Christianity, Democracy, and the Shadow of Constantine

Demacopoulos, George E., Papanikolaou, Aristotle

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STEPPING OUT OF CONSTANTINE’S SHADOW

Peter Iver Kaufman

Beginning in 1970 and continuing for forty years thereafter, Robert Markus informed and enlivened discussions of Constantinian Christianity. His impressive erudition still illumines our understanding of the period “during which Christian Romans came slowly to identify themselves with traditional Roman values, culture, practices, and established institutions.” Markus identifies the world in which that assimilation slowly occurred as “the secular.” Accustomed to hearing about assimilation of that sort when conversations turn to Christianity’s affirmations of—or accommodations to—democratic structures or, more pointedly, to civil religion, we may consider Markus politically correct. Yet because he conscripted Latin Christianity’s prolific paladin, Augustine of Hippo, into the service of the secular, as it were, Markus invites us to question whether he was, on that count, historically correct.

According to Markus, Augustine subscribed neither to his faith’s repudiation nor to its usurpation of the political cultures around it. What required repudiation, Markus’s Augustine claims, was—and is—the profane or unacceptable. The “neutral realm of the acceptable” was “secular.” The Christians of the late fourth and early fifth centuries—living in Constantine’s shadow and especially after Emperor Theodosius I emphatically proscribed pagan worship—found it difficult to conceive of municipal or imperial politics as alien or, to borrow Markus’s terms, to perceive the secular as profane; the empire “had become the vehicle of their religion and its natural political expression.” Participation in political culture was hardly compulsory. “Christians could treat [it] as secular,” Markus allowed, “per-
haps distancing themselves but without feeling a need to disown and condemn” political practice.³

What of the other options, usurpation and repudiation? Markus associated the first with the medieval papacy, making Pope Gregory I responsible for the desecularization of the secular. Gregory purportedly inspired his successors in Rome, papal hierocratic theorists, and the canon lawyers who posted precedents for the theorists’ intentions to “swallow . . . up the world.”⁴ As for resistance, repudiation, and repudiators, Markus could have nominated the usurpers’ medieval and early modern critics but cited instead several twentieth-century evangelical protests against Gregorian Christianity, particularly those of John Howard Yoder who alleged that “the church desert[s] its vocation” whenever it celebrates its “Constantinian status”—that is, whenever it forgets that it is a community that ought to be in critical relation to “the sword”—to the political.⁵

We shall start in 314, by assessing that status and celebration shortly after Constantine’s apparent conversion to Christianity. We will consider what Markus and his Augustine believe to be the secular spaces Constantinian changes opened between the sacred and profane. My aim is to raise several questions about the Church’s mission, to ask why the Church should agitate in the world and whether and how it can do so without losing its distinctiveness. Perhaps “agitate” is too strong a term, yet disturbances probably seemed inevitable when moral clarity, which faith ostensibly imparts to the faithful, was released into the secular where, according to historian and ethicist Charles Mathewes—from whom I’ve borrowed the use of the word “agitate”—situations always are “morally ambiguous,” at best, and, at worst, the world is infectiously wicked, as Augustine once claimed. The bishop could be quite unflattering when he bridled at and wrote about the conditions in this wretched world, in hoc saeculo maligno.⁶

Soon after he was attracted to Christianity, Emperor Constantine came to the conclusion that the African Christian clerics, who stubbornly opposed Bishop Caecilian of Carthage, were malevolent (qui vis malignitatis in eorundum pectoribus perseverat).⁷ Caecilian’s critics had challenged the validity of his appointment and consecration and, in effect, seceded from other African Christian churches, whose bishops believed their accusations against Caecilian libelous. But before seceding, they had urged Proconsul Anulinus to deny Caecilian and his partisans the exemptions Constantine awarded his new faith’s clergy. Anulinus fretted, referring the matter to
the emperor who, in turn, directed Miltiades, bishop of Rome, to confer with selected Italian prelates and to investigate the petitioners’ accusations. He complied, assembled eighteen colleagues, probed the cause of the dissidents’ discontent—notably Caecilian’s alleged collaboration with Christianity’s persecutors in the past—and vindicated the accused. Still, Miltiades hoped to avoid further recrimination and to appease the discontented by coupling Caecilian’s acquittal with a declaration that bishops ordained by his critics were not to be denied authority. According to the proposal formulated in Rome, wherever opposition to Caecilian in Africa divided a church, seniority rather than partisanship would dictate which of the rival bishops remained in his see. The less senior would relocate. The dissidents thought the Roman compromise reprehensible. They defiantly demanded that their original complaints be reevaluated. Constantine acquiesced and set aside the decisions reached by Miltiades and the bishops he had summoned to Rome, but a second council in Arles in 314 reaffirmed the Caecilianists’ position. Thereafter, the emperor considered the rage against Caecilianists irrational. The secular had weighed in, endorsing the resolution of a crisis that the sacred seemed unable to contain. Few, if any, better examples of Constantinianism—not as the church’s capitulation to, but as its collaboration with, “the state”—could be found. Yet the endorsement failed to have the desired effect. The Arles verdict and imperial approval were expected to marginalize if not to douse dissent. But dissidents soon capitalized on an outpouring of African sentiment against Roman occupation and landlords to fortify their coalition, consecrating as bishop of Carthage Donatus, a resourceful leader who masterminded a campaign that, within a century, gave the secessionists’ churches—the pars Donati or Donatists—a commanding position in several African provinces.

