Introduction: Mapping Memory
Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz

1. For one of the earliest accounts of contemporary Western culture as mnemonic, see Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (New York: Routledge, 1995).


3. Proponents of this view may trace their pessimism concerning the accelerated erosion of memory by digitization back to Plato’s view that writing separates the knower from the known, producing what Aleida Assmann has termed a “memory ersatz”; Assmann, “Canon and Archive” in Cultural Memory Studies, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008). For a study of the relations between cultural memory and digitization see José Van Dijck, Mediated Memories in the Digital Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007).


1. How to Make a Composition: Memory-Craft in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages
Mary Carruthers


3. Ezekiel is commanded to remember and then write down all he sees for the benefit of the people of Israel—to place what he sees in his heart (ponte cor teum in omnia, “set your heart upon all these things”) as the Vulgate says (Ezek. 40: 4), with a play upon the Latin verb recordari, “recollect.” On the significant role played by memory/recollection in our very ability to conceive and plan a future, see Yadin Dudai and Mary Carruthers, “The Janus Face of Mnemosyne” *Nature* 434 (March 31, 2005): 567. Dudai has published a helpful dictionary of concepts in neuroscience relating to the various aspects and activities of memory; see his *Memory from A to Z* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).


5. “Hic tantos auctores, tantos libros in memoriae suae bibliotheca condiderat, ut legentes probabiliter admoneret, in qua parte codicis quod praeixerat invenirent”; Cassiodorus, *Institutiones* 1.5.2. I have used the edition of R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937). Cassiodorus mentions the example of Didymus the blind expositor in this same passage. In his *Life of St. Anthony*, an essential book of early monasticism, St. Athanasius remarked on Anthony’s well-stocked memory, which served him instead of books: see chapters 2 and 3. As a boy, St. Anthony refused to learn to read and, according to his *Life*, learned his vast store of Scripture entirely by oral means. The impression this story made on St. Augustine precipitates the crisis he described in *Confessiones*, Book VIII.

6. I have described Aristotle’s analysis in *Book of Memory*, chap. 2; see my notes there for further references.

7. An important authority was Albertus Magnus in his commentary on Aristotle’s work *Liber de memoria et reminiscencia*, tractatus 2, c. 3. Recollection is defined as rational investigation (that is, investigation that consciously uses a method or scheme) and distinguished from *iterato addiscens* or repetitive learning. A translation of this treatise can be found in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, eds., *Medieval Craft of Memory*, 118–52.

8. This numerical limit was confirmed by modern psychological experiment by G. A. Miller, “The Magic Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information,” *Psychological Review* 63 (1956): 81–97.
9. “Ita, quamlibet multa sint quorum meminisse oporteat, fit sunt singula conexa quodam choro [ne erre]ント coniugentes prioribus consequentia”; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 11.2.20; cf. 11.2.37–38, where similar advice is given. In this essay, I have cited the Latin edition of Michael Winterbottom for Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), except in this instance, a notorious crux, where I have given the reading of the corrected fifteenth-century manuscripts. See Russell’s note to his translation of this passage.

10. One should recall that *meditatio* was the word used in Latin rhetorical treatises for the stages of composition: see, for example, Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 10.6. “Premeditation” of one’s subject matters was considered essential to successful oratory, and Quintilian notes that it depends entirely on the strength of one’s memory. I have discussed at length some of the ways in which rhetorical training and early meditational practices influenced one another in *Craft of Thought*.


13. I have discussed examples of all these organizing figures in *Craft of Thought*; they include works by Hugh of St. Victor (Noah’s Ark), Bede (the Temple of Solomon), Gregory the Great (Ezekiel’s Temple), Richard of St. Victor and Adam of Dryburgh (the Tabernacle), and a number of monastic writers who wrote about the “orchards” and “gardens” of the soul. One example particularly stands out. Richard of Fournival (d. about 1260), a canon of the cathedral at Amiens, discussed a reading curriculum or library, organizing his topics as a garden of books arranged as though they were planted in beds (see *Craft of Thought*, 273–74). Several of these figures are described and explained in the medieval works translated in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, eds., *Medieval Craft of Memory*.


20. Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 11.2.32; the translation is Russell’s for the Loeb Classical Library.

NOTES


22. From Hugh of St. Victor’s preface to a chronicle of Biblical history, quoted from my translation in *Medieval Craft of Memory*, 38.


24. *Institutio oratoria* 11.2.32. In Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 342. It is not possible that Hugh knew Quintilian’s text directly, a fact that underscores both the longevity of ancient pedagogy and the importance of practical technique, rather than written sources only, in accounting for its survival and adaptations.


26. Dante Alighieri, *Vita nuova*, 1.1 (my translation from the edition of Domenico de Robertis [Milan: Ricciardi, 1980]). Dante’s remark about words written in his memory “under larger paragraphs” is at the end of section 2.10. Paragraphs mark major divisions in medieval manuscripts but do not necessarily correspond to what we now call paragraphs.

2. The Reformation of Memory in Early Modern Europe

Peter Sherlock


8. “Atque indicia de Interpretatione Naturae complectuntur partes in genere duas; primam, de educendis aut excitandis Axiomatibus ab Experientia; secundam, de deducendis aut derivandis Experimenis novis ab Axiomatibus. Prior autem trifariam dividitur; in tres nempe Ministrationes; Ministrationem ad sensum; Ministrationem ad Memoriam; & Ministrationem ad Mentem, sive Rationem”; Francis Bacon, *Novum organum* (London, 1620), 165, aphorism X.

9. This is not to deny the significance of eighteenth-century thinkers such as the Neapolitan historian Giambattista Vico, who did indeed understand memory, not reason, as the locus of interpretation, whereby humans linked and made sense of both past and present. See Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory*, 32–51.

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15. David Loades, ed., John Foxe and the English Reformation (Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar Press, 1997). Foxe’s memory-making was so effective, it is really only in the last two decades that his creativity in weaving a narrative and his diligence in research has been unpicked and understood by David Loades, Tom Freeman, and all those associated with the John Foxe Project at the University of Sheffield. For further information, see http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/foxe/index.html (accessed March 31, 2006).
17. MacCulloch, Reformation, 201.
24. I am indebted for these observations to conversations with Charles Zika. For comments on these in an English context, especially the phenomenon of ghosts in post-Reformation England, see Peter Marshall, Beliefs and the Dead in Reformation England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
30. For insights into Petrarch’s significance and the idea of “future memory,” I am indebted to Elise Grosser at the University of Melbourne. We await her forthcoming PhD thesis on Renaissance conceptions of fame.
32. An extraordinary example of this is Thomas Lyte’s genealogical chart presented to King James following his accession, now housed in London, British Library Additional MS 48343.
33. See for example John Weever’s condemnation of Polydore Vergil in his Ancient Funerall Monuments (London, 1631), 298.
39. Ibid., 211.
42. Le Goff, History and Memory.

3. Memory, Temporality, Modernity: Les lieux de mémoire
Bill Schwarz

With thanks to Susannah Radstone.


10. Ibid., xxiii.


12. Schorske, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna, xxxiv.


17. The most helpful of these I’ve found to be Nancy Wood, Vectors of Memory: Legacies of Trauma in Postwar Europe (New York: Berg, 1999), chap. 1; and Peter Carrier, “Places, Politics and the Archiving of Contemporary Memory in Pierre Nora’s Les lieux de mémoire,” in Memory and Methodology, ed. Susannah Radstone (New York: Berg, 2000).

18. In what follows I will be concentrating only on Nora’s own contributions to the various volumes.


25. Ibid., 1:2 and 1:7.


32. Ibid., 1:5.
33. Ibid., 1:1. Indeed, Nora is keen to emphasize that the slow collapse of rural society explains the theorizations of Bergson, Freud, and Proust: “The disintegration of the traditional French image of memory as something rooted in the soil and the sudden emergence of memory as something central to individual identity were like two sides of a single coin, as well as the beginning of a process that has today reached an explosive stage.” Ibid., 1:11.
34. Ibid., 1:2.
35. Nora, “Current Upsurge in Memory.”
37. Ibid., 1:xi.
40. Nora, “The Era of Commemoration,” in Realms of Memory, 3:611; and see Pierre Nora, “Generation” in Nora, Realms of Memory, 1:498–531, which offered him the excuse to malign the soixante-huitards.
44. Ibid., 1:xvi; and for Proust, Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History,” in Realms of Memory, 1:20.

4. Bergson on Memory
Keith Ansell-Pearson

6. Ibid., 223.
7. Ibid., 151–52.
8. This is very much in line with how neuroscientists frame consciousness today: “Consciousness reflects the ability to make distinctions or discriminations among huge sets of alternatives.” Gerald M. Edelman, Wider than the Sky: The Phenomenological Gift of Consciousness (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), 141.
14. Ibid., 73.
15. Ibid., 79.
17. Ibid., 38.
18. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 84.
19. Ibid., 95.
20. Ibid., 101.
21. Ibid., 148.
22. Ibid., 127.
23. Ibid., 106.
24. Ibid., 170.
25. Ibid., 171.
26. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
31. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 139.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 175.
36. Ibid., 177.
37. Ibid., 151.
38. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 133–34.
39. Ibid., 135.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 166.
42. Ibid., 165.
43. Ibid., 165–66.
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46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., 150.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 117.
57. Levinas, *Time and the Other*, p. 132.
59. Ibid., 186.
65. Ibid., 440.
66. Ibid.

5. Halbwachs and the Social Properties of Memory

Erika Apfelbaum

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27. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), but as the English edition is abridged, some passages are translated from the French original.


10. Apfelbaum, “Désordre individuel et désordre social.”


14. Ibid.


17. Ibid., 37.

18. Ibid., 38.


24. Ibid., 183.


31. Halbwachs, La mémoire collective, 167.
35. Semprun, L’écriture ou la vie.
41. Halbwachs, Les cadres sociaux, 89. The passage appears in truncated form in Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 47.
45. Maurice Halbwachs, Les cadres sociaux, 135.

