NOTES

INTRODUCTION

George Marcus and Neni Panourgìá

2. Sherry B. Ortner, introduction to The Fate of “Culture”: Geertz and Beyond, ed. Sherry B. Ortner, Representations Books (Berekely: University of California Press, 1999), 11.
5. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 74.
7. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 74.
10. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 39.
12. Ortner, introduction to The Fate of “Culture,” 1.

INTERVIEW WITH CLIFFORD GEERTZ

Neni Panourgìá and Pavlos Kavouras


217
CONTEMPORARY FIELDWORK AESTHETICS IN ART AND ANTHROPOLOGY: EXPERIMENTS IN COLLABORATION AND INTERVENTION

George E. Marcus


8. I should also note here another similar sort of effort ongoing in U.S. anthropology by Chicago-trained students of George Stocking, the historian of anthropology; they are reinventing fieldwork from within merely by reinvoking and reinterpreting for present conditions the fieldwork style of Franz Boas, who was prominent in the institutionalization of U.S. anthropology, but whose style of ethnography lost out as a model of method to that of Malinowski. The so called neo-Boasian revival of Matti Bunzl and others is so suggestive because, inspired by Michel Foucault, it effectively shifts the coordinates of the Malinowskian scene of encounter to reflect the realities of changed circumstances of fieldwork today, mainly from the anthropologist’s crossing the boundary of cultural difference to encounter the subject as informant, as source of data on a culture for which is a token, to the anthropologist’s establishing collaborative relations with others who establish mutual curiosities and interests in a common object of knowledge. The Boasian pursuit of research requires a collaborative social imaginary in which to do its work that does not depend on the fixed coordinates of the way culture presents itself as a puzzle in the Malinowskian vision and relation of fieldwork.
9. Fieldwork is no longer site specific in a literal sense. It has become multi-sited not in the sense of making Malinowskian scenes of encounter many times over but through a different strategy of materializing the field of research at certain locations—these are questions of scale-making, a located, situated logic of juxtaposition in which fieldwork literally and imaginatively moves and is designed as such. The object of study is not a particular cultural structure or logic to be described, analyzed, and modeled but the exploration of the anthropologist’s relations to social actors who are both subjects and partners in research.


18. In Rheinberger’s view, experimental systems are to be seen as the smallest integral working units of research. As such, they are systems of manipulation designed to give unknown answers to questions that the experimenters themselves are not yet able clearly to ask.

Experimentation as a machine for making the future has to engender unexpected events.

Epistemic things are material entities or processes—physical structures, chemical relations, biological functions—that constitute the objects of inquiry. As epistemic objects, they present themselves in a characteristic, irreducible vagueness. This vagueness is inevitable because epistemic things embody what one does not yet know. Scientific objects have the precious status of being absent in their experimental presence.

19. How this revised aesthetics of method emerges in different projects will be diverse. For example, in 2005, I published an initial account of a collaboration with a Portuguese aristocrat, Fernando Mascarenhas, the Marques of
Fronteira and Alorna, who was, at once, patron, partner, and subject in this research. See George E. Marcus and Fernando Mascarenhas, *Ocasião: The Marquis and the Anthropologist, a Collaboration* (Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira Press, 2005). It is called *Ocasião*, a term rich in meaning both for Fernando’s house and our experiment in ethnography. This account is a transcript of our initial discussions via e-mail. Although superficially resembling a reflexive account of fieldwork in the Malinowskian mise-en-scène typical of the genre that followed the *Writing Culture* critiques, in fact it is an account of the development of a different architecture or design from our collaboration that involves creating a multi-sited imaginary for this particular project, materialized as a system of nested dialogues and discussions with orchestrated reflexive commentaries on the corpus of material as it was accumulating in this form. The climax of this study was a conference of Portuguese nobles held at Fernando’s palace in 2000. This was a rather rarified subject, but finally it incorporated many of the aspects of the practice of fieldwork explicit in the project of Cummings and Lewandowska and implicit in many contemporary projects of anthropological research. In short, it was a theater of reflexivities modulating nested occasions of discussion, increasingly enriched by a recursivity that comments on earlier materials. This was a project full of mediations, interventions, reactions, and receptions within its bounds; for anthropology, the academy, and others there are a set of publications that reflect its contents in the conventional genre tropes of anthropological writing, analogous to the way in which Cummings and Lewandowska resolved their project into the genre of the glossy, theoretical, semi-academic museum catalog publication as just one of its publicly expressive forms. In this publication of Cummings and Lewandowska, the processes of producing the project were hidden, made available only in the informality of the conference presentation at Tate; in the case of our Portuguese project, the comparable publication—the ethnographic work—was entirely devoted to the process of the research and thinking it through collaboratively. Surely this says something about the state of ethnography in anthropology—where its process inside out is of more immediate or priority interest in a general way than its results. Indeed, the most interesting ethnographic works today have this inside-outness quality where quite substantive results, understandings, analyses of processes, things in the world, are woven into a reflexive account of how the project itself as an act of research comes into being or evolves. This is far from the charge of narcissism and so-called self-indulgent reflexive ethnography so frequently written and even more feared after the 1980s critique. Such an account is actually relevant to its intellectual function and scope.

Anthropologists such as Kim Fortun, with her work *Advocacy after Bhopal*, are attempting to escape the narrowly configured ethical discipline that shapes
the traditional ethnographic narrative rejected by Cummings and Lewandowska for the sake of working at ethical plateaus of the emergent, where there is no firm ground in the multi-sited imaginary that Fortun constructed for herself out of the obligatory Malinowskian mise-en-scène of fieldwork, impossible to constitute from the very beginning of her work.

**MYTH, PERFORMANCE, POETICS—THE GAZE FROM CLASSICS**

*Richard P. Martin*


2. I am especially grateful to Neni Panourgia, George E. Marcus, and the *Ethniki Idryma Erevenon* for the invitation to represent classics at the sessions in Hermoupolis in July 1990. As a *xenos* in several regards, it was my privilege to attend, learn, and contribute toward a sharing of ideas between two not-so-distant intellectual encampments. It should be said that the intervening years have seen some progress in the directions observed within this paper; rather than try to provide a full update, I have selectively noted useful works.


