Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire
Schull, Kent F.

Published by Edinburgh University Press

Schull, Kent F.
Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire: Microcosms of Modernity.
Project MUSE. muse.jhu.edu/book/64101.

For additional information about this book
https://muse.jhu.edu/book/64101

For content related to this chapter
https://muse.jhu.edu/related_content?type=book&id=2279229
From July 1909 to August 1910 Ahmed Şerif, an Ottoman journalist, travelled throughout the Balkans, Anatolia, and some of the empire’s Arabic-speaking territories reporting on what he observed for the Tanin newspaper (the semi-official newspaper of the Ottoman Government). Of special interest to him was investigating the effectiveness of government administration in each area. As part of each of his journeys he visited each town’s government buildings, courts, police, gendarme, and prison. His reports are detailed and surprisingly candid concerning administrative problems, such as corruption, nepotism, and abuse by government officials. These reports provide rich insights into the state of the empire in the early years of the Second Constitutional Period.1

During his visit to the district of Karaağaç (Şarkıkaraağaç) located in Konya province from 9 to 13 September 1909, Şerif investigated its prison. As he walked into the government offices he came to the door of the prison dorm room, which was across a narrow garden. A foul odour emanated from the small metal grate in the door that acted as the prison’s only source of fresh air. Looking through the opening, Şerif saw a relatively large room holding about 25 prisoners who were either lying down or sitting and who were talking to one another. Their faces, however, were ‘pale, death shaded, and bloodless’.2

As he entered the prison, he was overcome with what he would later describe as the worst stench imaginable, forcing him to cover his mouth and nose. He also found the prison to be poorly lit, with only one small lamp and no natural source of light. Conditions as he saw and felt them were extremely damp, miserable, and wretched. At the back of the room stood a government toilet (hükümet abdesthanesi) that emptied its contents into an open sewer and emitted a horrific stench that filled the entire room. He could not see how anyone could survive being imprisoned in such horrible conditions.3

With his anger kindled, he marched straight to the prison director and demanded an explanation. He received only deflecting excuses, such as a
lack of funds and no authority to make changes. Şerif then proceeded to the court house to meet with the judge and other governing officials who made similar excuses in an attempt to blame their superiors at the provincial level. In the end, he left Karaağaç angered that the town’s administration was so inept and spineless. Throughout the rest of his visits in Konya he used the awful conditions of this district’s prison as the standard to measure the conditions of all the other prisons. While conditions in each of the other prisons were still poor, none was as bad as Karaağaç.

When punishment shifted from the plethora of options it had been in the early modern era to primarily incarceration in the nineteenth century, Ottoman authorities faced a series of challenges that Karaağaç prison starkly illustrates. As a ‘total institution’, the prison constitutes ‘a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life’. Incarceration requires intense and continuous supervision, housing, provisioning, and health and hygienic measures that raise other logistical and disciplinary problems. With the discontinuance of incarceration in the Imperial Shipyards where prisoners were continuously employed, authorities now had a large number of convicts incarcerated together in idleness. As discussed in Chapter 2, Ottoman authorities and prison reformers spent much of the nineteenth century dealing with the unprecedented scale of problems caused by this shift to incarceration.

The CUP inherited these concerns and problems when it seized power in 1908, and solving them was a matter of high priority. During the Second Constitutional Period it addressed prison conditions, order, and discipline on three interrelated fronts: 1. Constructing new prisons and transforming existing ones, 2. Improving health and hygienic conditions, and 3. Implementing programmes to facilitate the rehabilitation of inmates, such as secular and religious education, skills training, and labour. These efforts resulted in the production of incarcerated space by physically dividing and separating the prison population according to differences in crime, health, age, and gender. Although these efforts peaked in the Second Constitutional Period, their origins can be traced to the 1880 Prison Regulation (Hapishaneler ve Tevkifhaneler Nizamnamesi), which the CUP implemented at an unprecedented level.

This chapter argues that through these reforms and the implementation of the 1880 Prison Regulation, the Prison Administration and the CUP engaged in what Henri Lefebvre called the ‘production of space’ to create well-ordered prisons and to address the awful conditions illustrated above. The Ottoman administration spent a great deal of time, energy, and
resources improving prison conditions. These efforts exemplify Ottoman attempts to assume greater responsibility for the welfare of its population, particularly prisoners, improving public health and hygiene, provisioning, and regulating inmate interactions. Many of these responsibilities were traditionally reserved for individuals and the family. This chapter argues that this intervention represents the expansion of Ottoman state patriarchy and the Ottoman ‘nanny state’. Despite the best of state intentions, an investigation of reform implementation and the actual experiences of prisoners demonstrate the variegated and often haphazard nature of prison reform programmes, and the effects that these efforts actually had on their intended targets.

This chapter consists of three main, interrelated, sections. The first investigates the conditions and challenges facing inmates and administrators in the empire’s sprawling prison network through the in-depth investigation of Karesi central prison (Karesi merkez hapishanesi). The second section looks at specific attempts at creating the well-ordered prison through the production of space in terms of new building projects, prison architectural designs, health and hygiene regimens, and the concrete ways the Prison Administration organised inmates. Finally, this chapter looks at Ottoman efforts to rehabilitate convicted criminals. These three sections are linked by an emphasis on the theme of state patriarchy and an evaluation of reform and reality.

**Prison Conditions and Daily Life**

As discussed in the previous two chapters and as illustrated above, prison conditions, including order and discipline, during the nineteenth century were woefully inadequate. Horrible conditions, relaxed regimens, dilapidated buildings, corruption, escapes, and abuse typified prison experience. The 1880 Prison Regulation was never implemented systematically or comprehensively throughout the empire until the Second Constitutional Period. In the Hamidian era, administrators built numerous prisons, but few were up to modern health, hygiene, or architectural standards. Additionally, there was a general lack of regular funding for prisons, including for their management and upkeep, resulting in the dilapidation of many of these newly built structures. Periodic foreign and Ottoman inspections of the empire’s prisons, such as those conducted by Ambassador Canning, Abdülhamid II’s ‘Commission for Expediting Initiatives and Reforms’ (Tesri-i Muamelat ve Islahat Komisyonu), Ahmet Şerif, and the CUP Prison Administration confirm these assertions.

The central prison in the provincial sub-division of Karesi is an
excellent example of the problems faced by prison administrators from the 1870s through WWI. In Karesi’s 1871–2 provincial budget, central Ottoman authorities allocated 40,165 kuruş for the construction of a new central prison. According to building reports, it cost 24,000 kuruş to build. Three years after the Hamidian regime issued the 1880 Prison Regulation a report revealed that the prison contained three women incarcerated for serious crimes and requested that a women’s prison (kadınlar hapishanesi) be built to house them. Within months, the Council of State approved the request and allocated more than 11,000 kuruş to the construction of the prison. In 1897, an earthquake severely damaged the government buildings, including Karesi’s prisons. Its municipal council sent a request to the imperial government for funds to use to rebuild these structures and to expand the main prison to hold a maximum of 350 prisoners. It was approved, and 120,000 kuruş were allocated to the rebuilding of the area, including its prisons.

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, in 1911 the newly established Prison Administration undertook a survey that included Karesi central prison and initiated a series of measures to build new prisons and repair older structures. These plans came to a screeching halt when the CUP lost power in the summer of 1912. In 1914, after its hiatus from power ended, the CUP initiated and conducted another comprehensive prison survey. This questionnaire (sual varakası) was distributed to every prison in the empire. It contained a series of questions regarding the state and condition of each prison facility. It is unique, because it calls for local prison administrators to write extensive comments and suggestions about the specific needs of their respective prisons. To make their cases, some prison directors included photographs of their facilities demonstrating dilapidated edifices, massive overcrowding, and horrific living conditions. Other administrators included proposed architectural designs of prisons that they wanted to be built in their districts.