6. Memory in Freud
Richard Terdiman

NOTE: Some of the material in this essay is drawn from Richard Terdiman, Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), chapters 7 and 8. More detail on many of the points raised can be found there.
2. Freud’s most thoughtful reflections on the analytic situation as a system of two will be found in “Constructions in Analysis” (1937), SE 23:257–69.


5. Freud repeated this doctrine concerning the cause of hysteria regularly throughout his career, even as late as “Constructions in Analysis” (1937; SE 23:268).

6. Consider this passage from the “Dora” case where Freud comments on how easy it proves to understand what patients want to keep hidden and yet almost obsessively betray: “He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore” (“Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” [1905], SE 7:77–78).

7. For the image, see David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 252.

8. In Freud’s period this debate took the form of an argument over what neurologists termed “localization,” the argument that specific memory storage locations could be mapped within the brain. Freud was opposed to such literalist notions. Psychoanalytic interpretation supposes an unconstrainable variability and mutability of psychic representations. Any doctrine that tends to normalize such representations, or subject them to a criterion of simple fidelity to preexisting contents, would inevitably have impoverished such a theory to the point of abolishing its field altogether. The effect would have been to undermine Freud’s concept of memories as representations and turn them into nothing more than reproductions.

9. For an account of Freud’s reasons for abandoning the seduction theory, see William McGrath, Freud’s Discovery of Psychoanalysis: The Politics of Hysteria (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), chaps. 4–6. In 1924, Freud republished “The Aetiology of Hysteria” (originally published in 1896) which summarized his “seduction theory.” Upon the article’s republication, he added the following note to his wrenching description of the pain that accompanied his psychoanalytic patient’s recollection of infantile sexual abuse: “All this [the emotion patients experienced in recounting these memories] is true, but it must be remembered that at the time I wrote it I had not yet freed myself from my overvaluation of reality and my low valuation of phantasy” (Freud’s emphasis; SE 3:204 n. 1).

10. For Freud, consciousness itself has no capacity for the retention of anything. “Our memories—not excepting those which are the most deeply stamped on our minds—are in themselves unconscious” (Interpretation of Dreams [1900]; SE 5:539). “Becoming conscious and leaving behind a memory-trace are processes incompatible with each other” (Beyond the Pleasure Principle [1920]; SE 18:25).

11. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud introduced the abbreviations Ucs, Cs., Pcs., etc. to designate the parts of the psyche—the unconscious, consciousness, the preconscious respectively; see SE 5:540ff.

12. For numerous other statements dating between 1900 and 1937 of Freud’s undeviating position on this point, see Terdiman, Present Past, 274–76.


NOTES


16. In his attack on Freudianism, Ludwig Wittgenstein posed the same problem: “This procedure of free association and so on is queer, because Freud never shows how we know where to stop—where is the right solution. Sometimes he says that the right solution, or the right analysis, is the one which satisfies the patient. Sometimes he says that the doctor knows what the right solution or analysis of the dream is whereas the patient doesn’t: the doctor can say that the patient is wrong”; “Conversations on Freud: Excerpt from 1932–33 Lectures,” in Philosophical Essays on Freud, ed. Richard Wollheim and James Hopkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1. From the beginning of his career Freud struggled with this difficulty. In 1897 he wrote somewhat defensively to Fließ, “All this is not entirely arbitrary.” Dec. 22, 1897; The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904, trans. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 288; cf. SE 1:273.

17. For more analysis of these points, see Terdiman, Present Past, 331–38.

18. The question arose as early as The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), and Freud’s response had been unequivocal: “It is in fact never possible to be sure that a dream has been completely interpreted” (SE 4:279). It recurred in the Three Essays on Sexuality (1905): “It is not always possible to trace the course of . . . connections with certainty” (SE 7:155). In “ ‘Wild’ Psycho-Analysis” (1910) he says this: “One may sometimes make a wrong surmise, and one is never in a position to discover the whole truth” (SE 11:226). And finally, in “Constructions in Analysis” (1937), he acknowledges that “every . . . construction is an incomplete one” (SE 23:263).

7. Proust: The Music of Memory

Michael Wood


3. Contre Sainte-Beuve, 865.

4. Proust, Against Sainte-Beuve, 101–2; Contre Sainte-Beuve, 312.


9. Malcolm Bowie, Proust among the Stars (London: HarperCollins, 1998), 65: “Applying it as a key to understanding Proustian time is rather like looking at the working day from the viewpoint of weekends and holidays, or at the lives of plain-dwellers from the neighbouring mountain-tops.”
15. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 537.
49. Proust, *Against Sainte-Beuve*, 3; *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, 211.
NOTES

8. Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin: Memory from Weimar to Hitler
Esther Leslie

2. Ibid., 72.
3. Ibid. 73.
9. Ibid., 48
10. Ibid., 49.
11. Ibid., 54.
12. Ibid., 49–50.
13. Ibid., 50.
14. Ibid., 57.
15. Ibid., 59.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 56.
18. Ibid., 62.
19. Some vignettes included in Berlin Childhood around 1900 appear in various versions. The version of “The Little Hunchback” referred to here appeared in the Frankfurter Zeitung on August 12, 1933 and can be found in Walter Benjamin, Berlin Childhood around 1900, in Benjamin, Selected Writings, 3:344–413:384–85.
25. Benjamin refers passim to his failure: essentially it is the inability to be assimilated into bourgeois society.
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32. See Ibid., 320.
34. Ibid., 4:182.
35. Benjamin, Arcades Project, 211. The ellipsis covers a passage from Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu about the joy of the collector who stumbles by chance upon the other half of a pair.
39. See the editors’ notes in Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, 6:799.
43. Benjamin, Arcades Project, 471.
45. Benjamin, Arcades Project, 388–89.
47. This refers to Himmler’s Posen speech to SS leaders on October 4, 1943, in which, pronouncing on the extermination program, he said, “we will never speak about it publicly. . . . This is a glorious page in our history, and one that has never been written and can never be written. . . . Later perhaps we can consider whether the German people should be told about this. But I think that it is better that we—we together—carry for our people the responsibility. . . . and then take the secret with us to our graves.” Quoted in Richard J. Evans, Rereading German History, 1800–1996 (London: Routledge, 1997), 162.

9. Adorno on the Destruction of Memory

Brian O’Connor

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Suhrkamp, 1970–80), 10.2:555–72:557. Subsequent references are taken up into the text, using the abbreviation WTP, with English page numbers first, followed by the German.


7. As Adorno writes: “Such a rigid and invariant basis contradicts that which experience tells us about itself, about the change that occurs constantly in the forms of experience, the more open it is, and the more it is actualized. To be incapable of this change is to be incapable of experience.” (ND, 388/380.)


14. Adorno was committed to understanding this idea in as concrete a way as possible, as is evidenced by his involvement with the “studies on authority” project during his time in the United States. The outcome of this project was published as *Studies in the Authoritarian Personality*, in collaboration with Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford (New York: Harper and Row, 1950); Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 9.1. Later, the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, of which Adorno was a key member, undertook a comprehensive, somewhat prosecutorial, and certainly controversial, study of postwar German guilt, entitled *Schuld und Abwehr (Guilt and Denial)*, in Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 9.2.


482
NOTES

22. Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 234 (italics added); Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, 7:348. Subsequent references are taken up into the text, using the abbreviation AT, with English page numbers first, followed by the German.
23. See Norbert Rath, Adornos Kritische Theorie: Vermittlungen und Vermittlungsschwierigkeiten (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1982), 84–96, for a systematic treatment of this idea.
24. Peter Uwe Hohendahl, Prismatic Thought (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 83.
34. Ibid., 142.

10. Acts of Memory and Mourning: Derrida and the Fictions of Anteriority
Gerhard Richter


16. Derrida’s notions of the past that has never been present, that is, the past that “is” only in the passing of the trace, should also be thought in terms of his understanding of an “absolute past,”
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a past without a real past conceived as presence, in other texts, such as Of Grammatology. See especially David Farrell Krell’s chapter on this aspect of the Grammatology, “Mourning Ultratranscendence,” in his The Purest of Bastards, 103–16.


11. Deleuze and the Overcoming of Memory
Keith Ansell-Pearson


7. Freud’s der Todestrieb was translated into English by James Strachey not as “death drive” but as “death instinct.” In Difference and Repetition Deleuze refers to the “Freudian conception of de l’instinct de mort.” The clue to Deleuze’s choice is to be found in his definition of drives as bound excitations; this suggests that for him the death instinct is the primary movement of life because it denotes unbound energy. For further insight into this issue see Richard Boothby, Death and Desire: Psychoanalytic Theory in Lacan’s Return to Freud (New York: Routledge, 1991), 229 n. 1, 29–30, 69–70, 71–72, and 83–84. I concur with Boothby that the primary function of the death drive in Freud is not biological: “As a radical force of unbinding, the death drive must be interpreted psychologically. The death drive designates the way the bound organization of the ego is traumatized by the pressure on it of unbound instinctual energies” (84).

8. The category of forced movement comes from Aristotle and features in his treatment of different kinds of movement, natural and unnatural. See Aristotle, The Physics 4.8 and 8.4. Deleuze’s Proust and Signs was first published in 1964 and then republished several times throughout the 1970s. It is the 1970 expanded edition that first includes the added segment on “The Literary Machine.” A further edition of the text was published in 1976 that included at the very end a piece written in 1973, entitled “Presence and Function of Madness: The Spider.”

9. For Deleuze, it is important to appreciate that the “search” is not simply bound up with an effort of recall but, as recherche, is to be taken in the strong sense of the term, as one would speak of “the search for truth” (PS, 3). This point has recently been emphasized by Roger Shattuck in Proust’s Way (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 2000), 209.

