses, that style also becomes both most and least itself when the repressed returns in the form of an unwilled vulgarity. For Spender, vulgarity is the unconscious truth of style; it is its antithesis and purest articulation. Spender, quoted in Connolly, Enemies of Promise, 9.


23. Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 10–11.

24. Durgnat, Films and Feelings, 42.

25. In a sense, the lateral reappearance of red across the plotted surface of Colonel Blimp resembles a dialectical play between affect and narrative that Fredric Jameson has seen as necessary to realism; as he writes in relation to the
more or less untethered recurrence of certain sights and smells in Zola, “the very multiplication of these sensory onslaughts raises the question of their succession in time, where the gradual autonomization of the various affects slowly begins to release them from their relationship to plot as such and suggest whole new forms of temporal organization” (Antinomies of Realism, 65). As with the logic of affect in Zola, the chromatic irruption of red across Colonel Blimp threatens the sense of one totality while suggesting the conceptual possibility of another.

26. Lacan introduces the concept of the “anamorphic ghost” in his famous discussion of Hans Holbein’s The Ambassadors, which features a death’s head that can only be seen from a perspective that distorts the painting’s putative subject, the well-heeled ambassadors themselves. As a result, the one painting includes or, rather, produces two wholly different but obscurely related worlds, the world of luxury and comfort and the world of death. The suspended skull serves, in that case, as a sort of hinge between worlds. As a result, the doubled presence of the perceived ghost forces the viewer to confront the essential doubleness of the perceiving self: “In The Ambassadors . . . [w]hat is this strange, suspended, oblique object in the foreground in front of these two figures? All this shows . . . Holbein makes visible for us here something that is simply the subject as annihilated. . . . But it is further still that we must seek the function of vision. We shall then see emerging on the basis of vision, not the phallic symbol, the anamorphic ghost, but the gaze as such, in its pulsatile, dazzling and spread out function, as it is in this picture” (Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 89).

27. De Baecque, Camera Historica, 3.
29. For more on the blurred beginnings and endings of war in general and of World War II in particular, see Dudziak, War-Time.
32. Eugenie Brinkema has recently called for a return to a poststructuralist model of cinematic excess as one way to think through the relation between affect theory and aesthetic form: “Exactly as ‘affect’ does for theorists such as Shaviro, what excess undoes is a certain approach to theory; it remains with the stubbornly contingent ‘I,’ and what it ‘disturbs, sterilizes is metalanguage (criticism)” (Forms of the Affects, 42).
33. Michael Powell to Sir James Grigg, in Powell and Pressburger, Life and Death of Colonel Blimp, 28.
34. Ibid., 33. Rather than make its own feature films, the Ministry of Information sought rather to influence production, offering advice, materials, and support: “It controlled the allocation of film stock, it could secure the release of film technicians from the Services, and sanction the supply of scarce materials” (Drazin, Finest Years, 182). The Ministry of Information in fact offered direct financial support to only one feature, Powell and Pressburger’s 49th Parallel (1941), and although that film worked well, people within and beyond the Films
Division felt that more distance between the film industry and government was advisable: “Though 49th Parallel, the costs of which had been underwritten by the MOI, had turned out to be a great success, the giving of state funds to a private company had become too controversial to repeat” (MacKenzie, British War Films, 50). See also Chapman, British at War, 13–160; and Reeves, Power of Film Propaganda, 136–194.

35. For more on the history, theory, and practice of total war, see Aron, Century of Total War; Bell, First Total War; Black, Age of Total War; Chickering and Forster, “Are We There Yet?”; Gat, War in Human Civilization; Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes; Joxe, Empire of Disorder; Paret, Craig, and Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy; Marwick, Emsely, and Simpson, Total War and Historical Change; Wright, Ordeal of Total War.

36. Saint-Amour, Tense Future, 56.

37. Saint-Amour suggests that the idea of total war functioned for Britain less as a real state of affairs than as an ideological screen behind which to manage local, limited but no less pernicious forms of imperial violence: “A study of total war, then, must be a study of its partiality as an idea—of its prejudicial functions and its implications in an imperial world-system” (ibid., 9).


40. Miller, British Literature of the Blitz, 1.

41. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, 49.

42. Bowen, quoted in Stonebridge, Writing of Anxiety, 3.

43. Mieszkowski, Watching War, 192.

44. Saint-Amour, Tense Future, 184.


46. Lord Beaverbrook’s “Great Aluminum Scare” is a key example of the way the thrift and sentiment came together to support morale in the early days of the war. Faced with shortages of materials to produce fighter planes in 1940, Beaverbrook called upon the British to donate their domestic metals to the war effort: “We will turn your pots and pans into Spitfires and Hurricanes.” Of course, he knew that the metal salvaged from the tons and tons of kitchenware and knick-knacks collected “would not yield much high-grade aluminum,” a fact that points to the stunt’s real and brilliant value as almost pure, lived propaganda (Calder, People’s War, 149).

47. Piette, Imagination at War, 1. In thinking of this embodied “war in the mind,” we might turn to Althusser’s great account of an ideology of actions and practices: “This ideology talks of actions: I shall talk of actions inserted into practices. And I shall point out that these practices are governed by the rituals in which these practices are inscribed, within the material existence of an ideological apparatus, be it only a small part of that apparatus: a small mass in a small church, a funeral, a minor match at a sports’ club, a school day, a political
party meeting, etc. Besides, we are indebted to Pascal’s defensive ‘dialectic’ for the wonderful formula which will enable us to invert the order of the notional schema of ideology. Pascal says more or less: ‘Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe’” (“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” 168).

51. On the *Englishness* of eccentricity, see Dickison, “Ken Russell, National Culture, and Experimental TV,” 79–81; and Aymes-Stokes and Mellet, *In and Out*. See also Gill, *Eccentricity*.


63. For an account of how a baldly manipulative version of this tactical eccentricity has been mobilized in the service of British austerity from Thatcher to the present, see Hatherly, *Ministry of Nostalgia*. He looks, for instance, at the recent and frankly weird ubiquity of the phrase, “Keep Calm and Carry On”: “The power of ‘Keep Calm and Carry On’ comes from a yearning for an actual or imaginary English patrician attitude of stiff upper lips and muddling through. This is, however, something that largely survives only in the popular imaginary, in a country devoted to services and consumption, and where elections are decided on the basis of house price value, and given to sudden, mawkish outpourings of sentiment. The poster isn’t just a case of the return of the repressed, it is rather the return of repression itself. It is a nostalgia for the state of being repressed—solid, stoic, public-spirited, as opposed to the depoliticised, hysterical and privatised reality of Britain over the last thirty years” (*Ministry of Nostalgia*, Kindle location 267).