In the case of Karesi’s central prison, the warden reported in the 1914 survey that there were 794 prisoners incarcerated there, including twenty-two females. The prison built in 1897 was designed to hold 350 prisoners. Needless to say, prison conditions, according to the report, were severely crowded. In fact, they were so ‘narrow, dark, crowded, and unhealthy’ that the warden deemed the prison to be beyond repair and proposed that a new one be built in its place. To illustrate just how dire prison conditions were, the warden included the following four photographs of the prison (Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4). These photographs graphically illustrate the terrible shape of many of the empire’s prisons. They also demonstrate just how much work the Prison Administration had to do if it was com-
The Spatialisation of Incarceration

mitted to comprehensive prison reform. Photographs from this provincial prison show that conditions were severely overcrowded. Prisoners were housed in tiny chicken-coop-esque hovels (kümes), make-shift tents described as ‘gypsy dwellings’ (çerge baraka), and huts that resembled dilapidated stalls in a local market. Each unit contained as many as two or even three prisoners. The roofing and walls of the prisoners’ quarters were made of simple wood or canvas and were held down by rocks, bricks, and clay shingles. The structures depicted in these photographs were, in fact, additions built onto the prison in order to accommodate almost two and half times the prison’s intended capacity.¹⁸

Generally speaking, prisons throughout the empire were located next to or within fortress compounds and other government buildings with very few being properly enclosed. These prison conditions made escape a common occurrence. According to archival records, throughout the Second Constitutional Period there were constant problems with overcrowding and prisoner escapes. In fact, in several reports sent to the Prison Administration, overcrowding, poor conditions, and lack of supervision and discipline were listed as the main reasons for prison breakouts.¹⁹ Judging from Figures 4.2 and 4.4, escape from Karesi’s central prison would have been quite easy. The walls were either non-existent or they were very low and weak, being made from materials that meant they were not structurally sound. Furthermore, the town, just outside of the prison, was easily accessed by simply climbing over the roof. As escapes were so common, the Prison Administration attempted to address this issue in April 1912 by issuing a general directive regarding prison order, discipline, and the prevention of prisoner escapes. The directive emphasised that the prevention of prisoner escapes and general prison order was the responsibility of the prison cadre and that most escapes were the result of negligence on the part of prison employees or even direct assistance from prison employees.²⁰

Another way that the Prison Administration attempted to remedy the chronic problem of prison escapes was by alleviating overcrowding. With the approval of the Ministry of Justice, the Prison Administration periodically extended amnesty to prisoners who had served two-thirds of their sentence, who had been convicted of less serious offences (cünha ve kabahat), and who were well-behaved.²¹ Authorities also transferred many inmates to less crowded facilities in adjacent sub-districts and provinces.²²

Internal order, security, and discipline were also severely lacking. As evidenced by the Karesi prison photographs, inmates were not subject to work details, nor were they gainfully employed. In fact, during WWI, the Directorate of Prisons solicited the number of employed prisoners. Out of a total of 478 prisoners incarcerated in Karesi’s central prison and jail only
Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire

twenty inmates worked in some capacity inside the prison. Most prisoners throughout the empire, including Karesi, sat idle all day, drinking tea, smoking, playing backgammon, and gambling. Gambling was such a problem that many fights, injuries, deaths, and prisoner–guard collusions were blamed on it. In 1922, a gambling-related fight that broke out in the Istanbul penitentiary resulted in one death and seven injuries before the gendarme could suppress it.

Prisoner fights and riots also resulted from a general lack of internal order, supervision, and discipline. For example, in 1913 a fight among prisoners broke out in the Siirt administrative sub-division (sancak) in Bitlis province that resulted in the injury of several prisoners. The fight was attributed to the smuggling of weapons (kesici aletleri) into the prison, which had exacerbated tensions among inmates. No doubt, much smuggling occurred in Ottoman prisons with the consent of prison guards. Prison fights similar to Siirt’s were common place in Ottoman prisons. Archival records attest to numerous uprisings, disturbances, and

Figure 4.1 ‘An example of the makeshift structures, tents, and shacks [located] at the walls of the central prison in Karesi Sancak’ (Karesi sancağı merkez liva hapishanesi hıvalisindeki çerge baraka ve külliyelerden birer nümune).

Source BOA, DHMBHPOM 10/14, doc. 12
other disorderly conduct throughout the prison system and discuss the Prison Administration’s continuous efforts to prevent such occurrences.\textsuperscript{28}

Ottoman prisons and jails suffered from a general lack of supervision. In 1915, Karesi central prison employed only six male prison guards (gardıyanlar), who received a monthly salary of 200 \textit{kuruş} each. It also employed one female prison guard (nisa gardıyan) at a monthly salary of 150 \textit{kuruş}.\textsuperscript{29} Considering that the previous year’s prison population consisted of 772 males, it would be impossible for six guards to provide adequate inmate supervision. Judging from the photographs, it also appears that there was no separation of prisoners according to crimes committed or whether they were accused or convicted. This is not surprising since the prison was severely overcrowded.

Similar to the prisons inspected by Ahmed Şerif, inmates at Karesi’s central prison also suffered from poor health conditions. Overcrowding exponentially facilitates the spread of communicable diseases, such as typhus, typhoid fever, and cholera. Add to these threats the open sewage

\textbf{Figure 4.2} ‘Huts located on the eastern side of an interior section of the Karesi Sancak’s central prison’ (Karesi sancağı merkez liva hapishanesinin şark cephesinde bir kısm-ı dahili barakaları).

\textbf{Source} BOA, DHMBHPSM 10/14, doc. 13
running through the prison huts, as illustrated in Figure 4.2, and it becomes obvious how easily cholera epidemics could ravage a prison.

Judging by the cooking grates and the utensils strewn about the huts and the prison compound, prisoners cooked their own food, which was usually supplied by family members or local charitable organisations. Despite directives contained in the 1880 Prison Regulation, local prisons rarely provided food to inmates apart from a few small loaves of bread on a daily basis. They did, however, often hire outside contractors, such as bakers and grocers, to provide food for the prisoners. As prisoners often cooked for themselves and stoves were the main heating source in dormitory-style prisons, fires regularly broke out, causing death and extensive property damage. For example, in March 1918 a fire broke out in the Beyoğlu women’s jail that caused far-reaching damage. Prison officials conducted an investigation and allocated funds for the repairs. During this period, the female inmates were housed at other local prison facilities, such as the Istanbul women’s penitentiary and the women’s jail in Üsküdar.
The shocking photographs and report detailing the awful conditions and overcrowding at Karesi central prison led to an official visit by Talat Pasha (Interior Minister) in 1914. Talat Pasha declared the prison to be ‘crowded, terrible, filthy, and unacceptable’ and said that it would be replaced. In 1915, a new prison of approximately 14,000 m² was built on an almost two-acre (6.8 dönüm) wooded plot of land just outside the city fortress at the cost of about 24,000 kurus. This new prison was two stories tall, had seven separate wards intended to house 300 prisoners, and had indoor toilets. After the new prison had been built, conditions improved, but overcrowding persisted. In 1917, prison reports indicate that it held 417 prisoners (all of them male) and continued to employ a total of seven prison guards. It still suffered from overcrowding, but not to the extent that it had done two years earlier. The local municipality was also supplying the prisoners with proper provisions. These improvements reduced the risk of fire, greatly ameliorated the spread of communicable diseases, and
improved prisoner health and living conditions, despite continued overcrowding. Through the implementation of the 1880 Prison Regulation, the state assumed greater levels of responsibility for and power over its prisoners, although there were limits to its success.

