The Jalayirids

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The military governorships that the Mongols had established in Khurasan and Azarbayan were replaced by the Ilkhanate in the 1250s. Unlike the former governorships, which were responsible directly to the great qan in Qaraqorum, the Ilkhanate was a new princely *ulūs*, or appanage state, under the rule of Hülegü Khan, the brother of Möngke Qa’an. Hülegü’s primary missions were to eliminate the Nizārī Ismā’īlīs, or Assassins, who had made an attempt on Möngke’s life, and the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad. Hülegü’s forces were successful in both of these missions, and by 1260 the lands between the Oxus and the Euphrates were under Hülegü’s control. As in the other princely *ulūs*es, which were mentioned in Chapter 2, members of the Jalayir and other Mongol tribes provided the manpower for Hülegü’s army, and became the new amirs, or military elite, in Iran.

In the early years of the Ilkhanate, tensions developed between the khans (Hülegü and his descendants) and the amirs. In general, the khans sought to centre political power and wealth in their own hands, through a central government staffed mainly by native Persians. The amirs, in general, tended to resist this tendency toward centralisation, which threatened their own independence, power and wealth. Resistance among the amirs took the form of supporting alternative members of the Hülegüids, members of the Ilkhanid royal family, for the throne. Several Jalayir tribal families played a role in this struggle, which became particularly intense between 1282 and 1295.

This chapter examines the details of this struggle, which led ultimately to a centralisation process that eliminated all but one Jalayir family from political influence in the Ilkhanate. These Jalayirs were the descendants of Īlgā Noyan, a trusted commander of Hülegü during the Mongol invasion of the 1250s. By the end of the thirteenth century, the Ilgayid Jalayirs had become powerful amirs within the Ilkhanate, due to their ties to the royal family.
The Jalayirs and the Early Ilkhanate

 İlğâ Noyan and the Early Ilkhanate

The Jalayirid sultans of the fourteenth century were descended from İlğâ Noyan, who came to Iran in the army of Hülegü. He took part in the assault on Baghdad in January of 1258, leading a contingent of Mongol troops from the south of the city along the Tigris. On the day that the Abbasid caliph al-Mustaʻṣim bi-llâh was executed, İlğâ and his grandson, Qarâ Bûqâ, were charged with undertaking reconstruction operations in Baghdad. Two years later, following the Mongols’ defeat by the Mamluks at ‘Ayn Jalut, İlğâ Noyan led the remaining Mongol forces out of Syria, and headed north to Diyarbakr. Here İlğâ was shot from his horse during the Mongol siege of Mayyafariqin (modern Silvan), but was carried off the field by two of his men. In the winter of 1262–63, İlğâ appeared again in an Ilkhanid campaign against the Mongols of the Golden Horde at the Terek river in the Caucasus, a sign that the once united Mongol empire had split into independent and mutually hostile khanates.

İlgâ Noyan served Hülegü until the khan’s death in 663/1265. When Abaqa came to the royal court camp (urdū) in Jumâdá I/March of that year, unaware that his father had died, İlğâ Noyan met him to break the news. Rashîd al-Dîn writes:

Because İlğâ Noyan was commander-in-chief (amîr-i ūrdûhâ) and followed the path of affection in the service of the Ilkhan for a long time, he gave Abaqa Khan food and drink. In private he informed him of the circumstances of his father.

Abaqa succeeded Hülegü as Ilkhan. During his reign, İlğâ Noyan became the most respected senior amir. An illustration of his position in the Ilkhanid hierarchy is given in an account of a diplomatic mission from the Chaghatayid ulûs. The vizier Mas‘ûd Beg came in the winter of 665/1266–67 to obtain an accounting of the Chaghatayid property (închû) in Iran. At Abaqa’s court, only İlğâ Noyan sat closer to the khan than the visiting dignitary Mas‘ûd Beg.