10. Deleuze holds the essences of art to be superior to those found in the sensuous signs, such as the signs of involuntary memory. See Deleuze, PS, 61–65. In essence, Deleuze’s argument is that sensuous signs, unlike the signs of art, cannot separate themselves from external and contingent determinations. As such, they “represent only the effort of life to prepare us for art and for the final revelation of art” (PS, 65). See also chapter four, “Essences and the Signs of Art,” (PS, 39–51).
Deleuze’s text, “essence” is bound up with “internal difference” and functions as a principle of individuation.


12. Roger Shattuck translates the verb *miroiter* as “flashes back and forth” and notes that it also means “to glisten” and “to shimmer.” He describes this passage as the most important one on memory in the novel, and explains the experience the narrator is describing, which is akin, Shattuck says, to a “trick” or “subterfuge,” as like having “two probes in time the way we have two feet on the ground and two eyes watching space.” Moreover, what “would otherwise be a meticulous analytic explanation is suddenly set in motion and brought to life by the verb *miroiter*,” so that the sensation of time becomes iridescent, like a soap bubble, like the plumage of certain birds, like an oil film on water. This enlarged double vision of the world projected in time embodies a parallax view: it provides a sense of depth resulting from a displacement of the observer.” See Shattuck, *Proust’s Way*, 124.


14. On time that is neither empirical nor metaphysical but transcendental see ibid., 271.


17. On the event in Deleuze, see *What is Philosophy*: “The event is immaterial, incorporeal, unlivable: pure reserve. . . . It is the event that is a meanwhile [un entre-temp]: the meanwhile is not part of the eternal, but neither is it part of time—it belongs to becoming. The meanwhile, the event, is always a dead time; it is there where nothing takes place, an infinite awaiting that is already infinitely past, awaiting and reserve’’ (156, 158).


20. On the virtual object, see the important and precise treatment in Deleuze, *DR*, 98–103. A number of points are worth noting: first, that virtual objects are incorporated in real objects and can correspond to parts of a subject’s body, to another person, and to special objects such as toys and fetishes; second, that virtual objects belong essentially to the past, in particular, the formation of the pure past (so virtual objects exist, says Deleuze, as “shreds of pure past”); third, that these peculiar kinds of objects exist only as fragments of themselves in which they are “found” only as “lost” and exist only as recovered; fourth, and perhaps most decisively, that they are implicated in the amorous game and play of repetition. This means that Thanatos is immanent to the movements of repetition and to the displacement and disguise of the virtual object.


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26. Ibid., 129.
27. Ibid., 333.
28. Ibid., 330.
29. Deleuze, Cinema 2, 115.

12. Memory and the Unconscious
Roger Kennedy

2. Ibid., 212.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 221.
9. Ibid., 162.
12. Ibid., 259.
13. Ibid., 260.
21. See Kennedy, Psychoanalysis, History and Subjectivity, 151ff.
26. Ibid., 201.
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31. Ibid., 150–52.

13. Memories Are Made of This
Steven Rose


14. Memory and Cognition
John Sutton, Celia B. Harris, and Amanda J. Barnier

NOTE: Our warm thanks to Ed Cooke, Rochelle Cox, Paul Keil, Doris McIlwain, Charlie Stone, and Rob Wilson for their contributions to the framework developed in this chapter, and to the editors for their patience and encouragement.
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9. See, for instance, Nelson, “Self and Social Functions.”


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28. Conway, “Memory and the Self.”

29. Ibid.; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, “Construction of Autobiographical Memories.”


34. Ibid., 502.


37. Schacter, Searching for Memory, 221.


44. Kihlstrom, “Repression.”
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68. See Celia B. Harris, Amanda J. Barnier, and John Sutton, “Minimal vs. Interactive Collaboration and the Costs and Benefits of Collaborative Recall,” submitted manuscript.


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78. Bartlett, Remembering, 201–2.
79. Clark, “Re-inventing Ourselves.”

15. Physiological Memory Systems
Howard Caygill

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Memory.” For a recent comprehensive and provocative account of Warburg’s work, see Georges
Didi-Huberman, L’image survivante: Histoire de l’art et temps des fantomes selon Aby Warburg (Paris:
Les Éditions de Minuit, 2002).


3. Edelman won the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine in 1972 for his contribution to
immunology and Kandel in 2000 for his experimental work on the synapse. For a recent and
sustained philosophical inquiry into the concept of plasticity and its use in the neurosciences, see
Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain? trans. Sebastian Rand (New York: Ford-
ham University Press, 2008).

4. For a fascinating account of Broca’s discovery and its consequences see Denis Forest, Histoire

5. Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi, Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination


16. Memory-Talk: London Childhoods
Sally Alexander

NOTE: This chapter is taken from chapters in a project in progress, “Skin of the Day”: Women in
London Between the Wars, partly funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. Thank you
to Bill Schwarz for thoughtful editing.


2. Bloch, Historian’s Craft, 194–9, 151. Bloch did not complete the book. Lucien Febvre pub-
lished in his preface the brief notes that survived. Under the idea of cause they included the follow-
ing note: “The ‘destruction’ of cause and of motive (the unconscious)”; this is immediately followed
by the words: “The idea of chance” (xvi).

3. Bloch, Historian’s Craft, 3–12. For some of the ways in which being and time were being
explored in relation to each other in phenomenology, modernism and psychoanalysis after the First
World War in European thought, see Bill Schwarz, “‘Already the Past’: Memory and Historical
Time,” in Regimes of Memory, ed. Susannah Radstone and Katharine Hodgkin (London: Routledge,
2003), 135–51, which is republished as Memory Cultures: Memory, Subjectivity, and Recognition
(Somerset N.J.: Transaction, 2006).


5. Bloch, Historian’s Craft, 166.

6. Jacques Le Goff, History and Memory, trans., Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1992), xiii–xiv, xvi for memory as the “raw material of history”;
see also Frank Kermode, “Palaces of Memory,” Index on Censorship 30 (2001): 87–96, on the
“memories that count.”

7. Annette Kuhn, An Everyday Magic: Cinema and Cultural Memory (London: I. B. Tauris,
2002), 20 and throughout. See also Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (London: Granada,
1984, orig. 1929), 85; Marie Stopes, Mother England (London: John Bale and Danielsson, 1929), 178;
42.

494


13. Oral histories and autobiographies cited in this essay were compiled and written between the 1960s and 1990s. For some account of that moment, see the articles by Ken Worpole and others in Raphael Samuel, ed., People’s History and Socialist Theory (London: Routledge, 1981). I’ve used three archives of London oral histories: my own interviews from the 1970s and 1980s; the Island History Trust (IHT), focusing on the period since the 1870s; and the Making of Modern London archive (MML) compiled 1980s, in the Museum of London. My chapter owes a good deal to John Burnett’s unsurpassed portrait of the architecture, process, and content of autobiographical childhood memory. Early memories, Burnett discovers, are shaped by “unhappy experience,” by turning points in consciousness of the self; they recall moments of philosophical awakening and imagination, fear of death, shame, authority, and violence (John Burnett, Destiny Obscure: Autobiographies of Childhood, Education and Family from the 1820s to the 1920s [Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1984], 23–65). Burnett argues that modernization (higher living standards and reduced birth rate) introduced improvements in family life among the poor, encouraging the growth in affection; civilized notions of family life and affection, he argues, had filtered down from the upper and middle classes to the lower middle and artisan classes via education, industrial legislation, and so on by 1914. My emphasis—partly inspired by Burnett’s own sensitive interpretations of the texts—is on the impact of working people’s needs and aspirations on legislation and culture, and I work from the belief that the capacity for affect, while mitigated by economic conditions, is not produced by them. David Vincent discusses the relationship between economic lives and emotion in Bread, Knowledge and Freedom: A Study of Nineteenth-Century Working Class Autobiography (London: Methuen, 1981), chap. 3.

14. The recollection given precedence or that introduces the individual’s life, usually “holds the key to the secret pages of his mind”; Sigmund Freud, “A Childhood Memory of Goethe” (1917), in SE 17:149.


21. Lily van Duren, interview with Anna Davin, October 1980. There were five suicides a day in the County of London during the interwar years, the numbers rising from previous years, as too were the proportion of women committing suicide; Robert Sinclair, Metropolitan Man: The Future of the English (London: Allen and Unwin, 1937), 44–47.


23. Sixty thousand men from the County of London had been killed during the war, and thousands more were wounded and died a slow death; the influenza epidemic that swept Europe twice, in 1918 and in 1919, killed thousands more. Ill health was endemic and maternal mortality was rising in the thirties. See Robert Sinclair’s doom-laden account of London’s “C3 population” in Metropolitan Man, chap. 2, based on the London statistics.


25. Thirty percent of Londoners in the County of London lived three or more families to a house into the 1930s; NSL, 1:39–41.


30. Compare, for instance, Way Down East (1920), directed by D. W. Griffith and starring Lillian Gish, which tells of a seduced girl, a dead infant, and public exposure, includes a life threatening chase, and is well worth watching.


36. The proportion of illegitimate births in London fell from 4,727 in 1900 to 3,641 (approx. 4% of all births in the County) in the early thirties, as a result of increasing access to and knowledge of
NOTES

birth control through local clinics, maternity and child clinics, and some general practitioners; NSL, 9:292–96.


38. MML series 1, 45.8, Mrs. M. Welsh, who had been a shop assistant at Whiteley’s in the twenties. Freud’s “Family Romance” (1909), in SE 9:237–41, describes the child (usually a son, the girl’s imagination being in this respect “weaker”) unconscious envying and growing hostile toward his father, as well as wishing to exalt him. In these powerful workings of feeling and the imagination, Freud sees the origins of myth.

39. Church, Over the Bridge, 61–62.

40. See Rosie Kennedy, “Children and the Impact of the First World War” (PhD diss., Goldsmiths College, University of London), chap. 1, for memories of the First World War in the aftermath of the second.