64. To many, Jennings seemed to embody the same spirit of energetic, irrepressible, and yet comfortable quiddity that he sought to capture in his films: “Jennings,” writes his friend Jacob Bronowski, “was not at all a conformist; he was the most wonderful eccentric that I have ever met; he was totally unaware of the fact that every gesture that he made was outrageous.” And another friend, Gerald Noxon, writes, “To say that Humphrey Jennings was a typical Englishman is, of course, a contradiction in terms, for the most characteristic quality of the English is their untypicalness, their eccentricity. In fact he was most English in
his eccentricity” (Noxon, quoted in Aldgate and Richards, Britain Can Take It, 229). In terms of the relation and difference between Jennings and Grierson, Alan Lovell writes that, although apparent, their different commitments weren’t given a chance to come to light: “In fact, the conflict between the positions the two men represented never took place. It was prevented from doing so by the Second World War, which . . . stopped the debate by giving overwhelming support to the use of the cinema as a vehicle for propaganda. In the context of the war it was impossible to argue against the need for the ‘grim and desperate education of propaganda’” (“The British Cinema,” 44).

65. Synthetically influenced by a number of figures—Kant, Hegel, Eisenstein, Walter Lippman, and others—John Grierson had developed an idealist theory of documentary realism that he saw as commensurate with the goals of a strong, centralized, and progressive state. In practice this meant adapting Eisenstein’s theory of “overtonal montage” in order to stitch together disparate “actualities” (both bits of film and bits of the world) and to get at and dialectically present the difficult ideal “reality” of particular institutions and ultimately the whole state. Ian Aitken writes, “Grierson argued that the empirical content (the actual) of [a film’s] documentary images was organized so as to express general truths (the real), which existed at a level of abstraction beyond the empirical, and which could not be directly represented” (European Film Theory and Cinema, 166). The way one spliced two pieces of film together could and should produce a larger, “third” idea, something that was properly in neither but that somehow really sat between both. One can see this at work in Grierson’s Drifters (1929), where cuts and dissolves between ocean waves, North Sea herring fishermen, crowds bustling at a local market, and trains crisscrossing the country work to suggest a larger and largely invisible institutional network—a seaport sublime—that brought producer and consumer, country and city, nature and culture together as part of a more capacious and synthetically whole reality. “His technique,” writes Dan Blanton, “is explicitly dialectical, suspending character and narrative to render labor visible in a pure gesture” (Epic Negation, 266). Also see Evans, John Grierson.

66. As Jennings understood and sought to capture on film, the London Blitz was experienced not only as a hugely destructive event but also as a chance to imagine a necessary kind of national unity, a fact that the Queen registered when she remarked, after the bombing of Buckingham Palace on September 13, 1940, that she could now “look the East End in the face” (Stansky, First Day of the Blitz, 125). According to Kristine A. Miller: “The Blitzkrieg on the United Kingdom during the Second World War was the most direct attack on civilians in British history. As London and other British cities came under siege beginning in September 1940, the common cause of national defense seemed to reduce distance between soldiers and civilians, to resolve differences between men and women, and to repair divisions between leisured and working classes” (British Literature of the Blitz, 1).
68. Hubble, Mass Observation and Everyday Life, 228.
69. Martin Hunt argues that what might seem like an insoluble tension between “stylistic flamboyance”—what I’m calling cinematic eccentricity—and social conservatism in wartime and postwar British cinema in fact represents one version of a distinctively British effort to negotiate the politics of reformist consensus: “‘Our mild revolution,’ ‘Conservative by nature, Labour by experience,’ continuity and change—the sentiments are interchangeable and evidence of a common culture founded on progressive consensus. The films of Ealing and The Archers [Powell and Pressburger’s company] generally, and Pool of London and A Matter of Life and Death in particular, are a product and articulation of these values” (“New Labour, New Criticism,” 268).
70. Jennings, quoted in Wendy Webster, “The Silent Village,” 266.
71. Piette, Imagination at War, 5.
72. Orwell, “Prevention of Literature,” in George Orwell: In Front of Your Nose, 60.
73. Orwell, quoted in Hatherley, Ministry of Nostalgia, Kindle location 1536.
74. Forster, Two Cheers for Democracy, 54.
75. Waugh, Put Out More Flags.
76. Calder, People’s War, 468.
77. Churchill, quoted in Hastings, Winston’s War, 72.
78. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 253.
80. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 251.
81. This helps also to explain Churchill’s unwillingness to articulate war aims: “What this meant was, not that the coalition had no war aims, but that willynilly its aims were Churchill’s” (Calder, People’s War, 98).
82. Agamben, State of Exception, 1.
83. Ibid., 3.
84. Ibid., 23.
85. Empson, quoted in Piette, Imagination at War, 155.
86. Penguin Hansard, 1:36.
87. Nicolson, Why Britain Is at War. Calder writes that, “Like the Germans, the British devised ‘black propaganda’—the creation of fake ‘underground radios,’ the forgery of documents, the fabrication of rumors—justifying this on the grounds that such lies were necessary of a Nazi regime based on lies was to be defeated” (People’s War, 502).
89. Connolly, quoted in MacKay, Modernism and World War II, 12. Elsewhere, Connolly writes, “To have to dispense with their ideals and thus support a cynical policy in which they do not believe is a humiliating position for idealists. They therefore cannot be said to remain spiritually alive and this necessity of choosing between the perils of war and physical extermination and the dangers of an
ostrich peace and spiritual stagnation, between physical death and moral death, is another predicament” (*Enemies of Promise*, 5).


91. Forster, *Two Cheers for Democracy*, 23. After the war, Orwell captured what it might have meant if one had to live with this logical dilemma once the supreme emergency of total war had ended; 1984 indeed imagines a state permanently built on just this kind of doubled, fractured logic: “**doublethink** means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them” (1984, 176).


96. Although the war began with an attempt to forget the nation’s shared culpability, it is important to recognize that the avoidance of war at almost any cost was never merely craven; the will to appease was also an ultimately misguided effect of some of what was best if most unrealistic about British culture between the wars. As A. J. P. Taylor puts it: “The settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy, which had worked precisely to this end; not a triumph for Hitler, who had started with no such clear intention. Nor was it merely a triumph for selfish or cynical British statesmen, indifferent to the fate of far-off peoples or calculating that Hitler might be launched into war with Soviet Russia. It was a triumph for all that was best and most enlightened in British life; a triumph for those who had preached equal justice between peoples; a triumph for those who had courageously denounced the harshness and short-sightedness of Versailles” (*Origins of the Second World War*, 189). For all its obvious and subsequent shame, the deal Chamberlain managed at Munich should not in that case be seen simply as a sell-out; rather, it was a bad compromise that emerged out of a field of sentiments, virtues, and values that were revealed as foolish and ultimately disastrous only after the fact. At the time, Chamberlain’s willingness to negotiate and to avoid the waste of war seemed to many like an eminently sensible, humane, and grown-up response to the maybe empty saber-rattling of an unhinged dictator.


