In this chapter, we shall examine the remnants of some of the most famous and influential works of history written in the Hellenistic period. These works have fared less well across the millennia than those of Polybius and Diodorus and only survive in fragmentary form, but it is important to remember that in their day they were as real, tangible and genre-defining as the works that have accidentally been transmitted in fuller form. If we want to understand moral didacticism in Hellenistic historiography, we have to examine these ‘fragments’ and try to catch as many glimpses as possible of the magnificent works they once were. In the previous chapter we saw how Diodorus’ moralising changes with his change of sources, but also how many of his moralising themes are present regardless of the identity of his source, although with different degrees of emphasis. I argued that this shows that not just moral didacticism but moralising on a specific set of themes was a ubiquitous feature of late Classical and Hellenistic historiography, present in all the authors Diodorus used as sources. In this chapter we shall test that hypothesis against the evidence of the ‘fragments’ of some of his likely sources.

We know hundreds of names of authors who wrote history in this time period, and a selection has to be made somehow. The works examined in this chapter have been chosen on the basis of two criteria. The first criterion is their importance for the development of the genre of historiography, to judge from the number and type of references to them in later authors including Polybius and Diodorus – except for Hieronymus of Cardia, who is included because of a twentieth-century scholarly obsession with seeing his work as more ‘serious’, which at least partly equals ‘non-moralising’, than those of his peers and close successors. The other criterion is genre: I have included only historians who wrote the same subgenre(s) of historiography as Polybius and Diodorus, namely ‘universal history’ or ‘continuous history’, rather than local history or mono-
graphs about single wars or events. In practice, this means leaving out the Alexander historians (despite the fact that Diodorus certainly used one of them as his main source for book 17) as well as local historians including the Attidographers. As a result, this chapter will discuss Timaeus of Tauromenium, Duris of Samos, Phylarchus (of Athens?), Agatharchides of Cnidus and Posidonius of Apamea in chronological order, before devoting a brief and chronologically misplaced discussion to Hieronymus of Cardia. The reason for placing this discussion at the end of the chapter will become clear from its conclusion. The fragments of the fragmentary Classical historiographers will be discussed in Chapter 7.

The ‘fragments’ we will be considering are, generally, not fragmentary scraps of papyrus as one might think from the word, but references and paraphrases in later authors. These references and paraphrases were collected by Felix Jacoby in the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century in a monumental effort known as *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (FGrH) and left unfinished. It is currently being completed by a team of scholars under the leadership of Stefan Schorn. Alongside this effort, the passages collected by Jacoby, conventionally known as the fragments of Greek historiography, are being translated into English and provided with detailed scholarly commentaries in the online *Brill’s New Jacoby* (BNJ) under the directorship of Ian Worthington. This chapter is based on Jacoby’s text and makes liberal use of the BNJ commentaries alongside Jacoby’s own original remarks.

Jacoby worked in a tradition of positivist *Quellenforschung* (even if his purpose was not so much to uncover the sources used by extant texts as to come to an understanding of those lost sources) which regularly ascribed long passages from later authors, especially Diodorus and Plutarch, verbatim to specific sources. Most scholars would now agree that such an approach is overoptimistic and distorts the picture of both fragmentary text and ‘covertext’, that is, the text that preserves the ‘fragment’. The problems haunting any work on fragmentary texts have received increasing

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1 As stated in the Introduction to this study, I do not wish to imply that these are terms of fixed genres; they are simply useful shorthand for modern-day scholars to use when thinking about the traditions in which the ancient historiographers saw themselves, and what predecessors they imitated. For universal history see Alonso-Núñez (1990), Liddel (2010) with references to older scholarship, and Marincola (2011). For continuous history see Tuplin (2011).

2 The BNJ entries have no publication dates and will be referred to in the footnotes in the format ‘Pownall (n.d.)’. The BNJ has links to Jacoby’s original commentary, but does not reproduce his section headings and marginalia, as Baron (2013: 10–11) warns.

3 I adopt the expression ‘covertext’ from Schepens (1997: 166–7 n. 66), who argues rightly that we need a shorthand term for ‘the author who quoted or summarized the fragmentary author’, and that ‘covertext’ is fitting because it ‘covers’ the fragment in three senses of the word: (1) it preserves and protects it, (2) it conceals it, and (3) it encloses it. The expression is also adopted by, among others, Walbank (2007) and Baron (2013).
The primary problem, as illustrated by our discussion of Diodorus in the preceding chapter, is that of the faithfulness or otherwise of the covertext. It is necessary repeatedly to ask to what extent this later author has reworked the text of his source. We must assume a priori that the wording of any given fragment has been composed by the author of the covertext and is, at the very least, a rephrasing of the original. More often, the ‘fragment’ is a summary or paraphrase of the source. Only very occasionally does a covertext imply or explicitly state that it is giving the exact words of its source.

Apart from paraphrasing, the covertext may well also have recast the passage appropriated from an earlier text and put it to a new use. Part of this problem is the habit of ancient authors of ascribing sentiments and opinions to each other which in the actual works are put into the mouth of a narrative character. Sometimes, the author of the covertext ignores an introductory ‘some say’ (τινες λέγουσιν) and ascribes a version of events to his source which in the original was specifically argued against by the narrator. At other times, the covertext may even use a passage for a purpose almost diametrically opposite to the one for which it was intended. For this reason we cannot trust that any sentiment expressed in a fragment, moralising or otherwise, was actually in the original work, and, if it was, that it made the same point or was even equally explicit.

This problem is perhaps particularly acute for the main covertext for Hellenistic historiography, the Deipnosophistae (‘Scholars at Dinner’) by the second-century AD author Athenaeus. This is a glorious display of learnedness and wit disguised as a symposiastic conversation, during which the various interlocutors quote, paraphrase and reference a vast number of literary works, both poetic and prose, and use them as examples of themes fit for the convivial setting: eating, drinking, sex, entertainment, funny stories and generally excessive lifestyles. Importantly, the original texts canvassed by the speakers do not always support the use to which they are put in their paraphrased form. This obviously makes it extremely difficult

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5 For examples of Athenaeus’ deliberate misrepresentation of his sources see Pelling (2000).

6 On this fundamental point see especially Brunt (1980). It is often repeated, but also often ignored. Bernhardt (2003: 199–247), for instance, uses the fragments of Hellenistic historiography as evidence for Hellenistic attitudes to luxurious living without ever acknowledging the problem of the considerably later covertexts.

to interpret the tenor, moral or otherwise, of the original texts. The most obvious example of this problem is the term *tryphe* (τρυφή), which covers one of Athenaeus’ favourite subjects, namely luxurious and immoderate living. It has been argued in an important article by Gorman and Gorman that the fascination with *tryphe* belongs to Athenaeus and his time, not to his Hellenistic sources, who may have reported the details of such lifestyles but would not have condemned them.

Gorman and Gorman are most probably right that *tryphe* is a term more in use in the time of Athenaeus than in that of the Hellenistic historiographers discussed here: on a TLG search we find that τρυφή and its cognates are used not at all by Herodotus or Thucydides, three times in all of Xenophon’s works, four times in the surviving parts of Polybius, and seventy-five times in the extant parts of Diodorus. This semantic group, then, is apparently only really coming into widespread use (at least by elite prose writers) in the late Hellenistic period; but it becomes extremely common in the second century AD, with 140 instances across the literary output of Plutarch and no fewer than 219 instances in the surviving volumes of Athenaeus’ *Deipnosophistae*. However, *tryphe* is a wide-ranging term that entails not just luxury and extravagance, but also immoderate eating and drinking, indolence, effeminacy and sexual excesses, all vices in the moral-didactic systems of Polybius and Diodorus, as we have seen in Chapters 1 and 2. So, while the appellation *tryphe* in the fragments preserved by Athenaeus is probably in most cases his own spin on the original text, it is unlikely that these Hellenistic historiographers differed so widely from their better-surviving peers as to recommend the kind of lifestyle that could fit that term.

It is harder to argue against the other part of Gorman and Gorman’s argument, namely that the connection of *tryphe* with *hybris* and consequent destruction which we see in some of the historiographical fragments preserved by Athenaeus became common only in the first to second century AD and was not a feature of Hellenistic historiography. They show convincingly that the expressions ‘to run aground on luxurious living’ (ἐξοκείλειν εἰς τρυφήν) and ‘to come/progress to such a degree of *tryphe* that . . .’, which we see repeatedly in the fragments of Hellenistic historiography,

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8 Gorman and Gorman (2007).
9 For the scarce use of τρυφή in the fifth century BC see Bernhardt (2003: 192–3).
10 For its use in the propaganda of the Ptolemaic court, see Heinen (1983) and Ager (2005). For its use in inscriptions, which may show a discrepancy between popular morality and the morality propounded by historiography, see Bernhardt (2003: 193–4).
11 Bernhardt (2003) traces criticism of luxurious living in Greek literature from Archaic through to Roman Imperial times and shows how such criticism was always part of Greek elite discourse, but began to be ‘systematised’ in the late fifth to early fourth century. His study of Hellenistic historiography is problematic, however, because he ignores the problem of distortion of fragments by the covertext.
were Athenaeus’ own phrases which he used to demonstrate a connection between *tryphe* and disaster. This must necessarily make us sceptical about the interpretation of those fragments as instances of moral causation. However, I shall argue that Gorman and Gorman go too far in their scepticism and that some fragments can be assumed to be remnants of such causation in the lost historiographies. Every passage needs to be treated on its own premises, and we shall discuss some important cases below in connection with both Timaeus and Phylarchus.

The second problem facing our investigation is the question to what degree the fragments of a given author are representative of his original work. This is essentially a question of the selectivity of the covertext. For example, references to a historiographer in the geographical lexicon of Stephanus of Byzantium are likely to be short notices on the topography or ethnicity of a given city, but this does not mean that the historiographer named by Stephanus as his source was mainly interested in geography. Similarly, because of Athenaeus’ preoccupation with the theme of *tryphe* the number of historiographical fragments which moralise on this theme is almost certainly disproportionate to the space it occupied in his historiographical sources. On the other hand, the fact that Athenaeus was able to collect such a large number of passages on luxury and decadence shows that the theme was significant to some extent in the historiographical tradition. It is unfortunate that Athenaeus was not equally interested in other moral-didactic topics.

The third and related problem is the uselessness of arguments *e silentio*. We can never be certain that a qualifying remark, a negation or a specific type of moralising was *not* in the original work of history just because no instance of it happens to be preserved. Such considerations may well make one hesitant even to approach the fragments, but if we want to gain some understanding of Greek historiography as a genre, they are still our best evidence for vast stretches of it. Rather than throw up our hands in exasperation we shall therefore wade in bravely, at the risk of the occasional overinterpretation, and attempt to steer a course between naive trust in the covertext and fruitless agnosticism. The method for every author discussed in this chapter has been first to read all the fragments collected by Jacoby, in order to see whether any seem to have a moral-didactic purpose, and then to read the fragments that seemed interesting for our purpose in their covertexts, in order to get a sense of how the purpose of the latter may have distorted the original shape and contents of the former.