42. Ibid, 13–14. Angela Rodaway recounts how she woke from dreams as a child and young adult shouting in fear “and must have been born a thousand times as I waited for the birth of my child”; Rodaway, A London Childhood, 13.

43. See, for example, Helen Fletcher, Bluestocking (London: Pandora, 1986), 30.

44. Births in Bailey’s household (and neighborhood) were home births, attended perhaps by the doctor, or by the local woman; Bailey, Children of the Green, 24, 27.

45. Gamble, Chelsea Child, 7–8; Doris Knight, Millfield Memories (London: Centreprise, 1976), 17.


47. Quoted in Burnett, Destiny Obscure, 313; see also Leonora Eyles, The Ram Escapes: The Story of a Victorian Childhood (London: Peter Nevill, 1953), 1, for memories as “pictures in my mind.”


49. Bailey, Children of the Green, 24, 29.

50. Ibid., 13, 81, 108, 119, and 120. For Freud’s much criticized feminine wish, see Sigmund Freud, “Femininity” (1933), in SE 22:133.

51. Compare shame as a source of social injustice in Bailey with David Vincent’s discussion of the same process of development in nineteenth-century radical autobiographies, in Bread, Knowledge and Freedom, 93.

52. Knight, Millfield Memories, 24; William Goldman is among many who testifies to the vulnerability of domestic servants, “pouring in from the derelict mining areas of Wales . . . young, lonely, inexperienced and simple in their needs”; Goldman, East End My Cradle: Portrait of an Environment (London: Robson, 1988, orig. 1940), 68.

53. Sinclair, Metropolitan Man, 17, 162.


55. For eighteenth-century plebeian speech, see, for example, Tanya Evans, Unfortunate Objects: Lone Mothers in Eighteenth-Century London (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 109–17.

NOTES


17. Affect and Embodiment
Felicity Callard and Constantina Papoulias

NOTE: We are most grateful to Ruth Leys, Susannah Radstone, and Bill Schwarz for their careful readings of, and comments on, earlier versions of this chapter.


5. Sylvan Tomkins, the maverick psychologist who is currently much favored by cultural theorists is an exception: for him, “discrete emotions” are primary. Nonetheless, most cultural theorists tend to see emotions as secondary, socialized versions of bodily forces. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick led the way for a rethinking of Tomkins’s work; see Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, eds., Shame and Its Sisters: A Sylvan Tomkins Reader (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995).

6. It can be argued that the turn to affect replays some motifs in the similarly celebrated turn to memory, in cultural studies at least. Kerwin Lee Klein, in an important article that analyzed the fascination of memory for both scholars and the larger socius, argued that the work that we wish memory to do is “to re-enchant our relation with the world and pour presence back into the past”; Kerwin Lee Klein, “On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse,” Representations 69 (2000): 145. Affect too is about presence (the lived, “fleshed” experience) and ultimately about reenchantment.

498
NOTES

11. Ibid.
12. Hansen tends to use the term *affectivity* rather than *affect*; he borrows here from the philosopher Gilbert Simondon.
13. Hansen, for example, cites the researchers Joseph LeDoux, Antonio Damasio, and Daniel Stern, all of whom we shall discuss later in the chapter. Connolly, similarly, cites Damasio and LeDoux.
14. We should point out that our own use of the term *representation* usually implies this hegemonic meaning.
15. A note of caution is in order here: In this chapter, we are preoccupied with how a very particular privileging of affect as embodied memory has been crystallizing across different disciplinary domains since the 1990s. However, in neuroscience and developmental psychology in particular, the currency of research based on experimental findings arguably has a shorter life than in the humanities. We do not claim here to be keeping pace with the latest research in this area (not least because new experimental findings can reorient scientific debates in a matter of months rather than years). Rather, we are concerned with the following: first, with how a particular series of texts and emerging conceptual apparatuses originating in a particular scientific habitus became transferable and communicable to the humanities and to social theory within a particular discursive juncture; second, with the extent to which this cross-disciplinary attention to “embodied memory” is being presented as a certain overcoming of psychoanalytic conceptualizations of memory and of subjectivity more generally.
16. Indeed, it is clear—though the reasons for why this is the case would require extensive analysis—that Freud is frequently a touchstone, if sometimes an unacknowledged one, for those exploring memory, affect, and the body from a committedly non-psychoanalytic position. In other words, it sometimes seems as though it would be impossible to explore affect and the body without positioning oneself, explicitly or implicitly, in relation to Freud.
18. Ibid., 47.
19. This interpretation plots Freud’s own writings and is also indebted to the French school of Freudian commentary and practice, particularly that of Jean Laplanche. However, there are a number of contemporary psychoanalytic practitioners who, since the 1970s at least, have attempted to align psychoanalytic theory with the findings of developmental psychology and, more recently, with neuroscience. For a characteristic example that bears specifically on the relationship between memory and affect, see the special issue of *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* 25.1 (2005) entitled “Exploring Emotional Memory: Psychoanalytic Perspectives.”
NOTES

22. Ibid., 356.
24. Ibid., italics in original.
25. Affect is a notoriously slippery word in Freud’s oeuvre. Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis define it as “the qualitative expression of the quantity of instinctual energy and its fluctuations” (Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith [New York: Norton, 1973], s.v. “affect”), thereby pointing to its dual qualitative and quantitative characteristics. André Green describes affect as “a moving quantity, accompanied by a subjective tonality” (André Green, The Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic Discourse, trans. Alan Sheridan [London: Routledge, 1999], 70). In the early psychoanalytic paper “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence,” Freud described “a quota of affect or sum of excitation—which possesses all the characteristics of a quantity . . . which is capable of increase, diminution, displacement and discharge, and which is spread over the memory-traces of ideas somewhat as an electric charge is spread over the surface of a body” (Freud, “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1894), in SE 3:60).
It is important to note that Freud was indebted to Darwin’s formulations on affect (Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, 3rd ed. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, orig. 1872]); in Studies on Hysteria, Freud and Breuer note that “sensations and innervations” belonging to the field of “The Expression of the Emotions” comprise “actions which originally had a meaning and served a purpose” (Sigmund Freud and Joseph Breuer, Studies on Hysteria (1895), in SE 2:181). This statement, incidentally, as well as framing the close relationship that affect has to physiology, sees affect as in itself a kind of memory—the carrying over into the present of actions that once, deep in the prehistoric past, had specific purposes.
26. Freud’s strongest formulation regarding this division occurs in “The Unconscious”; “Strictly speaking . . . there are no unconscious affects. . . . The whole difference arises from the fact that ideas are cathexes—basically of memory traces—whilst affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feelings”; Sigmund Freud, “The Unconscious” (1915), in SE 14:178.
27. This is, of course, to push to one side the vexed place that war neuroses and trauma hold in Freud’s thought and the intractable challenge they posed to his libido model and its attendant conceptualizations of memory and affect. However, as Ruth Leys has shown, it is far from clear—on both conceptual and empirical grounds—that trauma can be separated out from sexuality and fantasy; Ruth Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
31. Adam Phillips makes clear the affective complexity of, for example, worry, boredom, and composure in terms of their ability to contain manifold diverse attitudes and feelings about oneself, others, and the world around one; Adam Phillips, On Kissing, Tickling, and Being Bored: Psychoanalytic Essays on the Unexamined Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).

37. Technological and discursive changes in psychology and psychiatry certainly played a significant part in these changes. The emergence of new medical imaging technologies, for example, enabled a new mapping of the mind onto the brain, as particular neurochemical processes could be said to make feeling and remembering visible. The development of psychotropic drugs meant that mental problems could be associated with the dysregulation of chemical substances between the brain’s neurons. See Allan Young, *The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Joseph Dumit, *Picturing Personhood: Brain Scans and Biomedical Identity* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); and David Healy, *The Anti-Depressant Era* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).


41. Young, *Harmony of Illusions*.

42. A good example is Cathy Caruth’s interdisciplinary edited book, whose very title, *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, points to the energy that the category of trauma gave to inquiries into the function (and dysfunction) of memory.

43. For a powerful critique of both van der Kolk’s and Caruth’s formulations concerning the manner in which trauma resists representation, see Leys, *Trauma*. See also, for a discussion of van der Kolk’s work, Young, *Harmony of Illusions*.


47. Elsewhere, van der Kolk likens this traumatic isolation of memory to a momentary regression of the traumatized person into infancy.
48. Key texts in which this debate is played out include those by Caruth and van der Kolk, as well as Leys, Trauma. Elspeth Probyn, in analyzing shame, cites van der Kolk when wondering whether “feelings lie quietly at the back of the mind” or are “slotted away in the body’s filing system”; “some mental representation of the experience is laid down by means of a system that records affective experience, but that has no capacity for symbolic processing and placement in space and time.” Probyn goes on to praise the complexity of “what the body does habitually”; Probyn, Blush, 65.


50. In the use of such “stories” about the brain by scholars in the humanities, the terminological and conceptual disjuncture between disciplines is frequently disavowed. For example, it is unclear how scholars in the humanities ought to interpret LeDoux’s claim that the amygdala responds to a sensory cue from the thalamus; in what sense are such cues both based on perception and nonrepresentational? To what extent can an image or a sound be perceived directly? Since it is not only snakes but also snake-like (wriggling) objects that can generate fear, how far can we talk about perceiving formal similarities in objects without invoking the term representation? And does it make sense to claim (as LeDoux and others do) that such formal similarities are universally perceived?

51. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 53.

52. LeDoux, Emotional Brain, 250.


55. Stern is perhaps one of cultural theorists’ most favored psychologists. His work is cited in the writings of Brian Massumi and Mark Hansen and figures prominently in the emerging body of writings on affect in cultural geography. Affective resonance as a concept originates with the psychologist Silvan Tomkins in his multi-volume opus Affect, Imagery, Consciousness (New York, Springer, 1962–92). Tomkins’s account of the primacy of the emotions in communication was partly conceived as a polemic against Freud’s privileging of the drive.


