“Wahrheit und Politik” (Truth and Politics) is entered in the *Denktagebuch* like a title on page 1 of Notebook XXIV, introducing a section that actually consists of forty-three individual entries. Unlike the other notebooks constituting Arendt’s thought diary, which usually record a month and a year, Notebook XXIV does not give a date at the beginning. Here the title replaces the date, while the first date appears on handwritten page 28 as “Weihnachten [Christmas] 1964.” Notebook XXIII covers the period from August 1958 through January 1961. Only thirty pages of this notebook were used, the rest left empty. The empty pages indicate a remarkable gap in the *Denktagebuch*, a gap that parallels a highly dramatic period in Hannah Arendt’s life and intellectual biography.

In April 1961, Arendt traveled to Jerusalem to attend the Eichmann trial. As a reporter for *The New Yorker*, she stayed in the courtroom between April 11 and May 7 and a second time from June 20 through June 23, during the first sessions when Eichmann was on the witness stand. Between these two visits in Israel and afterward, she traveled and worked in Europe, returning to the United States at the end of July. In 1962, she began to write her report. The manuscript she delivered to *The New Yorker* in October...
1962 was first published between February 16 and March 16, 1963, in a series of five installments. Apparently Arendt did not take her Denktagebuch with her when she was visiting Israel and various places in Europe in 1961, and she did not use it when she was writing her report in 1962. For the evaluation of the diary character of the Denktagebuch, this is highly significant, since, as we know, encountering Eichmann in the courtroom and reporting about the trial was a highly emotional undertaking for Arendt.

It seems likely that Arendt started Notebook XXIV with the section on “Wahrheit und Politik” in 1963, either shortly before or after she had made a decision concerning the attacks launched against her after the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem. On October 3, 1963, she wrote to Mary McCarthy from Chicago: “I am convinced that I should not answer individual critics. I probably shall finally make, not an answer, but a kind of evaluation of the whole strange business. This, I think, should be done after the furor has run its course and I think that next spring will be a good time. I also intend to write an essay about ‘Truth and Politics,’ which would be an implicit answer.”

Interestingly enough, most of the entries introduced by the title “Wahrheit und Politik” in the Denktagebuch are written in German, although the bulk of the public attacks on Arendt, her articles and her book were published in English. In addition, another striking observation should be mentioned: “Truth and Politics,” she wrote to McCarthy, was meant as an “implicit answer” to her critics. Indeed, the answer is so “implicit” that there is hardly any mention of a critic’s name or of a special argument, neither in the Denktagebuch nor in any version of her later articles on “Truth and Politics.” In the Denktagebuch Arendt simply jots down notes of thought with regard to “Truth and Politics” she wanted to keep, to save from getting lost. As she said to Günter Gaus in the 1964 interview: “If I had a good enough memory to really retain everything that I think, I doubt very much that I would have written anything—I know my own laziness.” In other words, in the section “Wahrheit und Politik” in the Denktagebuch, Arendt was collecting material that she might or might not ultimately use when composing on “Truth and Politics” itself. There is nothing refined about most of these notes in the sense that Arendt put much thinking into them, as she did in many previous Denktagebuch entries. They are hasty notes, certainly not meant to be published as such. Compared to other Denktagebuch entries, they lack the quality of free-floating thought found by so many of the other authors in this volume. Neither can something like a thinking process be detected in them: indeed, Arendt hardly engages in “exercises in
political thought.” Only in entry no. 21 do we see beginnings of a reflection that shows signs of that exercise.

Understanding this solitary section “Wahrheit und Politik” requires first a report of its forty-three entries in a kind of systematic overview. I will then single out two entries (nos. 10 and 21) for more specific presentation. They are the ones in which Arendt refers directly to her personal case and condition at the time, being complemented by the first entry following the truth-and-politics section, entry no. 44: “Weihnachten 1964.” Finally, I return to the question that haunted the seminar discussion and indeed many of the essays in this volume: What is “truth on a factual level”?