12 Lenfant (1999) brilliantly shows how one would arrive at a distorted picture of Herodotus if we only had the ‘fragments’ of his *History*.
13 This is one of the main points of Brunt (1980).
TIMAEUS OF TAUROMENIUM (FGrH 566)

The *Sicelica* (sometimes also called the *History*) of Timaeus of Tauromenium is the best-preserved fragmentary history of the period, with 163 surviving fragments. Despite its title, it was not a work of local history, but a history of the western part of the Greek world to parallel the many *Hellenica* already in existence, beginning in mythical times and ending with the death of Agathocles of Syracuse.\(^\text{14}\) Timaeus was a prolific writer who composed several other works beside history. Champion’s description of him as ‘the most important Greek historian of the western Mediterranean before Polybius’ is no doubt correct.\(^\text{15}\) The *Sicelica* was widely read, as can be seen from the vast range of authors who refer to and polemicise against it,\(^\text{16}\) and it is a mark of the esteem in which Timaeus was held that it was his work which Polybius decided to continue, even if he criticised it harshly. Diodorus most probably used Timaeus as his primary source for the Sicilian and Italian history in books 13–14 and 20–1 and for some of his mythological material.

There is an unusually high degree of scholarly agreement about the character of Timaeus’ work, partly on the basis of the fragments, partly on more or less optimistic ideas about to what degree it can be reconstructed from Diodorus and from Polybius’ criticism:\(^\text{17}\) he was a passionate critic of all tyrants except Gelon, who was idolised because of his relative antiquity and his successes against the Carthaginians, whom Timaeus presented as vile barbarians; the equally successful Agathocles was violently criticised because Timaeus had been exiled by him and so was influenced by personal bias. Positive bias, on the other hand, characterised his portrayal of Timoleon, the liberator of Sicily. Moreover, Timaeus was useless as a military historian, but was among the first to offer a history of Rome; and his work was ‘rhetorical’, emotional and full of moralising.\(^\text{18}\) This picture

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\(^\text{14}\) For two of the more recent attempts at reconstructing the shape of Timaeus’ work see Vattuone (2002: 192–203) and Baron (2013: 28–38, 202–32).

\(^\text{15}\) Champion (n.d.).

\(^\text{16}\) *FGrH* 566 T 1, T 11, T 15a, T 15b, T 16, T 17, T 18, T 19, T 22, T 23, T 26, T 27, F 28a.

\(^\text{17}\) Scholars who argue that Timaeus can to a large degree be reconstructed from Diodorus include Jacoby (1955), Laqueur (1936), Meister (1967) and Pearson (1984, 1986, 1987). More sceptical voices are Sanders (1987), Rubincam (1990) and Baron (2013). For good discussions of Polybius’ criticism of Timaeus see Vattuone (2002) and Baron (2013: 58–88).

has more recently been challenged by Baron, who argues that Timaeus was less biased against both the Carthaginians and the Sicilian tyrants than is usually assumed, more competent as a historian, and an imitator of Herodotus in the range and structure of his work.\(^\text{19}\)

Almost a third of the 163 Timaean fragments seem to refer to what in the original were moralising passages.\(^\text{20}\) This is a very large proportion of moralising, and it is no doubt partly due to the selectivity of his main covertexts: Athenaeus, who tends to extract passages dealing with luxury or flattery, and Plutarch, Polybius and Diodorus, who all have a moral-didactic agenda. On the other hand, it is likely that Timaeus was a favourite source for these authors exactly because they found him a rich source of moral-didactic material.

No fewer than eleven of the collected fragments are Athenaean references to Timaeus as a source for outrageous tales of \textit{tryphe}.\(^\text{21}\) As discussed above, such cases call for special caution, and we cannot be sure that Athenaeus’ interpretation is also Timaeus’. No condemnation (or praise) by the Timaean narrator is preserved in any of these cases; the fragments consist simply of more or less detailed and scandalised descriptions of luxury. They range from brief remarks which must be references to longer treatments in Timaeus’ original (F 1a: the Etruscans make their slave girls serve naked) through humorous vignettes with speech (F 48 on the extreme indolence of the Sybarites) to lengthy \textit{ekphraseis} on opulence (F 149 on the blasé attitude to wealth of drunken Acragan youths). An \textit{ekphraseis} on the wealth of Acragas in Diodorus is also attributed to Timaeus’ eyewitness account (F 26a = Diod. Sic. 13.81.3–82.8). An added complication is that it is often impossible to see how much of the passage designated as a ‘fragment’ actually comes from Timaeus; but the fact that he is repeatedly cited in connection with this theme – which, for instance, his contemporary and equally influential fellow-historian Hieronymus of Cardia is not (see later in this chapter) – suggests that extravagance and immoderate luxury had some part to play in his \textit{Sicelica}.

The varied forms of the fragments seem to indicate that the theme appeared in both vignettes and \textit{ekphraseis}. The longest fragment is F 50 (= Ath. 12.519b–520c), the main part of which is an \textit{ekphraseis} on extravag-

\(^{19}\) Baron (2013). The important part played by geography in his work is also discussed by Vattuone (2002: 222–4).

\(^{20}\) F 1a, F 2, F 9, F 11a and b, F 22, F 24a, F 26a, F 29, F 31b, F 32, possibly F 35a and b, F 44, F 45, F 47, F 48, F 49, F 50, F 51, F 82, F 83, F 95, F 99, F 100a, b and c, F 102a and b, F 105, F 106, F 111, F 116, F 118, F 119a, b and c, F 121, F 122, F 124a, b, c and d, F 134, F 139, F 148, F 149, F 150b, F 154, F 156, F 158a and b. I do not count F 159 because its derivation from Timaeus is extremely doubtful.

\(^{21}\) F 1a, F 9, F 11a and b, F 44, F 47, F 48, F 49, F 50, F 51, F 149.
gant Sybarite customs, offering plenty of over-the-top details (such as the wealthy Sybarites having the roads leading from the city to their country estates covered with awnings so they do not get too hot on the road, and master chefs being crowned at public festivals). The fact that Timaeus is only mentioned by Athenaeus at the beginning of the long passage (in connection with the information that the Sybarites became friendly with the Miletans from wearing cloaks made from Milesian wool) prompts Gorman and Gorman to argue that the details of outrageous luxury are not based on his work, but are a hotchpotch of general ‘knowledge’ of Sybarite *tryphe*.

Such an interpretation is possible, but perhaps overly sceptical: against Gorman and Gorman’s claim that no other Timaean fragment shows a similar credulity with regard to fantastical details I would put the evidence of F 150a, which gives Timaeus as the source for an argument to the effect that the goddess Artemis was present at the birth of Alexander the Great, and F 95, according to which the future tyrant Gelon was saved from an earthquake by a wolf (see below), both more fanciful to a modern mind than the decadence of the Sybarites.

The list of extravagances in F 50 ends with a narrative of how the destruction of Sybaris was foretold by an oracle, which warned the Sybarites about honouring human beings more than gods, and how such a fatal mistake occurred (by a runaway slave being whipped in a temple, then saving himself by fleeing to the tomb of his master’s father). If this passage does in fact go back to Timaeus, it shows that he made a connection between the Sybarites’ impious arrogance and their destruction, and perhaps that he made their arrogance arise from wealth and luxurious living. On the one hand, it is impossible to know whether Athenaeus was still using Timaeus at this point, as it is a full page since his name was mentioned; on the other hand, no other source has been mentioned in between. If Timaeus did create a causal link between the arrogance of the Sybarites and their destruction, this would put him in line with Polybius and Diodorus as a historian interested in human inability to handle good fortune.

A more certain indication that Timaeus did in some instances moralise on the difficulty of handling good fortune with moderation is F 100b (= Plut. *Nic.* 28.1–4). In this passage, a parallel narrative to Diodorus 13.19,
the Sicilian statesman Hermocrates lectures his fellow-Syracusans after the victory over Athens in 413 BC on how to bear success with moderation, and the narrator states that the Syracusans ‘were already abusing their good fortune’ (ὑβριζοντες ἢδη τοις εὐτυχήμασιν). It is difficult to be certain how much of this was in Timaeus, who is only mentioned in the next paragraph (ὁς δὲ Τιμαιός φησι), which deals with the Syracusans’ dislike of Gylippus.²⁴ However, the dictum of Hermocrates about moderate behaviour in victory (ὅτι τοῦ νικᾶν κρεῖττόν ἐστι τὸ καλῶς χρῆσθαι τῇ νίκῃ) is very similar to a dictum spoken by Hermocrates in Diodorus during the course of the same debate: ὥς καλλιόν ἐστι τοῦ νικᾶν τὸ τὴν νίκην ἐνεγκεῖν ἄνθρωπίνος (Diod. Sic. 13.19.5; see p. 115). There can hardly be any doubt that these two expressions of the same doctrine at the same point in the story must come from the same source. It is, however, entirely possible that Plutarch was combining several different sources, or even added extra details from his own imagination.²⁵ This would explain why the demagogue who proposes the death sentence is in Diodorus called Diocles and in Plutarch Eurycles, and also why Gylippus in Diodorus gives a speech for the execution of the generals while in Plutarch he wants to take them back to Sparta alive. Timaeus can only with any certainty be credited with the details that Diodorus and Plutarch have in common, namely the fact that the Syracusans shouted down Hermocrates when he said that ‘nobler than victory itself is bearing victory with moderation’. Even on its own, however, this dictum and the Syracusan reaction make for a powerful moralising vignette on the inability of the successful to remain moderate.

This leads us to the question of what precepts for behaviour Timaeus may have offered. On the basis of the extant fragments we get a more rounded picture of his negative paradeigmata of villainy, Agathocles and other tyrants of Sicily, than of any of his positive exempla. This, however, probably says more about the covertexts, who were interested either in passing on salacious details (Athenaeus, Plutarch) or in criticising Timaeus for being tasteless and overly harsh in his blame passages (Polybius, Diodorus), than it does about Timaeus’ moral pedagogy. The bad Timaeans leader seems to have been a tyrant, effeminate (F i11), sexually depraved (F i22, F i24b), cowardly (F i24d) and impiously faithless (F i21).²⁶ Such a leader has few friends, but many flatterers, who deserve

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painful deaths for their obsequiousness. A further explicitly criticised characteristic, not attributed to any tyrant in the extant fragments, but only to the Spartan Gylippus, is greed (F 100a, b and c). In contrast, the philosopher Xenocrates receives praise by internal evaluation for displaying conspicuous lack of greed (F 158a and b).