İlgâ’s prominence in the new Ilkhanid appanage state, and the subsequent prominence of his sons, seems attributable to his close relationship with Hülegü and his role in many of the military campaigns which established the territorial limits of the Ilkhanate. In Baghdad, Syria, Diyarbakr and the Caucasus, İlğâ was one of the principal military leaders in conflicts with the Ilkhans’ neighbours and rivals, the Mamluks and the Jochids.
The Jalayir and Tribal Factionalism (1282–95)

Īlgā Noyan was one of the many prominent amirs among the Ilkhanid elite. These amirs provided the military support that the khans required to maintain their authority. However, the amirs could also challenge a khan and assert his own independence by backing other Hülegüid princes. The tension between the centralisation of royal authority and the independent power of the amirs became acute following the death of Abaqa Khan in 1282.

Much of the account that follows is based on Rashīd al-Dīn’s Jāmi‘ al-Tavārīkh, and the ideological background to this history should be kept in mind. In the struggle between royal centralisation and the dispersal of power among the amirs, Rashīd al-Dīn most certainly favoured the former. It is possible, then, to read his account of this period, some thirty years earlier, as a kind of warning against factionalism among the elite, which would lead to civil war and the breakdown of order. This history is crucial, however, for the details it provides about the personnel within the Ilkhanid elite, and particularly their tribal affiliations. In other words, if we want to know what role tribal identity played in the internal politics of the Ilkhanate, Rashīd al-Dīn is an indispensable source.

When Abaqa Khan died in 680/1282, his brother Aḥmad Tegüder was in Georgia, and immediately set out for the royal court at Maragha. He was met by some of the most powerful Ilkhanid amirs, including Shīktūr Noyan and Būqā of the Jalayir tribe. Shīktūr was Īlgā Noyan’s second son. Like his father, he served in the earliest Ilkhanid military campaigns in Syria in 657/1259. Shīktūr was Īlgā Noyan’s second son. Like his father, he served in the earliest Ilkhanid military campaigns in Syria in 657/1259. In 658/1260 he accompanied emissaries from Mongolia to Hülegü in Anatolia to announce the death of Möngke Qa’an. He later served in the left wing of the Ilkhanid army on campaign against the Chaghatayid khan Barāq in 668/1270. By 680/1282, he was a respected senior amir.

Būqā was the son of Ügulāy Qūrchī Jalayir, who had come to Iran with Hülegü as a scout (qarāvul). Ügulāy died when Būqā was still a child and Būqā was raised at the court of Abaqa Khan. Here he served as a grand counsellor (‘azīm-īnāq), as well as keeper of the royal treasury (khazā’in-i nārīn) and keeper of pelts (khizāna-yi pustīn). In addition, Būqā served in the capacity of tamghāchī, keeper of the red imperial seal (āl tamghā) under Abaqa.

After the period of mourning for Abaqa, the princes, ladies and amirs who were present at the court at Maragha deliberated over who should succeed him. They were divided between support for Aḥmad Tegüder and Arghun, who served in Khurasan and had yet to arrive at the assembly.
Among the Jalayir amirs, Shīktūr Noyan supported Ahmad Tegüder, while his brother, Āq Būqā, as well as Būqā and Būqā’s brother Arūq, supported Arghun. In the end, Arghun was convinced to step aside, for most of the amirs were in favour of Ahmad Tegüder. Arghun was forced to acquiesce, and on 26 Muḥarram 681/6 May 1282 all of the amirs agreed to confer rulership upon Ahmad Tegüder. The enthronement followed over a month later, on the summer solstice, 13 Rabi‘ I 681/21 June 1282. An oath (mūchalgā) was given, and Ahmad Tegüder was seated on the throne by the amirs Qūnqūrtāy and Shīktūr Noyan Jalayir.

Shīktūr Noyan certainly held a prominent rank within the Ilkhanate at this time. Āq Būqā also achieved a high status under Ahmad Tegüder, despite his initial support of Arghun. He became an intimate (īnāq) of the new khan, a relationship that prompted resentment from Būqā. Būqā continued to resist Ahmad Tegüder’s rule, although he was forced to leave Arghun’s household in Khurasan and join the royal court in Azarbajyan.