100. Burgess, quoted in Piette, *Imagination at War*, 78.


103. Cole, *At the Violet Hour*, 43.

104. Ibid., 24.

106. For work from anthropology, archaeology, and evolutionary biology on
the idea that violence and war come before and not after civilization, see Burkert,
_Homo Necans_; Keeley, _War Before Civilization_; Gat, _War in Human Civilization_;
and Pinker, _Better Angels of Our Nature_.
107. Adorno, “The Late Style (I),” 121.
108. Ibid., 125.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Said, _On Late Style_, 10.
113. Favret, _War at a Distance_, 1.
114. Mannock, “We Critics Have Our Uses,” quoted in Lant, _Blackout_, 162.
Other films that use the structure include _In Which We Serve_ (1942), _The First of
the Few_ (1942), _Went the Day Well_ (1944), and _The Way to the Stars_ (1945).
115. Benjamin, _Arcades Project_, 474.
116. Clark, “For a Left with No Future,” 66–67. See also Susan Watkins’s
trenchant response to Clark for a clear statement of reservations about the
idea that any war could be reduced to an essential “hankering after evil”
(“Presentism?,” 77–102). That said, I’m less interested in the reality of that innate
capacity for badness than I am in the fact that some sense of something like it
seems to have haunted people living in the midst of World War II.
117. Adorno, “The Late Style (I),” 125.

1. “But what is it about?”: _The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp_

1. “The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp,” _Monthly Film Bulletin_, no. 114
(1943): 10.
2. Quoted in Powell and Pressburger, _Life and Death of Colonel Blimp_, 59–60.
3. A. D., “The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp.”
4. G. Ward Price, “Blimp Film Must NOT Go Abroad,” quoted in Havardi,
_Projecting Britain at War_, 77.
5. Haskell, “The Life and Death and Life of Colonel Blimp.” Similar notes
of pleasant confusion appear in Mass Observation’s “1943 Directive Replies on
Favorite Films”: “Life and Death of Colonel Blimp was both in color and was
different.’ I liked it—why I cannot say.” “Col. Blimp. In spite of technicolor, and
the glamourising of that pest, the Colonel, it was an amusing film” (Richards
and Sheridan, _Mass-Observation at the Movies_, 228, 252).
6. Christie, _Arrows of Desire_, 17; Chapman, “Cinema, Propaganda, and
National Identity,” 194.
8. Powell and Pressburger, _Life and Death of Colonel Blimp_, 42.
9. Ibid., 33.

11. Powell later described how he and Pressburger managed to get material for their film: “The answer is quite simple: we stole them. Any prop man worth his salt—and we had one of the best—would laugh at the question. There may have been one or two forged passes too. Who knows? It was all part of the war effort” (quoted in Murphy, British Cinema and the Second World War, 70, 69).

12. Ibid., 28.

13. Quoted in Chapman, British at War, 193.

14. Powell, quoted in Chapman, British at War, 83.


16. In a sense, the condition I’m describing amounts to something like a state of pragmatic suspension, an internally divided conceptual disposition that would allow one to hold pragmatically on to two incommensurate but necessary ideas at one and the same time. This is something like the ability pragmatically to suspend what is referred to in formal logic as the principle of bivalence, which states that propositions must be either true or false and not both at once.

17. Observers tended to cast the question of British propaganda in relation to Goebbels in particular as opposed to Germans in general, a tactic that implicitly tied the specific ugliness of bad or “black” propaganda to a single reprehensible and thus disavowable individual; if, in the nature of conflict, it is hard to be absolutely unlike one’s enemy, it was or should have been something else to be unlike Goebbels. In a 1941 essay for Horizon, Peter Cromwell wrote that “the tragedy of all our propaganda” was that we “have such a first-rate story to tell, the truth is so much on our side, yet it is told so badly that Goebbels can get away with practically any concoction he wants to” (quoted in Piette, Imagination at War, 145). On September 31, 1940, a House Member wondered if the Emergency Powers Act wouldn’t put the government in a “position by no means inferior, as regards the scope of [its] powers over newspapers, to that occupied by the distinguished Dr. Goebbels in Germany” (Penguin Hansard, 3:135). And Nicolson, who worked at the Ministry of Information in 1940 and was an early casualty of one of its early purges, reflected on the ministry’s situation in these terms: “At present the Ministry is too decent, educated and intellectual to imitate Goebbels. It cannot live by intelligence alone. We need crooks. Why I hate Hitler so much is that he has coined a new currency of fraudulence which he imposes by force. I am prepared to see the old world of privilege disappear. But as it goes, it will carry with it the old standards of honour” (Diaries and Letters, 2:105).

18. Bartlett, Political Propaganda, 153. See also Chapman, British at War, 44–46.

19. The political theorist J. L. Talmon refers to this potential bind as “the paradox of freedom”: “Is human freedom compatible with an exclusive pattern of social existence, even if this pattern aims at the maximum of social justice and security?” (Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, 2).

21. Ellul, *Propaganda*, 241. See also Marlin, “Jacques Ellul’s Contribution to Propaganda Studies,” 361: “either a democracy does not engage in propaganda, in which case it will be overcome from without or subverted from within by those who do make use of propaganda, or a democracy does engage in propaganda, defeating the threatening powers, but in the process becoming itself undemocratic in its methods.”


23. Although they stray significantly from their model, Powell and Pressburger based their character on David Low’s acidly satirical comic strip, which appeared first in the *Evening Standard* in 1934. However, whereas Low’s character exhibited an out-of-date, reactionary, and, dangerous complacency, Clive Candy is something altogether more sympathetic, a figure whose stubbornness is balanced by his sentiment, humor, and sense of honor (he is, as his ATS driver and third great love, Angela “Johnny” Cannon says, “an old darling”). Raymond Durgnat writes: “It’s of the essence of Low’s Blimp that he’s not only inefficient and pompous, but mean and vicious. As played by Roger Livesy . . . he’s a forlorn old boy, touchingly gallant in his Edwardian prime, but far too gentlemanly for this modern world” (*A Mirror for England*, 32).