Otherwise, little survives to show what moral recommendations Timaeus gave. It is clear that he idolised Timoleon, the Corinthian who abolished tyranny in various Sicilian cities and defeated the Carthaginians (F 119a, b and c), but we cannot see what virtues Timaeus ascribed to him. It seems that Timaeus praised him for being an enemy of all tyrants (T 3b and T 13) and even engineering the slaying of his own brother when the latter made himself tyrant of Corinth, although Timaeus’ version (F 116) seems to have differed from the one in Diodorus (Diod. Sic. 16.65) in having Timoleon cover his head and cry during the deed rather than committing it with his own hand. T 13 states that Timaeus praised Timoleon for his ‘moderation’ (τοῦ μετρίου), albeit in the very specific sense of his sparing the life of Timaeus’ father, who was ruler (tyrant?) of Tauromenium. The philosopher Empedocles likewise seems to have been a positive paradeigma of hostility to tyranny, but was perhaps presented as less than perfect in his private life, where Diogenes Laertius uses the words ‘boastful’ and ‘egocentric’ (ἀλαζόνα καὶ φιλαυτον) to summarise Timaeus’ description (F 2 = Diog. Laert. 8.66).

F 118 (= Plut. Quaest. conv. 5.3.2.d76d) is interesting. It narrates how Timoleon’s troops get scared before a battle because some donkeys arrive carrying celery, which symbolises mourning, but how Timoleon then manages to turn their mood around by reminding them that celery is also used for victory wreaths in the Isthmian Games. This passage seems to show Timoleon as an eminently rational general capable of making the superstition of others work for him, along the lines of Polybius’ Scipios. It is unfortunately impossible to know whether Timaeus commented on the episode in his narratorial voice or in other ways indicated to the reader how to interpret it.

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27 F 115 = Plut. Dion 35.6–7 (Philistus), F 155a = Polyb. 12.12b.2–3 (Callisthenes), F 32 = Ath. 6.25a–d (Democles).
28 F 100a and b = Plut. Nic. 19.5 and 28.1–4, F 100c = Plut. Tim. 41.4.
29 F 158 a = Ath. 10.437.6, F 158b = Phld. Index academicorum philosophorum Herculanensis VIII (IV) pp. 138–9 (Dorandi).
30 F 119a = Polyb. 12.23.4–7, F 119b = Plut. Tim. 36.1–2, F 119c = Cic. Fam. 5.12.7.
33 In addition, Cornelius Nepos (Alc. 11.1–6 = FGrH 566 F 99) cites Timaeus as someone who praises Alcibiades and goes on to talk about the chameleon-like qualities of the Athenian statesman. However, as noted by Champion (n.d.: ad loc.), Nepos says that
Having examined the meagre evidence for the virtues and vices of Timaeus’ main characters, we now turn to the other important question for discerning his overall moral message(s): did he describe a world where virtue was rewarded and vice punished? F 50 on the fall of Sybaris, discussed above, may well show divine punishment of arrogance and impiety, and possibly also of extravagant living. The divine connection is not made explicit, however, and we cannot even be certain that this final part of the fragment is from Timaeus. We must therefore look elsewhere for clues to the extent of divine involvement in the world of the *Sicelica*.

Some fragments show that Timaeus portrayed a world where superhuman forces at least played a part. F 29 narrates a prophetic dream, F 95 has a future good leader (Gelon of Syracuse) saved from an earthquake by a wolf, and, more concretely, F 155a quotes Timaeus’ statement that the execution of the historian Callisthenes by Alexander the Great was divine punishment for honouring a human being like a god. Intriguingly, two fragments indicate that Timaeus had a fondness for ironically apt punishment of the kind we have seen Diodorus use to signal divine involvement: F 24 (= Ath. 13.588b–589a) tells of the death of Laïs the courtesan (at the end of a string of outrageous stories about her, which were probably, but not necessarily, also in Timaeus), who is beaten to death with wooden footstools by jealous women in a sanctuary of Aphrodite, thus aptly dying in the house of the goddess of lust. Similarly, but more pointedly, F 102 (= Περὶ Ὕψους 4.3) interprets the Athenian defeat by Hermocrates (‘Power of Hermes’) son of Hermon as the city’s punishment (ἔδωκαν δίκην) for having mutilated the Herm. No divine power is mentioned, but the coincidence of crime and punishment – especially in the latter case – seems meant to indicate something superhuman (and so signal that the punishment was just).

Timaeus and Thucydides agree in their praise of Alcibiades, despite the fact that Thucydides is in fact extremely ambivalent about him. That means that we cannot be sure how unequivocal Timaeus’ praise was, and makes it impossible to use the fragment as a basis for reconstructing Timaeus’ advice for good leadership.

34 F 29 = schol. on Aeschin. 2.10, F 95 = Tzetz. Chil. 4.132.269–81. It is hard to know how seriously to take the attribution of this latter story to Timaeus, as Tzetzes dismissively talks of ‘the Timaeuses, Dionysiuses, Diodoruses, Dion(s)’, but it does not seem to be out of place with the other fantastical stories told in some of the fragments.

35 F 155a = Polyb. 12.12b: καὶ φησὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀξίους γεγονέναι, διότι ταῖς Ἀλεξάνδρου τιμαῖς ταῖς ἱσθοθίς ἀντέλεγον, τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον αἰγίδα καὶ κεραυνὸν <περι>τιθέντα θνητῇ φύσει δικαίως αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου τετευχέναι τούτων ὧν ἔτυχεν.

36 ξυλίναις χελώναις, literally wooden tortoises. Most probably a type of footstool; cf. LSJ (ad χελώνα) and Pearson (1987: 150 n. 87).

37 Pearson (1987: 150) says that Timaeus relates her ‘tragic death’. I think he misses the moral point of Timaeus’ story.

38 Baron (2013: 192–4, 244–6) offers the tantalising suggestion that such wordplay in Timaeus was meant to provide a streak of humour in his narrative. If that is indeed the case, it is difficult to know how seriously to take it.
This interest in coincidences of the details of a crime with its punishment was almost certainly part of a wider theme in Timaeus of coincidences of various types, particularly of dates, and especially when they could be construed to show the changeability of fortune.\(^9\) At 13.108.4, Diodorus cites him as his source (F 106) for the fact that on the same day and in the same hour as the Carthaginians had captured the Geloan colossal statue of Apollo, which they sent to Tyre, the same statue was later worshipped by the Greeks under Alexander the Great, who had on that day taken Tyre. This is a coincidence which shows how fortunes change and the arrogant victors become the humbled defeated. At the same time it functions as divine punishment of the Tyrians, who had committed sacrilege against the statue because they believed that Apollo was helping the Greeks in the siege. Coincidences are also the topic of F 60 (Rome and Carthage were founded on the same day),\(^40\) F 105 (Euripides died on the same day that Dionysius, the tragedy-loving tyrant, became ruler of Syracuse) and F 150a, where Cicero states that Timaeus claimed that the temple of Artemis at Ephesus burned down on the same night as Alexander the Great was born.\(^41\) The point in Cicero’s summary is Timaeus’ explanation of the coincidence, namely that Artemis was away from Ephesus because she, as the goddess of childbirth, wanted to be present at Olympias’ labour. Cicero says that Timaeus added the explanation of the coincidence concinne, which perhaps indicates that he thought of it as a learned and poetic explanation which was not to be taken literally. This would fit in with Pseudo-Longinus’ criticism of Timaeus’ tendency to showcase his learnedness (F 102). However, even if such highlighting of their author’s learnedness was the meta-purpose of these coincidences, they nevertheless create a narrative universe where some sort of superhuman power organises events and thereby plays a very real part. The impression we got from the Timaean parts of Diodorus’ Bibliotheca was of an author who moralises frequently on divine vengeance and uses the mirroring of punishment and crime as an indication of divine involvement. It is now tempting to think that this is an accurate reflection of a prominent feature of the Sicelica.

The other dominating characteristics of the moralising of Diodorus’ Timaean narrative are the theme of human inability to bear good fortune and several ekphraseis on wealth and luxury. The hypothesis that both of these were characteristics of Timaeus’ Sicelica is now supported by our examination of the Timaean ‘fragments’. However, in his ‘Timaean’


\(^40\) Jacoby (1955: 536–7) has a good discussion of the implications of this synchronism for Timaeus’ conception of history.

passages Diodorus also moralises frequently on piety and cruelty, topics which are not on display in the collected fragments. This could mean either that, by coincidence, none of Timaeus’ passages on piety and cruelty have been preserved in later authors, at least not with his name attached, or that Diodorus was responsible for adding moralising on those topics – clearly central to his own moral-didactic programme, as we saw in Chapter 2 – to the material he took over from Timaeus.

In terms of moralising techniques, the Timaean fragments are pleasingly varied. At the risk of assuming too much, they seem to show that Timaeus employed moralising vignettes (F 47, F 122, F 149), speeches (F 22, F 31), ekphraseis (F 26a, F 50), evaluative phrasing (F 100a, F 154a), internal evaluation (Hermocrates’ remark in F 100b; end of F 158a and b), fulfilled prophecies (F 29) and digressions (F 124a, b and c mention a lengthy condemnation of Agathocles towards the end of the work).42 Again, this fits with what we might assume on the basis of Diodorus, except that we might have expected also to see examples of moralising through pathos among the collected fragments, which we do not.

**Duris of Samos (FGrH 76)**

Just under a hundred fragments survive from the historical works of Duris of Samos. Like Timaeus, Duris was a prolific writer of works spanning several genres, and was widely read. The fragments of interest for us are not only the ones assumed to come from his *Histories* (sometimes called the *Macedonica*), but also the ones ascribed by ancient sources to his *History of Agathocles*, as Landucci Gattinoni has convincingly demonstrated that this was not a separate monograph, but was extracted from the *Histories* in Roman times.43 The work probably began with the death of Amyntas, father of Philip II of Macedon, and ended with the death of Pyrrhus. In an interesting contrast with most of the other historians discussed in this study, who composed their works in forced or voluntary exile, Duris probably wrote his while in a position of power, as tyrant of Samos.44

Considering the scanty remains, a surprisingly large amount of scholar-
ship exists on Duris. Much of the discussion centres on Duris’ relationship with the Peripatetics and the question of ‘tragic history’. The concept of a Peripatetic school of ‘tragic history’, which allegedly valued vivid descriptions full of pathetic details and aimed to create pity and fear in its readers, originated with Schwartz in the nineteenth century, inspired by Polybius’ criticism of Phylarchus (Polyb. 2.56–63), and held sway for half a century. It was refuted by Walbank (1955, 1960), who convincingly argued that both tragedy and historiography were inspired by epic, and that the elements often identified by modern scholars as typical of ‘tragic history’ are really traits which have always been part of Greek historiography. The argument against the concept has more recently been reframed by Marincola (2003), who shows that vividness and engagement of the reader’s emotions were part of Greek historiography from Herodotus onwards. I would add that both tragedy and historiography were concerned with moral didacticism and that the melodramatic descriptions of suffering associated with ‘tragic history’ are, in fact, an attempt to teach a reader about the wickedness of certain kinds of behaviour on an emotional rather than an intellectual level (see pp. 85 and 153).

Most scholars, however, still agree that Duris wrote ‘moralising history’, and that the disastrous consequences of luxury and extravagance were a prominent theme in his historical works. The problem is that despite the relatively large number of fragments it is hard to get a sense of Duris’ writing, because most of the fragments are in reality just brief references to events for which Duris is listed as the source, and often only as one source out of several. In such circumstances we cannot know how he narrated the episode or conveyed the piece of information for which he is cited, and so whether or not he used it for any moral-didactic purpose. We shall begin with the few characteristics of his work that can be discerned relatively securely, and move gradually on to thinner ice.