5. Parry, in his University of Paris *thèses* of 1928, developed his position regarding the deeply traditional nature of Homeric verse on textual grounds alone. See Adam Parry, ed., *The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 2–239. Only in 1933, with his assistant Albert Lord, did Parry compare Homeric poetry with the results of fieldwork among Serbo-Croatian singers. In the remaining years before his tragic early death in 1935, Parry concentrated on comparing technical aspects of Greek and South Slavic verse, rather than on the social contexts of the
respective poetries. Lord went on to develop and expand Parry’s findings, while stressing the fieldwork aspect of the investigation. See Albert Bates Lord, *The Singer of Tales* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). Lord’s role and the innovative aspects of Parry and Lord’s methods have been obscured, however, by anti-oral critics, including Parry’s son and literary executor, on which see Gregory Nagy, “Irreversible Mistakes and Homeric Poetry,” in *Euphrosyne: Studies in Ancient Epic and Its Legacy in Honor of Dimitris N. Maronitis*, ed. John N. Kazazis and Antonios Rengakos (Stuttgart, Germany: F. Steiner, 1999), 259–274 (esp. 265–268). On the “scripsist” position, see Oliver Taplin, *Homeric Soundings: The Shaping of the Iliad* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 335–338. Ironically, Taplin, in seeking to find a middle ground, is forced to appropriate the privileged term, giving the title “poetic fieldwork” to his attempt “to work out the mental and social structures of the *Iliad* by accumulating and comparing the evidence from within the poem”—in other words, doing what has usually been called philology. Ibid., 48.


10. As a referee for this volume kindly reminds me, the same point was made a number of times by Paul Ricoeur. See, for example, “The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text,” *New Literary History* 5 (1973): 91–117, in which he stresses the necessity for distancing in order to expand the horizon of understanding.
11. The two abilities tend to be blurred, in the desiring vision, although there is nothing in practice that guarantees a highly localized viewpoint—even if available—will automatically generate an analysis carefully aware of the sort of framing and distancing effects noted by Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 3–30.


16. On culture as an assemblage of texts demanding close reading, see the conclusion of “Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” in Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 448–453. On the applicability of notions of “text” and thus hermeneutics to living events, see Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text.”


18. The work of Jonathan Hall has been especially valuable in examining notions of Greek social affiliation. See Jonathan M. Hall, Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); on borders and frontiers, see François Hartog, Memories of Odysseus: Frontier Tales from

19. Humphreys, Anthropology and the Greeks; and Humphreys, The Family, Women, and Death offer reliable guides through the earlier literature.


22. P. E. Easterling, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997) prefaces the volume by referring to Clifford Geertz’s question, “How is it that other people’s creations can be so utterly their own and so deeply part of us?” and Paul Cartledge, in a similar gesture, titles his contribution (pp. 3–35) “‘Deep Plays’: Theatre as Process in Greek Civic Life.”


25. See essays and the bibliography in Easterling, The Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy. Ironically, little more than twenty years ago classicists could be described as prone to thinking that Greek philosophy and tragedy lay outside the province of anthropology. Humphreys, Anthropology and the Greeks, 4. At that time, the work of the so-called Paris school was only beginning to make its mark. For an introduction to the work of this group of structuralist interpreters and their academic forefather, Louis Gernet, see Louis Gernet, The Anthropology of Ancient Greece, trans. John D. B. Hamilton and Blaise Nagy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); R. L. Gordon, ed., Myth, Religion, and Society: Structuralist Essays (Cambridge, U.K.:

26. See the essay by Neni Panourgia in this volume.

27. This desideratum remains unfilled, unless one considers modern adaptations of drama from overt comparative angles (like Wole Soyinka’s Oedipus) to be analogous to anthropological readings.


30. This is Gerald Else’s term. See Dougherty and Kurke, *Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece*, 1.


34. Special mention must be made of the work of Marcel Detienne in this connection, whose *Comparer l’incomparable* (Paris: Seuil, 2000) usefully interrogates our assumptions about the boundaries and even arrogance of comparison. His special interest in comparative political systems, and their spatial expressions, offers a powerful new method for historians who have so far resisted the lessons of non-Greek comparanda.


Notes to Pages 51–53


42. Politically savvy work on myth is exemplified in Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, “Reading” Greek Culture: *Texts and Images, Rituals and Myths* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). A brilliant analysis of the working of “myth” in Roman culture is provided in T. Peter Wiseman, *The Myths of Rome* (Exeter, U.K.: University of Exeter Press, 2004). It must be confessed that the bias of the foregoing paper is toward Greek studies; Roman studies offer an even broader, faster-growing field for the application of anthropological approaches, and have in fact since the 1990s outpaced the scholarship on Greece in several key areas.


**The Birth of Anthropology Out of a Pause on Pausanias: Frazer’s Travel-Translations Reinterrupted and Resumed**

*James A. Boon*

Note: Deep and playful thanks to Neni Panourgia, Stathis Gourgouris, and participants in and around our conference, especially Pavlos Kavouras, George E. Marcus, and Cliff Geertz. Cliff had relished Syros and fondly remembered this company of scholars in many conversations until soon before his death. I also thank Dimitri Gondicas and Princeton’s Program in Hellenic Studies for support.


14. On biographical details, see Ackerman, *J. G. Frazer: His Life and Work*.

15. Frazer, as cited in Hyman, *The Tangled Bank*, 203.


27. On “chronotopes,” see Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981); using works by Michael Holquist, Caryl Emerson, Jan Kott, Michael Bernstein, and others, I amplify this concept anthropologically in Boon, Affinities and Extremes, 67–69; and Boon, Verging on Extra-Vagance, chap. 6. Ironically, the date of the latest link (mine) in chronotopes attested in this essay nearly coincided (jived) with 14 juillet; may the shade of Lady Lilly forgive my neglecting her national holy day when revisiting her husband’s interruptions “of and for” Pausanias.

28. Hitchcock, literally born “Victorian” (in 1899), has been figuratively classed as such for ostensible repressions. See Donald Spoto, The Dark Side of Genius: The Life of Alfred Hitchcock (Boston, Little Brown, 1983); and Robin Wood, Hitchcock’s Films Revisited (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). Other work suggests that this is a naive view not only of Hitchcock but, since the studies of Stephen Marcus, of Victorians!

29. Dozens of books on Hitchcock (a passion of so many, including me) define “MacGuffin”—for example, Francois Truffaut, Hitchcock (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967); and Thomas Leitch, The Encyclopedia of Alfred Hitchcock (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002). This gimmicky notion of a hybrid-arts gimmick became nearly as familiar as Hitch’s logo-profile (composed of eight swift strokes). I tend to liken such devices in studio-era movies to analogous tricks in “scenic ethnology” both prior to them and overlapping with
them. For studies of similar interrelations, see Leo Charney and Vanessa Schwartz, eds., *Cinema and the Invention of Modern Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

30. My sense of Greece over the years has been shaped by many anthropologists: John K. Campbell, Ernestine Friedl, Michael Herzfeld, Loring Danforth, Jane Cowan, and above all (including retroactively) Neni Panourgía. See also Eleana Yalouri, *The Acropolis: Global Fame, Local Claim* (Oxford: Berg, 2001).

31. Stocking, introduction to *The Golden Bough* (1926 abridgment); Fraser, introduction to *The Golden Bough* (new abridgment), xxi.