24. Powell and Pressburger, *Life and Death of Colonel Blimp*, 91. I have checked quotations from the film against Christie’s excellent interpolated edition of the written and shooting scripts.

25. Ibid., 92.

26. Ibid., 93.

27. Ibid., 94.

28. Ibid.

29. The inspiration for the flashback structure of *Blimp* came from a single line that had been cut from Powell and Pressburger’s earlier war film, *One of Our Aircraft Is Missing* (1942): “Sir George, the old gentleman, tells one of the younger members of the crew: ‘I was just like you thirty years ago and you’ll be just like me thirty years from now.’ Emeric liked the paradox, but David Lean persuaded him to drop it, saying: ‘It’s got nothing to do with the plot. It’s the sort of idea you could make a whole film about’” (Macdonald, *Emeric Pressburger*, 206).


31. Daniel Morgan has seen a similar effect at work in Michelangelo Antonioni’s *The Passenger* (1975), in which the camera pans away from Jack Nicholson’s character musing in the present only to land moments later on his own remembered image in the past: the film, he writes, shows David Locke “‘looking’ into the past,” where he “unexpectedly sees scenes from his earlier life in adjacent spaces” (*Late Godard and the Possibilities of Cinema*, 249). In *The Passenger*, the move is understood as an effect of Locke’s appropriately associative memory; because the film’s perspective has already been clearly linked to his point of view, we understand that the pan from present to past follows the associative drift of his thinking. The move is all the more appropriate given the existential
dispersal of subjectivity that stands behind Locke’s inexplicably ready willingness to take up another identity, a dead man’s identity, leaving his own behind. Because, however, Colonel Blimp has not by this early point established Clive as any kind of a focalizing presence, we can’t easily understand the move from one end of the pool to the other as a similar fall into or drift through an individual’s memory.

32. For Grierson, documentary realism’s ability to imagine the totality of a society in order to encourage the total participation of that society’s citizens served a softly but nonetheless coercive function that he understood as a form of “good totalitarianism”: “I am not going to pretend that I do not realize how ‘totalitarian’ some of my conclusions seem. . . . You can be ‘totalitarian’ for evil and you can also be ‘totalitarian’ for good” (quoted in Ellis, John Grierson, 158).


35. To track and not to cut was also a costly choice in Colonel Blimp. Although it would have been simple and cheap to cut from old Clive to young Clive, and to use some clear editorial effect to signal the reverse passage of time, Powell and Pressburger instead opted for a more elaborate set-up that required a body double for Livesy as well as at least two days of shooting for only a few seconds of film. Because we need to see the double fall into the water with Spud before the younger Clive can emerge from the water, it would have been necessary to call back all of the actors and extras from the first shot in order to stage the second. And because Livesy shaved his head to create the effect of aging into the older role, the later shot of him emerging from the pool as young would had to have been filmed before the earlier shots of him arguing with Spud as an old man. This gets all the more complicated when we consider the film’s several overlapping chronologies: there is its plot, which runs from 1902 to 1942; there is its formal arrangement into narrative discourse, which begins in 1942 and goes back to 1902 before taking the long way back to a narrative present that is both the film’s beginning and its end; and there is the more obscure, but nonetheless significant chronology of the film’s production where young Clive with his full head of hair would have to be filmed before its artificial but real loss to the make-up artist’s razor. All of which is to say that the choice to track instead of to cut was expensive in terms of time, planning, and money.

36. Powell and Pressburger, Life and Death of Colonel Blimp, 87.

37. Ibid., 80–81.

38. Ibid., 80.


41. Ibid.

42. Fuller, quoted in Marwick, Simpson, and Emsley, Total War and Historical Change, 261.

52. Looking back to the Turkish bath scene with which this chapter and the film begin, we can see there, too, the close combination of military aggression (between Candy and Spud) and the erotic charge that comes with a roomful of barely dressed men. Although I am finally more interested here in how a formal similarity in the way in which these scenes are shot contributes to the film’s larger theoretical argument about the nature of war, that there is a suggestion of something more than aggression, something more than war at stake in these scenes points to an important aspect of the way in which Colonel Blimp thinks about and possibly beyond the limited terms of total war.

53. McAleer, Dueling, 46.
54. Ibid., 5.
57. Powell and Pressburger, Life and Death of Colonel Blimp, 140.
59. Clausewitz, On War, 75.
60. Ibid., 80.
62. Clausewitz, On War, 605.
64. Mieszkowski, Watching War, 22. See also ibid., 184–91, for an analysis of the logical, semantic, and stylistic path taken by Clausewitz’s famous axiom, “war is a continuation of politics by other means,” as it passes through the pages of Michael Walzer, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Michel Foucault, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and Hannah Arendt: “For authors of all ideological stripes, coming to terms with this canonical proposition is never simply a matter of deciding whether Clausewitz ‘got it right.’ Whether seeking to applaud the truth of his insight or to correct his errors, Clausewitz’s readers consistently aim to rival his stylistic virtuosity by recasting his elemental formula in even more striking terms” (185).
65. Powell and Pressburger, Life and Death of Colonel Blimp, 147.
66. Taken by itself, Powell and Pressburger’s use of a dissolve to move from one space into another is, of course, not unique. Dissolves of this sort are common enough in narrative cinema. We might think here of another shot that seems to
have influenced Powell: the dissolve Orson Welles uses in *Citizen Kane* to track from the stormy exterior into the seamy interior of the El Rancho nightclub, where the reporter Jerry Thompson first meets an inebriated Susan Alexander Kane. The difference, underscored by the *Blimp* script’s emphasis on the camera’s moving “without a break,” comes with the dissolve’s particular relation to the content of the scene. Because the theory of war as duel depends explicitly on a number of conceptual breaks, dissolving where the film could have cut takes on a specific thematic and formal significance.