This brief history of Karesi central prison provides a sense of the experiences and challenges facing both administrators and inmates. While the examples of prison conditions at Karesi and Karaağaç were extreme, poor conditions and difficult circumstances were the norm throughout the empire. For example, in 1905 officials at Istanbul’s penitentiary proposed building sheds outside the prison in order to ease overcrowding and halt the spread of a disease epidemic by isolating sick prisoners.35

The vast majority of prisons suffered from bad sanitary conditions caused by poor ventilation and lighting, an inadequate potable water supply, and a lack of running water. Most prisons had no washing facilities and toilets consisted of a hole dug in the earth for communal use. Regimens stipulating regular cleanings of prison facilities and hygienic measures for inmates were rarely implemented. As a result, outbreaks of cholera, typhoid fever, typhus, scabies, and other communicable diseases were rampant in the squalid and fetid conditions under which prisoners languished. These conditions resulted in numerous deaths each year.36

Issues related to poor health and hygiene, as illustrated in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, constituted a major source of concern and focus for the Prison Administration.37 In fact, when announcing its first comprehensive reform programme in April 1912, it justified renovating existing prisons and constructing new ones by claiming that these reforms would bring health and hygiene conditions into conformity with the ‘laws of civilisation’.38 The existence of unsanitary conditions was also the most common justification given by local prison administrators for the construction of new prisons.39

Creating the Well-ordered Prison

As discussed in Chapter 2 and above, the Ottoman Ministry of Justice issued the first comprehensive prison regulation for the empire in 1880. This regulation meticulously detailed the responsibilities of all prison officials and employees. It also stipulated clear health and hygiene standards, prison labour, regimens, prison organisation, and the spatial separation of different types of prisoners.40 This was a thoroughly modern and progressive prison regulation according to nineteenth-century standards. It attempted to implement modern concepts of time and space in order to facilitate prison health, discipline, and organisation for the maintenance of order and the rehabilitation of the incarcerated. When implemented,
The Spatialisation of Incarceration

this regulation engaged in the ‘production of space’. In the minds of prison administrators, a key to prison order and inmate rehabilitation was the ‘spatialisation of incarceration’. This entailed dividing and organising the physical, mental, and social structure of the prison into specific areas and categories that facilitated proper health, order, discipline, and rehabilitation.41

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Prison Administration drew up new architectural designs; constructed new prisons and repaired existing ones; prepared and promulgated new regulations; and implemented new prison regimens in order to centralise power and instil discipline, order, cleanliness, and industriousness within the prison for both prisoners and employees. As early as 1910, the CUP began its attempts to remedy the awful conditions found in Ottoman prisons by establishing a commission for the purpose of producing a general plan for prison reform and the construction of new prisons.42 This commission formulated a comprehensive prison construction programme that was initiated in late 1911.43

During the Second Constitutional Period, the Prison Administration viewed the design and construction of modern prisons as the remedy for poor sanitary conditions. These new prison designs incorporated the latest developments in order to facilitate standards of health, hygiene, discipline, and surveillance, and in order to promote prisoner rehabilitation through labour. Through the production of special modern spatial relationships these new prisons were supposed to remedy the problems of disorder and death that typified ancien régime (Hamidian era) prisons.

In order to create the environment that would bring the health and hygiene of Ottoman prisons in conformity with the ‘laws of civilisation’, each new prison was to include washrooms (çamaşırhaneler), toilets (apteşhaneler), running water, electricity, proper ventilation, dormitory-style wards where prisoners of similar criminal convictions would be housed together, courtyards for exercise, and kitchens (mutfaklar). Each prison would also include a separate hospital or infirmary depending on prison capacity in order to isolate the sick from the healthy. Prison budgets and reports delineated the costs of medicines and treatments and reported them to the Prison Administration. Prison authorities also introduced new regimens regarding cleanliness, such as scheduled prison cleanings, whitewashing walls with lye, regularly changing and washing prisoners’ clothing and bedding, frequent bathing, and the washing of hands before eating. Finally, each prison was required to employ a doctor. If the prison was small (on the district level), several prisons in the same area collectively employed a physician.44 These seemingly obvious practices were initially mandated by the 1880 Prison Regulation, but their
Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire

full implementation was not attempted until CUP rule. For example, in late 1913, Istanbul’s penitentiary experienced an outbreak of cholera and scabies. Health measures to combat these communicable diseases and to prevent future outbreaks included the distribution of clean, new clothing to poor prisoners; introducing the practice of quarantining new inmates prior to their introduction into the general prison population; having the prison physician examine prisoners prior to their release to prevent them leaving with a communicable disease; making sure that prison bathrooms were in good repair; and ensuring that the prison hospital had access to fresh running water.45

Regarding the affect that these new spatial relationships had on prison order and discipline, prison administrators segregated inmates according to severity of crime (serious and less serious offenders), convicted and accused, age (children and adults), health (sick and well), and gender. In some cases, authorities allocated separate space for each of these divisions within the same prison, but often different prisons were constructed to meet these needs. For example, if there were enough female prisoners then a separate women’s prison (kadin or nisa hapishanesi) was built alongside a men’s prison, as was done in Karesi.

Less serious offenders with a sentence of less than three months’ incarceration were usually kept on the district (kaza) level. Those prisoners with sentences of up to three years (either cünha or cinayet) were incarcerated at a sub-division level (liva or sancak) prison. Only serious offenders with sentences of three years or more were incarcerated in central prisons (merkez hapihaneler) on the sub-divisional and provincial levels. Prisoners convicted of serious crimes and sentenced to hard labour (kürek) of five years or more were incarcerated in penitenciaries (hapishaneler-i umumi) in specially designated cities around the empire, such as Istanbul, Edirne, İzmir, and Sinop.46 Ottoman prison reformers eventually separated children from adult prisoners by releasing them to their parents or guardians or by sending them to reformatories (ıslahaneler). Prisoners aged from fifteen to nineteen were still incarcerated in regular prisons. They now, however, received reduced sentences in comparison with adults and were separated from them in specially designated areas within the prison.47

New and refurbished prisons also included special quarters for prison employees, such as offices, guard rooms, and observation towers, as well as sleeping quarters. The style and capacity of prisons varied according to location, type of prisoner, and security needs. Prison capacities ranged from sixty to 1,000 prisoners.48

While many of these regulations were effectively implemented, as demonstrated by the number of new prisons built for male and female
prisoners, these reforms did not go uncontested.\textsuperscript{49} Prison administrators attempted to hire more guards, but war-time needs for additional troops often took precedence over staffing prisons.\textsuperscript{50} Prisoners also complained about the new spatial divisions and organisation. For example, during an investigation into allegations of prisoner abuse and administrative corruption at the Sinop penitentiary in late 1912, one prisoner (Ismail, Fatsa’lı Hasan Ağa) took the opportunity during his questioning to express his displeasure with the prison’s new system of organisation. He claimed that the prison was divided into three wards and that the prisoners were no longer allowed to walk around interacting freely with one another. In his opinion this caused prisoner distress and low morale, especially for those incarcerated in a prison fortress, such as Sinop. In response to the prisoner’s assertions, the inspector (Sami Bey) argued that the Prison Administration promoted these divisions in order to prevent violence and prison escapes. Ismail rejected these rationales, claiming that no such problems would occur if greater prisoner conviviality were allowed.\textsuperscript{51} This exchange confirms several important points. New spatial relationships and prisoner organisation were being implemented; prisoners were directly affected by these changes; and, finally, prisoners voiced their displeasure through official channels, expecting to be heard by the Prison Administration.

Gender also played an important role in the production of space in Ottoman prisons. In fact, prison authorities spent a considerable amount of time and energy creating female gendered space if one considers it in relation to the overall numbers of women prisoners. In 1917, women represented less than 6 per cent of the total prison population, at a figure of 1,249 out of 21,666 prisoners.\textsuperscript{52} This percentage was up more than 2 per cent since 1915, when women made up about 3.4 per cent of the prison population (976 out of 28,773 inmates).\textsuperscript{53} In 1917, the provinces of Ankara (139), Aydın (183), and Kastamonu (218) had the most female prisoners. Karesi also had a high number of incarcerated women (55). The vast majority of these female inmates (at least 80 per cent) were Muslim, single, and unemployed, and most were incarcerated for less than a year. The most common crimes committed by women were assault and petty theft. Women incarcerated for lesser offences (\textit{kabahat ve cünhə}) were held in district prisons. When there were only a few female prisoners in a particular region a room was rented for them in a government building (\textit{konak}) or they were entrusted to local religious leaders (Christian, Jewish, or Muslim).\textsuperscript{54} A significant percentage of female prisoners (nearly 20 per cent) were incarcerated for serious offences, such as murder, banditry, violent theft, and brutal assault. These inmates would be incarcerated
in central prisons, such as Karesi, or in penitentiaries, depending on the length of their sentence.\textsuperscript{55}

The 1880 Prison Regulation gave very clear instructions regarding the creation of gendered space within Ottoman prisons. This should be of no great surprise since gendered space is an important aspect of most prisons in the modern period. Gendered space also has deep roots in Middle Eastern and Islamic societies. These regulations stipulate that female prisoners be supervised by female guards and special provisions be made for incarcerated women who were pregnant or nursing.\textsuperscript{56} All three of these issues (gendered space, gendered supervision, and gendered provisioning) were not adequately addressed during the Hamidian era, but they became pressing issues during the Second Constitutional Period as the CUP assumed greater control and authority over crime and punishment. One case in particular exemplifies the anxiety felt by the Prison Administration regarding female inmates and its desire to assume greater responsibility for them.