32. What one might designate “plus qu’encore plus que parerga” I have called “cosmomes.” Boon, *Verging on Extra-Vagance*, chap. 4. Cosmomes are intersecting places of cultural translation where the emptily cosmopolitan becomes indistinguishable from the utterly local—episodes I also call “Coca-colocalization” (distinct from “Coca-colonization”). Boon, *Verging on Extra-Vagance*, chap. 13, p. 304. To my tastes, a burgeoning critical literature on “cosmopolitanism” remains Enlightenment-tinged: too abstracted from ambiguities in everydayness.


34. Ibid., 39, 8–11.


37. On places like Radio City and world expositions (and Burke), see Boon, *Verging on Extra-Vagance*; and Boon, “Showbiz as a Cross-Cultural System.” K. Burke’s ironic attentiveness to commodity-life, including commercialized culture industry (or something like it), has been neglected by critical anthropologists; so has related attentiveness in Henry Adams, Max Weber, and others. See Boon, *Affinities and Extremes*, xv–xvi; Boon, *Verging on Extra-Vagance*, chap. 5; and Boon, “Also 100 Years Since Weber.”


40. Ackerman, *Frazer: His Life and Work*, 58, 64–65.


43. Elaborate scholarship on Malinowski and Westermarck cannot be discussed here. I note only that the more we consider what they read (as well as
observed), the less restricted to narrow “method” our sense of their lifeworks becomes. This is the spirit in which my studies have revisited Boasians, Geertz, Weber, Lévi-Strauss, Mauss, Balinese ethnography, and Indonesian ethnology—including the colonialist era and supposedly “since.”


45. “Book voyages” and “reading navigations” are conceits of Jacobean scholar Samuel Purchas—who forms, I have hinted, a historical parentheses of comparative scholarship with Frazer. See Boon, *Other Tribes*, p. 18, chap. 5.


49. Fraser, introduction to *The Golden Bough* (new abridgment), xxxiii, xxxii.

50. Boon, *From Symbolism to Structuralism*; and Boon, *Other Tribes*, chaps. 1, 4. For parallel approaches to novelists (e.g., Henry James), explorers (e.g., Antonio Pigafetta), scientists (e.g., Alfred Russel Wallace), and hybrids (e.g., A. E. Crawley), see Boon, *Affinities and Extremes*; Boon, *Verging on Extra-Vagance*; and James A. Boon, “The Cross-Cultural Kiss: Edwardian and Earlier, Postmodern and Beyond,” in *Four-Field Anthropology for the 21st Century*, ed. Eduardo Brondizio (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).

53. Ibid., 15.
54. Ibid., 17–18.
55. Ibid., 20.
56. Ibid. (emphasis added).
57. Ibid., 21.
58. Ibid., 23.
59. On “thick description” and (hood)winking, see Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, chap. 1; this winking approach is reprised and seconded in Boon, “Showbiz as a Cross-Cultural System”; and Boon, “Geertz’s Style.”
61. Pater, *Imaginary Portraits*. I have room only to mention this appealing possibility.
63. Ibid., 376.
64. Ibid., 377–379.
67. On Purchas and these reading-metaphors, see Boon, *Other Tribes*, chap. 5.
69. Ibid., 256.
70. Ibid., 257.
71. Ibid., 259.
72. Ibid., 263.
73. Ibid., 264.
74. Ibid.
76. On van Eck and this genre, see Boon, *The Anthropological Romance of Bali*, 30–34.
77. For “extravagant” aspects of Bali, such as cremation and noncircumcision (both ethnographically and historically), see Boon, The Anthropological Romance of Bali; Boon, Other Tribes, chap. 5; Boon, Affinities and Extremes; and Boon, Verging on Extra-Vagance, chap. 2.

78. So-called functionalism—in practice and historically—is more surprising than routinely (methodologically) made to appear. See Boon, Other Tribes, chap. 1; Boon, The Anthropological Romance of Bali, part 1; Boon, Affinities and Extremes, chap. 2; and Boon, Verging on Extra-Vagance, chaps. 1, 3.


80. Receptions of Frazer by (partly) Boasian Lowie, by (partly) Durkheimian Mauss, or by (partly) Durkheimian-Boasian Lévi-Strauss differ from mine, but only partly. Divergences and compatibilities of such receptions deserve sustained scrutiny. Notable in this regard is Hocart (mentioned as a “Frazer-Boas” hybrid in Stocking, After Tylor, 220–228). For more on Hocart and scholars praising him (e.g., Marshall Sahlins, Lévi-Strauss), see Boon, Affinities and Extremes, 125–129.


82. Boon, Other Tribes, 23.

83. Panourgía, Fragments of Death, 218 (emphasis added). The late Jean Pouillon once wrote: “C’est l’incroyant qui croit que le croyant croit [It’s the unbeliever who believes that the believer believes].” See James A. Boon, introduction to Between Belief and Transgression, ed. Michael Izard and Pierre Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). Pouillon’s near quip strikes me as a canny wink at “belief”—a category not unrelated to death (as in “belief in immortality”). Such astute, aphoristic insight—worthy of Michel de Montaigne, say (or of Geertz)—converts, if nothing else, inadequate dichotomies (e.g., belief/unbelief) into circumstantial ambiguities, cross-culturally!


86. I slate for future parerga “translations” across Phaedra (the movie), the history of its myth, and museum-going in contemporary Greece (and earlier). Here are just a few token dates and details (cross-cultural, multigenre, high/low). 1931: Frazer’s Fasti (Ovid) relates Phaedra, via Hippolytus, to Nemi. 1961: Release of (Brooklyn-born) Jules Dassin’s movie Phaedra—starring Melina Mercouri, his wife, and Anthony Perkins of Psycho fame (Hitchcock); Dassin’s movie, which seems strangely unfaithful to Euripides, conceivably memorializes Phaedra’s imagined acts with Hippolytus—much like the monument to her in Athens (described in Pausanias!). 1962: The present author (age sixteen) sees Dassin’s Phaedra, purchases its soundtrack (LP), and commences (in perplexity) reading Jean Racine’s version, the only one I can locate.
1975: George Steiner dismissively alludes to Dassin’s movie (in *After Babel*, a book I am asked to review when beginning teaching). 1999: My wife and I encounter a fragment of *Phaedra*—its title sequence (set in a museum), screened incessantly at the Melina Mercouri Foundation, the primary institution promoting Athens (or re-museumizing it). We had stumbled into “Phaedra’s” premises via the partially “sub-way” from Piraeus, having traveled Greece-ward to attend a conference in Syros.


87. As last note and would-be tidy “aftermath,” I add that Frazer’s skepticism, even about skepticism, may explain dismissive responses to his sometimes spellbinding work. This is a hunch that this essay is too discreet to blurt out in the text.