57. Schore, Affect Regulation, 30.

58. Ibid., 498.

59. Ibid., 542.

60. The feminist philosopher Teresa Brennan has produced a remarkable if problematic retheorization of sexuality through affectivity in her posthumous book The Transmission of Affect. Brennan, in a vitalistic recasting of Freud, reconceives libido as a life force (living attention) that is passed from the mother to the infant through what Stern called attunement. Tellingly, Brennan argues that conflict, fantasy, and psychic distress are a byproduct of the blocking of such energy and concludes that “disorder is not inherent in the body or the flesh, which loves regulation”; Brennan, Transmission of Affect, 155. Brennan’s insistence on the wisdom and orderliness of the body is shared by many writings in the turn to affect and merits further study.


62. These terms are not equivalent, though in unison, they have come to oppose explicit or representational memory.

63. Claparède’s commentary was brought to prominence through Ruth Leys’s provocative discussion of it in her book Trauma: A Genealogy. It has since been taken up in various ways by other

64. Edouard Claparède “La question de la mémoire affective” (1911), quoted in Leys, Trauma, 96.

65. For LeDoux’s discussion of Claparède see Ledoux, Emotional Brain, 180–82.

18. Telling Stories: Memory and Narrative

Mark Freeman

NOTE: This chapter draws on material in Mark Freeman, Hindsight: The Promise and Peril of Looking Backward (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).


4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. See especially Eva Hoffman, After Such Knowledge: Memory, History, and the Legacy of the Holocaust (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). Hoffman writes extensively about being a member of the “second generation”—in her case, the child of Holocaust survivors—and the “paradoxes of indirect knowledge” that accompanied her status. As she notes, “The formative events of the twentieth century have crucially informed our biographies and psyches, threatening sometimes to overshadow and overwhelm our lives. But we did not see them, suffer through them, experience their impact directly. Our relationship to them has been defined by our very ‘post-ness,’ and by the powerful but mediated forms of knowledge that have followed from it” (25). See also Edward Shils, Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981). “Memory,” Shils writes, “is furnished not only from the recollections of events which the individual has himself experienced but from the memories of others older than himself with whom he associates. From their accounts of their own experiences, which frequently antedate his own, and from written works at various removes, his image of his ‘larger self’ is brought to include events which occurred both recently and earlier outside his own experiences. Thus, his knowledge of his past is furnished by the history of his family, of his neighborhood, of his city, of his religious community, of his ethnic group, of his nationality, of his country and of the wider culture into which he has been assimilated” (51).


8. Ibid., 291.

9. Ibid., 296.


13. Ibid., 140.
16. Ibid., 26–27.
17. Ibid., 138.
23. Of special note in this context is Helen Keller’s autobiography, *The Story of My Life* (New York: New American Library, 1988, orig. 1902), in which, after having discovered that she had unwittingly plagiarized a short story, Keller writes that she “cannot be quite sure of the boundary line between my ideas and those I find in books. Perhaps this is so,” she ventures, “because so many of my impressions come to me through the medium of others’ eyes and ears” (48). “It is certain,” she adds, “that I cannot always distinguish my own thoughts from those I read, because what I read becomes the very substance and texture of my mind. Consequently, in nearly all that I write” (including, of course, the autobiography that contains these very sentences), “I produce something which very much resembles the crazy patchwork I used to make when I first learned to sew” (53). See also chapter 3 of my own *Rewriting the Self: History, Memory, Narrative* (London: Routledge, 1993), as well as my “Worded Images, Imaged Words: Helen Keller and the Poetics of Self-Representation,” *Interfaces* 18 (2000): 135–46. For another exploration of the Keller case, see Roger Shattuck, “A World of Words,” *The New York Review of Books*, Feb. 26, 2004: 21–24.
28. Ibid., 25.
29. Ibid., 26.
30. Ibid., 27.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 28.
NOTES

35. Freeman, “Too Late.”
37. Ibid., 264.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 30–31.
41. Hoffman, After Such Knowledge. See also Mark Freeman, “Autobiographische Erinnerung und das narrative Unbewußte” (“Autobiographical Memory and the Narrative Unconscious”), in Warum Menschen sich erinnern können (Autobiographical Memory in Interdisciplinary Perspective), ed. Harald Welzer and Hans J. Markowitsch (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006), 129–43; also, “Charting the Narrative Unconscious: Cultural Memory and the Challenge of Autobiography,” Narrative Inquiry 12 (2002): 193–211. By “narrative unconscious,” I refer to “those culturally-rooted aspects of one's history that remain uncharted and that, consequently, have yet to be incorporated into one's story” (193). As I also suggest, we become aware of the existence of this unconscious “during those moments when our own historical and cultural situatedness comes into view” (200). While Hoffman uses different language to deal with this issue, her own process of self-discovery and self-realization is very much in keeping with the idea of the narrative unconscious.
47. Carr, Time, Narrative, and History, 60.
50. Of special interest in this context is Patricia Hampl, I Could Tell You Stories: Sojourns in the Land of Memory (New York: Norton, 1999). Appearances notwithstanding, the work of memory,
Hampl suggests, is closer to poetry than to fiction: “The chaotic lyric impulse, not the smooth drive of plot, is the engine of memory.” In memoir and other such autobiographical ventures, this impulse may be “domesticated” into narrative, but the driving passion behind it derives from “the wild night of poetry” (224).


52. Ibid., 9.


55. Ibid., 31.

19. Ritual and Memory

Stephan Feuchtwang

**NOTE:** I thank Nicolas Argenti and Harvey Whitehouse for suggesting some very necessary revisions, without holding them responsible for the result. I also thank Amit Desai for searching out much of the relevant anthropological literature.


6. Ibid., 105–6.


11. See the chapters by Roger Kennedy, John Sutton et al., and Mark Freeman in this volume.


13. Ibid., 314.

23. Ibid., 264.
24. Ibid., chap. 2.
29. Ibid., 196.
30. Ibid., 308.
31. Ibid., 316.
37. Lewis, *Day of Shining Red*.
38. Argenti, “Remembering the Future.”
NOTES

41. Santos-Granero, “Writing History into the Landscape.”
42. Harvey Whitehouse and James Laidlaw, eds., Ritual and Memory: Toward a Comparative Anthropology of Religion, (Walnut Creek, Calif.: Altamira Press, 2004).

20. A Long War: Public Memory and the Popular Media
Paula Hamilton

5. Misztal, Theories of Social Remembering, 5; her book also includes a succinct survey of the debates about Hallwachs in the chapter “Theorizing Remembering”; Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006); and Oren Baruch Stier, Committed to Memory: Cultural Mediations of the Holocaust (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).
8. The Australian prime minister Paul Keating often used the memory of Singapore to shore up the idea of an independent Australia against the British colonial heritage. His biographer and former speechwriter, Don Watson, claims that next to John Curtin, the prime minister of Australia in 1942, Keating made more speeches on the war than anyone else. See Don Watson, Recollections of a Bleeding Heart (Sydney: Vintage Australia, 2002); and, on the fiftieth anniversary of the fall of Singapore, Paul Keating, “John Curtin’s World and Ours,” July 5, 2002, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library (ICPML 00746/1).
10. For Sturken, “cultural memory” is a refinement of the idea of collective memory that particularly engages with cultural production; see Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic and the Politics of Remembering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 3–5.
11. Winter, Remembering War, 6.
NOTES

15. Vivian, “‘A Timeless Now,’” 205.
17. Landsberg, in Prosthetic Memory, was not the first to articulate the notion of prosthetic memory but her account is the most comprehensive. See also Robert Burgoyne, “Prosthetic Memory/Traumatic Memory: Forrest Gump (1994)” http://www.latrobe.edu.au/screeningthepast/firstrelease/fr0499.
26. Other commentators included the historians Joy Damousi and myself; Garton, “Changi as Television,” 80–81.
30. Guestbook, Changi Internet forum, Kelly, November 18, 2001; Graham, October 14, 2001; see also Sian, October 20, 2001.
32. Guestbook, Changi Internet forum, Gazza, “Father Would be Proud” (post 368); Phil (post 338) was hostile; and Shane (post 295) reiterated the common saying that it was impossible to “forgive and forget,” all on October 14, 2001. (Later participants did not have post numbers.)
21. Sites of Memory
Jay Winter


22. Cinema and Memory
Susannah Radstone

2. For a wide-ranging and illuminating study of the cinematic flashback and its relations to memory see Maureen Turim, Flashbacks in Film: Memory and History (New York: Routledge, 1989).
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5. Ibid., 3.
6. Ibid., 104.
7. Ibid.


13. Ibid.


17. See Turim, *Flashbacks in Film*.


19. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Esther Leslie’s contribution to this volume.


21. Ibid., 171.


27. Ibid.
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28. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 259.
31. Ibid., 271.
32. Ibid., 267.
33. Ibid., 266.
34. Ibid., 266–67.
35. Ibid., 271.
37. Ibid., 7.
40. Ibid., 24; see also Janet Walker, Trauma Cinema (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).
42. Walker, Trauma Cinema, 20.
43. Texts that have particularly influenced the development of theories of culture, film, and trauma include Cathy Caruth, ed., Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); and Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (New York: Routledge, 1992).
50. Ibid., 59.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid. 60.
58. Burgin, *Remembered Film*, 68.
59. Ibid., 68.
61. Burgin, *Remembered Film*, 65, quoting Winnicott (emphasis in orig.).
62. Ibid., 70.
63. Ibid.
64. Kuhn, *Family Secrets*, 112.
68. See also Kuhn’s later research on memories of British cinema-going in the 1930s, published as Annette Kuhn, *An Everyday Magic: Cinema and Cultural Memory* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002).
69. Burgin, *Remembered Film*, 70.
70. Kuhn, *Family Secrets*, p.112.
72. Ibid., p. 133.
73. The film earned AUS$1.2 million in its first week of screening; ibid., 133.
74. Ibid., 139.
75. Ibid., 149.
76. Ibid.
78. For the complete text of the speech, see http://www.aph.gov.au/house/Rudd_Speech.pdf.