An Overview

Arendt begins the truth-and-politics section in the Denktagebuch by noting distinctions important to her treatment of the issue: truth vs. opinion (no. 1); truth vs. lie (no. 2). Actually, most of the entries can be systematized under the Arendtian effort of making distinctions. Truth vs. opinion is the topic of entry no. 30 too, while truth vs. lie can also be found under nos. 34 and 41 as well as entry no. 46. In addition, Arendt concerns herself with a constellation of related distinctions: truth vs. ideology (nos. 8 and 12); philosophical truth vs. scientific validity (no. 9); truth and thinking (no. 14); truth by agreement (no. 15); general vs. particular truth (no. 20); absolute or philosophical truth vs. factual truth (no. 32); facts or political facts (nos. 27 and 35). However, the Denktagebuch provides no elaborate formulations for any of these distinctions. One has to turn to the published essays in order to find out what her respective thoughts are, which requires rather extensive work of textual criticism, since Arendt published several pieces under the heading of “Wahrheit und Politik” or “Truth and Politics.”

But even if one consults the published essays, one may not find definitive answers.

In addition to making distinctions, in the Denktagebuch Arendt refers to examples for lies by noting the following keywords or phrases: “France,” “Resistance Movement,” “Jewish martyrs,” “greatest pogrom” (all in no. 3); “Silesians” (in no. 5); “Diaspora vs. Jewish home” (in nos. 8 and 11); “class struggle” (in no. 12); “Elders of Zion” (in no. 17); “man at the watchtower” (in no. 19); the “stab-in-the-back legends” (in no. 29). Again, she is hardly specific about these examples; why they are indications for lies needs explanation, which would require an extensive interpretation in each case and thus go beyond this essay’s scope. For the purposes at hand, it may
suffice to mention those examples she uses in her final essay “Truth and Politics”: (1) the lie held and presented by Adenauer, who claimed “that the barbarism of National Socialism had affected only a relatively small percentage of the country;” (2) De Gaulle’s lie that, as she puts it, “France belongs among the victors of the last war and hence is one of the great powers.” Lies of this kind, she continues, “whether their authors know it or not, harbor an element of violence; organized lying always tends to destroy whatever it has decided to negate.” Furthermore, she notes some examples more pertinent to the Eichmann case, which appear under the keywords “Jewish martyrs” and “greatest pogrom” in no. 3; they are treated more elaborately in entries nos. 8 and 11; in no. 17 she mentions the “Elders of Zion.”

Arendt concerns herself, then, with the mechanisms of distorting truth, e.g., by interests and interest groups (nos. 24, 25, and 28), or just by creating and communicating factual errors (no. 38). In two entries, she points out that lies and factual errors, for whatever reasons they may have been invented or accepted in public, become dangerous not only to the liar but also endanger the world in which they are communicated (nos. 26 and 29). “A ‘world,’” she notes, “can also be erected on the basis of a lie: An organization based on a lie is no less powerful than that erected on the basis of the truth” (no. 29), it may even be more powerful, but in the end “the strength of truth” outlasts “the power of the lie” (no. 34). “Images,” she writes in “Truth and Politics,” “have a relatively short life expectancy.”

There are two entries, however, that merit special attention. As mentioned before, nos. 10 and 21 are related directly to Arendt’s personal case, that is, to the controversy that arose after the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem. These as well as note no. 44 (“Weihnachten 1964”), examined in detail, provide us with something more of the flesh of “Truth and Politics.”

“Die Rolle der Big Lie”

Entry 10 in Notebook XXIV is entitled “Die Rolle der Big Lie” (The Role of the Big Lie), but there is no indication to what Arendt means by Big Lie, both capitalized. Not knowing a specific answer to this question, Ingeborg Nordmann and I, when editing the Denktagebuch, gave a rather general hint to Arendt’s essay “Lying in Politics” (1095). Now, however, we know a bit more. It was Patchen Markell who, by browsing through the New York Times index, found an article titled “German Posters Done from ’19 to ’61 Demonstrate Effect of Propaganda.” The article, which hints at the “big
lie” in Germany’s history of the twentieth century, reports about the exhibition “Weimar–Nürnberg–Bonn: Art as a Political Weapon” organized by the Art Center of the New School for Social Research. Arendt may have read this article, but she could not have seen the exhibition, since it was shown (May 8 through June 15, 1963) when she was traveling in Europe. The Times reported that the example of posters displayed at the exhibition “vividly” illustrated “how the ‘big lie’ was put over in Germany,” from the Weimar Republic through the Nazi era to the Cold War period. In any case, this would have reminded Arendt of the “Big Lie” as it became known by an anticommunist propaganda film produced by the US Army in 1951, which became a centerpiece of American political rhetoric against the USSR. The film begins with a quote from Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*: “The great masses will more easily fall victim to a big lie than to a small one.” In terms of content, Hitler’s “big lie” seems intuitively related to what Arendt in Entry 17 of Notebook XXIV refers to as the “Elders of Zion,” that is, the forged “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” which she had addressed in an article in 1945.