In 1913, an incident involving a male prison guard by the name of Mahmud Çavuş and two female prisoners at the women’s prison in Karesi came to light. Prison officials investigated Mahmud Çavuş for running a prostitution ring from the prison. Apparently, he smuggled female inmates out of the women’s prison and forced them into prostitution for his financial gain. As a result of the investigation, Mahmud Çavuş was fired from his job, fined 225 kuruş, and imprisoned for three months. The condition of the female inmates forced into prostitution was never mentioned in the report.\textsuperscript{57}

Similar violations led officials within the Prison Administration to place the treatment of female prisoners under closer scrutiny and push for important reforms regarding the incarceration, supervision, provisioning, and rehabilitation of female prisoners across the empire. As a result of this closer scrutiny, specific questions arose regarding the incarceration of convicted female sex-workers and women incarcerated with small children. There was a desperate need for the creation of better and safer conditions for female prisoners. The Mahmud Çavuş incident only drew greater attention to the pressing issue of female inmate conditions and the necessity of hiring more female guards (nisa gardiyanlari).

In early 1912, the Prison Administration issued a directive to implement fully the 1880 Prison Regulation regarding strict gendered space within all of the empire’s prisons. In essence, the 1912 directive states that in areas where there are no women’s prisons, budgetary allotments should be made to rent space for female prisoners and hire female guards for their supervision. In new prisons under construction, a secure, specially
designated area for female inmates was to be separated completely from the male section. In districts where prisons already existed, separate secure wards were to be created for women prisoners. If it was not possible to secure a separate place for female inmates within the main prison, then they should be removed to a neighbouring district with proper facilities.\textsuperscript{58}

This regulation led many prisons around the empire to make alterations to their facilities in order to provide separate quarters for female prisoners. Where there were only a few females or where the conditions were so crowded that a separate female area was not feasible, rooms in government buildings (\textit{konaklar}) or police barracks were rented for female prisoners. For example, in 1914, officials in Turgutlu, a district in Aydın province, established a ‘women’s prison’ to house Ayşe Kadin by renting space in a local government building for 60 \textit{kuruş} a month.\textsuperscript{59} Another example is the sub-division of Kütahya, wherein a local government building, a police barracks, and even a house were all rented in order to accommodate female prisoners.\textsuperscript{60}

Officials also made special provisions for the gendered treatment of sick female inmates. A 1916 case involving overcrowding and health concerns in the women’s wing of Istanbul’s penitentiary called for the allocation of space and funding to create a special women’s hospital for ill female inmates. Officials requested four separate wards (\textit{koğuşlar}) to accommodate up to forty ill female prisoners. The directive sent by the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the Interior stipulated that if this space was not available in the prison itself, then the ill female prisoners should be sent to another prison hospital or to a civilian hospital or rooms should be rented in order to accommodate the gendered space necessary to care for them.\textsuperscript{61} At this time Istanbul’s penitentiary contained a total of thirty-three female inmates.\textsuperscript{62} Perhaps this new facility was supposed to house ill female prisoners from the seven other prisons and jails located in Istanbul province. The total female prison population in these facilities, however, was only forty-eight at the time.\textsuperscript{63}

Safeguarding female honour by separating the general female prison population from female sex-workers is another example of prison officials creating female gendered space and Ottoman state patriarchy. Separating certain types of prisoners from others, however, is not new to Ottoman prison regulations. As mentioned above, there was a requirement to separate convicted and accused persons as well as to separate serious and petty offenders. There was, however, an extensive discussion concerning separating female sex-workers (a lesser offence) from other female inmates.\textsuperscript{64} Safeguarding the honour of women was an important responsibility assumed by the state at this time and was a common theme in public
discourse.\(^6^5\) There was absolutely no discussion, however, of separating male sex-worker from other male inmates. This is an unusual situation. There are no other examples of prisoners convicted of lesser crimes being separated from the general prison population unless they were sick or being punished for bad behaviour. Here is an ironic situation of the state attempting to safeguard the ‘morality’ of women and by extension ‘the family’ by shielding petty criminals from one another.

As stated in the 1880 Prison Regulation and in numerous directives issued by the Prison Administration, female prisoners were not supposed to be directly supervised by male guards. It was a lack of female guards that led to the Mahmud Çavuş incident. The CUP made it a special priority to hire more female prison guards. It viewed the prison cadre as linchpins of prison reform and prisoner rehabilitation, and the key to ending corruption, guard–prisoner collusion, as well as prisoner exploitation and abuse. This assumption applied equally to female and male prison cadre. Unfortunately, when the CUP came to power, the training and morality of prison guards was poor and the number was too few.

The need for more female prison cadre was especially critical. According to the 1880 Prison Regulation, female guards answered only to the chief prison officer (ser gardiyan) and the warden (müdür). No male prison personnel was supposed to enter the female wing of the prison, except if there was an extreme event (such as a fire or an uprising), and then only the chief prison officer could enter with a sufficient number of guards to handle the situation. The chief officer was then required to submit a report to the warden detailing the incident. Not even the warden himself was supposed to be anywhere near female inmates without a female guard present.\(^6^6\) The ideal female or male prison guard would be educated, of good moral character, and familiar with penal law and regulations. Despite the great importance placed on hiring female prison guards, they were paid, at most, two-thirds of the wage of their male counterparts (50–100 kuruş monthly).\(^6^7\) Female guards, however, were given considerable autonomy to perform their duties. They were essential to maintaining the gendered space and supervision needed to run a well-ordered prison.\(^6^8\)

All prisoners were supposed to be rehabilitated in order to become contributing members of society, but special provisions were made in this regard for women and children that were not made for adult males. These included reduced prison sentences, easier pardons, and clergy supervision. Of chief concern were inmates who were pregnant, nursing, and/or incarcerated with young children. By 1914, the Directorate of Prisons made concerted efforts to care for women who fell into these categories. It directed prisons to allocate additional food to pregnant women, nursing
mothers, and women incarcerated with children under the age of six. According to local custom and Islamic law, children should remain with their mothers until at least age six. Interestingly, these documents reveal the Directorate of Prisons’ concern that children incarcerated with their mothers would be adversely influenced by other female convicts. Authorities feared that children aged six and older would become maladjusted and more prone to a life of crime through their extended exposure to prison life. In response to these fears, one proposed solution called for placing the mother and child in a special area in the Istanbul Darülçeze (poor house or orphanage) where they would be isolated from the institution’s general population. If the woman, however, had family or friends (kimsesiz değil) then they would be assigned guardianship of the child.

Both the Prison Administration and the Directorate of Prisons made the improvement of prison conditions for women a special priority during the Second Constitutional Period. Even though women made up less than 6 per cent of the total prison population, administrators made provisions to provide separate space and special supervision and provisioning for female inmates. Therefore, Ottoman prisons became sites for gendered space, gendered supervision, and gendered provisioning wherein the state assumed greater responsibility for its female prisoners.