The tensions between Ahmad Tegüder and Arghun, which reflected broader factionalism among the amirs, broke into open conflict in Ṣafar 683/May 1284. Armies representing the two sides clashed at Āq Khvāja in a battle that marked the beginning of Ahmad Tegüder’s fall. Būqā continued to serve Ahmad Tegüder as tamghāchī and chief military commander. Uncertain by this time of the loyalty of his men, Ahmad Tegüder ordered his amirs to submit written oaths swearing that they would not transgress the command of Būqā. Although Būqā was the khan’s most trusted amir, he began to harbour resentment toward Ahmad Tegüder. At the same time, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, Ahmad Tegüder began to ignore Būqā in favour of his Jalayir rival Āq Būqā, son of Ilgā. For these reasons, Būqā became more inclined to support Ahmad Tegüder’s brother Arghun.

Less than a month later, Arghun surrendered to Ahmad Tegüder, who chose not to execute his cousin. Būqā Jalayir, with the help of his brother and two other Jalayir kinsmen, engineered a coup that freed Arghun and began a purge of Ahmad Tegüder’s supporters. Āq Būqā Jalayir, Būqā’s main rival, was also captured. A quriltay was then held to name Ahmad Tegüder’s successor. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Būqā made the case for Arghun’s enthronement:

The qan who is the ruler of the inhabited quarter of the world and āqā of the entire family of Chinggis Qan, gave rulership of the lands of Iran after his own brother Hülegü Khan to his eldest son Abaqa Khan, who was the most perfect and intelligent. After him, by way of inheritance, it should go to his beloved son, the true successor Arghun. If meddlers (fażūlān) had not interfered, the
crown and throne would have gone to the sons, and none of this turmoil (fitna) would have happened. God knows where this all will end. 31

These words, of course, belong to Rashid al-Din and not to Būqā, and reflect Rashid al-Din’s own interested view that rulership in the Ilkhanate belonged to Arghun, the father of his patrons Ghazan and Öljeytü.

With Ahmad Tegüder deposed, and eventually executed, and his own candidate on the throne, Būqā Jalayir was at the height of his power. Both Rashid al-Din and his contemporary Vaṣṣāf make it clear that Arghun owed his throne to Būqā. 32 Būqā’s influence was reflected in the fact that he controlled both the military and the financial administration. He was in charge of the army and the affairs of the royal household. Būqā also became the Ilkhanid grand vizier, and executed the ṣāḥib-dīvān, Shams al-Din, and replaced him with three individuals of his own choosing. 33

Būqā’s authority was recognised by Qubilay Qan in China, to whom the Ilkhans were still technically subordinate. Qubilay’s representative arrived at the Ilkhanid court in 1286, with a decree (yārlīgh) recognising Arghun as khan and Būqā as chancellor (chīngsāng). 34 Būqā’s power was formally recognised as virtually unlimited, for he was exempted from being tried for up to nine crimes. 35 He used his influence to protect his family as well. In 685/1286, his brother Arūq killed three men in Baghdad, including the personnel (īnchū) of Arghun Khan’s brother Geykhatu. Būqā offered his brother sanctuary at the royal court, and refuge from retribution from Geykhatu. 36

Arūq eventually returned to Baghdad, where, according to Rashid al-Din, he behaved less like an amir than like a king, withholding tax receipts from the central treasury. 37 These abuses by Būqā and Arūq bred resentment among the other amirs and officials. 38 Rashid al-Din puts the following indictment of Būqā in the mouth of the future grand vizier Ṣadr al-Din Zanjānī:

Būqā has arranged rulership for himself. Without an order from the pādishāh or counsel with the amirs he does whatever he wants, and he dispenses wealth the way he wants. No one knows Arghun is the pādishāh, rather it’s Būqā. Things have finally gotten to the point that whenever an envoy goes with a decree or passport (yārlīgh va pā’īza) to Tabriz, Amīr ‘Alī, who is the governor (vālī) of that place, doesn’t pay any attention unless [the document] has the red seal of Būqā (āl tamghā-yi būqā), and he turns back empty-handed. 39

Arghun Khan was not pleased with these reports, and punished Būqā by removing the financial registry from his possession and dismissing his deputies and dependants from the royal council. 40 Realising that he had completely fallen out of favour with Arghun, Būqā paid off a number
of Jalayir amirs in order to secure their loyalty, and again attempted to bring an Ilkhanid prince to the throne. These efforts failed, however, and Būqā was eventually executed, his mutilated corpse displayed publicly, in January 1289.41 Trials of his relatives and dependants followed, and most of them were also executed.42