Donatist successes during the fourth century—when they mattered most to Augustine during the 390s and thereafter—will concern us shortly, but first we need to reemphasize the perceived appropriateness of Constantine’s involvement in combatting what he took as the vis malignitatis, the “wickedness,” from which the African schism originated. He was said by his biographer to have deliberated with the bishops, if not at Rome in 313, then at Arles the next year. Eusebius imagined that collaboration; generations later, Augustine repeated the story. The evidence, however, suggests that Constantine did little more than nominate a few bishops to participate in the Roman conversation, which may have been in Trier when the
Council of Arles met. The wisest course, I suspect, is to follow Brent Shaw’s lead and to surmise that the bishops at Rome and Arles, regardless of the emperor’s whereabouts, vindicated Caecilian and condemned his African critics at Constantine’s prompting.10

But Constantine’s prompting and the Church’s councils failed to suppress African dissent. Nearly eighty years later, when Augustine resettled in Africa, the Donatist Christians outnumbered the Caecilianists. The emperor had promised to go to North Africa to make clear “what sort of devotion” pleased God, and compel the dissidents to conform to “the most perfect faith.” He explained that statesmen had no greater obligation than to eradicate religious error and encourage the faithful to defer to their legitimate bishops’ authority.11 But he never went, and the immediate outcome in situ was not what he (or what became the North African Catholic Church) expected. For the Donatists were durable, intransigent, and unsparing in their criticism of their rivals. They made the religious situation terribly untidy in one of the empire’s strategically important regions.

Doubts about Constantine’s motives linger. He seems to have believed that God’s favor was conditional, that God entrusted him with all earthly affairs, terrena omnia, including Church controversies about cultic practices, and that God would continue to favor his family and his rule as long as he sensibly ordered his realm’s religious life. The secular and sacred were one.12 Yet Peter Brown’s generalization about the effect of Constantine and his successors on religious disputes applies well to the untidiness across the Mediterranean in the fourth and fifth centuries: “Far from bringing doctrinal controversies to an end [the emperors’ pronouncements] were usually the opening shot in a campaign for the mastery of public opinion.” “The shambling Roman Empire,” Brown continues, “was far from being like a modern state, and the so-called Catholic Church was a loose-knit confederation of local churches, which resembled in no way the papal monarchy of later centuries.”13 So, once the “opening shot[s]” were fired, Augustine took it upon himself to arrange conversations with local Donatist bishops, circulate records of what was said, and master public opinion without inviting zealots who seemed eager to upstage statesmanlike conferees and without attracting the unwanted attention of secular authorities. One could argue that Augustine—on this count, and for a time—was trying to step outside Constantine’s shadow.14

From the late 390s into the next century, he tried to reason with the secessionists, content to offer rules of engagement that had the prospect of
restoring unity to North African Christianity. His subsequent reliance on imperial decree and on coercive measures to end the schism represented “a decisive volte-face.” It followed his disillusionment with attempts to appease Donatist moderates who, like Bishop Proculeianus, appeared irenic (in te praeminent placidoris mentis indicia) and able to dissuade Donatists from stubborn resistance to reunion. Only gradually (and grudgingly, it seems) did Augustine realize that many Donatists remained certain of the truth of the charges that had failed to convince the prelates at Rome and Arles of Caecilian’s unsuitability for office in the early fourth century. And many other dissenters were too uninformed to argue intelligently, yet appeared ghoulishly to take pleasure in recycling the accusations against Caecilian and his long-dead colleagues to smear their current Catholic critics.