### 23. Machines of Memory

*Steve Goodman and Luciana Parisi*

7. Ibid., 66.
8. Ibid., 67–68.
9. Ibid., 63–94.
11. Ibid., 118.
14. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 179.
21. Interrogating this nexus between genetic and cultural memory, memeticist Susan Blackmore argues for a process she terms “memetic driving” to emphasize that we must think the “coevolution” between genetic and memetic replicators: “The past history of memetic evolution affects the direction that genes must take to maximise their own survival. We now have a coevolutionary process between two quite different replicators that are closely bound together. To maximise their success the genes need to build brains that are capable of selectively copying the most useful memes, while not copying the useless, costly or harmful ones. To maximise their success the memes must exploit the brain’s copying machinery in any way they can, regardless of the effects on the genes. The result is a mass of evolving memes, some of which have thrived because they are useful to the genes, and some of which have thrived in spite of the fact that they are not—and a brain that is designed to do the job of selecting which memes are copied and which are not.” She concludes, “If memes are truly replicators in their own right then we should expect things to happen in human evolution which are not for the benefit of the genes, nor for the benefit of the people who carry those genes, but for the benefit of the memes which those people have copied.” (Susan Blackmore, “Evolution and Memes: The Human Brain as a Selective Imitation Device,” http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Articles/cas01.html [accessed, February 12, 2006], originally in *Cybernetics and Systems* 32.1 [2001]: 225–55.)
23. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 93–94.
29. Ibid., 178.
NOTES

30. Ibid., 179.
31. Ibid., 146–47.
32. Ibid., 148–50.
34. Ibid., 38.
35. Ibid., 36.
36. Ibid., 78–84.
37. Ibid., 44–45.
39. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 192.
43. Whitehead, Adventures in Ideas, 191.
44. Whitehead, Process and Reality, 129.
45. Whitehead, Adventures in Ideas, 195.
47. Ibid., 215.

24. Slavery, Historicism, and the Poverty of Memorialization
Stephan Palmié

NOTE: I would like to acknowledge the comments and criticism offered by Bobby Hill, Ira Berlin, the participants in New York University’s Atlantic History Workshop, and the students in my “Anthropology of History” graduate seminar at the University of Chicago.

2. Miguel Barnet, Biografía de un cimarrón. (Havana: Instituto de Etnología y Folklore, 1966). Henze, who met Montejo in 1969–70, went on to compose a work for baritone, guitar, flute, and percussion, set to a libretto of Enzensberger’s adaptations of Barnet’s text that premiered two years before Montejo died in 1973, at the approximate age of 113. As Henze later recalled, Montejo “was then 107 years old, tall as a tree, walked slowly and upright, his eyes were lively, he radiated dignity and seemed well aware that he was a historical personage”; Hans-Werner Henze, Music and Politics (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), 174.
4. A fact that, as William Luis argues, Montejo himself may well have been aware of; Luis, “The Politics of Memory and Miguel Barnet’s The Autobiography of a Run Away Slave” MLN 104 (1989): 475–91:480.
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11. Of course, this is essentially but a version of the epistemological quandaries historians encounter in dealing with what Marc Bloch called “intentional evidence” (*Bloch, The Historian’s Craft* [New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953]). It is likewise a problem that has not only always bedeviled the genre of anthropological life histories (Sidney W. Mintz, “The Sensation of Moving while Standing Still,” *American Ethnologist* 16 [1989]: 175–85) but similarly plagues contemporary attempts to ethnographically “give voice” to the “native.” For a thought-provoking interpretation of the fundamentally heteroglossic nature of Barnet/Montejo’s *Biografía* see Luis, “Politics of Memory.”


13. And taking also his recollections of less-than-admirable pursuits in the service of local políticos Montejo documentably engaged in after the turn of the twentieth century, and over which Barnet and the historian Michael Zeuske fought a pitched battle in the pages of the journal *New West Indian Guides* (Barnet, “The Untouchable Cimarrón,” *New West Indian Guide* 71 [1997]: 281–89; Zeuske, “The Cimarrón in the Archives: A Re-Reading of Miguel Barnet’s Biography of Esteban Montejo,” *New West Indian Guides* 71 [1997]: 265–79). For further information concerning the context of the production of Barnet’s book, see Luis, “Politics of Memory.”
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29. This is an ideological move, we might say, that Miguel Barnet had apparently been able to perform even while Esteban Montejo was still speaking to him: for Barnet, “el cimarrón” had already become a metonym of pasts on which he himself aimed to leave his interpretative stamp in the name of the Cuban revolutionary national project. Luis, who provides the most sensitive reading of the text in regard to this moment, suggests that there are traces of textual evidence that support the assumption that Montejo may not have shared Barnet’s vision of history and instead remained skeptical, if not outright disillusioned; Luis, “Politics of Memory.”


34. Lambek, “Past Imperfect.”


37. See Knapp, “Collective Memory and the Actual Past.” On the legal question of how restitutionary claims based on personal injury might be rendered “descendible” see Westley, “The Accursed Share.”


39. The logic becomes obvious in the American legal form of the class action suit, in which the plaintiffs are treated as collectivities composed of instances of wronged persons rather than as groups.


41. Hence perhaps Charles Maier’s worry that the global trend toward “revisiting . . . collective victimization and catastrophe” at the end of the twentieth century may less reveal a genuine concern to transcend such pasts than reflect “our current incapacity to entertain transformative political projects for the future and hence to invest our collective resources in contesting the past”; Charles S. Maier, “Overcoming the Past? Narrative and Negotiation, Remembering and Reparation: Issues at the Interface of History and the Law,” Politics and the Past, ed. John Torpey (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 295–303:303.


43. Named so after Christine Taubira, a delegate from French Guyane who had originally introduced the bill—no doubt in the sincere belief that it might lead to genuine political reflection.

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2006/speech_by_the_president_of_the_republic_marking_the_first_commemorative_day_in_metropolitan_france_for_removing_slavery_and_its_abolition.50223.html.


46. As Christine Chivallon puts it in regard to the rush to commemorate the slave trade that seems to have gripped the city of Bristol under the impact of Britain’s newly discovered “multicultural” agenda in the late 1990s, “the boom in memory was only translating the excess that marks the instrumentalization of all signs that serve to accredit a social vision in which the acceptance of difference must be viewed as already achieved,” rather than as a woefully incomplete project (Chivallon, “Bristol and the Eruption of Memory: Making the Slave-Trading Past Visible,” Social and Cultural Geography 2 [2001]: 357).


48. Proof of the pudding is that—one pace Aristotle, and with the significant exception of Count Tolstoy—few modern claims upon the past have ever explicitly been made in the name of “poetry.” See Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Knapp, “Collective Memory and the Actual Past”; Michael Lambek, The Weight of the Past: Living With History in Mahajanga, Madagascar (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Koselleck, Futures Past.


52. Trouillot, “Abortive Rituals.”


56. One needs to note an additional layer of irony here: for it was arguably the work of historians of the Atlantic slave trade like Curtin that, by empirically assessing its scope and authoritatively
inscribing it into the Western historical imagination, makes possible statements like the foregoing (or, indeed, the entire controversy). I thank Fred Cooper for this observation, though I do not think that it has much bearing on the present argument. Compare Steven Feierman, “African Histories and the Dissolution of World History,” in Africa and the Disciplines, ed. Robert H. Bates, V. Y. Mudimbe and Jean O’Barr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 167–212, on the non-additivity of historical knowledge.


58. This is not to say that the “memories” fostered by “roots tourism” are unproblematic. As Paulla Ebron argues in her analysis of a McDonald’s-sponsored “African American homeland tour” to Gorée Island, not only does contemporary corporate “identity marketing” aim to domesticate oppositional expressions of difference. It also effectively disarticulates the vision of a shared transatlantic history of oppression central to mid-twentieth-century forms of political Pan-Africanism by replacing it, on both sides of the Atlantic, with “the pragmatism of free-market wealth generation” (Hasty, “Rites of Passage,” 58). In the case Ebron describes, the “McDonald’s tour . . . brought participants into an identity journey that blocked out much of collective politics, both African and American, even as it gave us a sense of connection” (Ebron “Tourists as Pilgrims,” 928; cf. Hartman, “The Time of Slavery”). Nonetheless, to compare these two modes of mnemonic practice coinciding at the Maison des Esclaves risks mistaking the profit-driven manipulation of authentic desire to connect with and mourn a tragic past with the staging of commemorative rituals designed to render such connections irrelevant in and for the present.

59. These range from Representative Tom De Lay’s accusation that President Clinton trea-sonously criticized the United States on foreign soil in delivering (what arguably was not) an apology for slavery, to the much publicized “genomic exposure” of Thomas Jefferson’s paternity of one of his slave Sally Hemings’s sons, to the last-minute decision of the Library of Congress not to open its “Back of the Big House exhibit” (which soon after surfaced at the District of Columbia’s Martin Luther King Public Library), to the belated discovery that Philadelphia’s Freedom Bell exhibit was to be housed on the grounds where George Washington kept his slaves during his presidency, and on to scuffles that broke out during the Colonial Williamsburg Museum’s reenactment of a slave auction, or—apparently even most disturbing for Berlin—the interruption of scholarly dialogue by an unruly lay audience during a 1998 Omohundro Institute for Early American History and Culture conference on the merits of a newly unveiled CD-ROM database on the transatlantic slave trade (David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson, and Herbert S. Klein, eds., The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Database on CD-ROM [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999]). For more on such controversies see the contributions to James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, eds., Slavery and Public History: The Tough Stuff of American Memory (New York: The New Press, 2006).