Prisoner Rehabilitation through Education and Labour

One of the main purposes of incarceration for Ottoman reformers, at least in the ideal, was the prisoner’s rehabilitation and reintroduction to society as a productive citizen. Prison administrators and reformers viewed inmate rehabilitation as a multifaceted project that had to be implemented on a variety of fronts. These fronts included moral rehabilitation, education through instruction and productive labour, and, finally, proper discipline and supervision by competent, properly trained, and morally upright prison cadre. Similar to most prison reforms throughout world in the nineteenth century, Ottoman reformers met with relatively little success in implementing their vision of rehabilitation. Their efforts, successes, and failures do provide valuable insights into broader social and political issues.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Ottoman officials participated in international prison conferences and adapted many assumptions regarding incarceration, its purpose, and methods to the empire. One central concept was prisoner rehabilitation, which was not new to Islamic societies. The
idea of reforming the wayward soul runs deep within Islamic law and practice. Punishment is seen as a key ingredient in reforming the sinner or criminal. In addition to punishment, Ottoman authorities maintained that moral instruction could also rehabilitate a convict’s soul.

Articles 50–2 of the 1880 Prison Regulation mandate that prisoners be allowed access to their respective religious leadership and have the freedom to practise their religions. Religious authorities (Muslim, Jewish, and Christian) should visit prisoners in their wards on a daily and/or weekly basis in order to attend to the inmates’ spiritual needs. Also in the event of a death, religious authorities should be notified immediately in order to perform proper rites and rituals. Article 9 of the 1880 Prison Regulation states that in addition to other staff, such as wardens, chief scribes, chief guards, and guards, prisons should also employ an imam and, if needed, clergymen of other denominations. Additionally, Article 91 stipulates that ‘all prisoners are required to carry out their respective religious obligations and rituals’. Likewise, Article 93 requires that all young prisoners who are on the verge of puberty (mürahik) and others designated by the prison warden must be given compulsory religious instruction by their respective clergy. Despite these regulations, it is not clear how well the Prison Administration fulfilled all of these requirements. Only two prisons actually employed clergy to teach, preach, and/or minister to their inmates. According to the 1916 Ottoman prison employment records only the Istanbul penitentiary and the Kastamonu central prison had clergy on their payrolls. The Istanbul penitentiary employed an imam, ecumenical patriarchate priest (rum papası), an Armenian priest (ermeni papası), and a Jewish Rabbi (haham). The imam received a monthly salary of 330 kuruş while the two Christian clergymen and the Rabbi were paid only 230 kuruş each. The Kastamonu prison employed an imam and preacher (vaiz) for its Muslim inmates at a monthly salary of 50 kuruş. It appears that if other prisons kept the regulations stipulated in Articles 9 and 50–2 then the vast majority must have drawn upon the voluntary services of local religious authorities. Of course Article 9 also made the provision that prisons could fill any position ‘according to need’ (icabına göre), which, by extension, means that hiring was predicated on the number of prisoners in a particular facility. Most central and provincial prisons had hundreds of inmates that would have justified the employment of clergymen, as stipulated in Article 9, but it appears that the local municipal councils did not see fit to expend the necessary funds.

In spite of the poor numbers of professional clergy in prisons, other provisions were made to ensure that prisoners were able to worship. Some prisons provided special areas of worship for inmates. For example,
according to Charles Riggs, the Istanbul penitentiary contained a small mosque and chapel where prisoners could worship on a voluntary basis. Apart from these scant pieces of evidence, there is very little data on prisoner rehabilitation through moral uplift and instruction. It can reasonably be concluded, therefore, that rehabilitation through spiritual edification was not the primary method for the Prison Administration and for its successor, the Directorate of Prisons.

Modern education was another possible method for prison rehabilitation. Apart from Article 92, which stipulates that every prison should have a select number of books available to prisoners, the 1880 Prison Regulation is surprisingly silent on this issue. Apparently, the Prison Administration did not have an empire-wide inmate education programme. Prison administrators during the Second Constitutional Period, however, showed interest in inmate literacy. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 1912 prison survey collected statistics on this issue. According to the survey, literacy among prisoners was roughly 18 per cent.

Archival documents indicate that individual prisons did employ instructors to provide a basic education to inmates. This was not, however, an empire-wide programme, and it seems to have been primarily confined to penitentiaries with inmates incarcerated for long periods of time (more than five years). For example, according to 1915 prison employment statistics, the Istanbul penitentiary employed two teachers (mualim) at a generous monthly salary of 600 kuruş each. In 1913, the Sinop penitentiary employed İzmid’li Hasan Efendi as a teacher. Being a prisoner himself, he received a salary of 50 kuruş a month and a private room near the entrance to the prison hospital. His duties included holding regular class hours each day and teaching prisoners to read and write. İzmid’li Hasan Efendi was relieved of his duties for alleged ‘bad behaviour’, which included not performing his teaching duties, gambling, and inciting other prisoners to rebellion. He allegedly showed up to teach each day for only fifteen to twenty minutes and then he would wander off to gamble in the various wards of the prison. The warden, Cemal Bey, reported his behaviour to Sinop’s municipal school board and informed the board that he had replaced İzmid’li Hasan Efendi with another prisoner – İstanbul’lu Kemal Efendi. This new teacher was a former cavalry officer currently serving fifteen years’ hard labour for homicide (katil-i nefs). Local municipalities controlled the hiring of prison teachers and not the Prison Administration, which may explain why every prison in the empire did not employ a teacher. Apart from hiring a couple of professional teachers, allowing literate prisoners to educate their fellow inmates, and collecting statistics on prisoner literacy, it does not appear that the Prison Administration or the
Directorate of Prisons exerted much effort to rehabilitate inmates through education. Ottoman prison policy, instead, appears to have focused its prisoner rehabilitation efforts on productive labour.

In addition to facilitating prison supervision by keeping inmates occupied with attention-directing labour, productive labour had other important functions for Ottoman prison reformers. First, according to the assumptions of prison reformers of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth, productive labour was an essential element to effective rehabilitation. This labour would keep them constructively occupied, thus preventing slothful behaviour through the pursuit of lascivious activities and idleness. As discussed above, idleness was a serious problem for prison administrators, because it often led to escapes, fights, and uprisings. Labour could also provide prisoners with useful occupational skills that would help them to become contributing members to society upon their release. In this way, prisoners were rehabilitated and shaped into productive members of society, thus making it possible for them to avoid recidivism. Ottoman prison reformers discussed the benefits of prison labour in their report of the 1890 International Prison Conference proceedings in St Petersburg, Russia.

Ottoman officials, however, did not appropriate these ideas from the West. The 1880 Prison Regulation already reflected these assumptions. Moreover, incarceration with hard labour (kürek cezası) in galleys of the Imperial Shipyards had already been practised in the empire since at least the eighteenth century. The concept of hard labour changed over the course of the nineteenth century from that of the galleys to labour in prison workshops and factories, but it still maintained its original name (kürek), which means ‘oar, paddle’. Articles 69–72 of the 1880 Prison Regulation stipulated that no prisoner was to ‘remain unemployed’ while incarcerated; that prisoners must work throughout their entire prison sentence; and that they should be paid for their labour. Part of that money should be used to offset the costs of their upkeep, another part should go to the state treasury, and the remainder should be held in reserve for the prisoner’s personal use. Prison wardens were responsible for organising productive labour for the inmates. They were also personally responsible for deciding which prisoners would work on what projects and for supplying the necessary tools. They were also required to inspect the quality of the final products and oversee their sale. The Ministry of the Interior reaffirmed these provisions by issuing a special regulation (talimatname) in 1911 that called for the full implementation of the principle of prison labour and that described its benefits for reforming prisoners. According to this special regulation,
all prisons throughout the empire were to implement the principles of the 1880 Prison Regulation regarding work. Prison wardens were responsible for arranging the details in conjunction with local administrators, farmers, and businesses in order to get prisoners working.89

As a result of these regulations, many prisons established workshops that produced, on a small scale, socks, fabrics, shoes, carpets, tools, cabinets, and other carpentry items. Other prisons, especially in rural provincial areas, engaged in agricultural production where inmates would pick fava beans, chickpeas, tobacco, and other produce. Both male and female prisoners were supposed to engage in productive work, but in separate areas. Females were authorised to work in their prison dormitories on needlework, sewing, knitting socks, making and repairing clothing, bedding, towels, and carpets.90