Būqā Jalayir’s rise and fall reflects the tension between the amirs and princes in the Ilkhanate. Rashīd al-Dīn attributed his fall to the corrupt use of his authority to protect his brother, who acted ever more independently in Baghdad. The other amirs, as well as Arghun Khan, sought to bring Būqā under control. When he attempted to overthrow Arghun, as he had with Ahmad Tegüder, other amirs stepped in to stop him. Būqā’s fall was the end of the Ugulayid branch of the Jalayir in the Ilkhanate, which meant that the Ilgayids, including Shīktūr, Āq Būqā and Ṭughān, would gain prominence.

Challenges to the central authority of the khans did not end with Būqā’s downfall, however. In the 1290s, the Ilkhanate’s northwestern frontier in Anatolia became the site for a number of rebellions among the tribal amirs, including several from the Jalayir tribe. The political situation in Anatolia and the elimination of these rebellions by the central Ilkhanid authority are examined below.

Jalayir Amirs and the Anatolian Frontier

The Mongol presence in Anatolia began in 641/1243 with the victory of Bāyjū Noyan, the imperial military governor of western Iran, at Köse Dagh. Bāyjū defeated the army of the Saljūq sultan Kay Khusraw II (r. 634/1237–644/1246) and opened up eastern Anatolia to the Mongols. A second wave of Mongols migrated westward after 654/1256, when Bāyjū was forced to cede his control over Azarbajjan to the new Ilkhan ruler Hülegü Khan.43 While Hülegü was successful in securing the relatively accessible plain of Diyarbakr, the higher country between the Euphrates and Kırşehir was a region of political fluidity for those political powers that sought to control it: the Ilkhans from Azarbajjan, the Mamluks from Cairo and Syria, and the Saljūq and Armenian rulers whose loyalty was sought by the larger imperial powers.

Zeki Velidi Togan has highlighted the importance of Anatolia to the Ilkhanid empire in an article discussing references made by Rashīd al-Dīn in his letters.44 The authenticity of these letters has been the subject of much debate among scholars.45 Without addressing the issue of whether or not the letters are authentic, it is worth mentioning some general aspects of Togan’s work that suggest the importance of Anatolia to Rashīd al-Dīn
and the Ilkhanate. Togan cites Ibn Bībī’s report that the city of Erzincan was incorporated into the personal property (injü=inchū) of Abaqa Khan. When one also considers that over a third of Rashīd al-Dīn’s personal property was located in Anatolia, the importance of this western province to the Ilkhanid ruling elite is clear. The reason seems to have been the significance of Anatolia for overland trade, which passed through Ilkhanid territory in northern Iran on its way west. Öljeytü, under whom Rashīd al-Dīn served as vizier, constructed a new imperial capital at Sultaniyya, southeast of Tabriz, in the early eighth/fourteenth century. As Togan points out, Sultaniyya marked the central point along the Ilkhanid imperial highway (shāh-rāh), extending from the Oxus to the Mediterranean. A large portion of the western half of this route (shāh-rāh-i gharbī) passed through Anatolia, via Erzurum, Erzincan and Konya. Anatolia was more than just a frontier march; it was an integral part of the Ilkhanid economic system.

Following Abaqa Khan’s accession in 663/1265, a son of Īlgā Jalayir, named Ṭūqū (or Ṭūghū), had been appointed to the province of Rūm as a secretary (bītkchī), along with Tūdā‘ūn of the Sulduz tribe. They were soon called upon by Abaqa to help put down the rebellion of Sharaf al-Dīn Mas‘ūd b. Khātīr, who had challenged the authority of the Mongols’ Saljūq protectorate from his bases in Niğde and Develi.