**Anamneses of a Pestilent Infant:**
**The Enigma of Monstrosity, or Beyond Oedipus**

*Athena Athanasiou*

**Note:** I would like to thank Neni Panourgia, to whose friendship and intellectual stimulation I owe the incentive to write this essay. I began working on this paper during my postdoctoral year at the Pembroke Center for Teaching and Research on Women; I am grateful to Mary Ann Doane, Elizabeth Weed, and all the other participants of the 2001–2002 Pembroke Seminar for offering inspiring conversations. I also thank Elena Tzelepis for her brave questions and responses.


6. According to Michel Foucault’s theory of biopolitics, zoé occupies a central place in the polis (zoé is bios anyway). In the political writings of Aristotle, Giorgio Agamben finds the first fracture between two semantically distinct terms in ancient Greek for life: zoé and bios: zoé (as the thingness of life, the biological concept of life) and bios (political life, the manner of living peculiar to a single individual or group). See Giorgio Agamben, _Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life_, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).


11. One is reminded of Freud’s usage of the word _Führer_ when he talks about the unifying bonds of trust, love, and identification between the leader and his people. See Freud’s notion of _Bindung_ in “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” in _Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology and Other Works_, vol. 18 of _The Standard Edition_, 97. For a very interesting discussion, see Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, _The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis, and Affect_, trans. Douglas Brick and others (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).

12. This particular genealogy of life and death as a misreading of a discourse is central to the history of psychoanalytic discourse itself; in a reading of _Beyond the Pleasure Principle_, Jacques Derrida understands the “survival” of psychoanalysis itself through the survival of the father past his children. See Jacques Derrida, _La carte postale: De Socrate à Freud et au-delà_ (Paris: Flammarion, 1980).


14. Oedipus’s father—or his mother in other accounts—pierced his (or her) son’s ankles before disposing of him on Mount Cithaeron.

15. Thebes, the antipodes of Athens, became the “stage” for eight of the tragedies that have been saved: Aeschylus’s Seven against Thebes; Sophocles’ Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus, and Antigone; and Euripides’ Bacchae, Supplicants, Phoenician Women, and Heracles.

16. Sophocles, Oedipus the King, line 28.

17. In the wake of Nazism, another “plague,” Albert Camus’ The Plague (1947), inaugurates the Age of Testimony as the age of the ethical and political imperative of bearing witness to the unthinkability of trauma. See Shoshana Felman, “Camus’ The Plague, or a Monument to Witnessing,” in Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (New York: Routledge, 1992), 93–119.


19. See Caruth, Unclaimed Experience; see also Cathy Caruth, ed., Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).


22. From Egypt the idea of the Sphinx spread to the Syrians and the Phoenicians and finally to the Greeks. In Egypt the Sphinx is male, whereas in Greece the Sphinx becomes female: she is the offspring of Typhon and Echidna, and she represents a deadly threat against human culture and Greek society in particular. This beast had the face of a woman; the breast, feet and tail of a lion; and the wings of a bird. According to Greek mythology, during the rule of Creon, a calamity befell Thebes: the Sphinx appeared on Mount Phicium, declaring that she would not depart unless someone interpreted the riddle that she proposed and that, in the meantime, she would devour whoever failed to give the correct answer. The riddle was “What is the creature that walks on four legs in the morning, two legs at noon, and three in the evening?” Creon proclaimed that he would give the kingdom of Thebes along with his sister Jocasta in marriage to the man who solved the riddle of the Sphinx. The hero Oedipus—the one with the mutilated feet—advanced to the trial and gave the answer, “Man, who in childhood creeps on hands and knees, in manhood walks erect, and in old age with the aid of a staff,” thus causing the Sphinx’s death. The gratitude of the people for their deliverance was so great that they appointed Oedipus their king, giving him in marriage their queen Jocasta, Laius’s widow. Ignorant of his biological parentage, Oedipus had already become the slayer of his father Laius when he confronted an old stranger in a narrow road near Delphi; in marrying the queen he became the husband of his mother. These horrors remained concealed until the polis of Thebes was afflicted with pestilence and, after the oracle was consulted, the double crime of Oedipus came to light.


26. Indeed, we may understand the Sphinx’s plunge also in terms of Paul de Man’s association of theory with falling. Cathy Caruth has offered an insightful analysis of the connection of problems of theory with literary and philosophical scenes of falling in Paul de Man’s work. See Cathy Caruth, “The Falling Body and the Impact of Reference (de Man, Kant, Kleist),” in Unclaimed Experience, 73–90.


30. Agamben, Means Without End, 90.


34. Cixous, “Castration or Decapitation?” 49.


Oedipus’s will to conquer the maternal monster as emblematic of the emergence of a new *homo philosophicus*: one founded on the repudiation of the monstrous alterity and the triumph of reason. He writes: “‘Monstricide’ is the great unthought element of Freudian doctrine.” Ibid., 25.

42. Cixous, “Castration or Decapitation?” 46.


44. Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire*, vol. 2, *Le Moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique psychanalytique* (Paris: Seuil, 1978), 250. Felman reads, and extends, Lacan’s selection of Colonus as the truly psychoanalytic place thus: “For if Colonus—and Colonus only—marks ‘the end of Oedipus’ psychoanalysis,’ it is to the extent that Oedipus’ tale of desire ends only through its own dramatic, narrative discovery that the tale has, in effect, no end: the end of Oedipus’ analysis, in other words, is the discovery that analysis, and in particular didactic self-analysis, is interminable.” Felman, “Beyond Oedipus,” 146.

45. I suggest this term (certainly a neologism of my own) to underline the splicing of the monstrous (*teras*) onto the anthropomorphic.


49. Felman, “Beyond Oedipus,” 103. Although Lacan’s work is nowhere preoccupied with any systematic analysis of the Oedipus myth, Oedipus often emerges in Lacan’s writings as a literary figure. Lacan is also fully aware of the selective nature of the Freudian appropriation of the myth. He writes: “When we study mythology . . . we see that the Oedipus complex is but a tiny detail in an immense myth. The myth enables us to collate a series of relations between subjects, in comparison with whose complexity and wealth the Oedipus appears to be such an abridged edition that, in the final analysis, it is not always utilisable.” Lacan, *Le Séminaire*, vol. 1, 101. For an insightful exploration of the way in which the Oedipus story holds the key to Lacan’s insight
into the theoretical teachings of Freud’s work, see Felman, “Beyond Oedipus.” In Lacan’s rendering, the Oedipus complex emerges as a site where the triple relation between clinical event, theory, and literature plays out. As Felman puts it: “For Lacan, in much the same way as for Freud, the Oedipus embodies an unprecedented, revolutionary moment of coincidence between narration and theoretization. . . . But if for Freud the Oedipus embodies the insightful moment of discovery at which the psychoanalytic narration—in passing through the analytic practice and in turning back upon itself—becomes theory, it could be said that for Lacan the Oedipus embodies the insightful moment of discovery at which the psychoanalytic theory—in passing through the analytic practice and in turning back upon itself—becomes narration: unfinished analytic dialogue, or an ongoing story of the discourse of the Other.” “Beyond Oedipus,” 127–128.