In addition to the proliferation of prison workshops around the empire, the CUP developed a plan to create large-scale prison factories (imalathaneler, sanayihaneler, or fabrikalar) in 1911. It envisioned these factories as centres of industrial production in the empire’s major cities. These factories would require industrial education and training for prisoners to learn how to operate the modern machinery necessary for textile mass production and other light industrial activities. In fact, a curriculum was proposed for prison factory workers that included instruction in reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, history, and Ottoman Turkish.91

As these types of factories required a great deal of investment and prisoner training, officials decided to locate them in penitentiaries where prisoners served sentences of at least five years.92 There is an inherent logic to this type of restriction. Once trained, these prisoners would be able to do these jobs for an extended period of time. In the eyes of the CUP, prison factories had many possible benefits. Prison labour is inexpensive, readily available, reliable, and relatively stable. Additionally, factory space, housing, health care, worker discipline, and supervision are readily available and paid for by the state. In other words, by utilising prison labour an entrepreneur’s costs are minimised, thus making it possible to gain an advantage on the open market.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, prison factories were established to help pay for prison reforms in 1911. Prison reformers, however, also justified their development as a means of ‘stimulating’ the economies of major urban centres, such as Istanbul, Ankara, Beirut, Damascus, İzmir, and Edirne.93 Half of the net profits gained in the sale of these manufactured goods were to go to the Ottoman Treasury.94 These funds would then be used for industrialisation and economic programmes in the cities where the factories were located, thus assisting the CUP in its imperial economic
Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire

development programme. In fact, prison factories had the dual purpose of rehabilitating both the prisoner and the economy, thus making prisons doubly effective as ‘microcosms of modernity’. In other words, prison factories were viewed as an important aspect of imperial economic regeneration through industrialisation. They facilitated the development of the Ottoman industrial complex and a local Muslim entrepreneurial middle class that could compete with inexpensive, mass-produced foreign goods. Construction of these prison factories was one of the first steps of the CUP to implement its plan to create an Ottoman ‘national economy’ (milli iktisat).

This plan of creating a ‘national economy’ was not put into full effect until after the assassination of Mahmut Şevket Pasha and the CUP’s assumption of full control over the Ottoman administration. Therefore, the construction of Ottoman prison factories and their use to stimulate local economies pre-dates the implementation of the CUP’s plan to build a ‘national economy’.

The factory established in Edirne’s penitentiary is an excellent example of a successful textile factory built and funded by the state. Edirne’s prison textile factory actually became the model prison factory upon which others were fashioned and built throughout the empire. Not all prison factories, however, had to produce textiles. Each was given leeway to adapt its production to local strengths, such as iron works, carpentry, or other appropriate products.

It is not clear exactly how many prison workshops and factories existed in the empire by 1917, but there must have been at least twenty-five in operation. As late as November 1917, Dr Paul Pollitz, the Inspector General of Ottoman Prisons, was still requesting and receiving funds for the construction of more prison factories and the development of prison lands for agricultural production. These prison factories and farms were also incorporated into the Ottoman war effort, because they produced desperately needed items for the military and the civilian population during WWI. Prison factories and farms were seen as essential elements in the creation of modern penitentiaries and prisons that benefited prisoners and the empire as a whole.

Despite state officials’ idealisation of prisoner rehabilitation through productive labour and the proliferation of prison workshops and factories around the empire, inmates engaged in productive labour still represented a very small percentage of the prison population. Numerous documents, inspections, and eyewitnessest attest to this fact. The 1916–17 prison survey indicates that less than 8.5 per cent of the prison population (1,812
The Spatialisation of Incarceration

prisoners out of a total population of 21,666) was gainfully employed in working for the ‘common good’, working at special jobs (hasus işle meşgul), or working within the prison’s workshop or factory. Despite the many regulations, programmes, and expenditures, the vast majority of inmates were still not gainfully employed. Instead, most prisoners were spending their sentences in idleness. Without a doubt, the small percentage of inmates working within the prison did benefit from their experiences, but most prisoners were not rehabilitated through productive labour.

**Conclusion**

As this chapter demonstrates, Ottoman prison reformers heavily engaged in what Lefebvre termed ‘the production of space’. Officials did this through the conscious construction of an ordered, uniform physical space – the prison, jail, and penitentiary – in order to incarcerate criminals. This represents a direct response to the challenges the empire faced as it transitioned from a multifaceted system of punishments to one that primarily employed imprisonment. As a ‘semiotic abstract’, the Ottoman prison became a space wherein the ideals of imperial reformers, governmental aspirations, state administrators, local officials, prison cadre, charitable organisations, families, and inmates all converged, interacted, contested, and/or conformed on various levels. This convergence affected the efficacy of intention, reform, and reality in Ottoman prisons. Creating the well-ordered prison through the spatialisation of incarceration altered the everyday life of prisoners and prison officials in terms of interaction, organisation, living conditions, and self-perceptions, thus affecting the reality of imprisonment.

Ottoman efforts to create the well-ordered prison met with a great deal of success and failure. The greatest challenges included terrible prison conditions, overcrowding, dilapidated structures, poor supervision and discipline, and a lack of funding. Ottoman policies attempted to rehabilitate the incarcerated, through specific means, such as improved prison organisation, supervision, and provisioning; attempts at moral and secular education; and putting prisoners to work. These efforts epitomise nineteenth-century sensibilities regarding increased state intervention into the lives of its citizens and caring for its population, including prisoners. These efforts also demonstrate how prison reform addressed many of the most pressing questions of Ottoman modernity.

Building on the reforms of earlier regimes, the CUP oversaw the greatest improvements to prison policy implementation and the transformation of prison conditions. While many of these efforts did achieve success,
Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire

others ended in failure, met resistance, or encountered problems associated with wartime constrictions. The Prison Administration and the Directorate of Prisons constantly monitored, inspected, issued directives, and exerted efforts that did have tangible results. On the other hand, war, prisoner and cadre resistance, corruption, and financial crisis undermined many of these gains. The ideal of reform must always be tempered by the reality of implementation and its limitations as various actors exert power and agency.

The CUP, the Prison Administration, and the Directorate of Prisons knew that all these rules, regulations, and modern designs were only as good as those who implemented them. This is why CUP prison reforms, first and foremost, focused on professionalising the prison cadre. In the eyes of Ottoman prison reformers, the prison cadre represented the linchpin to successful prison organisation and prisoner reformation. The next chapter investigates CUP attempts to professionalise its prison cadre as a means to combat the prevalence of guard–prisoner collusion, corruption, and inmate abuse. It also juxtaposes the ideals of these reforms with the realities of everyday prison life.