Entry no. 10 deserves to be considered more carefully because of the way it reflects on the reasoning it contains with regard to Arendt’s personal case. She states: “I am reproached for saying certain things because I am a ‘self-hating Jew.’” This, she reflects, is an accusation against which she could defend herself if she wished, while against other accusations, such as that she is a defender of Eichmann or a “behaviorist” thinker, there is no possibility of defense since these accusations have no relation to reality and are thus absurd. Nevertheless, she asks herself: “If these statements are absurd, why then are they uttered”? Without giving a direct answer, she adds that reality is limited, but that absurd statements presented as facts belong to a sphere of unlimited possibilities, thus pointing to her argument that lies, like images, create a reality which “can always be explained and made plausible,” while factual truth is characterized by “this stubborn there-ness, whose inherent contingency ultimately defies all attempts at conclusive explanation.”

Framing the problem in the terms of jurisprudence, Arendt continues, “I would have to file a libel suit, and this would mean that I would have to defend myself. It would force me to present everything I have ever written. If one is completely innocent, then one cannot argue. This is why in court it is always the prosecutor who must prove the defendant’s guilt. ‘Proof of innocence’ cannot be given.” In the same vein and later in the *Denktagebuch* as well as in “Truth and Politics,” Arendt notes a quote from Montaigne: “If falsehood, like truth, had but one face, we should know better where we are,
for we should then take for certain the opposite of what the liar tells us. But the reverse of truth has a thousand shapes and a boundless field.”

“Fang an mit”

Entry no. 21, the longest in the “Wahrheit und Politik” section, is the only one that includes questions and answers Arendt posed to herself when engaging in an inner dialogue on truth and politics. She asks herself questions, for instance, about Socrates. Was he cautious? No, she answers. Was he moderate? Yes, insofar as he admitted that no man is wise. She discusses possible interpretations with regard to Lessing’s quote that seems so meaningful to her thoughts: “Let each man say what he deems truth, and let truth itself be commended unto God.” She then concerns herself with the question “Who am I to judge?” and notes, just as a reminder, the old saying “Fiat justitia, et pereat mundus” (Let there be justice, though the world perish). This is followed by a quote from Bacon and reflections on the “obligation of the scholar to ‘the truth as he finds it.’”

Entry 21 starts as an admonition of the author to herself: “Fang an mit” (begin with), which is a rather rare feature in the Denktagebuch. Presumably, she wrote this when planning her essay “Truth and Politics.” However, what she writes thereafter hardly can qualify as an outline for that essay, but it is highly telling with regard to her self-perception in this “whole strange business.” Arendt conceives of herself as having sought and found “some truth.”

She elaborates on this thought in “Truth and Politics” when she writes about the standpoint of the truth-teller. “This standpoint . . . is clearly characterized as one of the various modes of being alone. Outstanding among the existential modes of truth-telling are the solitude of the philosopher, the isolation of the scientist and the artist, the impartiality of the historian and the judge, and the independence of the fact-finder, the witness, and the reporter.” From Entry 21, it is quite obvious that she considers herself to be the truth-teller regarding Eichmann: “None of the things I spoke of were secret, all were in the Trial. It speaks for the power of the press or rather the magazines that they appeared in the open only after I had published them” (626). Even more clearly, in a letter to Mary McCarthy: “My point would be that what the whole furor is about are facts, and neither theories nor ideas. The hostility against me is a hostility against someone who tells the truth on a factual level.”