52. Felman, “Beyond Oedipus,” 129.


55. Ibid., 134.


60. Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, scene 1, line 85.

61. See Agamben, Homo Sacer.

the first nebulous idea of *Oedipus* as something more than what Freud and Claude Lévi-Strauss have given us, to the understanding of the deeply political nature of *Oedipus*, my thought has benefited immensely from discussions with Athena Athanasiou, James A. Boon, Vincent Crapanzano, Stathis Gourgouris, Martin Harries, George E. Marcus, Susan McKinnon, Sherry Ortner, Andrew C. Parker, Joel Whitebook, and Michael Wood. Students in my seminar “The Culture of Oedipus” questioned my assumptions and helped me toward a more refined understanding of *Oedipus*. My two guides through *Oedipus* have been Jean-Joseph Goux and Charles Segal.


2. On the imagined meeting of mother and daughter, Chimera and the Sphinx, see Gustav Flaubert’s *The Temptation of Saint Anthony*, where the two monsters attempt first to obliterate each other verbally and then to leave together, failing in both, parting ways at the end. For a reading of the Chimera and the Sphinx as a means to rethink upon theory as it bears on architectural practice, see Mark Jarzombek “Ready-Made Traces in the Sand: The Sphinx, the Chimera, and Other Discontents in the Practice of Theory,” *Assemblage*, no 19 (December 1992): 72–95. On the issue of female homosexuality as the danger posed by *Oedipus*, especially as it pertains to the problem of the Sphinx, see Athena Athanasiou’s essay in this volume.

3. I have argued elsewhere (Neni Panourgia, *Fragments of Death, Fables of Identity: An Athenian Anthropography* [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995]) for the possibilities that *parerga* afford the author. *Parerga* are not simply notes, but they should be thought of as the extremities of a body: necessary but not detectable from close up, without which the text becomes and remains truncated. These are notes to the text that make the text show its complexities.

4. It is nowhere mentioned but it would be safe to assume that only men passed by the Sphinx’s corner; women never ventured outside the city walls unaccompanied.

5. Lowell Edmunds states that this version of the riddle by Athenaeus is the most complete one, and it is, of course, the one that brings up the issue of voice and the issue of animality that have systematically been excluded from the analyses of *Oedipus* and that are, nevertheless, constitutive of the questions posed by *Oedipus*. See Lowell Edmunds, *Oedipus: The Ancient Legend and Its Later Analogues* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 12.

6. Pausanias 9.5.6.

7. Frederick Ahl, in *Sophocles’ Oedipus: Evidence and Self-Conviction* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), has proposed that Oedipus was not the murderer of Laius but that Oedipus accepts it as the truth, convinced by the argumentation put forth by Creon, Teiresias, and the rest, despite the fact that
there is nothing that ties him to the murder itself. Over and above the many problems that are associated with Ahl’s reading (which are uniquely exposed by Charles Segal in his review of Ahl’s book in *Classical World* 86 [1992]: 155), the main problem of Ahl’s position is that he takes Oedipus as a real person, not as part of myth, so there is no real Oedipus who might have or might not have killed his father.


9. Ibid., 10.

10. Freud claimed in 1908, at two meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, that he had not read anything published on the Oedipus myth so that his judgment would not be occluded. As a matter of fact, Freud, not only then but repeatedly, disavowed that he had read any of the commentaries on Oedipus by anyone, including Nietzsche. Referring to Nietzsche in particular, Freud mentioned that his occasional attempts at reading Nietzsche’s work in general “were smothered by an excess of interest.” Sigmund Freud, *Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society*, 2:31, 1:359, quoted in Peter L. Rudnytsky, *Freud and Oedipus* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). The evidence, however, that Freud knew Nietzsche’s pieces on the Oedipus myth (primarily presented by Rudnytsky, at pages 198–223) is not only convincing but also overwhelming. While studying under Brentano, Freud joined the Reading Group of Viennese German Students, which was primarily concerned with the work of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Wagner. Rudnytsky notes the correspondence between Freud and his friend Eduard Silberstein, where it is mentioned that during his first year at the university in 1873, Freud had read Nietzsche’s published work. By 1873 *The Birth of Tragedy* and the first two *Untimely Meditations* had been published, and it is in *The Birth of Tragedy* that Nietzsche’s piece on Oedipus appeared.


12. Ibid., 9.

13. This is a proposition that is just and justly as problematic as the proposition that attributes the paternity of history to Herodotus—it is just as fictional.

14. In 1968, Terrence Turner proposed a look at the myth of Oedipus as a narrative that spans large segments of time, although he still stayed with the Lévi-Straussian analysis of *Oedipus* as a symbolic rather than as a metaphorical
Notes to Pages 105–9

Levi-Strauss's analysis eschews the narrative in favor of the diagnosed mythemes, something that is also prevalent in the folkloristic analyses of Oedipus, such as those presented by Vladimir Propp in his “Edipo alla Luce del Folklore,” in Edipo alla Luce del Folklore, ed. Clara Strada Janovic (Turin, Italy: Einaudi, 1975), 85–137, as well as in the important collaborative work by the classicist Lowell Edmunds and Alan Dundes, Oedipus: A Folklore Casebook (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), and in Edmunds's numerous articles on the appearance of Oedipean mythemes throughout the world.


19. This is juxtaposed to other disciplinary approaches to the theme of Oedipus. In classics and philosophy (from Hegel’s Antigone and Oedipus to Jean-Joseph Goux’s Oedipus, Philosopher) the entirety of the myth, including Antigone, the legend of the Seven against Thebes, and Ismene are considered. See Edmunds, Oedipus: The Ancient Legend on the encounter of different disciplines with Oedipus. For a rare exception in the treatment of the myth in its entirety within psychoanalysis, see John M. Ross, What Men Want: Mothers, Fathers and Manhood (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), especially chapter 5, “Oedipus Revisited,” 94–128.

20. Pietro Pucci has ingeniously retermed the crime of Oedipus parincest, combining thus the horror of regicide with that of incest. As ingenious as this formulation is, however, it further underscores the lack of willingness to engage with Oedipus outside the context that Freud has produced, namely, the shorthand version of the myth as “the person who killed his father and married his mother.” Pucci, however, does bring up a question that is quintessentially anthropological, namely, how are the mother and the father conceptualized as categories of existence that become categories of kinship?


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., 105.