Notes

1. Şerif, Anadolu’da, pp.xi–xxiii. His other volume is Arnavudluk’da, Suriye’de, Trablusgarb’de Tanin. Ahmet Şerif’s travel diaries of the Ottoman Empire are unlike European travel volumes. His observations have greater credibility, because he was an educated Ottoman subject with the knowledge, intelligence, native language capabilities, and cultural background to make sense of what he encountered and observed. His account often sharply critiques Ottoman state and local officials and provides detailed insight into local administrative affairs shortly after the 1908 Constitutional Revolution. During his travels he visited several prisons and jails throughout Anatolia, the Balkans, Syria, and Lebanon. His accounts corroborate, at least in part, European observations that Ottoman prisons were not effectively implementing the 1880 Prison Regulation. Conditions were poor at best and atrocious at worst. His travels and accounts do, however, take place just before the CUP initiated comprehensive prison reforms.
3. Ibid., p. 39.
4. Ibid., pp.39–42.
5. Ibid., pp. 42–7, 52–3, and 83. He also visited prisons in the districts (kaza) of Beypazarı, Beyshehir, and Ilgin in Konya province.
7. Lefebvre, *Production of Space*.
8. Yıldız, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde Hapishane Islahatı’; and Chapter 2 of this work.
9. See FO 195/364, 226/113, and 97/418 for Sir Stratford Canning’s prison inspection reports. See BOA, DHTMIKS for the inspection reports of the ‘Commission for Expediting Initiatives and Reforms’. See Ahmet Şerif, *Anadolu’da* and *Arnavudluk’da, Suriye’de, Trablusgarb’de Tanin* for his inspections. See Chapter 2 in this book for an overview of the various prison inspections conducted during the Second Constitutional Period. Additionally, the Prison Administration’s papers contain reports and petitions submitted by foreign officers working in the Ottoman Empire. For example, on 18 September 1907 a Russian headquarters chief (*stabsrotmeister*) by the name of Agura who was tasked with reorganising the Macedonian gendarmerie as part of the Mürzsteg Programme, submitted a petition to the Ottoman Governor of Macedonia and CUP supporter Hilmi Pasha criticising the severely overcrowded conditions of a local prison in the district (*kaza*) of Avrethisar. He claimed that thirty-four prisoners were being incarcerated in two small rooms and that the situation would only worsen because of the increasing crime and number of criminal prosecutions in the district at this time. The prisoners’ situations were so bad that several of them, Christian and Muslim, begged the Russian official to intercede on their behalf, but the local Ottoman authorities apparently were very slow to heed his petitions (BOA, YEE 135/8). I would like to extend a special thanks to Milena Methodieva for translating the original document from Russian.
10. Şimşar, ‘Karesi Hapishanesi’, p. 68.
11. They were Emine, wife of Mehmed (serving five years), Şerife, daughter of Mehmed (serving eight years), and Hanife, wife of Kara Mehmed (serving a life sentence for murder).
12. Şimşar, pp. 68–9.
13. Ibid., p. 69.
14. The general directives for this survey are contained in BOA, DHEUMTK 13/11, 54/4, DHMBHPSM 9/59, and DHMBHPS 72/46. Each province returned these completed questionnaires: DHMBHPSM 11/84 (Adana); DHMBHPSM 11/26, DHMBHPS 57/39 and 154/40 (Ankara); DHMBHPSM 10/6 and 11/18 (Aydın); DHMBHPSM 12/75 (Baghdad); DHMBHPSM 10/19 (Beirut); DHMBHPSM 10/10, 10/31, 11/8, 11/32, 11/43, 11/71, and 13/1 (Bitlis); DHMBHPS 149/17 (Bolu); DHMBHPSM 10/4 (Canik); DHMBHPSM 9/94 (Çatalca); DHMBHPSM 12/18 and DHMBHPS 10/51 (Diyarbekir); DHMBHPS 149/6 and 149/9 (Edirne); DHMBHPSM 9/103 and 11/31 (Erzurum); DHMBHPSM 10/40 (Halep); DHMBHPS 149/12 and DHMBHPSM 11/7 (the Hijaz); DHMBHPS 149/11 (Hüdavandigar); DHMBHPSM 9/96 (Istanbul); DHMBHPSM 9/106 (İzmid); DHMBHPSM 10/13 (Kala-i Sultaniye); DHMBHPSM
15. BOA, DHMBHPSM 10/14, docs 1 and 12–15.
16. BOA, DHMBHPSM 9/103, 10/14, and 11/84.
17. BOA, DHMBHPSM 10/14, docs 12–15.
18. BOA, DHMBHPSM 10/14.
19. See the four catalogues of the Prison Administration – one catalogue (BOA, DHMBHPSM) and three catalogues (BOA, DHMBHPS). There are nearly five hundred files containing thousands of documents on prisoner escapes during the Second Constitutional Period. A sampling of the internal documents of the administration dealing with escapes includes BOA, DHMBHPS 96/12, 101/2, 101/3, 101/4, 101/5, and 103/31, and DHMBHPSM 2/20, 5/4, 7/70, 7/95, and 43/9.
20. BOA, DHMBHPS 153/35. For the issue of guard-assisted prison escapes see Chapter 5.
21. This amnesty is discussed more fully in Chapter 6.
22. BOA, DHMBHPSM 17/35, doc. 40 is an official directive issued in February 1911 about transferring inmates in order to ease overcrowding. See also BOA, DHTMIK 45/5. In 1903, a typhoid fever epidemic broke out in the administrative sub-division of Çorum’s prison, caused by overcrowding. Prison officials gave early releases to a number of less serious offenders and transferred others to less crowded facilities in order to ameliorate the epidemic.
23. BOA, DHMBHPSM 27/28, doc. 6.
24. According to Article 82, 1880 Prison Regulation, ‘all types of games, intoxicants, and gambling are absolutely forbidden’ (her türlü la’biyat ve müskirat ve kumar oyunu kat’iyan memnu’dur).
26. BOA, DHMBHPSM 8/68.
27. Regarding prison corruption and prisoner-guard collusion see BOA, DHMBHPS 73/33, 105/9, 89/61, 73/15, 73/25, 106/35, 99/14, 81/66, 83/15, 85/15, 149/50, 94/64, 137/18, 134/64, and 131/24. This topic is discussed in great detail in Chapter 5.
28. BOA, DHMBHPSM 8/74 is an example of prison administrators successfully preventing and minimising fights and disputes at the Trabzon Central Prison in 1913. Examples of fights (kavgalar) and riots (isyanlar) occurring in Ottoman prisons during the Second Constitutional Period include a fight in Konya’s prison in 1914 blamed on crowded, constricted, and unsanitary conditions (DHMBHPS 4/29). Excessive crowding in Amasya’s prison led
The Spatialisation of Incarceration

to a fight in 1913 (DHMBHPS 72/12). In Manisa’s prison a fight resulted in the death of an inmate and several injuries in 1913 (DHMBHPS 148/35). In Konya’s central prison in 1912, guard misconduct led to a fight that resulted in injuries to several prisoners (DHMBHPS 111/3). In 1912, a riot broke out in İzmir’s central prison because of prisoner neglect (DHMBHPS 96/16).

Finally, in 1914, prisoners in Cenin rioted in order to protest the transfer of some inmates to the Beirut central prison resulting in injuries to both prisoners and gendarme (DHMBHPSM 17/23).

29. BOA, DHMBHPS 154/14, doc. 67.

30. Forder, pp. 26–35. A. Forder was a British expatriate living in Jerusalem when the Ottomans entered WWI. He was arrested on suspicion of espionage and was imprisoned first in Jerusalem’s jail and then in Damascus’ jail. While much of his story is self-serving and derogatory of Middle Easterners, some of his claims match data found in Ottoman prison records concerning poor living conditions, lack of food, prisoner idleness, and overcrowding. For official Ottoman records that corroborate Forder’s claims about prisoner nutrition and food rations in Jerusalem’s prison, see BOA, DHMBHPS 74/39 and 75/19. In 1917 and 1918, Ottoman administrators reiterated specific articles from the 1880 Prison Regulation that stipulate the responsibilities of prison cadre concerning proper prisoner nutrition and provisioning (DHMBHPS 165/84 and 160/14).

31. BOA, DHMBHPS 72/41, 64/47, 81/12, 82/21, and 83/34.

32. BOA, DHMBHPSM 35/95.

33. Şimşar, pp. 69–70; BOA, DHMBHPS 151/5, docs 4 and 13–14; and DHMBHPSM 27/28, doc. 6.

34. BOA, DHMBHPSM 27/28, doc. 6.

35. BOA, ZB 310/82, doc. 1.

36. For instance, in 1918, a typhus epidemic hit the Yozgad prison and reportedly killed a large number of prisoners (BOA, DHMBHPS 79/17, 80/60, and 80/63).

37. Health and hygiene issues constitute the single largest number of documents found in the Prison Administration’s catalogues (BOA, DHMBHPS and DHMBHPSM). For a closer look at prison sanitary conditions and prison hospitals see Daşcioğlu, ‘Prison Hospitals’.

38. The exact phrase is ‘kuva'id-i mediniye’. This phrase can be interpreted as ‘laws/principles or doctrines of civilisation’ (BOA, DHMBHPS 145/31).

39. For example, see BOA, DHMBHPSM 10/23 from the Trabzon Central Prison that ‘requests a new prison in order to prevent deaths as a result of poor sanitary conditions’ (gayri sihhi şartları haiz Trabzon merkez hapishanesi’ndeki ölümlerin önlenmesi için yeni bir hapishane yapılması talebi).

40. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10.

41. This phrase from Lefebvre offers three ways to analyse space: 1. as a physical environment that can be perceived (‘spatial practice’); 2. as a semiotic
abstraction that informs how ordinary people, corporations, planners, and politicians negotiate space (‘representations of space’); and 3. as a medium through which the body lives out its life in interaction with other bodies (‘representational spaces’). He proposes a unitary theory of space that unites the physical, mental, and social (Lefebvre, pp. 31–9). This approach to space has very useful applications to understanding Ottoman prisons.

42. BOA, DHMBHPS 142/54.

43. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/6, 1/24, doc. 1, and 2/17; DHMBHPS 43/7; and Gönen, ‘Osmanlı’, p.175.

44. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10; and Daşcioğlu, pp. 999–1,014.

45. BOA, DHMBHPS 72/26.

46. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10, Articles 2–7.

47. The topic of incarcerated children is discussed in great detail in Chapter 6.

48. See BOA, DHMBHPSM 53/37 for the blueprint of a model prison designed by state architect Mimar Kemal Bey to hold seventy-five inmates on the district (kaza) level. See DHMBHPS 148/116 for an architectural design of a prison containing a mosque, a church, a doctor’s office, and a hospital. See DHMBHPS 148/117 for a prison architectural plan designed to hold 300 prisoners on the provincial level. For the most detailed architectural plans for a felons’ jail in Istanbul designed to house 300 prisoners see DHMBHPSM 51/62.

49. Prison repairs, building reports, and their inspections constitute the second most prevalent type of document found in the catalogues of the Prison Administration (BOA, DHMBHPS and DHMBHPSM).

50. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

51. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/19, docs 5–6.

52. BOA, DHMBHPS 144/74. These figures do not include political prisoners or those incarcerated in military prisons. Those prisoners fell under the jurisdictions of the Directorate for Public Security and the army.

53. BOA, DHMBHPS 17/32, docs 1–2.

54. BOA, DHMBHPS 144/74; Yıldız, Mapusane, pp.94, 180, 359, and 383; and Kuru, Sinop Hapishane, p.14.

55. The statistics in this section are culled from the 1916–17 prison survey (BOA, DHMBHPS 143/93).

56. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10, Articles 6, 28–9, 32–3, 53, and 61.

57. BOA, DHMBHPS 89/23.

58. BOA, DHMBHPS 144/74.


61. BOA, DHMBHPS 106/10. Ömer Şen dates this document to 1914, but this is incorrect since its Rumi date is listed as Şubat and Mart of 1331 and 1332, respectively, which correspond to February–March 1916 in the Miladi calendar (Şen, Osmanlı’da Mahkum Olmak, p.160). While Şen touches
The Spatialisation of Incarceration

on many of these documents (pp. 157–61) some of his dates are incorrect. Moreover, he provides very little in the way of actual analysis. During the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire adopted three official calendars: Hijri (Islamic calendar), Rumi (Gregorian calendar), and Miladi (Christian calendar). Official documents were dated according to all three calendars.

62. BOA, DHMBHPS 143/93.
63. Ibid. Istanbul province had a total of eight prisons and jails: Istanbul penitentiary and jail, Beyoğlu jail, Üsküdar prison and jail, Geğbüze jail, and Şile prison and jail.
64. BOA, DHMBHPS 96/40.
66. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10, Article 33.
67. BOA, DHMBHPS 154/14 contains a comprehensive breakdown of prison employment statistics for the whole empire.
68. See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of prison cadre, their qualifications, and roles in prison life and reform.
69. BOA, DHMBHPS 61/20, doc. 5.
70. BOA, DHMBHPS 160/82.
72. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10, Articles 50–2.
73. Ibid. Article 9.
74. Ibid. Articles 91 and 93.
75. BOA, DHMBHPS 154/14.
76. Ibid.
78. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10, Article 92.
79. BOA, DHMBHPSM 3/36, 4/1, 4/4, 4/20, 4/21, 5/1, 5/9, 6/27, 12/70, 14/65, 145/56, 53/34, DHMBHPS 145/2, 145/26, 146/69, and 146/70. These are the surviving records from the 1912 prison survey. For total literacy statistics, see Chart 3.10.
80. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/27, docs 1–3.
81. In May 1917, Dr Pollitz made a list of prison reform priorities for Istanbul province. Among them was the continuation and expansion of prisoner education (BOA, DHMBHPS 159/8).
82. BOA, DHMBHPS 143/144.
83. Demirel, ‘1890 Petersburg Hapishaneler Kongresi’.
86. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10, Articles 69–72.
87. Ibid., Article 17.
88. BOA, DHMUI 61–2/25.
89. Ibid.
91. Çiçen, pp.122–3.
92. Ibid.; BOA, DHMBHPS 158/27; and Şen, Osmanlı’da Mahkum Olmak, pp.61–2.
93. For basic information on the establishment of labour prisons, see Gönen, pp.173–83.
94. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10, Article 72.
95. The prison factories in Aydın, Edirne, and Istanbul were built, respectively, to produce textiles, cabinets, and shoes. Each yielded good returns, but Edirne was especially productive (BOA, DHMBHPSM 8/3, docs 20 and 25). The 1912 prison survey collected information on prison factory production: For Istanbul, see DHMBHPSM 4/4, doc. 9 (backside) and for Edirne, see DHMBHPSM 4/1, doc. 25 (backside).
96. There is an extensive literature on the CUP’s economic policies and its attempts to create a ‘national economy’ (milli iktisat) via the establishment of a Muslim bourgeois entrepreneurial class. This new industrial class would be established through ‘state-interventionism’ as opposed to free trade. For detailed analyses of the CUP’s economic policies see the works of Zafer Toprak; Ahmad, ‘Vanguard of a Nascent Bourgeoisie’; and Göçek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie.
97. Mahmut Şevket Pasha was Grand Vizer after the CUP countercoup in January 1913. He was not, however, a CUP member or supporter. He controlled the Ottoman military and prevented the CUP’s full consolidation of power until his assassination on 11 June 1913. The CUP then gained full control over the entire Ottoman administration. See Turfan, Rise of the Young Turks, pp.285–428.
98. BOA, DHMBHPSM 3/27. In this prison circular (tamim), Edirne’s prison textile factory is labelled ‘the model’ for other prison factories (Edirne Hapishanesi’nde mahkumlara yaptırılmaktaki olan dokuma sanayiinin suret-i tabikinin diğer hapishanelere de tavsiye edilişi).
99. For example, instead of producing textiles, the Istanbul prison factory specialised in carpentry items, such as desks and chests (DHMBHPS 4/4, doc. 9, backside).
100. BOA, DHMBHPS 143/93. This document shows the number of employed prisoners within the empire.
101. BOA, DHMBHPS 119/23. The CUP utilised some of the funds provided by Germany for the Ottoman war effort in WWI to pay for prison reforms. The Germans, however, were not pleased to see this money being spent on pursuits other than the Ottoman war effort.
102. During WWI, many prisoners were put to work on agricultural and road
The Spatialisation of Incarceration

repair projects to assist the war effort (DHMBHPS 76/20, doc. 3). The 1917 prison survey commissioned by Dr Pollitz contains a category requesting the numbers of prisoners being employed in activities for the ‘common good’ (menafi-yi umumi) (BOA, DHMBHPS 143/93).

103. For example, Konya’s governor wrote a report complaining of inmate idleness and requested funds and equipment to establish a prison factory after inspecting Konya’s central prison in 1916 (BOA, DHMBHPS 28/100). Johnson, ‘Prison Conditions in Constantinople’; Riggs; and Forder all attest that idleness was a persistent problem.

104. BOA, DHMBHPS 143/93. This survey collected several types of data relating to prisoner employment: 1. ‘Prisoners eligible to work for the common good’ (total: 2,186); 2. ‘Prisoners working for the common good’ (total: 1,047); 3. ‘Prisoners working in the prison’ (total: 424); 4. ‘Prisoners occupied with special work’ (total: 307); and 5. ‘Prisoners not working’ (total: 19,772).