Like Timaeus, Duris owes his image as a historiographer obsessed with

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46 It was once taken for granted that Duris was a pupil of Theophrastus (Kebric 1977, Gray 1987, Pédech 1989), but Dalby (1991) has shown that the evidence for the pupil–teacher relationship rests on a modern emendation of Athenaeus 4.128a (= T 1) which is unnecessary and indefensible. He has been followed by Landucci Gattinoni (1997) and Pownall (n.d.). Schwartz (1905) and Jacoby (1926b: 115–16) argue that Duris was influenced by the Peripatetics, without making him a pupil of Theophrastus. Knoepfler (2000) seems unaware of Dalby’s article. Gray (1987) provides a brilliant analysis of Duris’ use of the term *mimesis*, which has often been connected with ‘tragic history’.

the deleterious effects of luxury to his covertexts. About a fourth of the surviving fragments of his works are preserved by Athenaeus, most of them for their descriptions of extravagance, and eleven of the longer fragments are found in Plutarch, who shares this interest to a lesser degree. We have to keep reminding ourselves that this percentage of text dealing with luxury and extravagance is disproportionate to the role played by this theme in Duris’ original works. However, as with Timaeus, we should also note that the theme was clearly present in Duris’ histories even if it played a smaller part than what is now apparent.

The two most conspicuous passages dealing with *tryphe* are F 10 on the luxurious lifestyle of Demetrius of Phalerum and F 14 on the extravagant habits of Demetrius Poliorcetes. F 14 is presented as a verbatim quotation of Duris (‘Παυσανίας μὲν’ φησίν ‘ὁ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν βασιλέως . . .’). The two passages are very similar in style: both are detailed descriptions in a scandalised tone with some evaluative phrasing (τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀκρασίαν, ἠφάνιζεν: F 10), and both use rhetorical comparisons: F 10 states that Demetrius of Phalerum surpasses the Macedonians in the expense of his dinners, and the Cyprians and Phoenicians in the elegance of his attire; F 14 begins with brief statements about the descent into luxury of Pausanias, Dionysius I and Alexander the Great, and then makes the claim that Demetrius Poliorcetes trumped all of them. On this basis, even if F 10 is not a verbatim quotation, it is perhaps legitimate to take it as a fairly close paraphrase of Duris. It is certainly tempting to think that a moralising juxtaposition in F 10 which comments scathingly on the hypocrisy of its protagonist was in Duris’ original. Such comparisons and juxtapositions are rhetorical techniques employed in the service of moralising by Polybius at his most ardent.

Other fragments on the topic of *tryphe* are mere references to passages at whose original form we can only guess (F 35, F 37a and b, F 49), and one seems to have been an explanatory digression on background history with some evaluative phrasing (F 4 = Ath. 4.167c–d). Two fragments are ambiguous in that they seem to be scandalised descriptions of extrav-


49 καὶ ταῖς μὲν δαπάναις ταῖς εἰς τὰ δεῖπνα τούς Μακεδόνας ὑπερέβαλε, τῇ δὲ καθαρειότητι Κυπρίως καὶ Φοίνικας: F 10; ‘Παυσανίας μὲν’ φησίν ‘ὁ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν βασιλέως καταθέμενος τὸν πάτερον τρίβωνα τὴν Περσικὴν ἐνεδύετο στολήν. ὁ δὲ Σικελίας τύραννος Διονύσιος ἐξολόθρια καὶ χρυσοῦν στέφανον <ἔτι δ’> ἐπιπόρπημα μετελάμβανε τραγικόν. Ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος δ’ ὡς τῆς Ἀσίας ἐκφύσεις ἐρήμος αὐλή νόησεν. Δημήτριος δὲ πάντας ὑπερέβαλεν’: F 14. For an analysis of the rhetorical effect of F 14 see Landucci Gattinoni (1997: 130).

50 ‘Demetrius who set down laws and ordered the lives of others made his own life completely lawless’ (καὶ ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις τιθέμενος θεσμοῖς Δημήτριος καὶ τοὺς βίους τάτην ἀνομοθέτητον εαυτῷ τὸν βιόν κατεσκεύασε: FGrH 76 F 10 = Ath. 12.542b–c).

51 F 35 = Ath. 12.532d–f, F 37a = Ath. 6.231b–c, F 37b = Ath. 4.155d, F 49 = Ath. 1.17f.
agance, but concern people whom one would expect Duris to treat positively: Alcibiades, his alleged ancestor, in F 70, and the Samians, his own people, in F 60. The former passage has been explained well by Landucci Gattinoni as a preparation for the *peripeteia* that is soon going to happen to Alcibiades and bring about his downfall, and it is certainly true that Alcibiades would be an illustrious ancestor even if his larger-than-life persona eventually destroyed his career and led to his death. F 60 cites some lines from the poet Asius about the richness of the annual procession of the Samians to the Heraeum, after stating that Duris uses this as evidence for Samian custom. The appellation of this custom as *tryphe* is most likely to be Athenaeus’ interpretation of the custom described by Duris and Asius; Duris probably used it as a sign of the former wealth, magnificence and power of his country rather than of any untoward behaviour on the part of its citizens. This leaves only the two passages on Demetrius of Phalerum and Demetrius Poliorcetes, discussed above, as true moralising passages on decadence.

Nevertheless, Duris also seems to have moralised on the kind of immoderation that is an integral part of *tryphe*: heavy drinking (F 15), sexual transgressions (F 18) and effeminacy (F 12, F 42). F 42 even suggests that Duris, like Diodorus, drew a causal connection between the assassination of the Assyrian king Sardanapalus and his effeminacy, showing that vice can lead to disaster. On the positive side, F 50 (= Plut. Phoc. 4) ascribes an enthusiastic description of the extreme self-discipline of Phocion to Duris; it may well have formed part of an obituary, although Plutarch is unlikely to have taken it over verbatim. F 51 (= Plut. Phoc. 17) most probably refers to the same obituary when it cites Duris as evidence for Alexander the Great addressing Phocion more politely than anyone else in his letters, thus demonstrating that moral virtue can lead to positive results. The only other fragment that seems to refer to a positive evaluation of a historical character is F 53 (Plut. Eum. 1.1–3) on Eumenes of Cardia. Apparently Duris portrayed this Successor of Alexander as the son of a poor man risen to prominence through his good education (*τραφῆναι δὲ ἐλευθερίως ἐν γράμμασι καὶ περὶ παλαίστραν*), intelligence and courage (*συνετὸν καὶ ἀνδρεῖον*).

An intriguing issue in the light of the moral-didactic themes found in Polybius and Diodorus is whether Duris moralised on human inability to handle good fortune. No such moralising survives from his works, but F 66 and F 67 certainly refer to scenes involving victors and their captors, which

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52 F 70 = Plut. Alc. 32, F 60 = Ath. 12.525e–f.
54 See Pownall (n.d.: *ad loc.*).
is the most common situation for moralising on this theme in Polybius and Diodorus. F 66 (= Phot. Lexicon s.v. Σαμίων ὁ δῆμος) is a lexicon entry giving Duris as an authority for the Athenian practice of tattooing their Samian captives with the image of an owl (and probably for the corresponding Samian practice of tattooing their Athenian prisoners with the image of a ship, although the text is uncertain), but gives no indication of how this information was conveyed in his narrative. In F 67 (= Plut. Per. 28.1–3), on the other hand, Plutarch criticises Duris for ‘making a tragedy out of’ (ἐπιτραγῳδεῖ) events surrounding the Athenian victory over Samos in 441/0 BC. In Duris’ version, which Plutarch offers as an alternative to the one he considers the true version, the Athenians torture the captured Samian marines and trierarchs for ten days before executing them with wooden clubs. Presumably Plutarch’s accusation of ‘tragedising’ means that Duris’ narrative of these events was full of pathetic detail, much like some of the passages of Diodorus we saw in the previous chapter. Such details are not necessarily added for the sake of sensationalism, however: Duris presumably felt strongly about these events as they concerned the recent past of his own country, and may well have included them with the purpose of showing his readers the truth of what had happened, against the Athenophile versions of other historians such as Thucydides and Ephorus.\footnote{Plutarch probably also intends to imply that Duris has exaggerated or even added fictitious details. We cannot know whether Duris was guilty of doctoring the facts or Plutarch had been falsely persuaded by a dominant Athenocentric tradition.}

Finally, the question remains whether there is any evidence for divine punishment of vice and rewarding of virtue in Duris.\footnote{Schwartz (1905) argues that Duris was not a believer, but introduced gods and oracles for literary effect. Kebric (1977: 30–1), on the other hand, has argued, partly on the basis of Duris’ interest in Herodotus and Sophocles, partly by analogy with the Peripatetic Clearchus of Soli, whose fragments share some features with those of Duris, that the Samian historiographer was an adherent of a ‘traditional’ belief in divine punishment of hybris. In fact, the similarities between Duris and Clearchus are no greater than those that exist between Duris and the other Hellenistic historiographers, and the same caveats apply to interpreting the fragments of Clearchus – also primarily preserved by Athenaeus – as to those of the historians, so this evidence is inconclusive.} Only a single instance of divine punishment occurs in the fragments, and that is mythological and so must have occurred either as part of a digression or in a speech delivered by a character. This makes it impossible to interpret outside of its context.\footnote{F 47 (= schol. in Ap. Rhod. II 1249).} If we look for punishment of human impiety, we are disappointed. Two fragments castigate people for celebrating a mortal like a god (Demetrius Poliorcetes F 13, Lysander F 71), but it is hard to see...
whether it is just the flattery that is being criticised or also the impiety, and there is no indication that the peoples in question suffer for their actions. F 35 (= Ath. 12.532d–f) mentions Duris as ‘narrating the same thing’ at the end of a brief story about how the Athenian general Chares was given money stolen from Delphi during the Sacred War and spent it on dinner parties. If Duris told this story in any detail, he may well have moralised on the impiety of the temple-robbery – or he may have stuck to criticising the extravagance of the dinners, or he may have kept off moralising all together. The ‘fragment’ is too short to be of much use.

The only indication that there may have been some divine involvement in the world of Duris’ Histories is three fragments which seem to show that momentous events could be foretold by oracles and omens: F 36 refers to omens foretelling the loss of Philip II’s eye, F 38 mentions an omen predicting the Battle of Chaeronea, and F 84 an omen foretelling the mythical kingship of Aletes over Corinth.59 F 56b (= Tzet. schol. on Lycophron 1378) cites Duris as one among other authorities for the story of the self-sacrifice of Decius Mus (or his father; see Pownall n.d.: ad loc.) and may imply that the sacrifice resulted in Roman victory. In other words, superhuman causation may have played a part in the work, but little evidence remains, and it is impossible to see whether such powers enforced any kind of moral code.