24. Jonathan Lear, 1998. “Crossroads” (address at the 452nd Convocation of the University of Chicago, 1998), University of Chicago Record 33, no. 1

25. Lear, *Open Minded*, 34.

26. This formulation that underlines the very idiosyncratic relationship between the citizen and the *polis* in Athens is Dennis Slattery’s, from *The Wounded Body: Remembering the Markings of the Flesh* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 52. The particularity of this relationship has been pointed out in different formulations by Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, and by Nicole Loraux in her *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).

27. What follows is an inevitably elliptical account of this most convoluted and contorted period of modern Greece. For a detailed analysis of the period, the history of the Left in Greece, and the experience of “the islands,” see Neni Panourgia, *Dangerous Citizens: The Flesh of Dissidence and the Terror of the State* (Greece 1929–2004) (Fordham University Press, forthcoming). The end of the Second World War came for Greece in October 1944, when the German occupying forces left the country. The exhilaration of liberation did not last long. On December 3 and 4, 1944, a peaceful demonstration held by unarmed members of EAM (the political branch of the main resistance force against the German occupiers) and ELAS (which comprised mainly the Left and the Communist Party) was met with the armed police forces aided by the British army, which had arrived in Greece as part of an effort to prevent the forces of the Left from seizing power. Winston Churchill advised General Scobie (the chief of military operations in Greece) to act as if in an occupied country. And so Scobie did. Throughout December 1944, the ELAS fought with the British forces and the Greek police in what came to be known as the *Dekembriana* (the December events). Throughout the month and into the beginning of January 1945, the British forces, aided by the Greek police, identified and arrested as members of the EAM/ELAS resistance more than eight thousand men and boys from ten years old to sixty years old, whom they first interned at the military barracks at Goudi (in Athens) and then sent to the concentration camp of el-Daba’a in Egypt. They were released in waves by June 1945. During the period of White Terror that lasted from the spring of 1945 to the spring of 1946 and was carried out by the members of the paramilitary forces (mainly collaborators of the Germans during the occupation) against the Left, many of those who had been sent to el-Daba’a were arrested and imprisoned or murdered on the spot. The civil war that broke out in Greece in 1946 between the ELAS and its new army, the Democratic Army, and the government forces (this time supported psychologically, militarily, and financially by the United States, after Britain pulled its support in March 1947) lasted until 1949. On the islands themselves, see Polymeris Voglis,
28. Bastinado is the technique of beating the soles of the feet of the prisoner using a bamboo stick or the staff of a rifle or a metal pipe, until the feet swell and spill out of their bounds, mangled flesh with caked blood and dirt on them.

29. Gilles Deleuze, in his reading of Desert Islands, engages in the radical deconstruction of the notion of the “desert” island by invoking the lack of recognition by the European traveler/settler of the already existing there humanity. He is primarily thinking of and discussing the European travel literature of the Enlightenment. Deleuze is most emphatically not referring to actual desert islands, places where only the most tenuous of life can be sustained on the edges of life—life that can be sustained with the scant rainfall of a couple of months a year; places that have no aquifer or only have aquifer that holds contaminated or nonpotable water. Deleuze is speaking of the construction of the desert as part of a discourse that has sustained colonialism. I am speaking of actual desert (not deserted, even metaphorically) islands that for a limited time carried only human life on them in an inversion of this humanity into animality. See Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953–1974 (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004). Michael Taussig has actually captured not only the horror of the islands as colonies of the undesirables (Nicos Poulantzas’s “anti-nationals”) but also the complicity between the management of undesirable life with capitalist ventures, especially in the way in which he erects the problem of offshore operations not as simply an economic but a political one. See Michael Taussig, My Cocaine Museum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); and Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, new ed. with an introduction by Stuart Hall (London: Verso Classics, 2000) (first published 1978).


31. For a critical reading of Agamben’s notion of bios and zoë in reference to the Greek islands, see Neni Panourgia, “Desert Islands: Ransom of Humanity,” Public Culture 20:2.

32. The play Ho Dolophónos tou Laiou kai ta Korákia [Laius’s murderer and the crows] was produced by the Theater Stoa and performed at the ancient theater at Delphi in July 2004. Pontikas uses the gendered term ἄνδρας (man), not the unmarked term ἄνθρωπος (human), as his concern is with man and woman, not with Oedipus as a paradigmatic human. I use it here because of the connection that Pontikas draws between the myth of Oedipus and the (still) lived realities of the civil war.
CARNAL HERMENEUTICS:  
FROM “CONCEPTS” AND “CIRCLES” TO  
“DISPOSITIONS” AND “SUSPENSE”  
Eleni Papagaroufali

2. Ibid., 28–29.
3. Ibid., 452 (emphasis added).
4. Ibid., 29.
5. Ibid., 30.
7. Ibid., 59 (emphasis added).
8. Ibid., 58 (emphasis added).
9. I have borrowed the term “carnal hermeneutics” from Hwa Yol Jung’s excellent work on phenomenology and body politics, “Phenomenology and Body Politics,” Body & Society 2 (1996): 1–22. Although I consider his theoretical approach similar to mine, I am the only one responsible for what is written here, under this apt metaphor.
12. Geertz, “From the Native’s Point of View,” 57–58.
14. Ibid., 79. Throughout his work, Bourdieu gives many definitions of habitus and dispositions. Central to all of them is the notion of the “socially informed body,” ibid., 124, perceived as the locus of all social practice. On many occasions, however, he speaks of “mental”—as opposed to “bodily”—dispositions, which he identifies with “schemes of thought.” Ibid., 15. As it will be shown, this implicit distinction between body and mind pervades his wider separation of the unconscious, practical, nonverbal habitus from the conscious, symbolic, verbal mastery of classificatory schemes. Ibid., 88.


18. In Greece, to obtain a donor card, one must go to a donors’ association, a hospital’s social services department, or some other official body to declare his or her willingness to become a prospective donor. This decision requires a level of preparation that is probably more complicated than the one expected of, for example, Americans, who can register as donors when they obtain or renew their driver’s licenses.

19. Thomas Csordas, in an attempt to elaborate on “embodiment as a paradigm for anthropology”—“Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology,” *Ethos* 18 (1990): 5–45—as complementary to textuality and representation, has introduced the construct of “somatic modes of attention” seen as “culturally elaborated ways of attending to and with one’s [always already socially informed] body in surroundings that include the embodied presence of others.” “Somatic Modes of Attention,” *Cultural Anthropology* 8 (1993): 138. Through this intersubjective approach, experiences perceived as individual or personal, and thus “psychological” or “mental” (e.g., intuition, imagination), prove to be socially informed embodied knowledge or dispositions shared by historically concrete people, but felt “as no more than an indeterminate horizon” as long as they remain “unattended.” Ibid.