69. We can track the waning of Clausewitz’s influence in several ways. The rise of militarism across Europe and particularly in Wilhelmine Germany led some to question what authority civilians and diplomats ought to have over soldiers. Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz’s *The Nation in Arms* (1883, rev. in 1906) exploited contradictions within Clausewitz’s thinking in order to argue that the military could best serve political ends by wholly ignoring them: “War will on that account be in no way lowered in importance nor restricted in its independence, if only the commander in chief and the leadings statesmen are agreed that, under all circumstances, war serves the end of politics best by a complete defeat of the enemy. By attention to this maxim the widest scope is allowed in the employment of fighting forces” (quoted in Howard, “Influence of Clausewitz,” 32). In 1903, the French military strategist, Ferdinand Foch, argued: “You must henceforth go to the very limits to find the aim of war. Since the vanquished party now never yields before it has been deprived of all means of reply, what you have to aim at is the destruction of those very means of reply” (*Principles of War*, 38). The disappointed World War I general and early Hitler crony Erich Ludendorff was most explicit in his bitter 1935 pamphlet, *Der Totale Krieg*: “All the theories of Clausewitz should be thrown overboard. Both warfare and politics are meant to serve the preservation of the people, but warfare is the highest expression of the national ‘will to live,’ and politics must, therefore, be subservient to the conduct of the war” (quoted in Handel, *War, Strategy and Intelligence*, 76). In Britain after World War I, there was a different but related reaction to Clausewitz’s legacy. As a result of the horrific losses of that war, losses that seemed the result of having come all too close to war’s absolute limit, B. H. Liddell Hart recommended imposing strategic limits on the scope of war, limits made possible by the development of increasingly mobile military technologies, especially fast-moving armored tanks (Bond and Alexander, “Liddell Hart and de Gaulle,” 600).

70. Bell, *First Total War*, 5.
74. Powell and Pressburger, *Life and Death of Colonel Blimp*, 257.
77. Fuller, *Military History*, 145.
80. For more on how the British sought and often failed to maintain a tenuous difference between the imagined tactics of total war and the violence of colonial “small wars,” see Saint-Amour, *Tense Future*, 49–55.
83. Quoted in ibid., 39.
88. Mellor, *Reading the Ruins*, 166.
91. Powell and Pressburger, *Life and Death of Colonel Blimp*, 278.
92. Ibid., 181–82.
94. Spenser, *Faerie Queene*, 201.
96. Welles and Bogdanovich, *This Is Orson Welles*, 100.
98. The war’s fantasy of the late Middle Ages was one invested in the structuring force of chivalric play, what Mark Girouard describes as a “code of conduct evolved for the knights of the middle ages, that is to say for an elite and increasingly hereditary class of warriors; it accepted fighting as a necessary and indeed glorious activity, but set out to soften its potential barbarity by putting it into the hands of men committed to high standards of behavior” (*Return to Camelot*, 16).
100. *A Canterbury Tale* (1944) begins with one of the more remarkable sequences in all of Powell and Pressburger’s work. A voiceover moves through the opening lines of *The Canterbury Tales* while a familiar cast of characters—the clown, the scholar, the shrew, the knight—make their way, eating, flirting, and cutting capers along the Pilgrim’s Road. This brief sketch again resembles the freedom, the contrasts, the violence, and the play of order and disorder that Huizinga saw in his Middle Ages. Powell and Pressburger then bring their film suddenly into the present with a startling match cut: a falconer’s bird is released, arcs into the sky, and is cut suddenly into a matching image of a fighter plane flying overhead. And, while the cut draws a contrast between the past and the present (a bird is not a plane), it also reveals—cinematically—the possibility that


102. Woolf, _Between the Acts_, 81, 76.

103. We might also think of Guild Socialists such as S. G. Hobson and Alfred Orage, who looked to the example of Morris, Ruskin, and the Fabian Society for the basis of a renewed twentieth-century politics; or of Frank Pick, the designer responsible for much of the London Underground who developed a design philosophy and aesthetic that owed its marriage of form and function to an idea of what premodern life might have felt like: “Given the horrors that mechanisation and ‘locomotion’ were creating,” writes Owen Hatherly, “it is unsurprising that Pick’s project became ever more obviously an attempt to fuse modernity with a deep English nostalgia” (Ministry of Nostalgia, Kindle location 1139).

104. Esty, _Shrinking Island_, 61.

105. We might in these terms compare _Colonel Blimp_ with H. G. Wells’s 1936 film, _Things to Come_, which offers a less subtle but no less related example: as a result of decades of bombing and germ warfare that began with the fictional World War II of 1940, British society has been thrown back into an explicitly medieval state. Although the film ultimately supports the smooth, scientific utopia represented by Raymond Massey’s character, John Cabal, the feudal society that emerges before utopia but after years of disease, violence, and deprivation is nonetheless a mostly cheerful relief. Despite the vulgarity of Everytown’s warlord (played beautifully against type by Ralph Richardson), our first look at early modern Britain is one of craft, honest labor, simplicity, and ruddy physical health. And, despite, the ultimate victory of science over nationalism and force, the techno-future represented in the film’s third and final act remains dangerously susceptible to the seductions of the past: the peace and prosperity of the future is temporally disrupted when a charismatic sculptor, Theotocopulos (“I am a craftsman!”), successfully encourages the people to revolt against progress itself; that they fail is mostly a matter of chance. Medievalism is thus presented both as a cause of and a cure for the violence at the heart of war.


107. Ibid., 256.


110. Freud, _Civilization and Its Discontents_, 144.

111. “The sentimental poet is thus always involved with two conflicting representations and perceptions—with actuality as a limit and with his idea as infinitude; and the mixed feelings that he excites will always testify to the dual source” (Schiller, “On Naive and Sentimental Poetry,” 196).

112. Powell and Pressburger, _Life and Death of Colonel Blimp_, 257.


117. The difference between the cut and the no-cut in *Colonel Blimp* recalls a distinction recently made by Saint-Amour between the epic and the encyclopedic fiction: “I understand epic as constellating war, form, and totality in a particular way—and encyclopedic fiction as departing most emphatically from epic in how it reconstellates the same terms” (*Tense Future*, 10).

2. **Pistol’s Two Bodies: Henry V at War**


2. “Arthur Rank, who’d gained control of Filippo del Giudice’s production company in return for the money to finish the film, told me I should have cut the ‘unimportant’ scenes like Henry’s wooing of Katherine—played with delicious humor by Renee Asherson, and part of the delicate balance of the play—and I said, ‘All right. But the film would have seemed twice as long. I’ll show you!’ I did, and it did” (Olivier, *On Acting*, 283).


7. Stone, “For God and Country.”


13. Rabkin, “Rabbits, Ducks, and *Henry V*,” 285. One might suggest that Rabkin’s own double-talking, ethically gray version of the play is perhaps less about war than about Watergate, about a seemingly novel and horrible political situation that appeared to have put the truth or falsity of statements into a state of ideological suspension.