The moralising techniques of Duris are equally hard to discern. It seems that he used detailed descriptions with evaluative phrasing, comparisons and juxtapositions. Beyond that, things get less certain. F 15 (= Ath. 12.546c–d) has been taken to indicate that he could use Homeric references to back up moralising on contemporary issues,60 but it could equally well be a reference to a non-moralising erudite passage on changing customs. The fragments on Phocion discussed above seem to form part of an evaluative digression, probably as part of an obituary. Eumenes may or may not have received similar treatment. Strangely, perhaps, there is no evidence of a use of moralising vignettes, but that is of course not proof that Duris did not use them.

Phylarchus (FGrH 81)

We know very little about Phylarchus, except that he wrote Histories in twenty-eight books and possibly several minor works which are now lost.61 Polybius (2.56.1 = T 3) says that Phylarchus was a contemporary of Aratus

60 See Pownall (n.d.: ad loc.).
61 Alternatively, as suggested by Africa (1961: 3–4), the works listed in the Suda were excerpts made from the Histories in Roman times.
the Elder, who died in 213 BC. The *Histories* began at the death of Pyrrhus in 272 BC, which means that it continued from the point where the works of both Hieronymus and Duris left off, and it most probably ended in 220/19, at the death of Ptolemaeus Euergetes, his wife Berenice and Cleomenes III of Sparta.\textsuperscript{62} This terminal date was probably decided partly by the work’s bias in favour of Cleomenes, which is noted by Plutarch (Arat. 38.6 = F 52).\textsuperscript{63} The *Histories* are the target of a vicious attack by Polybius (Polyb. 2.56–63), which gave rise to the early twentieth-century theory of ‘tragic history’ (see above, pp. 85 and 137), and which shows that Phylarchus’ *Histories* was considered the authoritative account of his time period.\textsuperscript{64}

Eighty-five fragments of Phylarchus are collected in *FGrH*; he is not yet included in the *BNJ*. All eighty-five fragments are believed to derive from the *Histories*. Of these, almost half (forty-one) are from Athenaeus, and Plutarch, the second most frequent co-text, preserves twelve. It is thus unsurprising that a large number of the fragments are moralising, and it is likely that the proportion of moralising in the fragments is larger than it was in the original work. At the same time, however, as in the cases of Timaeus and Duris, Athenaeus’ reason for using Phylarchus so extensively was probably precisely the large number of moral vignettes to be found in his work. Most scholars agree that Phylarchus’ narrative was moralising, but also that this moralising was implicit in the narrative’s display of universal justice rather than explicit. Schepens has argued that Phylarchus’ work was more serious and historically informative than the fragments show; this may well be true, but does not preclude that his work was also moral-didactic.\textsuperscript{65}

Considering the large proportion of fragments preserved by Athenaeus, it is not surprising that there is an overweight of passages moralising on luxury and decadence and related topics.\textsuperscript{66} Intriguingly, three of these fragments seem to indicate that Phylarchus propounded a causal connection leading from wealth and success to arrogance and then to disaster. The

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\textsuperscript{63} This is well discussed by Africa (1961).

\textsuperscript{64} Marincola (2003) and Schepens (2005) offer good analyses of Polybius’ polemics against Phylarchus. For Phylarchus as an accepted authority see Schepens (2005: 141–3) with further bibliography in n. 5.

\textsuperscript{65} E.g. Africa (1961) and Pédech (1989). Kroymann (1956: 488) argues that the main message of Phylarchus’ work was the helplessness of man in the face of *tyche*. However, Kroymann bases this theory not on the attested fragments of Phylarchus, but on Plutarch’s *Agis* and *Cleomenes*, which he argues are based on Phylarchus’ *Histories*. The doctoral thesis by Sonia Stelluto, *Filare e la storiografia tragica* (1997, University of Salerno), on which Schepens (2007) bases some of his arguments, has unfortunately been unavailable to me.

clearest instance is F 45 (= Ath. 12.521b–e). This passage begins with a summary of the sumptuary laws of Syracuse, attributed to Phylarchus, and then switches to the laws of the Sybarites, which aim to promote rather than curtail luxury. The switch is probably due to Athenaeus’ combining two different passages, but he indicates by a repeated φησίν that Phylarchus is also the source of the second passage. After the scandalised description of the *tryphe*-promoting laws follows a dramatic narrative of the downfall of the Sybarites, introduced with the statement that ‘having run aground on their arrogance’ (ἐξοκείλαντες εἰς ὅβριν) they killed ambassadors from Croton and threw their bodies out unburied – a clear instance of *tryphe* leading to arrogance and impiety, which then lead to disaster as dramatic omens immediately predict divine destruction. Gorman and Gorman have shown that the metaphor ‘to run aground on luxury/arrogance’ is a favourite expression of Athenaeus, and argue that it shows his interpretation of a given story and does not go back to any of his sources. In this case, it is probably Athenaeus’ way of abbreviating the narrative that took Phylarchus from the luxury laws to the murder of the envoys. However, if the murder of the ambassadors, the colourful omens and the subsequent destruction of Sybaris were part of Phylarchus’ *Histories*, the only possible interpretation is one of divine punishment for arrogant impiety regardless of how Athenaeus introduces his abbreviated version.

A similar problem attaches to F 40, another fragment dealing with the dangers of extravagance, which seems to be an abbreviated version of what was a full moralising vignette in Phylarchus:

In his twenty-second book the same author says that Ptolemy II of Egypt, the most august of rulers and second to none in his care for education, was so mentally beguiled and corrupted by unreasonable luxury that he assumed

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68 The running-aground metaphor is often used by Athenaeus to introduce material taken from a new source, so it may mean that he got the omens of divine destruction from an unnamed author and not from Phylarchus. I would, however, choose to believe that he uses the metaphor in this case to introduce a later passage from Phylarchus rather than an entirely different source.
that he would live forever and said that he alone had discovered immortality. So, being tortured by gout for many days, when he eventually recovered and saw through some openings in his colonnade the Egyptians breakfasting by the river, contributing whatever they happened to have, sprawled on the ground, he said: ‘Miserable wretch that I am to not be one of them!’ (Phylarchus, F 40 = Ath. 12.536e)

This vignette shows a powerful and arrogantly impious character whose suffering makes him realise his mistake and, perhaps, avoid downfall. This philosophical insight could be the reason why the king is described in extremely positive terms at the beginning of the fragment, or this praise may have been composed by Athenaeus. Either way, the message that even powerful human beings are not masters of their own fates is clear, as is the message that power and wealth are not enough to make a man happy. (This message is often called Herodotean, and we shall encounter it again in Chapter 4.) What is less clear is whether the connection between Ptolemy’s ‘undiluted luxury’ and his impiety was made by Phylarchus or by Athenaeus.

F 44, the third fragment relating to decadence and its consequences, seems to be a close paraphrase, if not a verbatim quotation, of Phylarchus by Athenaeus (Φύλαρχος γοῦν ἐν τῇ ε καὶ κ τῶν ἱστοριῶν τάδε γράφει). It compares the decadence of third-century Sparta with the moderation of a previous era. The mention of the habits of two men ‘who lived a short time before the reign of Cleomenes’ as the peak of degeneration perhaps points to a larger narrative arc in Phylarchus, whereby Cleomenes became the restorer of Spartan moderation and with it their fighting ability and general fortunes. Four further ‘fragments’ mention Phylarchus as a source for the luxurious or immoderate habits of historical characters (the Byzantines F 7, Isanthes of Thrace F 20, Alexander the Great and his companions F 41, the Colophonians F 66), but are too brief for an analysis to be possible.

One enigmatic fragment, Polybius’ acidic criticism of Phylarchus’ treatment of the fall of Mantinea (F 53 = Polyb. 2.56.6–7), shows that Phylarchus at least on one occasion narrated the fall of a city in dramatic detail. Considering the moralising use of such narratives in Diodorus and very probably also Timaeus, it is not unlikely that Phylarchus meant his narrative to be understood as moralising through pathos; and taking our cue from Polybius’ statement that Phylarchus’ vivid narrative derived from a desire ‘to make crystal clear the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians, and along with them of Aratus and the Achaean’s’ (βουλόμενος δὴ διασαφεῖν τὴν ὠμότητα τὴν Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Μακεδόνων, ἅμα δὲ τούτωι τὴν Ἀράτου καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν) we may speculate that one of the moral messages was the typical abuse of good fortune by victorious troops and commanders.
Unfortunately, Polybius gives us so few details about what Phylarchus actually said that this must remain speculation.\(^69\)

It remains to be asked what moral qualities Phylarchus promoted. From the surviving fragments, the negative *paradeigmata* are easier to discern, and predictable from Athenaeus’ prominence as covertext: the bad man lives in luxury, he is immoderate in drink and sexual appetites, and he treats his defeated enemies cruelly.\(^70\) The good man is presumably moderate, although no one is credited with this virtue in the extant fragments. In addition, he is courageous and competent on the battlefield and shows steadfast endurance in the face of personal persecution.\(^71\) So far the vices and virtues are entirely traditional, if a little patchily covered due to the fragmentary nature of the evidence. One aspect of a leader’s personality, however, seems to have been of more interest to Phylarchus than to any of the other Hellenistic historiographers covered by this study: a sense of humour. No fewer than five fragments are vignettes that display a ruler’s wit: F\(^{11}\) on Alexander (of Pherae or Epirus); F\(^{12}\), F\(^{19}\) and F\(^{31}\) on Demetrius Poliorcetes, who is called ‘fond of a joke’ twice (φιλόγελως: F\(^{12}\) and F\(^{19}\)); and F\(^{37}\), which shows Philip II’s light-hearted reaction to a profession of undying hostility from an opponent.\(^72\) In this Phylarchus is more in line with the Classical Xenophon, as we shall see in Chapter 6, than with any of his Hellenistic peers. Phylarchus also seems to have had something to say about how to behave towards powerful rulers such as tyrants or Hellenistic kings. Three fragments concern flatterers (admittedly because they have been collected by Athenaeus for a passage of book 12 on flattery) and relate their ignominious behaviour in scornful detail, while other passages seem to give credit to subjects who behave with courage and *parrhesia* towards their rulers.\(^73\)

An important question for Phylarchus as for the other fragmentary works of history is whether his moral code was enforced by divine intervention.\(^74\) If the end of F\(^{45}\) on the omens and destruction of the Sybarites

\(^{69}\) On the allusiveness of Polybius’ criticism see Scheps (2005).


\(^{71}\) Courage: F\(^{59}\) = Plut. Cleom. 27–9; I assume that only the bare bones of this narrative go back to Phylarchus. Endurance: F\(^{67}\) = Diog. Laert. 9.12.115, which briefly gives Phylarchus as a source for the courage of P'aylus of the Troad.

\(^{72}\) F\(^{11}\) = Ath. 6.58c, F\(^{12}\) = Ath. 14.614d–615a, F\(^{19}\) = Ath. 6.261b, F\(^{31}\) = Ath. 6.261b, F\(^{37}\) = Ath. 6.249c.