61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., 1262.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., 1262–63.

65. Ibid., 1266.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., 1266ff.


70. And these might include not only descendants of victims of slavery, but—in all fairness—disgruntled white supremacists and “neo-Confederates” in the U.S. South as well.
75. Koselleck, *Futures Past*.
76. Compare here Fasolt’s doubly sacrilegious comparison between the Eucharist as the major ritual of Catholicism, and contemporary historians’ ritual of producing evidence: in both cases (the body of Christ and the historical past), we are arguably dealing with an ultimately unsubstantiable “reality” that must be represented, and rendered socially binding, through ritualized procedures. As Fasolt argues, the sacredness (in Durkheim’s sense) of evidence, central as it is to such rituals, arises out of and in turn stabilizes liberal visions of personal freedom and accountability—two key components of a credo at the very core of modern historiographical praxis (Fasolt, “History as Ritual”).

25. Soviet Memories: Patriotism and Trauma
Catherine Merridale

NOTE: I presented a version of this chapter at the University of Southampton’s Memory Research Group in May 2006. I am grateful to the participants for inviting me and for their helpful comments in discussion.


2. The first book, concerning death and memory, was my *Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Russia* (London: Faber and Faber, 2000). On the war veterans, see my *Ivan’s War: The Red Army, 1939–1945* (London: Faber and Faber, 2005). I am grateful for the support of the Economic and Social Research Council in both cases, and also for research leave funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Board.


5. The remark was picked up by Derek Summerfield in his “The Psychological Legacy of War and Atrocity: The Question of Long-Term and Transgenerational Effects and the Need for a Broad View,” *Journal of Nervous and Medical Disease* 184.1 (1996): 375–77.


7. Solzhenitsyn’s *Gulag Archipelago*, published in English in 1974, resulted in his expulsion from the USSR. Like earlier “revelations,” it served to ensure that the European Left could not turn to the Soviet Union for comfort at a time of political crisis, but like earlier publications (notably Viktor Kravchenko’s *I Chose Freedom*), it was unwelcome in such political circles.


11. After Stalin’s death, the Gulag was gradually liquidated, initially on the instructions of Lavrenti Beria and then as part of Nikita Khrushchev’s program of de-Stalinization.


26. The Witness in the Archive: Holocaust Studies/memory Studies
Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer

**Note:** This chapter appeared in *Memory Studies* 2.2 (2009): 151–70. We thank Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz for their invitation to write this article and the challenging question they posed to us: What has Holocaust Studies brought to Memory Studies and how, conversely, has Memory Studies inflected Holocaust Studies? We are also grateful to members of the Columbia Cultural Memory colloquium and the Seminar on the Age of the Witness at CUNY Graduate Center for their excellent suggestions on earlier versions of this article.


2. Among other possible trajectories we could have chosen, are visuality and especially photography as privileged media of memory; the acute interest in museums and memorials as media of
history and memory; and the challenges of intergenerational transmission of traumatic histories, or what we have termed “postmemory.” Each of these trajectories would have led us to explore the connections between Holocaust studies and the larger field of memory. Certainly a key factor motivating our choice of testimony as the topic to pursue is its important role in the new truth commissions that have increasingly come to serve as vehicles of transitional justice in the aftermath of catastrophe on a global scale. For a related argument about Holocaust testimony, see chapter 3 in Dominick LaCapra’s recent study History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009).


4. Ibid., 229.

5. Ibid.

6. In his Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, Agamben distinguishes between two kind of witnesses: one, emerging from the Latin notion of testis (based on the third party, terstis), is one who observes but does not live through the event; the other, the superstes, is the one who has lived through something and bears witness to it; Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 1999), 17. Our discussion of witnessing in this article concerns the superstes, the survivor-witness.


10. Felman, Juridical Unconscious, 123.

11. Felman objects to Susan Sontag’s provocative reference to the Eichmann trial as “the most interesting and moving work of art of the past ten years,” arguing: “There is at least one crucial difference between an event of law and an event of art . . . : a work of art cannot sentence to death. A trial, unlike art, is grounded in the sanctioned legal violence it has the power (and sometimes the duty) to enact”; Felman, Juridical Unconscious, 152–53. For Sontag’s remark, see her “Reflections on The Deputy,” in Eric Bentley, ed. The Storm Over “The Deputy” (New York: Grove Press, 1964), 118.


15. Gouri, Facing the Glass Booth, 129.


25. Felman and Laub, _Testimony_, 80.

26. Ibid., 81.

27. Ibid.


32. Ibid., 114.

33. Ibid., 116.

34. Ibid., 117.


37. As Sidra deKoven Ezrahi has written, these debates revolve around questions of authority and authenticity. In the dominant desire to get as close as possible to the heart of the abyss, the “black hole” of Auschwitz, certain voices, certain sites, and certain genres have gained greater authority over others. In what Ezrahi terms the “static or absolutist” approach to representing the Holocaust, as opposed to a more “dynamic or relativist” one, the Holocaust is conceptualized as a series of concentric circles with Auschwitz and the gas chamber—unreachable, immobile, and ultimately incomprehensible—at the center; Sidra deKoven Ezrahi, “Representing Auschwitz,” _History and Memory_ 7.2 (1996–97): 120–53.

38. In contrast, witnesses invariably apologize for breaking down during their testimony. Most try hard to maintain composure, to tell stories, provide information and, indeed, “truth.”


NOTES

See ibid., 144–94, for a more encompassing critique of Remnants of Auschwitz. See also the critique by Philippe Mesnard and Claudine Kahan, Giorgio Agamben à l’épreuve d’Auschwitz (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 2001).

43. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 150.

44. For Agamben, the notion of the archive needs to be redefined to accommodate the “unsayable.” See Remnants of Auschwitz, 144.

45. See Derrida’s distinction between “bearing witness” and “proof” in “Poetics and Politics of Witnessing,” 75.

46. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 12.


49. Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth, 32.


53. In this regard, see especially the work of James Young on “received history” and of Dominick LaCapra on “transference.”


55. Ibid., 63.

56. Ibid., 67.

57. Ibid., 71.

58. In his critical analysis of Laub’s debate with the historians, Thomas Trezise takes Laub to task precisely for his reliance on the lens of clinical psychotherapy, which leads him to “selective listening,” “exaggeration,” and “mythmaking.” After watching three testimonies on which Laub’s analysis might have been based, Trezise finds that none of them project the extreme change of affect highlighted in Laub’s interpretation. In his response, Laub claims as a form of interpretive evidence the psychoanalytic process of countertransference that emerges in the “intimate dialogue” of testimony and thus his own counter-transferential responses and recollections. These led him, in this case, to “replace[e] the manifest text (of the testimony) with its latent meaning.” Laub thus insists on testimony as a psychoanalytic encounter, whereas Trezise sees testimony as a “generic hybrid”
NOTES

that “requires for its reception a plurality of interpretive frameworks”; Trezise, “Between History and Psychoanalysis,” 31; Laub, “On Holocaust Testimony.”


60. For her elaboration of this call, see Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, esp. 261–79.

61. “It is necessary that our youth remember what happened to the Jewish people. We want them to know the most tragic facts in our history”: Arendt quotes the Israeli David Ben Gurion’s comment about the function of the Eichmann trial; Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 10.


64. Levy and Szaider, Holocaust and Memory, 32.

65. Ibid., 4.

66. Ibid., 11–12.

67. See Michael Rothberg’s recent book Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009). See also recent work on how the invocation of a transnational Holocaust memory can serve as a screen memory in local scenes of catastrophe, for example, Neil Levi, “‘No Sensible Comparison?’ The Place of the Holocaust in Australia’s History Wars,” History and Memory 19.1 (Spring/Summer 2007): 124–56.

27. The Long Afterlife of Loss
Eva Hoffman


6. W. H. Auden, “September 1, 1939,” New Republic, October 18, 1939. The first version of the poem, written in response to Germany’s invasion of Poland, included the line “We must love one another or die.” Auden subsequently altered this line to “We must love one another and die.”
NOTES

28. Migration, Food, Memory, and Home-Building
Ghassan Hage

NOTE: This essay is a revised version of a text that appeared in Helen Grace, Ghassan Hage, Lesley Johnson, Julie Langsworth, and Michael Symonds, Home/World: Space, Community and Marginality in Sydney’s West (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1997).

1. The inclusion of some Arabic throughout the text is meant primarily for Arabic-speaking readers who would appreciate the expression in its original form, given the layers of meanings it is capable of expressing and that are sometimes lost in the process of translation.


4. While I realize that this definition of home is stated as if it were an a priori certainty, in fact it is the end result of both my empirical investigation and my extensive reading in the substantial literature already available on the subject. In particular, I would like to recognize the important influence of a highly stimulating issue of the journal New Formations, no. 17, Summer 1992, titled “The Question of ‘Home.’”

5. If I get up at night, “my feet” can take me to the toilet or to the fridge without having to “really” wake up and think where to go. Home is a space of maximal bodily knowledge.


7. This is empirically true for both men and women. The point is important to our purposes, for among migrants, both men and women who bury themselves at home and do not succeed in opening up to the host society are frequently pathologized and their houses considered unhomely.


9. What is good for Edward Said (“Reflections on Exile,” in “After the Revolution,” special issue of Granta 13 [1984]: 159–72) or Salman Rushdie (Imaginary Homelands [London: Granta/Viking, 1991]) is taken as if it represents a universal condition. The point is not that Said’s and Rushdie’s experiences of nostalgia are unimportant in explaining other forms of nostalgia but that the sociological specificity of the subject is ignored. Interestingly, Said and Rushdie deploy nostalgia to make lives for themselves in the West, where they actually live.