Although the suppression of the revolt of Sharaf al-Dīn Mas‘ūd helped to consolidate the position of the Saljuqid governor Mu‘īn al-Dīn Sulaymān, known as the parvāna, in Anatolia, it had also demonstrated that the parvāna was dependent on Ilkhanid military support to maintain that position. In an attempt to achieve a greater degree of autonomy, the parvāna sent emissaries to the Mamluk sultan Baybars, encouraging him to invade Anatolia. Baybars, who had seized the sultanate after the Battle of ‘Ayn Jalut in 658/1260, and who had laid the foundation of the sultanate through his campaigns against the Syrian crusader states, was eager to extend his northern frontier into Anatolia. As the Mamluk forces headed north in late 675/early 1277, Ṭūqū and Tūdā‘ūn left their winter residence at Kırs ¸ehir to join the amir Qūtū, who had to arrive from Niğde. However, when Ṭūqū reached the plain of Abulustayn (Elbistan), Qūtū was not there, and Baybars’ forces soundly defeated the Mongols on 9 Dhū al-Qa‘da 675/14 April 1277. Baybars went on to Kayseri, where the khatba and sikka were given in his name. Both Ṭūqū and Tūdā‘ūn, as well as Ürūghtū Jalayir, were killed at this battle.

Mamluk supremacy in Anatolia did not last long. Baybars retreated when he realised that Abaqa himself was preparing an expedition to deal with the Mamluks and the parvāna, who had not been at Abulustayn to aid
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the Mongol troops. The Ilkhanid amirs Samāghar and Kuhūrgāy soon replaced Tūqū and Tūdā’ūn as governors in this region.

Eastern Anatolia remained a stronghold for the Ilkhans under Jalayir and Sulduz governors, the ancestors of the Jalayirid and Chubanid dynasties of the eighth/fourteenth century. Ilgā Noyan’s son Āq Būqā, who had become a favourite of Aḥmad Tegüder, served on the fringes of the Ilkhanid political scene in Anatolia during the reign of Arghun Khan and Būqā Jalayir. Here, Āq Būqā became attached to prince Geykhatu, Arghun’s brother. His time in Anatolia with Geykhatu meant that his status rose after Geykhatu became khan in 690/1291, leading to his appointment as chief amir (mīr-i mīrān). During Geykhatu’s reign, Āq Būqā Jalayir played a prominent role in the administrative affairs of the Ilkhanate. He became the patron (murabbī) of Ṣadr al-Dīn Zanjānī, Geykhatu’s grand vizier. He also carried out the execution of his own brother Ṭughān, who had supported Baydu to succeed Arghun Khan, and had conspired with several other amirs against Arghun’s vizier, Sa’d al-Dawla. As one of Geykhatu Khan’s trusted amirs, Āq Būqā was sent to Tabriz in 693/1294 to introduce the new Chinese-inspired paper currency, known as chao (chāw). However, this fiscal experiment was short-lived, as its introduction led to utter chaos and a standstill of economic activity in Tabriz.

Geykhatu ruled as khan from 690/1291 until 694/1295. He returned to Anatolia following the investigations into his brother’s death in 690/1291, and spent most of his reign in that region. Geykhatu placed Iran under the command of Āq Būqā’s brother, Shīktūr Noyan, as his deputy in Iran, while Āq Būqā remained at Geykhatu’s court in the west. During his reign, Geykhatu seems to have dispensed with the title ‘īlkhān on his coins, omitting at times even the name of the great qan Qubilay. Such a policy indicates an attempt to establish the full independence of the ulūs of Hūlegū by severing the nominal ties of allegiance to the eastern court of the great qan, which had been at the foundation of the Ilkhanate’s political identity since its establishment.

Despite these symbolic declarations of independent sovereignty, Geykhatu faced a challenge to his authority similar to that which Ahmad Tegüder had faced a decade earlier. As lateral successors – that is, brothers of the previous khan – they were both threatened by the existence of the former khan’s sons as rallying points for political opposition. For Geykhatu, this threat was represented not only by Arghun’s son Ghazan, who had inherited his father’s personal appanage in Khurasan, but also by his cousin Baydu, the grandson of Hūlegū through his son Ṭaraqāy. Several disaffected amirs, led by Ţaghāchār, gathered around Baydu in
Baghdad and launched a rebellion in 694/1295. When Ṭaghāchār moved against the army of Geykhatu Khan, Āq Būqā warned him that such an action was unlawful (khilāf-i yāsā). Ṭaghāchār responded, saying:

Until today, Āq Būqā was commander of the entire country on the order of Geykhatu Khan. Now, by the virtue of Baydu’s decree, leadership belongs to me.65