\(^{73}\) Flatterers: F\(^{11}\) = Ath. 6.58c, F\(^{29}\) = Ath. 6.254f–255a, F\(^{31}\) = Ath. 6.261b. Courageous subjects: F\(^{22}\) = Phot. Lexicon s.v. tiara, F\(^{37}\) = Ath. 6.249c. Phylarchus also clearly had a fondness for stories about friendships between human beings and animals: man and dolphin F\(^{26}\), Egyptians and asps F\(^{27}\), man and horse F\(^{49}\), boy and eagle F\(^{61}\).

\(^{74}\) Africa (1960, 1961: 52–6) argues that Phylarchus does not display belief in any divine
does come from Phylarchus, this is clear evidence that divine punishment of impiety played a part in his work. One further fragment, F 70 (= Parth. Amat. narr. 25), certainly shows divine punishment of impiety. Here the mistress of one of the Phocian generals responsible for appropriating the Delphic treasure during the Sacred War asks for and receives Eriphyle’s necklace after the plundering of Delphi during the Sacred War. The end of the story is similar to the one related by Diodorus (see p. 90):

ἐπεὶ δὲ διεκομίσθη εἰς οἶκον τὸν Ἀρίστωνος, χρόνον μὲν τινα ἔφορει αὐτὸν ἡ γυνὴ μάλα περίπυστος οὖσα, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παραπλήσιον αὐτῇ πάθος συνέβη τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἐριφύλην γεγομένων. ὁ γὰρ νεώτερος τῶν υἱῶν αὐτῆς μανεῖς τὴν οἰκίαν ὕφησε καὶ τὴν τε μητέρα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν κτημάτων κατέφλεξεν.

When the necklace was brought into the house of Ariston, the woman first wore it for a time and was highly celebrated; but then a disaster struck her much like those that had happened to Eriphyle. For the younger of her two sons went insane, set the house on fire, and burned his mother to death along with all their possessions. (Phylarchus, F 70 = Parth. Amat. narr. 25)

It is not explicitly said that being burned to death is punishment for the woman’s greed and impiety, or that the punishment is divinely sent. Nonetheless, superhuman causation is implied: firstly, the structure of the passage leads the reader to see a connection between the wearing of the necklace and the death caused by the son’s madness, indeed between the necklace and the son’s going mad in the first place, and that connection can hardly be human. Furthermore, the narrator is careful to point out that the fate which overtook Phaullus’ mistress was ‘much like those that had happened to Eriphyle’ (i.e. murder at the hands of her son). Such an ironical aptness of punishment is in Diodorus, and most probably in Timaeus, a sign of divine vengeance, and is likely to have been so also in Phylarchus. (It goes back to Herodotus, as we shall see in Chapter 4.) Unfortunately, we cannot be sure whether this was exactly how Phylarchus told the story: the reference to his Histories is given in a ‘manchette’, one of the marginal notes added to most of the stories told by Parthenius at the bottom of the page of the manuscript (in this case ἱστορεῖ Φύλαρχος, ‘Phylarchus says in his Histories’), which almost certainly go back not to the author, Parthenius, but to an ancient scribe or scholar. To what degree these manchettes signal correspondence between the story as told by Parthenius and the story as told by the work mentioned in the manchette is unclear, as all

power, and that his general tendency to let the good be successful and the wicked suffer is a purely human mechanism. Contra Pédech (1989: 473), who argues that even though Phylarchus did not believe in the traditional Greek gods, he does show belief in a more general divine justice which rewards the good and punishes the wicked.
of the works mentioned are now lost; they could essentially be references to places where the scholar has found similar but not identical versions of the same myth.\textsuperscript{75} However, since the other known versions of the story of the woman who received Eriphyle’s necklace all differ from the one told by Parthenius to some degree, it is tempting to believe that he reproduces Phylarchus’ version faithfully.\textsuperscript{76}

Two further instances of divine punishment are found in fragments retelling obscure mythological stories, namely F 69 on Demiphon of Elaeusa, who sacrifices other men’s daughters to Apollo and is finally given the blood of his own daughters to drink, and F 71 on Dimoetes who causes his wife’s suicide and soon after falls in love with the dead body of another woman and kills himself. However, as Phylarchus’ \textit{Histories} began in 272 BC, these stories must have been told either in digressions or in speeches delivered by characters, which makes them impossible to interpret in their decontextualised and renarrated form.\textsuperscript{77} Nevertheless, they may be evidence that divine justice played a part generally in the work.

It is difficult to say anything about the moralising techniques employed by Phylarchus on the basis of the fragments, as they have all been through some kind of adaptation process before being incorporated into the coertext. However, it is probably safe to assume that Phylarchus made use of moralising vignettes, often with speech, perhaps even soliloquies.\textsuperscript{78} It is possible that he resembled Xenophon in this regard, as in his enthusiasm for reproducing the wit of his characters; we shall see in Chapter 6 that Xenophon was fond of quoting witty or punchy sayings of characters about to die, and two of the Phylarchan fragments may well be remnants of such courageous-death vignettes (F 24 on Danae and F 67 on Praullus). On the testimony of Polybius (2.56 = F 53) and Plutarch (\textit{Them.} 32.4 = F 76), who both criticise Phylarchus for treating history like tragedy, we can assume that Phylarchus engaged in moralising through pathos, as we have seen that Diodorus and perhaps Timaeus and Duris did. From fragments such as F 41 on the extravagance of Alexander the Great and his companions it seems that Phylarchus also, like Diodorus and probably Timaeus and Duris, enjoyed detailed \textit{ekphraseis} of luxury and decadence. A few

\textsuperscript{75} For a discussion of ‘manchettes’ in Parthenius see Lightfoot (1999: \textit{ad loc.}, 246–56 with bibliography).

\textsuperscript{76} Other versions: Diod. Sic. 16.64.2, Plut. \textit{Mor.} 553e, Ath. 6.232d = FGrH 70 F 96, Ath. 13.605a–d = FGrH 115 F 248.

\textsuperscript{77} F 69 = Hyg. \textit{Poet. astr.} II 40, F 71 = Parth. \textit{Amat. narr.} 31.

\textsuperscript{78} Pédech (1989: 460–2) notes that Phylarchus’ penchant for pathetic direct speech uttered by characters with no one to hear them, such as Ptolemy here and Danae in F 24, is a technique used in tragedy. This is true, if the utterances are indeed soliloquies: we cannot know for certain that the original vignettes did not feature an audience for and perhaps even respondents to the exclamations.
fragments seem like moralising introductions (F 20) or conclusions (end of F 69), but it is impossible to be sure that these were employed in that capacity in the original Histories.

**AGATHARCHIDES OF CNIDUS (FGrH 86)**

Agatharchides of Cnidus lived from c. 215 to some point after 145 BC and was thus a contemporary of Polybius. The fragments of his works have traditionally been thought to come from three different outputs: *On Asia* (Τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν), *On Europe* (Τὰ κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην) and *On the Red Sea* (Περὶ τὰς Ἐρύθρας Θαλάσσης), the former two histories, the last one either a geography or a history. Only twenty-two fragments, primarily preserved by Athenaeus, are said to come from *On Asia* and *On Europe*. *On the Red Sea* has fared rather better. Codex 250 of the Bibliothek of the Byzantine patriarch Photius reproduces a long fragment (fifty-five pages in the Belles Lettres edition) partly of book 1, partly of book 5. The similarity between the extracts from book 5 and Diodorus 3.12–48 as well as Strabo 16.4.5–20 makes it possible to identify Agatharchides as the source of these later works, although in the case of Strabo through an intermediary source, probably Artemidorus of Ephesus. Of these three covertexts, Photius is the one that stays the closest to the original: as long ago as 1955, Palm showed that Photius had copied long stretches of Agatharchides verbatim and had abbreviated the text by leaving out passages rather than by summarising. Diodorus’ version is fuller, but has changed both the style and some of the emphasis of Agatharchides’ text. The fact that Strabo’s version is not based directly on Agatharchides makes it less useful for our purposes.

The title *On the Red Sea* and, indeed, the contents of the long passage from book 5, which deals with the geography, flora, fauna and ethnography of the regions on either side of the Red Sea, give the impression of a work of geography and ethnography rather than history. However, both Photius and Diodorus call Agatharchides a historian, and Burstein

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80 Schwartz (1893), Fraser (1972: I, 539 with II, 773 n. 160), Burstein (1989). This has made some scholars read and print Diod. Sic. 3.12–48 as Agatharchides (Müller 1855, Woelk 1966) despite the fact that Diodorus clearly changed the style as well as some of the points of Agatharchides’ text; see Palm (1955) and Burstein (1989).

81 Palm (1955: 16–26).

82 For a fuller discussion of the difference between the three covertexts see Burstein (1989: 36–9).

83 ἀνεγνώσθη Ἀγαθαρχίδου Ἱστορικόν: Phot. Bibl. cod. 213, BNJ 86 T 2; ὡς φησιν Ἀγαθαρχίδης δὲ Κνίδιος ἱστοριογράφος: Diod. Sic. 3.18.4.
and Marcotte have both argued convincingly that the work was primarily a work of history.\textsuperscript{84} Marcotte, followed by Ameling, has further argued that \textit{On the Red Sea} was not a separate work at all, but that it formed the introductory books to \textit{On Asia}, which in its turn formed the preamble to \textit{On Europe}, constituting one overall work of forty-nine books.\textsuperscript{85} This is an attractive hypothesis, but ultimately we have too little evidence to be certain. For the purposes of the present study it is of no great consequence whether the remaining fragments come from one, two or three works, as long as we can assume that they were all works of history. In this respect it is telling that Photius, when praising Agatharchides for his grand and imaginative style, puts him on a par with Thucydides (T 1). Furthermore, the extant fragments of \textit{On the Red Sea} would look perfectly congruous in a work of history, provided it included geography and ethnography on the scale of Herodotus and Diodorus. Jacoby, however, mainly relegated the long fragment of book 5 to his planned, but never realised, volume V about geography, and only printed twelve passages from it in his volume on universal history.

For the present study, the text has been accessed in the Belles Lettres edition of Photius and the Loeb edition of Diodorus. All numbers referring to the long Agatharchides fragment in Photius and Diodorus are the ones used by Burstein (1989), who helpfully prints the two texts side by side. They often correspond to the chapter numbers of Photius in the Belles Lettres edition; when they do not, this will be noted. When confusion is possible between the \textit{FGrH} fragments and passages preserved in Photius and/or Diodorus, the former will be labelled ‘\textit{FGrH}’, the latter ‘Bur.’.