23. Ibid., 19.


27. The view that death is not instantaneous and that there is “a liminal period during which a person is *neither fully alive nor fully dead*” is common in cultures where secondary burial or exhumation are practiced. Loring Danforth, *The Death Rituals of Rural Greece* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), 37 (emphasis added); see also Richard Huntington and Peter Metcalf, *Celebrations of Death: The Anthropology of Mortuary Ritual* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 81–92.

28. Geertz, “From the Native’s Point of View,” 56.

29. Carnal hermeneutics can also lead to such fears or hopes once the *materiality of carne* itself is taken as naturally given, rather than culturally constructed. For example, in supporting his carnal hermeneutic approach, Hwa Yol Jung speaks of “the body-as-flesh” as if “flesh,” as well as “body,” were panhuman realities. Jung, “Phenomenology and Body Politics,” 1–22. For a different approach, see Papagaroufali, “Donation of Human Organs or Bodies After Death.”


32. Geertz, “From the Native’s Point of View,” 69 (emphasis added).


and Peter Hervick (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 109. In this dilemma, anthropologists’ language is always a priori and one-sidedly conceived as observational, propositional, conscious, inevitably inert, because “representational,” whereas “natives’” language is always perceived as experiential, presentational, unconscious, inevitably moving, because “really lived.” See, e.g., ibid., 106–109. In fact, according to Geertz, “By definition, only a ‘native’ makes first order [interpretations]: it’s his culture.” The Interpretation of Cultures, 15. However, in a footnote, he also accepts that “informants [like anthropologists] frequently, even habitually, make second order interpretations—what have come to be known as ‘native models.’” Ibid. The latter become “intricate matters,” especially in “literate cultures, where ‘native’ interpretations can proceed to higher levels.” Ibid. It seems that, whereas natives resemble anthropologists in terms of producing “experience-far concepts,” ethnographers do not resemble natives in using “experience-near concepts”!


37. Bourdieu identifies habitus with the “practical mastery” of, for example, a poem—that is, with its learning “by hearing” only and unconsciously, “without the learner’s having any sense of learning”—and distinguishes it from the poem’s “symbolic mastery—i.e., [its] conscious recognition and verbal expression.” Outline of a Theory of Practice, 88 (emphasis added). In other words, contrary to what will be suggested here, Bourdieu argues that habitus may be verbal but only unconsciously, or that conscious, symbolic, verbal expressions are not habitus.


39. This problem is particularly acute for the “translator-anthropologist” (both in the field and in his or her own society) because “the anthropologist’s translation is not merely a matter of matching sentences in the abstract, but of learning to live another form of life.” Talal Asad, “The Concept of Cultural Translation in British Social Anthropology,” in Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, ed. James Clifford and George Marcus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 149. For example, when Michele Koven studied the linguistic experience of the “self” among women of Portuguese origin who lived for many years in France and spoke both Portuguese and French, she preferred to use native bilingual interviewers, although she herself knew both languages. Apparently, she felt that her competence in grammar and syntax was not sufficient to capture language-as-“form of life”—or habitus. Michele Koven, “Two Languages in the Self / The Self in Two Languages,” Ethos 26 (1998): 410–455.
41. Ibid., 81.
46. Michael M. J. Fischer, “Ethnicity as Text and Model” in *Anthropology as Cultural Critique*, 173. According to the linguist John Lyons, the nonlinear, and thus indeterminate, nature of language per se is best exemplified by the fact that the meanings of grammatical categories of time (traditionally defined as “past,” “present,” and “future” tense) are only deceptively accurate because of their always already contextual character. John Lyons, *Language and Linguistics* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981). This is why, for example, past tense does not necessarily refer to the past, and present tense has a much wider use than the one denoted by the term. (Also, for the nonlinear character of narrated “stories” and “life-stories,” see, e.g., Renato Rosaldo, “Ilongot Hunting as Story and Experience,” in *The Anthropology of Experience*, ed. Victor Turner and E. Bruner [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986], 97–139, and Schrauf, “Costalero Quiero Ser!” respectively.)

“REAL ANTHROPOLOGY” AND OTHER NOSTALGIAS

*Kath Weston*

2. With regard to the literary quality of Geertz’s writing—which exerted a transformative effect on thousands of opening paragraphs, if not as much effect on the body of monographs as one might wish—it could also be argued that anthropology experienced not so much an unprecedented turn but rather a re-turn to the value placed on expository writing in nineteenth-century social theory.
9. This observation holds equally well for attempts, however intriguing, to reconceptualize culture as anthropology’s proper object. See, for example, Karen Fog Olwig and Kirsten Hastrup’s bid to move away from a place-focused understanding of culture by distinguishing between place and space in *Siting Culture: The Shifting Anthropological Object* (New York: Routledge, 1997). On the sometimes fraught relationship between anthropology and cultural studies, see Richard Handler, “Raymond Williams, George Stocking, and Fin-de-Siècle U.S. Anthropology,” *Cultural Anthropology* 13, no. 4 (1998): 447–463.


8. Dionysios of Fourna, *Manuel d’iconographie chretienne*, ed. A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus (St. Petersburg: B. Kirschbaum, 1909). (Denys, or Dionysios, was a Christian Orthodox monk and a painter in the seventeenth century.)


17. Jules Michelet, in *The People* (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1846), 240, wrote of “the grand human movement from India to Greece and to Rome, and from Rome to us [the French].”
22. Müller, “Perspectives in Historical Anthropology,” 41.
32. According to this theory, the language was invented by the Turks of Central Asia, who, looking at the sun, utter the first word: “ag” = sun.
34. Halil Berktay, “The Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History/Historiography,” in *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman*

35. Often, these classical periods were forgotten inside the country, and knowledge of these periods was reintroduced by the European scholarship.

36. The case of Iran has become more complicated since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which introduced the Islamic past as a rival to the Persian past. As a consequence, there are two pasts: the secular, based on the history and the genealogy of language, and the religious, based on the history of Islam. Shahrokh Meskoob, Iranian Nationality and the Persian Language (Washington, D.C.: Mage Publishers, 1992).

37. “Invention-ism” is a constant feature of national ideologies and a counterweight to the eschatological conception of history in the course of the initial stages of the secularization of historical thought.

38. B. M. Kies, introduction to The Contribution of the Non-European Peoples to World Civilization, ed. Maurice W. Hommel (Braamfontin, South Africa: Scotaville, 1989), 1–47.


40. The historian Liang Qichao was the first to introduce to China the writing of history on the principles of Enlightenment historiography in 1902. Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 35. For Japan, see Tanaka, Japan’s Orient.


42. Ibid., 30.

43. Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).


55. Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient*, 274.