Arendt ends Entry 21 with the statement “Truth . . . because it can be discovered and told by the One only, has no power; it lacks the capacity to
organize. Only if many consent to one truth, then truth develops power. However, what creates power in this case is the fact of consenting, not truth as such” (627). It is this generally skeptical view regarding truth that informs Arendt’s essay on “Truth and Politics,” and that she specifies with regard to “truth on a factual level,” as will be shown later.

“Weihnachten 1964”

Like Entry 21, Entry 44 is unique, but this time because it reveals some of Arendt’s inner life, which in principle she keeps hidden almost all through her thought diary. This entry, following the “Wahrheit und Politik” section, is dated Christmas 1964. It was written at a time when “die Welt lacht,” that is, when the world was smiling on the author of the Denktagebuch, a surprising notation. In Arendt’s life, 1964, like the second half of 1963, was a time in which she had to cope with the many private and public, mostly unfair criticisms after the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem in the spring of 1963—a year, one would think, that rather would have made her doubt whether the world will ever smile on her again.

The good mood, however, may not have been due only to what Arendt mentions in Entry 44, namely, as she puts it, the fact that the world complies with her vanity and rewards her ambition in such a way that she is willing to settle her posthumous affairs, among them the preservation of her papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. But it also may have been owing to an occurrence in 1964, which is known from the “Kant-Heft,” included in the published Denktagebuch. There we find a telling entry under the heading “Nacht vom 28. zum 29. April 1964” (Night of April 28–29, 1964), which she presumably noted in Chicago when she was struck by an inspiration concerning Kant’s Critique of Judgment: “In the Critique of Judgment . . . the political man has his say.” This discovery at night, probably an allusion to the well-known anecdote from the life of the young Descartes, seems to have overwhelmed her, although there had been signals for it in former times. It points to the path ahead for Arendt’s work—the path that leads her, via “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” to the Judgment part of The Life of the Mind.

The Haunting Question: What Is “Truth on a Factual Level”? Among the many distinction, examples, and thoughts Arendt notes in her Denktagebuch truth-and-politics section, one item can be singled out as fundamental. It may be phrased in the question, What is truth on a factual
level? This question receives a specific twist when debated within the realm of Arendt’s now notorious concept of the “banality of evil,” which, by the way, is never mentioned in the Denktagebuch. Roger Berkowitz, in his introductory remarks to the Conference on “Truth telling: Democracy in an Age Without Facts,” held at Bard College in 2011, proposed that in Arendt’s terms “Eichmann is banal” and that Arendt had meant this to be a statement of factual truth. But did she really? The question has lingered ever since.

Before entering into the discussion, a short reminder may be appropriate. At the end of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt reports the last words uttered by Eichmann on the gallows, concerning which she comments: “It was as though in those last minutes he was summing up the lesson that this long course in human wickedness had taught us—the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil.” This is the only place in the book where Arendt uses the formula she had put in the subtitle. Only later, in her 1964 preface to the German edition (and accordingly in 1965 in the postscript to the second English edition), does “banality of evil” come up again. She writes (in the second English edition): “When I speak of the banality of evil, I do so only on the strictly factual level, pointing to a phenomenon which stared one in the face at the trial.” The “banality of evil,” a phenomenon staring the reporter in the face, which is “fearsome” in such a way that it is “word-and-speech-defying”—these component parts of Arendt’s interpretation cannot be overemphasized. Many critics, however, have overlooked both the adjectives “fearsome” and “word-and-speech-defying,” a point made by Ernst Vollrath in his speech of acceptance of the Bremen Hannah Arendt Prize for Political Thinking in 2001. Vollrath also highlighted that for Arendt the phenomenologist, the “banality of evil” is a “phenomenon” and in so doing implied that a statement like “Eichmann is banal” remains off the mark. Arendt may have confirmed “banalities” (in Jerome Kohn’s phrasing) of Eichmann, but she never made a statement to the effect that Eichmann was banal. The fearsome “phenomenon” was word-and-thought-defying, but Arendt was able to describe what she had experienced in confronting herself with the reality of Eichmann. She could write a report; however, as she later confessed in a letter written to Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg in 1966: “The whole truth is that I did not know the answers myself when I wrote the book.”