12. All interviews cited in this chapter were conducted by the author in the suburbs of western Sydney in 1993.

13. It is important to note that, for international migrants, such spaces of homely feelings from within the new country are only national spaces (Lebanese, Greek, Vietnamese, etc.). That is, if in a village in Lebanon, a woman marries someone in the same village, she will experience homesickness when she moves to her husband’s house. The spatially-yearned-for “back-home” in this context is her prior home in the village. If they both move from the village to Beirut searching for
work, she will also experience homesickness, but in this case the yearned-for back-home becomes "the village." It is only when she migrates to Australia that back-home becomes Lebanon. In all these cases, the sphere of actual experience is much more limited than the spatial category (house, village, city, nation) used to refer to it.


16. *Sydney Morning Herald*, January 26, 1993, Good Living, 22. Although they capture an important aspect of the process, these descriptions are clearly romanticized, for such articles aim at more than just describing: they construct migrant eateries as desirable places for consumption by non-migrants.


18. I do not want to leave the impression that these practices of traveling back-home in order to engage in home-building in the present leave people entirely satisfied. There is a whole dialectic of lack, which as one woman put it "leaves a bitter taste" after each event of this sort. It takes you back-home but not quite, and you are left lacking. Despite its importance, I have chosen not to concern myself with this dialectic here, since it is a generalized "existential" condition well analyzed in psychoanalysis.

29. *The Seventh Veil: Feminism, Recovered Memory, and the Politics of the Unconscious*

Janice Haaken


NOTES


9. Herman, Trauma and Recovery; Freyd, Betrayal Trauma; Bass and Davis, Courage to Heal. These works stress recovering and validating childhood memories of abuse as vital to recovery.


12. For discussion of feminist analysis of the False Memory Syndrome Foundation, see Haaken, Pillar of Salt, chap. 1.


NOTES


25. Herman, Trauma and Recovery.


27. Research on memory supports both the concepts of dissociation and repression as systems of defense, although the repression model is more consistent with findings that fluctuating and current mood states influence autobiographical recall. See, for example, Gordon H. Bower, “Mood and Memory,” American Psychologist 36 (1981): 129–48. For distinctions between the repression and dissociation models of divided consciousness, see Ernest R. Hilgard, Divided Consciousness: Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action (New York: Wiley, 1977); Singer, ed., Repression and Dissociation; and Haaken, Pillar of Salt.


30. For discussion of historical parallels between MPD and earlier female diagnoses, see Haaken, Pillar of Salt, and Hacking, Rewriting the Soul.


34. For discussion of gender dynamics of the film noir genre, see Foster Hirsch, Film Noir: The Dark Side of the Screen (New York: Da Capo Press, 1981), and E. Ann Kaplan, Women in Film Noir (London: BFI, 1980).


36. For symptoms of “disguised presentation” of abuse commonly included in checklists for clinicians, see Bass and Davis, Courage to Heal.

37. Martha Baldwin, Beyond Victim: You Can Overcome Childhood Abuse . . . Even Sexual Abuse (Highland City, Fla.: Rainbow Books, 1988); Craig Lockwood, Other Alters: Roots and Realities of Cultic and Satanic Ritual Abuse and Multiple Personality Disorders (Minneapolis: ComCare, 1993).

38. Ross, Multiple Personality Disorder.

39. For further elaboration of this argument, see Haaken, Pillar of Salt, chap. 10, and Frankfurter, Evil Incarnate.
NOTES

43. Ibid., 19–20.

30. The Gender of Memory in Post-Apartheid South Africa
Annie E. Coombes

NOTE: This chapter is dedicated to the many courageous women who were imprisoned for their challenges to the apartheid state and whose sacrifices made the new South Africa possible. In particular I wish to thank the ex-detainees from the Sizoya Sibuye (SiSi) organization who generously shared their time and memories with me while I was conducting my research on the Women’s Jail: Yvonne Ntonto Mhlauli, Patricia Alarm, Joyce Dipale, Maggie Nozi Makhudu, and Maleshane (Mally) Mokoena. Juby Mayet (a former political prisoner) describes one of SiSi’s main aims as making “Number Four [another name for the Old Fort Prison complex, which also houses the Women’s Jail] as famous as Robben Island, because it seems that the world at large forgets that many women played an important part in achieving democracy for our country”; *Mapping Memory: Former Prisoners Tell Their Stories; An Exhibition Created by Lauren Segal, Clive van den Berg and Churchill Madikida*, (Johannesburg: Constitution Hill, 2006), 8. Many thanks to Shula Marks for her careful reading of an earlier version of this chapter. It has benefited from the insights of many colleagues around the world where I have presented versions as keynotes and lectures (including Oxford University, Harvard University, and Göteborg and Norrköping Universities). Thanks to my colleague at Birkbeck College, Hilary Sapire, for inviting me to speak at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies Workshop on Cultures and Memories of Confinement in Southern Africa and for her comments and those of the other participants. Thanks also to Clive van den Berg and especially to Lauren Segal for generously providing insights into the curatorial process at the Women’s Jail and for facilitating my access to transcripts of the ex-prisoner and ex-warder workshops.

5. See Charles Villa-Vicencio, “Getting on with Life: A Move Towards Reconciliation,” in *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*, ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press; London: Zed Press, 2000), 199–209. Although Villa-Vicencio, who was the director of research for the TRC, is one of the most measured and ultimately supportive commentators on the TRC, he puts his finger on the crucial demand made of the victim: “The victim is asked to give priority to his or her obligations as a citizen rather than a violated person in the creation of a new and different
kind of society—within which the bigger picture of national unity and reconciliation is promoted” (201, his emphasis).


7. Bundy, claims that “it goes without saying that the TRC was charged with writing an official history”; Bundy, “Beast of the Past,” 13.


13. Fiona C. Ross, “Speech and Silence: Women’s Testimony in the First Five Weeks of Public Hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering and Recovery, ed. Veena Das, et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 253. The statistics she cites are instructive. In the first five weeks of the hearings, 204 testified about 160 cases of human rights violation. Out of these 58% were women, but only 13% of the women testified directly about violations against women. Most of my citations of Ross are from this article, but the fuller account of her research can be found in her wonderful monograph, Bearing Witness.


16. Ibid., 259.

NOTES

19. The film won the Grand Jury Prize of the 2000 Sundance Film Festival, and was nominated for an Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature. It focused on the cases of the Cradock Four, the killing of Amy Biehl, the bombing of Robert McBride, and the murders of the Guguletu Seven.
20. Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 36.
21. Ibid., 38.
22. The Ugandan Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights, which sat between 1986 and 1994, held public victim hearings, but these were considerably fewer in number than in South Africa; see “Wounded Nations, Broken Lives,” 148–50, for a list of truth commissions and war tribunals held internationally between 1971 and 1996. See also Hayner, “Same Species, Different Animal,” esp. 35.
23. See Archbishop Desmond Tutu, “Foreword” TRC, 1:19–20, where he singles out the South African media for special thanks and explains the reason for welcoming their participation: “We are particularly grateful for the work of SABC radio, which communicated in all our official languages to ensure that even the illiterate did not miss out. We want to mention, too, the special television programme that was broadcast on Sunday evenings—giving a summary of the previous week’s events at the Commission and a preview of the coming week’s events. No wonder these television and radio programmes won prestigious awards—on which we congratulate them. The media helped to ensure that the Commission’s process was as inclusive and as non-elitist as possible.”
28. Ciraj Rassool, Leslie Witz, and Gary Minkley, suggest that Lungile Maninjwa and another artist similarly commissioned by a local authority were “seen as rooted in their respective communities and as having the ability to express the sentiments and respond to the sensibilities of the community.” Clearly, the mothers of those commemorated by the monument held a different view. See Ciraj Rassool, Leslie Witz, and Gary Minkley, “Burying and Memorialising the Body of Truth: The TRC and National Heritage,” in After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, ed. Wilmot James and Linda Van de Vijver (Athens: Ohio University Press; Cape Town: David Philip, 2000), 124.
29. In 2005 another monument was erected by Donovan Ward in collaboration with Paul Hendricks; it consists of seven silhouettes representing the seven murdered youths set into plinths containing a bronze plaque with a portrait and information about each individual. I do not know if this has found more favor with the victims’ mothers.
30. For more details of the commission of the monument and its local response, see Annie E. Coombes, History after Apartheid: Visual Culture and Public Memory in a Democratic South Africa
NOTES


31. See Coombes, History after Apartheid, chap. 2, “Robben Island: Site of Memory/Site of Nation,” particularly 105–15, which explores the dearth of representations of women’s participation in the liberation struggle in public commemorative culture in South Africa and women’s response to the opening of Robben Island.

32. Fatima Meer, however, on seeing the site, had other things to say about the planted grass and the new buildings: “Terrible to see all this thing pushed up and the prison gone. I mean if this is a historical monument, then you don’t go around making it all pretty. I would much rather see the cells. Cells as they were and the cells in Winnie’s yard were even more terrible”; transcript, Constitution Hill Project, Workshop of Political Prisoners at the Women’s Jail, September 27, 2003.


35. TRC, 4:298.


38. See also Jill Bennett, Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma, and Contemporary Art (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005).

39. Cecilie Palmer: “Go into women’s struggle, there is a period where things like the terrorisation of the Transvaal . . . are not even mentioned. You can forget, you can forget. They stand on platforms . . . then they talk about the march in ’56, the banning of the ANC and then they talk about . . . exile” (ibid., 49).

Unidentified speaker: “There are a lot of people who are not appreciated and there are a lot of people who are depressed, who can’t find jobs, who are . . . you know, nobody. . . . Some of them were detained and some are from exile and nobody appreciates them and there are a lot of people now who are telling lies . . . who are saying they were underground, and some of them we knew were never involved” (ibid., 48).

Lolo Tabane: “Maybe we need to say to ourselves and to the world, particularly to the world, . . . that there was a certain period in our lives which has been lost and that period needs to be told and needs to be appreciated and needs to be connected from the past to the future” (ibid., 54).


41. Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 76–77.