Āq Būqā’s forces were overwhelmed, and Geykhatu was eventually captured and executed.66

Baydu’s reign lasted only four months before he was toppled by Ghazan. By the time of Ghazan’s accession in 694/1295, most of the sons of Īlgā Noyan Jalayir had disappeared from the political scene. Shīktūr Noyan seems to have died around this time, while Āq Būqā, Tughān, Ürūghtū and Tūqū had all been killed between 675/1277 and 694/1295. Īlgā’s family had represented a major component of the early Ilkhanate’s military and administrative elite. However, by the early period of Ghazan’s reign, representatives of other branches of the Jalayir tribe attempted to establish independent authority on the western frontier.

While Rūm had been Geykhatu’s personal appanage, Ghazan had inherited Khurasan and thus had fewer personal ties to the west. It is perhaps this weakness in terms of dependants and allies in Anatolia that prompted or allowed for a series of uprisings in the region between 695/1296 and 698/1299. These uprisings involved several Jalayir amirs who, unlike the Ilgayids and Ugulayids, did not have close ties to the royal family, but who used the opportunity presented by their post in the west to carve out their own local influence.

One of these Jalayir amirs was Āyna Beg. His father, Qipchaq, was a relative of the family of Ūgulāy Qūrchī Jalayir. His brother, Ishāk Tughlī, was an amir in Aḥmad Tegüder Khan’s army, and fought at the battle of Āq Khvāja in 683/1284 between Aḥmad Tegüder and Arghun.67 However, he is not mentioned after this point, and it is likely that he was killed in 683/1284 during the purge of Aḥmad Tegüder’s supporters, led by Būqā Jalayir. Āyna Beg survived this purge, and is mentioned as having being sent by Ghazan Khan to Anatolia to intercept a rebel named Īldār. After his forces seized Īldār near Erzurum,68 Āyna Beg himself turned against Ghazan. He joined a faction of amirs who attacked Ghazan’s army at Baylaqan in February or March 1296.69 The next day, Ghazan’s troops rallied, and Āyna Beg was captured. He was brought to Tabriz, where he was publicly executed.70

The following year, another Jalayir amir named Bāltū raised another rebellion. Bāltū had served in Anatolia along with his father, Tāyjī, from
the period of Abaqa’s reign (663/1265–680/1282). As in the case of Āyna Beg, Bāltū’s rebellion began as part of a campaign to put down the rebellion of another amir. This amir was Ṭaghāchār, who had sided with Baydu against Ghazan in the civil war of 1295. After Baydu was defeated, Ṭaghāchār left Azarbayjan for Anatolia, taking refuge in Tokat. Ṭaghāchār was eventually captured and executed by Bāltū’s forces, but Bāltū then repeatedly ignored Ghazan’s demands that he return. Bāltū himself was defeated at Malatya, and later captured in May of 1297. Like Āyna Beg, Bāltū was publicly executed in Tabriz later that year. In addition, the Saljūq sultan Mas’ūd II was suspected of having conspired with Bāltū. Ghazan had Mas’ūd deposed, and replaced by his nephew, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Kay Qubād III.

This Saljūq coup still did not end the unrest in Anatolia. In the winter of 1298–99, a number of amirs, led by Sulaymish, who had led the coup against Mas’ūd II, revolted against Ghazan’s appointed governors. Among the rebels was the Jalayir amir Iqbāl. By the spring of 1299, Ghazan’s new commander in Anatolia, Amīr Chūpān Sulduz, had defeated Sulaymish and captured Iqbāl. This event marked a turning point in the Ilkhanid military administration in Anatolia. Particularly after the death of the Saljūq sultan Mas’ūd II in 702/1303, Rūm came to be governed almost as an autonomous principality under Amīr Chūpān. During the early reign of the young Abū Sa‘īd Bahādur Khan (717/1317–727/1327), Amīr Chūpān became the Ilkhanid commander-in-chief and virtual sovereign.