17. Ibid., 296.
23. Ibid., 31–32.
24. Ibid., 28.
31. Ibid., 128.
32. Ibid., 40.
34. Ibid., 190.
39. Ibid., 99.
40. Ibid., 4.
41. Ibid., 7.
42. Ibid., 8.
43. Ibid., 108.
44. Tillyard imagines the medieval period as a large, slightly absurd, but nonetheless effective game, a system that might both allow and contain violence. He imagines the Elizabethan age as the moment where cracks begin to show in that earlier edifice, cracks that in Shakespeare reveal not the ordered stability of the social world but rather its native tendency toward repetition, aggression, betrayal, and violence. In this regard, Tillyard’s world picture comes to look presciently, oddly, and disturbingly like Jan Kott’s “Grand Mechanism”: “Feudal history is like a great staircase on which there treads a constant procession of kings. Every step upwards is marked by murder, perfidy, treachery. Every step upwards is marked by murder, perfidy, treachery. Every step brings the throne nearer. Another step and the crown will fall” (*Shakespeare Our Contemporary*, 10–11). If we want to understand Tillyard as offering the Elizabethan world picture as a thinly veiled account of his present, we should see it not as a naive wish fulfillment but instead as a historical diagnosis based in a recognition
that modern war had unbalanced a social relation between order and disorder, between violence and civilization that had once been seemed given. And it is this darker, paranoid version of the Elizabethan world picture that we must look to in order to understand the political complexity of Olivier’s exactly contemporary reading of *Henry V*. In a sense, this is to argue for Olivier’s film as itself a version of Kott’s topsy-turvy history, one in which the catastrophes of the twentieth century somehow authored Shakespeare or at least lately revealed him as what he always already was: our contemporary. Olivier’s experience of World War II similarly allowed him to see *Henry V*’s inherent ambivalence about war, an ambivalence that had, as Olivier seems to intuit and as Joel Altman explicitly argues, a precedent in Shakespeare’s late fifteenth century. Altman suggests that *Henry V* is shot through with historical ambivalence about “the penultimate phase of the Elizabethan struggle to subdue Ireland”: “One of my aims in this essay is to [show] that the contrariety we have come to admire in *Henry V* is closely related to the complexity of response that the Irish struggle was evoking in Shakespeare’s audience, forced to lend themselves, materially and spiritually, after for years of dearth and more than a decade of war in the Low Countries, France, and Ireland, to a vast new military undertaking.” In Olivier’s film, the ambivalence of the present situation helped both to reveal the ambivalence of the past and to use that rediscovered history to explain and the enliven that present. In the complex, circular terms of Olivier’s war historiography, Shakespeare appears, indeed, as our contemporary (“Vile Participation,” 8).


47. Ibid., 280–81.


49. This effect is one that Deleuze sees at work in the weaving together of the real and the theatrical in Renoir: “If we consider the relations between theatre and cinema in general, we no longer find ourselves in the classical situation where the two arts are two different ways of actualizing the same virtual image. . . . The situation is quite different: the actual image and the virtual image coexist and crystalize; they ender into a circuit which brings us constantly back rom one to the other; they form one and the same ‘scene’ where the characters belong to the real and yet play a role. In short, it is the whole of the real, life in its entirety, which has become spectacle” (*Cinema 2*, 83–84).


53. Quoted in Coleman, *Olivier*, 112.
54. Ibid., 121.
56. Ibid., 192–93.
57. “Perspective subjects the artistic phenomenon to stable and even mathematically exact rules, but on the other hand, makes that phenomenon contingent upon human beings, indeed upon the individual: for these rules refer to the psychological and physical conditions of the visual impression, and the way they take effect is determined by the freely chosen position of a subjective ‘point of view’” (Panofsky, Perspective, 67).
58. Blair, Henry of Navarre, 127; Tolstoy, War and Peace, 779. Lévi-Strauss writes in The Origin of Table Manners that cup-and-ball not only passes the time but also alters the way time passes: cup-and-ball is one among several “magical devices which act sometimes as accelerators, sometimes as brakes, but are always intended to obtain seasonal equality: over a vast territory stretching from the Arctic circle to California, string games are used to slow down the sun’s course, or may be in danger of prolonging the winter months, which must then be shortened by cup-and-ball games” (173). As in those other contexts, the Duke of Orleans’s game suggests that the French inhabit a temporality experienced as distinct from the rest of the film.
60. Powell and Pressburger, Life and Death of Colonel Blimp, 130.
61. Quoted in Henricks, Disputed Pleasures, 60.
62. Van Doren, Shakespeare, 151
64. Lenoir and Lowood, “Theaters of War,” 429.
67. Van Doren, Shakespeare, 151. For more on the wartime limits of abstraction, see Mieszkowski, Watching War, 144: “How can a diagram capture the horrific physical and emotional trials that compose the traumas of combat? Surely this is the fantasy of someone condemned to a perpetual childhood of waging wars with chessboards of various sizes and colors. In fact, war’s uniqueness among human endeavors has to do with the way in which it demands a new understanding of the concrete consequences that abstractions have in the physical world.”
68. Keegan, Face of Battle, 110.
69. Ibid., 104.
70. Ibid.
71. Wiles, Shakespeare’s Clown, 119
72. Shakespeare, Henry IV, part 2, 1122.
73. On these questions see Wiles, Shakespeare’s Clown; Gurr, Shakespearean Stage; and Shapiro, Year in the Life of William Shakespeare, and Knapp, Shakespeare Only.
75. Knight, Olive and the Sword, 27.
76. Wilson, Fortunes of Falstaff, 120.
77. Tillyard, Shakespeare’s History Plays, 296.
78. Wilson, Fortunes of Falstaff, 88.
79. Shakespeare, Henry IV, part 1, 1074. The wartime analysis of Hal and Falstaff needs in that case to be seen in the context of wider anxieties about the psychic effects of combat on soldiers, as part of a larger effort to differentiate between healthy and unhealthy responses to war. While there were efforts to understand and anticipate trauma in the light of World War I, World War II nonetheless saw the coinage of a new and humiliating technical term with which to describe troops unwilling or unable to fight, “lack of moral fiber.” Put forward in a 1940 RAF memo, the phrase was intended to shame soldiers into action: those designated “‘LMF’ were deliberately stigmatized; they lost their flying badges and were sent to a network of ‘not yet diagnosed, neuropsychiatric’ centers for assessment and treatment” (Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, Kindle location 2394). For more on LMF, see English, Cream of the Crop.
81. Shakespeare, Henry IV, part 1, 1074.
83. Ibid., 725. Harold Nicolson almost seemed to have this characterological phrase in mind when he wrote in his journal: “Yet through all this regret and dread pierces a slim clean note of pride. ‘London can take it.’ I believe that what will win us this war is the immense central dynamo of British pride. The Germans have only assertiveness to put against it. That is transitory. Our pride is permanent, obscure and dark. It has the nature of infinity” (Diaries and Letters, 145).
84. Quoted in Behler, Irony and the Discourse of Modernity, 74.
86. Quoted in Welles and Bogdanovich, This Is Orson Welles, 101.
87. Ibid., 114.
88. Ibid., 100.
89. Coleridge, Shakespeare and the Elizabethan Dramatists, 71.
90. Danson, Shakespeare’s Dramatic Genres, 98.
92. Shapiro, Year in the Life of William Shakespeare, 32.
93. Shakespeare, Henry IV, part 2, 1122.
94. Ibid.,
95. Ibid., 39–40.
96. Welles and Bogdanovich, This Is Orson Welles, 16.
97. Shakespeare, Henry IV, part 1, 1058.
98. Quoted in Anderegg, Orson Welles, Shakespeare, and Popular Culture, 140.
100. Faulk, “Modernism and the Popular,” 618.
103. Samuel Johnson offers a survey of the carnage: “The comic scenes of the history of Henry the fourth and fifth are now at an end, and all the comic personages are now dismissed. Falstaff and Mrs. Quickly are dead; Nym and Bardolph are hanged; Gadshill was lost immediately after the robbery; Poins and Peto have vanished since, one knows not how; and Pistol is now beaten into obscurity. I believe every reader regrets their departure” (*Johnson on Shakespeare*, 173–74).
110. Ibid.
114. Davies, *Filming Shakespeare’s Plays*, 32
118. Quoted in McFarlane, *Lance Comfort*, 34.
119. Crowther, “*Odd Man Out*,” 710.
121. Ibid., 74.
125. Woloch, *One vs. the Many*, 4.
126. Ibid., 5.
127. Nemerov, *Icons of Grief*, 71. For more on the Thersites’s structural and critical position in *The Iliad*, see Bell, “Homer’s Humor: Laughter in *The Iliad*”: “Thersites is a disgraceful, ridiculous caricature of the hero’s tragic grandeur, greater stature and complexity. To regard Thersites as a conventional foil makes sense but begs the question: why does Homer make Thersites so eerily like Achilles in several minute particulars?” (105). See also, McLoughlin, *Authoring War*: “The function in war and war representation of the *gelotopoios* or laughter-maker is to neutralise the pervading hyperlogic by matching or exceeding it.
This figure—from Homer’s Thersites to Shakespeare’s ‘fool and jester’ Falstaff to Hašek’s Schweik to Heller’s Yossarian to Spike Milligan as he appears in his own memoirs to Tim O’Brien’s Cacciato—is the (often self-appointed) creator and butt of jokes, described by Robert H. Bell (in the case of Thersites) as ‘an avatar of comic energy that disrupts events, complicates issues, eludes closure, and generates inquiry’ (178).