In 403, Augustine collaborated with Bishop Aurelius of Carthage on a proposal to enlist the help of local magistrates, who might serve as referees and keep conversations from turning into nasty confrontations. Augustine also favored conferring in small villages where neither faction had established a church. Neutral sites seemed perfect places to pore over passages in sacred texts and to reconcile rival interpretations. But by 406, Augustine had issued a veiled ultimatum, suggesting that the Donatists would soon be faced with a decision either to agree to reconcile with him or to confront government officials bent on their suppression.

During this period and into the next decade Augustine harped on about the difficulties that Catholic Christians in Africa were facing from the Donatist thugs, called circumcellions. If we believe Augustine, they were paramilitary ruffians whom militant Donatist bishops used as enforcers. Augustine circulated reports of their atrocities and called on the emperor’s deputies in Africa to remove local officials who tolerated the terror. The circumcellions were “men of blood . . . armed and active everywhere.” To assume that moderate dissenters could bridle them was unrealistic. The moderates were in a tight spot; they could hardly appear severe when so many of their colleagues—and not a few of those among them—owed their basilicas to circumcellions, who had frightened away Catholic congregations and left their rivals in possession. Augustine complained that Donatist prelates were the thugs’ driving force—agonistes—inciting circumcellions to “arm themselves against the law.” Hence, Catholic Christians were justified calling in the law, Augustine explained, in effect raising the stakes, overstating the militants’ malevolence, and overdramatizing Africa’s purported
plunge into anarchy. His recourse to force was “fundamentally defensive,” Charles Mathewes says, and in no way “an exemplary case of Constantinianism,” and, understandably, many of his contemporary admirers found it “alarming.”

Alarmed Augustinians may find little comfort from this reconstruction of the perception of the crisis that led Augustine himself to subscribe to his colleagues’ appeals for government assistance. The context does not excuse the miscue. And I fear that what remains of this essay will not comfort the alarmists who sift Augustinian sources for “an ethic of democratic citizenship,” inasmuch as I want to trawl in a few of Augustine’s texts to catch a modus operandi that might be construed as his alternative to Constantinian Christianity.

He had not been looking for one earlier in his career. His *Confessions* confides that he had hoped for a place at court and traveled to Italy to cultivate influential friends, flatter officials, and make an advantageous marriage. His progress was professionally promising but personally unfulfilling. He grew apprehensive. He came to believe that the happiness he sought was specious, that street people were better off, and that his quest for patronage had turned him into a bootlicking beggar. Years later, composing his memoir, he recalled that he and several friends contemplated forming a community of scholars “far removed from crowds.” The project called for the appointment of a bursar or two so that others, undistracted by the business end of their colloquy could devote themselves to studies and learned conversations. Yet several wives withheld consent, so the plan was abandoned. Its attraction for Augustine, who was unwed, seems comprehensible. He had been drawn to the Manichees years before, in part because he valued the companionship and conversations in the sect’s cells. He was also intrigued by the promise that Manichaean specialists would explain cosmology and Christian theology. Even after he grew disillusioned with their “utterly confused” explanations and found their conduct unbecoming (which, he scowled, they egregiously explained away by referring to the sinners reckoned as righteous in several of Christianity’s sacred texts), he was loath to leave the Manichees. Peter Brown suggests that Augustine’s “decades of shared religious intensity . . . as a Manichee [and as] a pioneer of a philosophical commune” led him to withdraw to a country estate outside Milan for a few months with his mother, his son, and some others—“a community of like-minded souls,” Brown says—and then led him to return to North Africa, with a “party of retired bureaucrats and
failed would-be courtiers,” “a closed religious group” or company of Christian intellectuals intent on prayer, reading, and discussion.27

Apparently Augustine was satisfied that his small companies of Christians could encourage the self-inquiry and colloquy (interius cogitando et loquendo) he thought necessary as preparation to approach what he called “the edge of eternity.”28 Most studies of his Confessions emphasize the introspection, but Gaetano Piccolo, in a lengthy discussion of interiority, concedes the importance of self-analysis, and especially memory, in the reception of God’s revelations. The inner life, if overemphasized, often disorients, becoming the principal obstacle to convivenza civile.29 Augustine seems to have anticipated Piccolo’s counsel. When describing his party’s pastimes, he added loquendo as if to signal that the Christian community’s piety and fellowship were due to discourse as well as to sighs, studies, and prayers. As he came under the influence of the call for personal reform found in the gospels and the writings of the apostle Paul, Augustine elsewhere and increasingly advised that colloquy, which he called “a surface activity,” was an aid to contemplation. Nonetheless, as Phillip Cary notes, “the privacy of the inner self is a temporary phenomenon.” Augustine looked forward to a time when the “inmost selves” of the faithful would “be open to each other’s gaze, as they were always meant to be.”30