The years between 1282 and 1300 were characterised by internal struggles in the Ilkhanate. The conflicts between Aḥmad Tegüder and Arghun, and between Geykhatu, Baydu and Ghazan, reflected not only the competing interests of the Ilkhanid royal family, but also those of the amirs who backed them. As we have seen in this chapter, an amir in the Ilkhanate who could help his candidate on to the throne could become extremely powerful, as Būqā Jalayir had been. Būqā was aided by other Jalayir tribesmen, but he was also opposed by other Jalayir, most notably Āq Būqā, the son of Īlgā Noyan. The Jalayir certainly did not act as a cohesive group during this period of civil war in the Ilkhanate. Conflict occurred not between tribes, but between supporters of different royal princes. After Ghazan Khan came to power in 1295, the amirs who had opposed Ghazan, and thus did not have a royal patron after Ghazan’s succession, attempted to rebel. Several Jalayir tribesmen took part in these rebellions in Anatolia in the first years of Ghazan’s reign.

By the turn of the fourteenth century, Amīr Chūpān Sulduz had begun to consolidate his authority in Anatolia, in the name of Ghazan Khan. This was part of a wider programme of centralisation under Ghazan Khan.
The khan and the non-Mongol administrative elite attempted to remove power from the hands of the amirs, and place it in the hands of the central government. This process involved a series of reforms, which included the regularisation of the financial administration, the collection of taxes, the revocation of individuals’ privileges granted by previous rulers, and the increase in the authority of the khan as religious leader, through mass conversion to Islam and the formulation of an ideology that presented the khan as the pādishāh-i islām, and an ideal Muslim sovereign.

There were fewer challenges to the central authority of the khan from the amirs after 1300. Jalayir families that had opposed Ghazan had been eliminated, and the line of Īlgā Noyan was the one Jalayir family that had any political influence. As the following chapter illustrates, the son and grandson of Āq Būqā became closely tied to the Ilkhanid royal house during this period of political centralisation in the early fourteenth century.

Notes

1. Rashīd al- Dīn / Jāmi’, 1008. Īlgā Noyan, Kit Būqā and Qūdūsūn are also all mentioned among Hülegū’s amirs in Rashīd al- Dīn’s genealogical work Shu’ ab-i Panjgāna. Īlgā Noyan is among the first names listed in the account of the amirs in Hūlegū’s time. Īlgā is described as follows: ‘Īlgā Noyan from the Jalayir was a great amir. He came here from that province (vilāyat) with Hūlegū.’ Kit Būqā is listed two names below Īlgā in the same column: ‘Kit Būqā from the Nayman tribe was an amir of the army and extremely respected. He conquered Syria and Damascus (shām va dimashq), and after that was killed in battle with Egypt (dar jang- i miṣr).’ Qūdūsūn (or Qudusūn, as his name is written in the Shu’ ab- i Panjgāna manuscript) ‘was a respected amir and was among the amirs who conquered Baghdad’. See Rashīd al- Dīn/ Shu‘ab, 139b–140a.
2. Rashīd al- Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,019.
5. Rashīd al- Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,046.
7. Īlgā is listed among the top amirs during Abaqa’s time in the Shu‘ ab- i Panjgāna. He is described as ‘a greatly respected amir’ (amīrī- yi bas mu’ tabar). See Rashīd al- Dīn/Shu‘ ab, 144b.
8. On the issue of extra-territorial possessions of the Chinggisid princes, see Thomas T. Allsen, ‘Sharing Out the Empire: Apportioning Lands under the Mongols’, in Anatoly M. Khazanov and André Wink (eds), Nomads in the Sedentary World (Richmond: Curzon, 2001), 173; Paul D. Buell, ‘Tribe,


10. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,124. Rashīd al-Dīn listed Shīktūr Noyan among the top amirs during Ahmad Tegüder’s reign in the Shu’ab-i Panjgāna. However, Rashīd al-Dīn also mentioned that Shīktūr did not pay much attention to him (ziyādat-i itifātī namī-kard). See Rashīd al-Dīn/Shu’ab, 141b.


17. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,110. The āl tamghā was probably adopted by the Mongols from Uyghur chancery practices. It was used for general imperial decrees, while the altūn tamghā (gold seal) was used specifically for financial documents or decrees. See Gerhard Doerfer, ‘Āl Tamğa’, Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), 1:766–8.

18. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,125.

19. Jean Aubin has described Būqā as leading a movement to return to Mongol tradition in the events surrounding the succession in 1284. See Aubin, Émirs Mongols et vizirs Persans, 38.