**ANTHROPOLOGY AT THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY:**
**THE SEMIOTIC ASPECTS OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION**

Marc Abélès

2. Ibid., 123.

“**LIFE IS DEAD HERE**:
**SENSING THE POLITICAL IN “NO MAN’S LAND”**

Yael Navaro-Yashin

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at the Hermoupolis seminars, and in an American Anthropological Association panel in 1999, “Memory, Transformations, Death,” both organized by Neni Panourgia and George E. Marcus. The article was published previously in a slightly different form in *Anthropological Theory* 3, no. 1 (2003), 107–125.


2. Yiannis Papadakis has studied the political chasms between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots in reference to the actual “dead zone” that lies between the partitioned north and south of the island. “Perceptions of History and Collective Identity: A Study of Contemporary Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Nationalism” (Ph.D. diss., University of Cambridge). But the project in this paper is different, studying the subjective experience of living in Northern Cyprus which, as I study it, has been transformed into “no man’s land.”


4. There is an actual “no man’s land” between Northern and Southern Cyprus controlled by the United Nations and the city of Varosha (in Turkish, *Maras*); evacuated of its inhabitants and in the hands of the Turkish military, it is a ghost city.


7. For such dialectical thinking, see Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: Continuum, 1994).


12. Ibid.


15. Ibid., 50–51.
16. Turkey-fication is different from Turkification. Not only Greek Cypriot village names were changed through this project. Even village names that were formerly Turkish, in the Turkish Cypriot dialect, were changed to names more akin to places and connotations of Turkey.


18. In certain formerly Ottoman territories like the Sudan, the word Turk is still used to refer to a “statesman” or “state official,” where Turquia is another word for devlet or “the state.” Charles Jedrej, personal communication.

19. Under Ottoman sovereignty, subjection was based on religion, not ethnicity. Subjects of the empire belonged to distinct religious communities (millets) with different rights under the imperial legal system. If subjects of the empire considered themselves “Muslim” or “Greek Orthodox,” the concepts “Turkish Cypriot” and “Greek Cypriot” are postcolonial (in reference, here, to British colonialism) and therefore more recent. For a study of the “Turkification” of Muslim Cypriots, see Huseyin Mehmet Atesin, *Kibrisli Müslümanların Türklesme ve laiklesme sıraları, 1925–1975* (Istanbul, Turkey: Marifet Yayinleri, 1999).


21. Even Turkey does not properly recognize the “TRNC” as a state, refraining from inviting Turkish Cypriot administrators to international conventions held in Turkey.

22. Calotychos, *Cyprus and Its People*.


28. Aziz Nesin is one of Turkey’s best-known authors. The title of this novel is *Yasar ne yasar ne yasamaz* [Yashar neither lives nor doesn’t] (Istanbul: Adam Yayinlari, 1995).
32. Taussig, “Malefici um: State Fetishism.”
33. Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State*.
37. Maronites living within the domain of the “TRNC” do not have the “right” to leave property to their children after they die if the children are not living in the “TRNC.”
40. Vassos Argyrou has studied rubbish in South Cyprus. However, he has studied the issue solely as a problem of (class) distinction and identity. The history of war in Cyprus is absent from his analysis, where South Cyprus is ethnographically compared with Greece and other Mediterranean contexts. Rubbish figures in Argyrou’s study as a site of conflict between middle-class environmentalists from Nicosia and working villagers from Paphos. “‘Keep Cyprus Clean’: Littering, Pollution, and Otherness,” *Cultural Anthropology* 12
The project in this paper is different: I argue that there is no space in the political context of Cyprus, north or south, where living in ruins, as I study it, can be solely interpreted in sociocultural terms, whether in reference to class or identity. The analysis demands a contextualization in the history of war on the island, with impacts on the use of space not only in the north, but also in the south. I would invite Argyrou to consider whether rubbish in Paphos has nothing to do with the structure of feeling of the conflict in Cyprus. I would argue that there must be a “no man’s land” quality, as I name it, to existence in South Cyprus, as well.


43. *Enosis* means “union” and it implies “union with Greece,” and it was the ideal of Greek Cypriot nationalists led by the EOKA group.

44. See, e.g., *Cumhuriyet* (Turkey), July 21, 1998 (front page).


46. Ibid., 248.

47. Ibid., 249.


49. See, e.g., Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*.


TEXT AND TRANSNATIONAL SUBJECTIFICATION: MEDIA’S CHALLENGE TO ANTHROPOLOGY

Louisa Schein

1. Throughout this essay, my emphasis is on visual and usually narrative media such as film, video, CDs, DVDs, and television.


6. Ibid., 285.


25. This essay represents part of a larger ongoing study of transnationality among Hmong Americans and their co-ethnics in Asia. Louisa Schein, “Rewind to Home: Hmong Media and Gendered Diaspora” (book manuscript in preparation). Field research, ongoing in the United States intermittently since 1978, also included seven trips to urban and rural China in 1982, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2000 and one trip to Thailand in 1982. For research support during those years, I would like to thank the Committee on Scholarly Communications with the People’s Republic of China, the Fulbright-Hays...
Notes to Pages 196–97

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26. Estimates of Hmong populations in the diaspora as of 1992 were 120,000 in the United States, 13,000 in France (including 1,500 in French Guiana), 650 in Canada, and 650 in Australia. See Yang Dao, *Hmong at the Turning Point* (Minneapolis, Minn.: WorldBridge Associates, 1993).


28. Music, over the last two decades, has been the largest industry in Hmong media. Local bands are ubiquitous, and some gain national and international fame, touring by invitation to large Hmong functions in parks and auditoriums. Vocalists sing Hmong or Lao lyrics that they have written themselves, sometimes to music borrowed from existing melodies in pop and Asian pop music. Recording is a major part of the business, and those who produce tapes, CDs, or music videos, usually by renting studio time, are the ones who stand to gain widespread acclaim and to make considerable profits. Many of the Hmong in video that I have interviewed got their start in the music scene.


33. At present writing the series is in part 8.

34. Incest discomfort was not an issue in these relatives acting as lovers for the purpose of the video. By Hmong custom they were not reckoned as kin since the girl had a surname different from that of Ga Moua. In the Hmong patrilineal, clan-exogamous kin system, no matter how close the relationship, if a person’s surname denotes a different clan, they may qualify for courtship and marriage. Ga Moua’s calling her “niece” was likely out of deference to the American bilateral reckoning he imputed to me.


39. The title denotes Ban Vinai, the largest refugee camp of Hmong settlement in Thailand, in Hmong orthography.


41. Marriage or sex before the age of eighteen as well as the practice of abducting young women as brides, both of which were practiced routinely...


44. Ibid., 371–372.


46. Abu-Lughod, “The Interpretation of Culture(s),” 114.


**AFTERWORD**

**THE ETHNOGRAPHER’S “GAZE”:**

**SOME NOTES ON VISUALITY AND ITS RELATION TO THE REFLEXIVE METALANGUAGE OF ANTHROPOLOGY**

*Maria Kakavouli*

12. Ibid., 54.