Memory was critical: ego sum qui memini.31 Their memories constituted Christians. Memory probed and processed experiences and, in Augustine’s memoir, memory molded experience into what Brian Stock calls “the West’s first fully developed narrative philosophy.”32 The tenth and eleventh books of the Confessions are its display cases. Significantly, the latter starts speaking “plurally and communally,” Charles Mathewes notes; for nine books, readers watch Augustine, alone, measuring time, but after that “we are in the church,” a church that remembered Constantine’s conversion, but not necessarily as a watershed: that is, as a political turning point that accommodated Christianity—or assimilated the Church—to the political structures of the empire.33

Faithful Christians in the Church were on pilgrimage in time, Augustine explained later, when he realized that politicized Christianity was unsteady in theory and practice. After he wrote his memoirs—but before his day seemed so disjointed, following rebellion and riots in Africa and the sack of Rome in 410—he associated pilgrimage with tears. Weeping, he claimed, was the appropriate response to the faithful’s estrangement from the celestial city.34 Despite the consolations on offer in time (rationality,
vitality, and the Church with its sacraments), pilgrims needed to be reminded that their true home was elsewhere, and that their purpose on earth, in large part, was to yearn for it. The Church was also the repository for memories and for their authoritative interpretation. Both the memories and their interpretation reinforced the pilgrims’ sense of mission to proclaim their citizenship in the celestial city together with their longing for it. Augustine learned as much in the 380s. In the *Confessions* he recalled being told a story by Simplicianus, who succeeded Ambrose as bishop of Milan. Simplicianus reported coaxing a widely respected rhetorician, Victorinus, into the Church. Victorinus eventually admitted that he found truth and comfort in Christianity, but he resisted public disclosure. He declined Simplicianus’s invitation to come to church (arguing that it was preposterous to suppose that walls made the faithful any more faithful) until God unexpectedly moved him to make a conspicuous and celebrated confession of his adopted religion and to join “God’s gentle flock.”

The Church was custodian of memories and stories such as that of Simplicianus. Retelling the stories of conversions instructed prospective converts. Conceivably, Augustine was thinking of that possibility when he drafted his memoirs and added his odyssey to the Church memory bank. Possibly he had this prospect in mind when he strategically deployed the Church’s recollections in his *City of God*. Rehearsing martyrs’ ordeals, he suggested to Christian pilgrims what they could expect from authorities, even after the Constantinian settlement, since many pagans continued to blame Christianity for their empire’s unnerving setbacks in 387, when Emperor Valens died defending the frontier, and in 410, when Alaric chased Emperor Honorius from Rome. The Christians were blamed for abandoning Rome’s old gods who protected cities in return for worship rendered by leading citizens. Pilgrims learned from martyrs that they lived precariously and as captives on earth and that they should stand ready to embrace the promise of redemption rather than cultivate civic pride and accumulate possessions associated with an unwholesome secular life. Pagans created and preserved memories for related reasons, using them to encourage civic solidarity. In a recent study, Patrice Cambronne infers that Augustine adapted their approach to the Church’s purposes. Alleging that the pagans’ storytellers were charlatans, he relayed his memories of martyrs to bind pilgrims to their Church over their cities, and to the Christian promise of redemption.
Binding pilgrims to each other as well as to a repository of their faith’s stories and memories, Augustine steps outside our frame of reference, which, as Martin Claussen says, takes pilgrimage “as a somewhat solitary exercise.” For Augustine this was not the case, and pilgrimage was rather “something the whole community . . . does together.” For Augustine, entering the community, catechumens were given history lessons. They began with the Old Testament’s saga of creation, fall, and flood. They recalled the apostles’ ordeals and concluded with a short tribute to the martyrs, who attested the truth of their faith until “the neck” of their persecutors’ pride had been snapped. The Church, as Joost van Neer says, makes its memories come alive “to build up the faith.”