In Arendt’s understanding, then, may we consider “Eichmann is banal” a statement of factual truth? Since Arendt writes explicitly in “Truth and Politics” that she wants to understand truth in the sense in which men commonly understand the word, we cannot simply look up philosophical
dictionaries for definitions and then decide how to answer the question. However, it does make sense to look at Arendt’s concept of factual truth by examining the concept in the works of thinkers to whom she is indebted: Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, and, as Peg Birmingham points out, Walter Benjamin.

Arendt’s hint to the distinction (known since Leibniz) between rational truth and factual truth does not help much, since she writes: “I shall use this distinction for the sake of convenience without discussing its intrinsic legitimacy.” Rather, we are left with the examples she provides and with those statements she formulates in the course of her reflections on “Truth and Politics.” Concerning the examples, Arendt is very clear about what Eichmann is not. He “was not Iago and not Macbeth, and nothing would have been farther from his mind than to determine with Richard III ‘to prove a villain.’” He was not a monster, as has often been pointed out. But are these negative examples sufficient to empirically feed the statement “Eichmann is banal” in a way that it can be claimed to be a statement of factual truth?

With regard to Arendt’s reflections on truth and politics, things become even more complicated. “Factual truth,” she writes, is “political by nature,” it “informs political thought,” and, as she has it in the final German version, “hält Spekulation in Grenzen” (provides limits to speculative thinking). There exist “brutally elementary data” like that to which the French politician Georges Clemenceau is said to have referred during a talk on the question of guilt for the outbreak of the First World War: “I know for certain that they [i.e., future historians] will not say Belgium invaded Germany.” Certainly, the statement “Eichmann is banal,” does not belong to these “brutally elementary data,” but there is a striking parallel between the two. Arendt’s guess holds for both: “It is as if people commonly are incapable of coming to terms with things of which cannot be said any other way than that they are as they are—things in their naked facticity.” However, when she continues to say that factual truth is “beyond agreement, dispute, opinion, or consent”—or put even more directly, when it comes to factual truth, persuasion is useless, so is discussion—one can no longer follow the argument on factual truth with regard to her view on Eichmann.

Furthermore, Arendt differentiates her description of Eichmann from the concept “banality of evil” by declaring that with the latter she is drawing one conclusion, or rather “the most general” conclusion from what she had seen and described: “My ‘basic notion’ of the ordinariness of Eichmann is much less a notion than a faithful description of a phenomenon. I am sure there can be drawn many conclusions from this phenomenon and the
most general I drew is indicated: ‘banality of evil.’ I may sometime want to write about this, and then I would write about the nature of evil.’” Unfort-
unately, this is a work she never wrote.

Arendt’s views on Eichmann as well as her way of introducing the “banal-
ity of evil,” are basically tentative and open to debate. The portrait she painted of Eichmann was multifaceted, which Jerome Kohn brings to atten-
tion. Arendt’s Eichmann, Kohn argues, is a “murderer,” an “idealist,” and a “clown.” To claim as a statement of factual truth that Arendt’s Eichmann is banal would reduce this multifacetedness. One would miss part of the story Arendt wanted to tell and did tell, even though she did not claim to have told a story, but rather to have learned a lesson. She had sought to initiate a “real” or “authentic” controversy, as she wrote to Rabbi Hertzberg: “I had hoped for a real controversy.” It was a debate that she did not get.

Such deficiency, if it is really one, hardly comes as a surprise to those, myself included, who believe that Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem and par-
ticularly the concept “banality of evil” left not only truths on a factual level but also a Socratic sting to posterity.

Two Concluding Observations

Returning to the “Wahrheit und Politik” section in the Denktagebuch, I want to put on record two more general observations. One is directly related to the Denktagebuch entries discussed here, the other one places the section in the broader context of the Denktagebuch as a literary genre.