22. For the meaning of mūchalgā, see TMEN, 1:502–5 (no. 370).


26. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,129; Rashīd al-Dīn/Shu’ab, 141b.


29. Rashīd al-Dīn records a clash between Ahmad Tegüder and Būqā; see Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,140.

30. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,140.


32. Vaṣṣāf writes that since Arghun considered that he had become sultan thanks to Būqā’s efforts, he conferred on him all but the name of khan. See Vaṣṣāf/Tārikh, 230; Vaṣṣāf, Taḥrīr-i Tārikh-i Vaṣṣāf, ed. ‘Abd al-Muḥammad Āyatī (Tehran: Mu’assasa-yi Muṭāla’at va Taḥqīqāt-i Farhangī [Pizhūhishgāh], 1372 [1993]), 129.
33. For the period of Būqā’s power at the head of the administration, see Aubin, *Émirs Mongols et vizirs Persans*, 38–41.


35. Vaṣṣāf/Tārīkh, 229.


37. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,166.


42. Vaṣṣāf/Tārīkh, 233. Būqā’s son, Ābāchī, was raised by his fellow Jalayir tribesman Ṭughān, a son of Īlgā Noyan. Ṭughān wanted to free him, and brought him before Arghun to have him show allegiance (*hūljāmīshī*). Arghun was still angry about Būqā’s betrayal, however, and ordered Ṭughān to purge his family. Ābāchī and his brothers Malik, Tarkhān Tīmūr and Qutlugh Tīmūr were killed. See Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,171.


46. Togan, ‘References to Economic and Cultural Life in Anatolia in the Letters of Rashīd al-Dīn’, 90.

47. Togan, ‘References to Economic and Cultural Life in Anatolia in the Letters of Rashīd al-Dīn’, 100.

48. On the founding of Sultaniyya, see Dāvūd ibn Muḥammad Banākatī,
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50. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,060. Tūdā’ūn was the grandfather of Amīr Chūpān, eponym of the fourteenth-century Chubanid dynasty.

51. Ibn Bībī/Houtsma, 314; Ibn Bībī/Erzi, 666–7; Paul Wittek, ‘Niğde’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 8:15–16. The Khatirids had governed the district of Niğde under the Saljuqs. Following the death of the Saljūq sultan Rukn al-Dīn Qilij Arslān in 663/1265, which marked the rise in power of the parvāna, Mu’īn al-Dīn Sulaymān, Sharaf al-Dīn Mas’ūd b. Khaṭīr attempted to assert his own influence over the new sultan, the young Kay Khusraw III. His actions brought reprisals from the Mongols after the parvāna’s report of the situation.


56. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 289. Ibn Bibi reports that Baybars turned back to Egypt because he had not been joined by the parvāna or any of the other Saljūq amirs, his animals were dying due to lack of forage, and because he feared an attack from the Ilkhanids. See Ibn Bibi/Houtsma, 317–18.


59. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,181–3. For an account of Ėughān’s final days, see also Āqsarāyi, Musāmarat al-Akhbār, 167–70.

60. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,198.


63. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,192; Vaṣṣāf/Tārīkh, 260.


65. Vaṣṣāf/Tārīkh, 278.

66. According to Vaṣṣāf, Ėq Būqā was executed on Baydu’s order; see Vaṣṣāf/
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*Tārīkh*, 282. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Āq Būqā escaped this initial purge and continued to oppose Baydu, fighting alongside Ghazan. However, later that year he was captured and killed in battle near Hashtrūd; see Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,202.

68. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,261.
69. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,263.
70. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,267.
71. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,270.
74. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,270.
75. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,271.
76. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,277.
77. Rashīd al-Dīn/Jāmi’, 1,282.
78. Rudi Paul Lindner has pointed out the correlation between the suppression of Sulaymish’s revolt and the proliferation of mints striking silver coins in Anatolia in the year 699/1299, probably an effort by Ghazan Khan to win support from the Turkmans there who had joined with Sulaymish, by letting them benefit from the profits from the silver coinage. See Rudi Paul Lindner, ‘How Mongol Were the Early Ottomans?’, in Reuven Amitai-Preiss and David O. Morgan (eds), *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 287.