On Augustine’s watch, memories were crafted and conveyed to make the Church’s story and prospects so much more appealing than those of the secular world. His *City of God* sets out the history (and pre-history) of the Church after commenting somewhat favorably on old Rome’s achievements. Contestable interpretations of those comments and of several passages elsewhere suggest that Augustine imagined that secular regimes could be more or less just; readings of the *City’s* fourth book, for example, justify Rome’s territorial expansion by referring to the unruly conduct of the neighbors it absorbed. But the lust for domination, which Augustine deplored, is the proper explanation—his explanation, according to which such lust made political equilibrium impossible. That the *City* defines a republic without reference to justice and that it endorses the complaints of one of Cicero’s characters in *De re publica*, who maintained that political practice requires unjust behavior, appear to be irrelevant to scholars devoted to discovering Augustine’s optimism or sources for political optimism in his *City* that would enable them to come to comfortable terms with liberal democracy.

Thomas Martin’s essay on the politics of monasticism seems to me a more sensible application of Augustine’s reflections on solidarity and civic piety. Martin relates Augustine’s take on fairness and meaningful reciprocity to “the republic of grace” in convents. Monasticism was *peregrinans* and “far from perfect,” yet it represented humanity’s best efforts—and best bet—*in hoc saeculo maligno* to get just results. “The monastic community does witness to the art of the possible,” Martin says, to “what can be done while still on pilgrimage.” As for Christian magistrates and soldiers, who cannot responsibly retire from the secular world and who must reconcile themselves to their secular duties, which amount to damage control, Au-
Augustine told them to pray for their deliverance, fret about the inconsistency between their political practice and their piety, and to repent. Ideally, they can find scope for an uncompromising exercise of virtue in their churches.42

The world is to be used but not improved by Christian pilgrims and their Church, which is the context in which operative and cooperative grace improves relations among the faithful and the relations between them and their creator and redeemer. Pilgrims are taught to expect celestial rewards, properly to weigh the value of temporal rewards, and to pay forward God’s love in their love for neighbors. But pilgrims are not to propose a new religious foundation for municipal moral order. Augustine did not politicize piety. For him, piety’s proper arena was, according to John Rist, “unpolitical”—not apolitical, but unpolitical—and what Francesco D’Agostino identifies as Augustine’s antigiuridismo demonstrates just that. It surfaces in several skirmishes with Pelagians who depicted law as grace, when, insisting that a Christian’s freedom to obey the law was implicit in the very existence of law, they supposed the laws of God were reflected in the laws of civil society. To Augustine, their supposition was preposterous.43

So it would be foolish to look for any significant slab of the optimism resembling Eusebius of Caesarea’s euphoria in Augustine’s remarks on political leadership or jurisprudence. Perhaps we should refer to Augustine, in the words of Christoph Horn, as “a political functionalist,” one who acknowledges the normativity of institutions and laws, while accepting that prevalent political practices serve useful yet occasionally immoral purposes? After all, Augustine would have conceded that institutions, laws, and practices in the terrestrial city, in hoc saeculo maligno, were normative to a point. But “normativity” meant relatively little in the long run for Augustine or, to put his likely perception in more precise terms, calling the prevailing patterns of political behavior normal or normative did little to relieve the distress that “everywhere filled” what he knew of human experience in this wicked world (ubique impleverunt); temptations and suspicions afflicted what passed as ordinary lives. For Augustine, the secular was sinful; whatever there was of his functionalism was trumped by his “morality.”44 In Augustine’s City of God political behavior and, more importantly, political institutions invariably succumb to “the universal sway of antagonism.” That phrase, “universal sway of antagonism,” is John Milbank’s and is quite controversial, but, as James Wetzel admits, Milbank has “an exegetical basis in the City of God for conjoining sin, secularity, and paganism.”45
The Church supplied some refuge and relief from the wreckage of creation that we have been calling “the secular.” The Church had a distinctive calling, which distinguished it from—and called for unremitting criticism of—political settlements. That criticism neither required nor commended active participation in political deliberations. In Augustine’s judgment, the compassion of Christians was better spent in their churches than in senates, better spent paying forward God’s love for the pilgrims’ celestial city in their love for neighbors. *Opera misericordiae*, expressions of tenderness, were sacrifices that assuredly pleased God, Augustine warranted, and might even snatch up *(rapere)* neighbors whose behavior had been objectionable and change them into effective executors of God’s love.46 To change or reform others, of course, required that one be reformed, which, for Augustine, meant losing the form of secular desire *(formam concupiscentiae saecularis amittat)*, having it consumed by the fire of God’s love. That fire was kindled by submission to God. Pilgrims’ passions for the celestial city began with self-inquiry, which Luigi Alici dubs “spiritual reconnaissance,” developed with their submission, and contributed to constituting churches as pride-free zones in which aversion to contention eventually, and ideally, douses the self-love and lusts that inflame contentious spirits.47