Of the twenty-two fragments of \textit{On Asia} and \textit{On Europe}, it is striking that no fewer than twelve are explicitly moralising,\textsuperscript{86} of which eight are concerned with some form of \textit{tryphe} or lack of moderation. This large proportion of moralising and the heavy emphasis on \textit{tryphe} are no doubt due to the fact that thirteen of the twenty-two fragments are preserved by Athenaeus. However, in the continuous passage of \textit{On the Red Sea} from Photius another seven instances of moralising are found on a variety of themes; some of these instances are lengthy, which shows that moral didacticism did play a part, perhaps even a central one, in Agatharchides’

\textsuperscript{84} Scholarship on Agatharchides is scarce. The best overall treatments are Woelk (1966), Fraser (1972: 539–50), Strasburger (1982 [1966]: 1006–10) and Burstein (1989, n.d.). Marcotte (2001) and Ameling (2008) provide an interesting and partially convincing corrective to the traditional understanding of his works, but Strasburger is the one whose reading comes the closest to my own, as shall become clear in the following.


work. The unusual preservation of such a long passage of an otherwise lost work means that we have a better idea of Agatharchides’ style and the flavour of his work than is the case for the other historiographers treated in this chapter. Nonetheless, we shall begin with the fragments collected in the $FGrH$.

Let us begin with the tryphe passages. As with the tryphe fragments of Timaeus, Duris and Phylarchus, it is impossible to say with certainty how much comes from Agatharchides and how much is Athenaeus’ interpretation and rewriting. Thus F 2 and F 3 give Agatharchides’ *On Asia* as the source for information about the extravagant dining habits of Alexander’s companions (or his Successors), labelling it ‘excessive luxury’ (ὑπερβαλλούσῃ τρυφῇ), a phrase no doubt attached by Athenaeus. However, the fact that these details – gold wrappers for dried fruit thrown away with the rubbish, gold studs on footwear, purple rugs for walk-and-talk meetings – were in Agatharchides’ work in the first place is interesting: although not impossible, it is hard to imagine that he reported them with approval; more probably they were either narrated in a scandalised tone of voice or had pejorative phrases attached, maybe even explicit moralising. In two cases a fragment shows disastrous consequences resulting from extravagant living: F 7 states that Magas, tyrant of Cyrene, died from obesity ‘because of bodily inactivity and the amount of food he ate’ (δι’ ἀργίαν σώματος καὶ τῶν προσφέρεσθαι πλῆθος τροφῆς); and F 14 gives Agatharchides as the authority for the fact that the inexperience of the Zacynthians in war (leading to their capture by Philip V) was due to their prosperity, wealth and luxurious living. Burstein argues that this causal connection was made by Athenaeus, not Agatharchides, which is possible, but it looks more as if Athenaeus is abbreviating a longer account in Agatharchides with the same moral point:

εν δὲ τῇ λα ᾽Ζακυνθίους φησίν ἀπείρους εἶναι πολέμου διὰ τὸ ἐν εὐπορίαι καὶ πλούτῳ τρυφῶντας ἐθίζεσθαι.

And he says in the thirty-first book that the Zacynthians were inexperienced in war because they were used to luxurious living in prosperity and wealth. (Agatharchides, *FGrH* 86 F 14 = Ath. 12.528a)

Finally, F 16 purports to quote Agatharchides verbatim as saying that the Arycandeis of Lycia joined Antiochus III (or his general

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87 F 7 and F 11–18 from book 1; F 21, F 24–9, F 49, F 100a, F 103a from book 5.
88 See Burstein (n.d.: ad F 3).
89 As demonstrated by Gorman and Gorman (2007); see discussion above.
90 See Burstein (n.d.: ad loc.) for the probable historical context.
Mithridates against the Romans because they had been led into debt by ‘their profligate and extravagant lifestyle’ (τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον ἀσωτίαν καὶ πολυτέλειαν). In this last passage, the causal connection was certainly in Agatharchides, and we have a clear instance of morally evaluative vocabulary:

᾽Αγαθαρχίδης δ᾽ ἐν τῇ τριακοστῇ πέμπτῃ τῶν Εὐρωπιακῶν ἔριθ᾽ Ἀρυκανδεῖς φησί ‘Λυκίας ὁμοροι ὄντες Λιμυρεῦσι διὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον ἀσωτίαν καὶ πολυτέλειαν κατάρχειο γενόμενοι καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀργίαν καὶ φιληδονίαν ἀδυνατοῦντες ἀποδοῦνται τὰ δάνεια προσέκλιναν ταῖς Μιθριδάτου ἐλπίσιν ἄθλον ἔξειν νομίσαντες χρεῶν ἀποκοπάς.’

Agatharchides says in the thirty-fifth book of his On Europe: ‘The Arycandeis of Lycia, who were neighbours of the Limyrians, had come into debt because of their profligate and extravagant lifestyle, and because of their indolence and addiction to pleasure they were unable to pay back their loans, so they joined in the hopes of Mithridates, thinking that they would win the cancellation of their debts as a prize.’ (Agatharchides, FGrH 86 F 16 = Ath. 12.35.527f)

A further two fragments refer to Agatharchides for information about the ignominy of being fat in Sparta (F 10 and F 11, the latter apparently from a speech), and one more mentions Spartan punishment for immoderation (ἀσωτία: F 12). Although all of these fragments are found in Athenaeus, whose interest in tryphe we have discussed above, the conclusion seems unavoidable that the theme of immoderation and its negative consequences played some part in Agatharchides.

This theory is supported by the fact that moderation and immoderation are also a theme in the long ethnographic passage from book 5 preserved by Photius and Diodorus. Here, the least civilised of all people, the ‘Fish-eaters’ who do not use tools and do not have a language, are also lacking in civilised virtues such as moderation. Whenever they have food, they eat ‘not according to any weight or measure, but only to each person’s desire and gratification’ (οὐ πρὸς μέτρον καὶ σταθμόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου βουλήσιν καὶ χάριν: F 34a and very similar phrase in F 34b). And when the narrative reaches the wealthy Sabaeans of South Arabia, their extravagant riches are described in great detail, then rounded off with the devastatingly moralising conclusion:

Εἰ δὲ μὴ πόρρω διεστηκυῖαν τὴν οἰκήσιν κατεῖχον τῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τόπον τὰς δυνάμεις στρεφόντων, οἰκονόμοι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἄν ὑπῆρχον οἱ κύριοι

91 See Burstein (n.d.: ad loc.) for the probable historical context.
93 F 34a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250.34 459a; F 34b = Diod. Sic. 3.16.1–4.
τῶν ἰδίων ἄθλων, τῆς ῥᾳθυμίας ἀδυνατοῦσης τὸ ἐλεύθερον πλείω χρόνον διατηρεῖν.

If they did not have their home so far from those who deploy their forces into every area, those who are masters of their own prizes would be the stewards of others’ because laziness is unable to guard freedom for long.

(Agatharchides, F 104a (Bur.) = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 102 l. 42–5)

This is a message with which especially Polybius, but also Diodorus, would agree. Likewise, the generalising moral conclusion to F 101a and b might equally well have been phrased by either of these authors: ‘Thus, any natural advantage managed with moderation and order promotes life, but if deprived of due measure and proportion, it becomes a burdensome possession’ (Ὅτως ἄπαν ἐπίτευγμα μεσότητι μὲν καὶ τάξει κυβερνώμενον παραπέμπει τὸν βίον, συμμετρίας δὲ καὶ καιροῦ στερηθέν οὐκ ἔχει τὴν κτῆσιν ὀνησιφόρον). 94 In Agatharchides, however, this message of moderation is connected with another core message which is less conspicuous in Polybius and Diodorus, namely that of virtues arising from necessity: the nomadic Troglodytes, who fight fierce battles over pasture, and whose funeral rites are ‘intelligently’ (νουνεχῶς) conceived, are able to conquer the desire for sleep by practice out of necessity (τῆς μελέτης διὰ τάναγκαίον τὴν φύσιν νικώσης: F 64), some of the Fish-eaters have been taught how to make shelters out of whale skeletons by ‘a need arising from nature’ (τῆς κατὰ φύσιν χρείας: F 43), and the otherwise luxurious Sabaean have been taught to make boats by the tide (διδασκούσης τὴν χρείαν τῆς ἀναπώτιδος καὶπερ ἐν τρυφῆ καταγινομένου: F 103a).

But we can go further. The long, ethnographic fragment preserved by Photius and Diodorus begins with the least civilised people of all, the Fish-eaters and other peoples who are barely more advanced than animals (they do not use fire and do not have a language), but who live in a state of peace with each other and harmony with nature, without knowledge of what is morally good or bad (F 30–52). 96 It then proceeds through peoples of increased degrees of civilisation, who use increasingly complex tools and cooking methods and fight each other with weapons (F 53–64), through those who mine gemstones (F 84), until it gets to the extravagantly

94 F 101a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 99 l. 37–9; F 101b = Diod. Sic. 3.47.3.
95 F 64a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 63 l. 17–18; F 64b = Diod. Sic. 3.32.2–6; F 43b = Diod. Sic. 3.19.1–9; F 103a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 101 l. 24–5. See also F 53b (end). The idea seems to come from or be shared with the Stoics.
96 For the ‘harmony with nature’ theme see especially F 38b = Diod. Sic. 3.17.3–4, F 42b = Diod. Sic. 3.18.1–2 and F 49 = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 451b. Lack of knowledge of the morally good and bad: αἰσχρῶν δὲ καὶ καλῶν οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην εἰσφέρομενον ἐννοιαν (F 31a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 449b and F 31b = Diod. Sic. 3.15.1–2). Some of these ‘peoples’ are almost certainly apes (F 52).
wealthy Sabaeans, whose civilisation has tipped over into degeneration (F 99–106).\(^97\) This structure seems to carry a moral-didactic message: in order to live like a good human being one needs a certain amount of civilisation and a healthy dose of moderation and self-discipline, but not too much wealth, or slackness and effeminacy (F 103a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 101) are bound to follow.

Another theme that runs through the long fragment of Agatharchides’ book 5 is suffering, human and animal. This was already singled out as a characteristic of his work by Strasburger, who emphasised Agatharchides’ broadening of the historiographical horizon to encompass the suffering of the unnamed and socially marginal alongside that of famous generals and well-known Greek peoples, and saw it as a positive development.\(^98\) For most other scholars it has been a sign that Agatharchides was a disreputable representative of the school of ‘tragic history’ influenced by the Peripatetics.\(^99\) We see this feature of On the Red Sea in the description of the conditions of the convicts working the gold mines of Nubia (F 22–9 [Bur.]), but it is also a prominent theme of the long descriptions of elephant hunting (F 54 [Bur.]), of dying from Guinea-worm infestation (F 59 [Bur.])\(^100\) and of the dangers of sailing on board an elephant transport ship (F 85 [Bur.]).\(^101\) I would argue that these passages, like the pathetic narratives of the fall of cities in Diodorus (and possibly Duris and Phylarchus), have a didactic point. Interestingly, the first few pages of Photius’ summary of On the Red Sea book 5 supports such an interpretation (F 21 [Bur.] = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 21). Here, Agatharchides discusses exactly the appropriate way to talk about the destruction of a city. He criticises some specific expressions used by certain orators and historians as inappropriate because they are more concerned with creating a novel or clever turn of phrase than with how to describe the event in a vivid manner (διὰ τῆς ἐναργείας) or with pity for the sufferers (τοὺς οἴκτους). This focus on vividness in description (enargeia) and its relation to the provoking of pity in the

\(^97\) This structure has been demonstrated in detail by Ameling (2008), who argues that Agatharchides meant it as an analogy for the origins of mankind; I cannot see the evidence for this. Marcotte (2001: 425–35) argues in detail for a strictly geographical structure.