128. Shakespeare, History of Troilus and Cressida, 492.
129. Homer, Iliad, 108.
131. Ibid.
132. MacKenzie, British War Films, 71. “Invalided out of the Army in 1916, divorced and living apart from his children, at a low moment he was reduced to selling his paintings on street corners, so ashamed of his failure that he pretended to be disabled, and wore a mask to disguise his identity. By the time he was 40, he had long been familiar with what the 19th-century critics Jules and Edmond de Goncourt described as ‘the bohemia that embitters’” (Dormant, “The Peculiarity of Algernon Newton”).
133. Neame, Straight from the Horse’s Mouth, 80.
134. Ibid., 112.
136. Brownlow, David Lean, 141.
138. Niven, Moon’s a Balloon, 308.
139. Connolly, Enemies of Promise, 106.
140. Burnett, Liquid Pleasures, 133.
141. Orwell, As I Please, 43.
142. Ibid., 136.
143. Nicholls, “Drink the British Disease?”
145. Ibid., 294–95.
147. Shapiro, Year in the Life of William Shakespeare, 100.
149. Gill Plain writes of the commando, “This liminal bogeyman is beyond re-domestication: a figure curiously both ancient and modern, a skilled warrior who fights outside the rules” (Literature of the 1940s, 210).
150. Allport, Demobbed, Kindle location 3255.
151. James Hodson, quoted in Allport, Demobbed, Kindle location 3475. Joanna Bourke, quoting deputy minister of National Health and president of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene, Canada (1944): “[T]he whole object of [the serviceman’s] existence and the focus of all endeavor about him is killing.
Effective and wholesale killing for years has been given precedence as the highest moral value and the most admirable of virtues. . . . Aggressive urges which have been carefully nurtured and developed over a period of years are supposed to disappear overnight, leaving a peaceful civilian with no such pressures and consequently no need of outlet. . . . With the memory . . . of his friends or relatives who have been killed or maimed or even tortured by the enemy, fresh in his experience and kept alive as a spur to his aggressions, this changeover in attitude may be very difficult indeed" (Intimate History of Killing, 340).


3. Celia Johnson’s Face: Before and After Brief Encounter

1. Lant, Blackout, 158–59. Coward’s screenplay specifies the film’s setting as “the winter of 1938–39” (Brief Encounter, 119).

2. Brownlow, David Lean, 196.

3. Thomson, Big Screen, 194.

4. Fleming, Celia Johnson, 137.


7. Schaefer and Salvato, Masters of Light, 278.

8. Genette, Narrative Discourse, 84.


10. Fleming, Celia Johnson, 140.


14. Phillips, Beyond the Epic, 86.


16. Ibid., 67.

17. Lant, Blackout, 176.


20. Coward, Brief Encounter, 132. This excerpt and those that follow are from Coward’s screenplay, which differs slightly from what appears in the film and thus from what I have reproduced in the text. I offer these notes as assistance to readers who might like to compare lines from the finished film to what appears in the screenplay.