“Zoning” the Church in this fashion returns us to Augustine’s opposition to the Donatists. To his mind, the Donatists’ claims to superior righteousness—their purported libels against their first critics, the Caecilianists, and their resistance to reconciliation—exhibited an all-too-human lack of compassion and an addiction to contention. Augustine believed the Pelagians were similarly disposed. He chided them as well for conceit, inasmuch as their claims to please God without special divine assistance drove them, he said, from the certainties of faith to idolatry.48 Pride played itself out in assertions of “moral self-sufficiency, religious superiority, and political domination,” according to J. Patout Burns—“pride was the principal obstacle to overcome.” One function of the law was “to dissolve a person’s sense of self-reliance,” Patout Burns goes on, but it was also the Church’s function to challenge members’ self-satisfaction. The churches consequently contributed to a process by which the celestial city was “constantly being formed by the reform *(mutatione)* of the wicked.”49 Augustine acknowledged that there would be heavy lifting ahead. Professed Christians in the Church could be indecisive, and “many live[d] lives unworthy of the baptisms they received.” They crowded into the circus rather than into the basilica. They set up shops on holy days and grew irritable if
trade on those days was restricted. Augustine urged that the faithful help coreligionists whose determination was unequal to the challenges that Christian standards posed for them. The most motivated pilgrims should help the least to “cross the Red Sea,” he said, and get wet enough to wash away the residue of their sinful lives—to accept God’s promises, and put the temptations of this wicked world into perspective. In the same sermon, preached sometime during the first decade of the fifth century or shortly after Rome’s humiliation in 410, Augustine concluded that Christians might also assist those “dregs” (amurca) who tempted pilgrims into the saeculum and have them participate as incurious and uncomplaining citizens of this wicked world; maybe the faithful should bring that “slag” to church along with those susceptible to their tempters’ touting civic pride, Augustine suggested, trusting that tempters and tempted alike might be inspired by the memories of martyrs and the stories of converts as well as by self-reconnaissance, and colleagues’ compassion—inspired to step out of Constantine’s shadow.

Notes


2. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2007), 86–88 traces to the late Renaissance the “disciplined reordering of life and society,” which disenchanted the world, distinguished the elite’s ideals of piety
and civility from those of ordinary Christians, and made possible the new self-understandings and practices, which, to his mind, define secularity.


5. Markus, Christianity and the Secular, 24–28. Here, as in the sixth article of the Schleitheim Confession, “the sword” refers to “an ordering outside the perfection of Christ.” Yoder’s works have been profoundly influential. His Täufertum und Reformation im Gespräch (Zurich: EVZ Verlag, 1968) chronicled the early opposition to the Constantinianism of the magisterial reformation. For relatively recent commentary, see the essays by Waldemar Janzen and J. Alexander Sider in The Church Made Strange for the Nations: Essays in Ecclesiology and Political Theology, ed. Paul G. Doerkson and Karl Koop (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2011).


8. Donatus was long after known as the prelate who purged Carthage of practices associated with undisciplined versions of the Christian faith imported from Rome; see Augustine, Contra Cresconium 3,56.


12. See, for example, Constantine’s Letter to Aelafius, in Maier, *Dossier*, 157–58.


17. Augustine, *Epistolae* 43.15.


34. Augustine, *Sermones* 31.5.
35. Augustine, *Confessions* 8.2.5.
36. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 19.17; “apud terrenam civitatem velut captivam vivam.” Also see *De civitate Dei* 1.29.
47. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 10.6. For “autoricconoscimento spirituale” see Luigi Alici, “Storia e salvezza nel *De civitate Dei*,” in *La fine dei tempi: storia e escatologia*, ed. Mario Naldini (Fiesole: Centro di Studi Patristici, 1994), 87–90. This is obviously quite different from what Augustine describes as *amor sui* or from what Charles Mathewes calls “morbid self-consciousness”; see Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 14.28 and Charles Mathewes, “A Worldly Augustinianism: Augustine’s Sacramental Vision of Creation,” *Augustinian Studies* 41 (2010), 337.
51. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 80.8: “Nihil ergo alius significabit transitus per mare, nisi Sacramentum baptizatorum.”
52. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 80.11.