The “Wahrheit und Politik” entries are a collection of eclectic observa-
tions, thoughts or “trains of thought” (to use Margaret Canovan’s phrase), and quotations; they obtain some structure only if seen in the light of the later publications on “Wahrheit und Politik” and “Truth and Politics.” When reviewing “Truth and Politics” for the second edition of Between Past and Future, Arendt gave a decisive hint by adding an asterisked foot-
note: “This essay was caused by the so-called controversy after the publica-
tion of Eichmann in Jerusalem. Its aim is to clarify two different, though interconnected, issues of which I had not been aware before and whose importance seemed to transcend the occasion. The first concerns the question of whether it is always legitimate to tell the truth—did I believe without qualification in ‘Fiat veritas, et pereat mundus’—Be there truth, even if the world may perish? The second arose through the amazing amount of lies used in the ‘controversy’—lies about what I had written, on one hand, and about the facts I had reported, on the other.” It is with both these issues that Arendt tried to come to grips in her essay “Truth and Politics,” and it is for both these issues that she collected materials in the Denktagebuch. But
there are also thoughts and materials in the Denktagebuch section that did not enter the “Truth and Politics” publications, and vice versa.

Considered in the context of the Denktagebuch as a whole, the “Wahrheit und Politik” section is proof of the “Arbeitsjournal” (logbook) or “Werkstatt” (workshop) character of the Denktagebuch, namely, Arendt’s practice of using her thought diary during a period when she was preparing a special publication. Only marginally does this section show the real quality of the Denktagebuch: the kind of Socratic inner dialogue, the two-in-one dialogue, and the free flow of thinking that our working group has enjoyed and has been concerned with in other sessions. One may even argue that after the break or gap in 1961–62, a general change in the Denktagebuch can be detected. The prolific time of the 1950s is over, more and more the diary becomes instrumental up to the end in the 1970s, when it serves the purposes of only a traveling calendar.42

With Gary Ulmen as “Englisher”


On October 3, 1963, Hannah Arendt wrote another letter. It was addressed to Emory University, to which she was invited to give two Walter Turner Candler Lectures in 1962. Because of the Eichmann trial, this commitment was postponed to 1964. Originally, she was scheduled to talk about Revolution and Freedom and, in a second lecture, on Bertolt Brecht. Now she announced that she wanted to change the topic of her first lecture to “Truth and Politics,” and in fact the official announcement of her lectures, preserved among her papers in the Library of Congress, lists “Truth and Politics” as the topic of her first lecture on April 30, 1964. I owe this information to Patchen Markell.


3. For the significance to Arendt of the methodological approach of making distinctions, see her remarks at the 1972 Toronto Conference: Hannah


5. Methodologically speaking, examples may be looked at as being as significant to Arendt’s thinking as the noting of distinctions. In her *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, she points to and explains Kant’s “exemplary validity” and his quote “examples are the go-cart of judgments” in particular, Hannah Arendt, *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 76f.

6. For references, see “Truth and Politics,” 252.

7. Ibid., 256.


12. She writes “vorlesen” (read aloud), which, in my understanding, should be read as “vorlegen” (present).
15. I made the respective passage in Entry 21 the subject of my “Quote of the Week,” published under the title “One Against All” on the Hannah Arendt Center website on September 3, 2012.
16. “Truth and Politics,” 259f; see also, on “loneliness” as a topic that is present throughout the Denktagebuch, Ursula Ludz and Ingeborg Nordmann in their “Nachwort” to the Denktagebuch, 825–862, at 854f.
20. Denktagebuch, 818.
21. Arendt refers to Descartes’s “famous night” in Denktagebuch (XXVII.16.759), i.e. the night in 1619 when Descartes was struck by the idea that there is “un accord fondamental entre les lois de la nature et les lois des mathématiques” (a fundamental agreement between the laws of nature and the laws of mathematics).
22. See, for example, Hannah Arendt in her letter to Karl Jaspers (August 29, 1957): “At the moment I’m reading the Kritik der Urteilskraft with increasing fascination. There, and not in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, is where Kant’s real political philosophy is hidden.” Arendt and Jaspers, Correspondence, 318. See also Denktagebuch (XXII.571f).
23. Roger Berkowitz, introductory lecture to the Arendt Center 2011 Fall Conference, on the Center’s website on October 28, 2011.
25. Ibid., 287; see also Arendt to Joachim Fest: “banality was a phenomenon that really couldn’t be overlooked.” Hannah Arendt, “Interview by Joachim Fest” (1964), translated by Andrew Brown, in The Last Interview and Other Conversations (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2013), 39–85, at 47.


40. Arendt to Hertzberg.


42. Ludz and Nordmann, “Nachwort,” 834f., 858.