22. Queval, quoted in Wimmer, Cross-Channel Perspectives, 100.

23. Thomson, Big Screen, 195.

24. Ibid., 194.


26. Quoted in Lant, Blackout, 168.

27. Brownlow, David Lean, 196.
29. Kosseleck, Futures Past, 105.
30. Ibid., 106.
31. Laplanche, Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, 40.
33. Benjamin, Arcades Project, 476.
34. Bell, F. R. Leavis, 4.
37. Benjamin, Illuminations, 236.
38. Pudovkin, quoted in Nichols, Movies and Methods, 409.
40. Bloch, Historian's Craft, 38.
42. Book of Common Prayer, 189.
43. Whereas British war films often focus on good relations between socio-economic classes, American films take pains to imagine the military as a racial and ethnic “melting pot.” See Basinger, “The World War II Combat Film,” 30–49.
For more on the float as a figure for the suspension of class differences, see Chapman, British at War, 185–86: “The image of the men clinging to the float becomes a powerful and irresistible metaphor for class leveling.”
44. Brownlow, David Lean, 154.
46. Ibid.
47. Young, quoted in Brownlow, David Lean, 437.
49. Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 5.
50. Clausewitz, On War, 119.
51. Saint-Amour, Tense Future, 185; Franco Moretti also sees the modern epic as a text that reveals “a discrepancy between the totalizing will of the epic and the subdivided reality of the modern world” (Modern Epic, 5).
52. For more on the relation between the development of aerial warfare between the wars and the idea of total war, see Harrison, Living Through the Blitz, 19–43; Mellor, Reading the Ruins, 11–47; Grayzel, At Home and Under Fire; and Saint-Amour, Tense Future.
55. Churchill, quoted in Lindqvist, History of Bombing, 84.
56. Harris, quoted in Bellamy, Massacres and Morality, 142.
57. Schlosser, Command and Control, 119.
58. O’Connell, Of Arms and Men, 284. Referring to Frederick Lindemann’s notorious “de-housing” memo, C. P. Snow writes, “It is possible, I suppose, that some time in the future people living in a more benevolent age than ours may
turn over the official records and notice that men like us, men well-educated by the standards of the day, men fairly kindly by the standards of the day, and often possessed of strong human feelings, made the kind of calculation I have just been describing. Such calculations, on a much larger scale, are going on at this moment in the most advanced societies we know. What will people of the future think of us? Will they say, as Roger Williams said of some of the Massachusetts Indians, that we were wolves with the minds of men?" (*Science and Government*, 42).


60. Fussell, *Great War*, 64; quoted in Harrison, *Living Through the Blitz*, 78.

61. Orwell, *Lion and the Unicorn*, 9; we might also think of Fussell's account of how the diurnal patterns of trench warfare had ironized even sunrise and sunset: "It was a cruel reversal that sunrise and sunset, established by over a century of Romantic poetry and painting of tokens of hope and peace and rural charm, should now be exactly the moments of heightened ritual anxiety" (*Great War*, 52).


70. Dickens, *Great Expectations*, 507.

71. For much more on the image and idea of the ruin, see Mellor, *Reading the Ruins*.


74. Ibid.


76. Bukatman, *Poetics of Slumberland*, 22. Part of Donald’s appeal is that, unlike other Disney characters, his distinctive speech seems to put him on either side of the animal and the human. Whereas Mickey speaks with a recognizably human, if highly pitched, voice and Pluto is a dog who barks and barks alone, Donald’s moist half-man/half-duck squawk seems to put him on both sides of that divide: “Voice-man Clarence ‘Duck’ Nash’s Donald has a special speech impediment for this talking animal. It is not stuttering . . . nor does it involve a lisp like Daffy Duck’s dethpicable. . . . Rather, Donald Duck has a speech impediment closely tied to breathing” (Shell, *Stutter*, 100). Both the frustration and the joy of his character stems from the fact that unlike other characters, his impeded speech frees and disqualifies him from Disney’s otherwise rigorous system of species being (some animals talk, some don’t). This is a source of both
his freeing anger and, in the nature of things, his comic frustration; his speech is
the sound of air pushed against a physical constraint.

80. Schatz, *Boom and Bust*, 222.

81. Wartime Donald was immensely popular. Throughout the forties, he
surpassed Mickey as the most important and recognizable Disney character.
His propaganda message was one that resonated widely both in and out of the
military. Spike Jones’s version of the theme song to “Der Fuehrer’s Face,” “sold
1.5 million copies and provided an anthem for the war”; and Donald’s image
became one of the most frequently painted images on both bombs and military
bombers, maybe most famously on the nose of the “Ruptured Duck,” the doomed
B-25 featured in Mervyn LeRoy’s *Thirty Seconds over Tokyo* (1944). Disney’s next
major wartime production was the 1943 animated adaptation of Alexander P. de

87. Ibid., 132.
88. Ibid., 129–30.
89. Ibid., 147.
90. Ibid., 150–51.
91. Ibid., 156.
92. Ibid., 177.
95. Manvell, “Lunch with Carl Dreyer,” 67. Although close-ups are important
to all of Lean’s films, the influence of Dreyer feels particular to *Brief Encounter.*
In *In Which We Serve, Lawrence of Arabia,* and *Doctor Zhivago* his faces are
as striking but seem more influenced by the polemic of Eisenstein than the
mysticism of Dreyer.

98. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 47.
100. Ibid., 32.
101. *The Third Man*, directed by Carol Reed (London Film Productions, 1949).
104. Welles and Bogdanovich, *This Is Orson Welles*, 182.
108. Ibid., Kindle location 1675.
110. See Hall, *Policing the Crisis*.
111. Allport, *Demobbed*, Kindle location 1767.
112. Ibid., Kindle location 1659.
115. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 208
117. For more on the effects of World War II on gender and ideology, see Schneider, *Loving Arms*: “the culturally sanctioned definitions of gender continuously threatened to implode as the necessities and cruel mechanisms of war revealed radical disjunctions between the discourse of gender and actual experience” (21).
118. Johnson had appeared as a major in an ATS training film directed by Carol Reed in 1942.
119. *In Which We Serve*, directed by Noël Coward and David Lean (Two Cities Films, 1949).
120. For more on the representation of women in *In Which We Serve* and *Mrs. Miniver*, see Grayzel, *At Home and Under Fire*, 301–14. See also Miller, *British Literature of the Blitz*, 176–78.
121. See Schneider, *Loving Arms*: “Because of the war’s double threat to the stability and legitimacy of its own sex-gender system, Britain’s patriarchal hegemony made every attempt to (re)assert its political and narrative authority over the feminine (feminized) Other” (26).
123. Ibid., 180.
125. Ibid., 177–78.
126. Ibid., 178.
127. Peter Ackroyd characterizes the period of postwar social retrenchment in this way: “This air of mild oppression, like a hangover after the excitement of war, was intensified by a concerted if unspoken desire to redefine sexual and social mores which had been considerably relaxed during the conflict. The relative sexual freedom of women, and the chummy egalitarianism of enforced contact between the classes, were phenomena strictly of the past” (*London*, Kindle location 13226–28).
130. Quoted in Lant, *Blackout*, 182.
133. Coward, *Brief Encounter*, 188.
134. See Jones and Wessely, *Shell Shock to PTSD*, Kindle location 4526.
136. Ibid., Kindle location 3927.
137. Ibid., Kindle location 3920.

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11. Ibid., 14.
13. Ibid.
17. Ibid.