\(^99\) Schwartz (1893), Woelk (1966) (both without using this expression), and Fraser (1972: 539–50). Burstein (1989) agrees that Agatharchides was influenced by the Peripatetics, but does not discuss tragic history. Contra Santoni (2001), who argues that Agatharchides criticised this type of historiography. For the flawed concept of ‘tragic history’, see above, pp. 85 and 137.

\(^100\) For the identification of the affliction with Guinea-worm infestation see Burstein (1989: ad loc.).

reader is extremely interesting, not least because it goes against Polybius’ guidelines for how to write good history (Polyb. 2.56–68), which are much better known and have long been considered to represent the general view of ‘good’ or ‘sober’ ancient historiographers. Although Marincola (2003) has clearly demonstrated that Polybius is not in this passage denying pity and anger a place in historiography (the historiographer simply has to make sure that they are felt by his readers for the right people), it is clear from Polybius’ contempt for Phylarchus’ pathetic narratives of suffering that the former believes such scenes have no place in historiography, and in fact (the extant parts of) his work contain(s) none. In contrast with Polybius, Agatharchides believes that the good historiographer has a duty to the victims to describe their sufferings in vivid detail; he just wants such descriptions to be respectfully centred on the victims and free of the kind of wordplay that draws more attention to the author than to his subject. This is clear from a passage a bit further on in the fragment where Agatharchides gives an example of what he considers the appropriate way of describing the sack of a city, from Demosthenes:

‘Τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἐξώρυξεν ἐκ τῶν θεμελίων, ὥστε μηδὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἑστίαις καταλιπεῖν τὴν τέφραν, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας τῶν ἡγησαμένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς τῶν βαρβάρων διένειμε. ’Πικρῶς καὶ σαφῶς καὶ βραχέως ἀφ’ ἑκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν εἰληφὼς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, ὅμως τῆς διδασκούσης τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐναργείας οὐκ ἐπελάθετο.

‘He prised the city up from its foundations so as not to leave even ashes on the hearths, and he divided up the children and wives of those who had been the leaders of the Greeks among the tents of the barbarians.’ Although he sharply, clearly and concisely stripped each image of exaggeration, he did not forget the vividness that teaches the essence of the event. (Agatharchides, F 21 (Bur.) = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 21 l. 30–6; translation modified from Burstein)

The quoted description of the brutality of this sacking of a city⁰¹ is both vivid and pathetic, and contains an explicit reference to the sexual abuse of the captured women and children that is reminiscent of Diodorus’ descriptions of the taking of cities. Nevertheless, Agatharchides praises Demosthenes for speaking ‘sharply, clearly and concisely’, for not exaggerating, and for not forgetting ‘the vividness that teaches the essence of the event (τῆς διδασκούσης τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐναργείας). This final phrase is especially

⁰¹ Polybius’ sneering criticism of narratives of pathetic suffering in historiography is at Polyb. 2.56.7–10.
⁰² The quotation is not from any of Demosthenes’ preserved speeches, so we cannot be certain what city he is talking about, but if Agatharchides is right that he is speaking about Alexander the Great, it must be Thebes.
interesting for the purposes of the present study: Agatharchides believes that the mimetic vividness of the description makes it didactic. So what is the reader supposed to learn from it?

In Chapter 2, I argued that Diodorus’ purpose with his pathetic descriptions was to teach a lesson about the changeability of human fortunes and human vulnerability and thereby lead the reader to a recognition of his own frailty and propensity for suffering, which should in turn lead him to avoid cruelty against those in his power. In Agatharchides’ passages on human suffering the mutability of fortune does not play a prominent role: *tyche* is mentioned only once, and in the sense of the ‘allotted fate’ of the Nubian miners rather than a changeable force.\(^{104}\) It seems rather that Agatharchides skipped this step and portrayed human suffering as a purely human affair: caused by human beings, suffered by human beings. What seems to have been radically new in his work is his instalment in the reader of pity for marginalised groups such as primitive non-Greek peoples, convicted criminals, and various labourers in the service of the Ptolemies.

Finally, we need to ask the question we have asked of the other fragmentary works of historiography: is there any sign of divine justice or other superhuman validation of a certain moral value-system? The short answer is no. Neither any of the fragments of *On Europe* and *On Asia* nor the sections from *On the Red Sea* found in Photius and Diodorus contain any examples of divine justice. The closest we get is the narrator expressing his satisfaction at pirates suffering their ‘deserved punishment’ (προσηκόντως ἐκολάσθησαν) in F 90b (Bur.),\(^{105}\) but this is nothing more than use of evaluative vocabulary and does not imply that a superhuman power inflicts the punishment. Furthermore, one set of fragments shows that Agatharchides was deeply critical of certain types of religious behaviour: in F 20a and b (*FGrH*), Josephus says that Agatharchides mocked Stratonice (daughter of Antiochus I of Syria, wife of Demetrius II of Macedon)\(^{106}\) for her superstition in obeying a dream that leads to her death, and then went on to ridicule the Jews for not defending themselves when Jerusalem was attacked by Ptolemy on the Sabbath. Josephus quotes the conclusion that turns this criticism into an explicitly didactic *paradigma*:

> τὸ δὲ συμβὰν πλὴν ἐκείνων τοὺς άλλους πάντας δεδίδαχε τηνικαῦτα φυγεῖν εἰς ἐνύπνια καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ νόμου παραδεδομένην ὑπόνοιαν, ἡνίκα ἂν τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις λογισμοῖς περὶ τῶν διαπορουμένων ἐξασθενήσωσιν.

\(^{104}\) Οὗτοι πάντες οἱ τὸν εἰρημένον τῆς τύχης κλῆρον ὑπελθόντες ποθεινότερον τοῦ βίου τὸν θάνατον (F 26b end [Bur.]).

\(^{105}\) = Diod. Sic. 3.43.5.

\(^{106}\) See Burstein (n.d.: *ad loc.*) for the historical context.
This event has taught everyone except those people [i.e. the Jews] only to take refuge in dreams and inherited notions about [religious] law when human reasoning about situations of great uncertainty falls completely short. (Agatharchides, FGrH 86 F 20a = Joseph Ap. 1.211)

This is tantalisingly similar to Polybius’ statement about when it is appropriate to pray to the gods for answers, and for the historian to fall back on *tyche* as an explanation of events (Polyb. 36.17.2–4). Although he and Agatharchides disagreed on the way to deal with human suffering in a historical narrative, they seem to have shared a certain rationalising narrative persona, which rejects many traditional ways of engaging with religion and sees it only as a last resort. This fits nicely with F 7–8 of Photius’ extract from book 1 of *On the Red Sea*, which is a lengthy harangue against belief in traditional myths, based on rational arguments and kept in a sarcastic tone. A small sample is enough to convey the point:

Τῶν δὲ μετηλλαχότων τὸν βίον ἐπὶ σχολῆς πρὸς Ὀδυσσέα διεξέρχεσθαι παντοδαπῆ ἀδολεσχίαν, ἐκ τῆς ἀμόρφου σκιᾶς τὸ τῆς ὄψεως γινώσκοντα ἱδίομα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνειν οὐ κοιλίας, οὐ βρόγχους ἔχοντας, ἑτέρους δὲ φοβεῖσθαι τὸν σίδηρον οὐκέτι δυναμένου τρωθῆναι, τινὰς δὲ πέτρον κυλίειν τῶν σωμάτων πάλαι κατακεκαυμένων, ἄλλους δὲ δικάζειν ἑτέροις τεθνηκόσιν ἀδικήματος οὐδενὸς ὑπάρχοντος·

Dead people leisurely carried on all sorts of silly conversations with Odysseus, who recognised individual shapes from the formless shadow; and some of them drank although they had no stomachs and gullets; and others feared his sword although they no longer could be wounded; and others were rolling a stone although their bodies long ago had been cremated; and others judged other dead persons although no crime had taken place. (Agatharchides, *On the Red Sea* F 7 = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 443b; translation modified from Burstein)

This is a ruthlessly logical approach to ancient myths, expressed in a manner designed to amuse and shock the reader in equal measure. It could not be more different from Diodorus’ pious narratives of gods and demigods as culture heroes, and one suspects that it would be too coarse for Polybius’ sensibilities.107

If the gods are absent from Agatharchides’ narrative, it looks as though *tyche* may have played a part. It shows up five times as seemingly a historical agent: in F 41a and b of *On the Red Sea* the Fish-eaters ‘endure without complaint what fortune has assigned to them from the beginning’, and in F 103 of the same work the narrator comments on the fact that an Arabian people have no firewood, and so are compelled to burn expensive spices,

107 For a discussion of this aspect of Agatharchides’ work see Santoni (2001).
with the remark that ‘so unequally has tyche distributed her goods, giving to some a scarce amount of the good things and to others plenty’ (οὕτως ἀνίσως τὰ αὐτῆς ἡ τύχη μεμέρικε, τοῖς μὲν σπάνιν τῶν σπουδαῖον τοῖς δὲ πλentiful διδοῦσα = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 459a)\textsuperscript{108}. F 17 (Bur.) of On the Red Sea is a third example of tyche as historical agent, but obviously comes from a speech, the context of which is now lost, which means that we cannot know how the reader was meant to respond to it.

The fourth passage that mentions tyche is F 100a of On the Red Sea, which describes a deadly snake found exclusively in the precious incense forests of Arabia Felix:

οἰονεὶ φθονούσης τοῖς ἁδροῖς ἐπιτεύγμασι τῆς τύχης καὶ παραπληκούσης τάγαθῳ τὸ βλαβερόν, δύσμης μηδεὶς εἰς τέλος ἔξυβρίζων τιτανῶδες καὶ κατεγνωκὸς τοῦ θείου τὸ φρόνημα λαμβάνῃ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εὐτυχοῦντων, παιδεύηται δὲ τῇ παραθέσει καὶ μνήμῃ τῶν ἑναντίων.

as if tyche was jealous of abundant prosperity and mixes the good with the harmful in order that no one should show complete insolence in a titanic manner and, disrespectful of the god, should become arrogant in their good fortune, but that they should be educated in the opposite of this behaviour by this juxtaposition and reminder. (Agatharchides, On the Red Sea F 100a (Bur.) = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 98.458b)

The idea of a superhuman power jealous of human success is reminiscent of Archaic Greek thought as well as Herodotus, as we shall remind ourselves in the next chapter; but the use of οἰονεί, ‘as if’, turns the whole statement into a simile, something that is typical of most of the colourful tyche passages in Polybius. It is hard to gauge how seriously to take the passage. On the one hand, οἰονεί creates distance, and the adverb τιτανῶδες (‘in a titanic manner’), used by the same narrator who has spent a large part of his introductory book ridiculing traditional mythology, can only be tongue in cheek. On the other hand, Agatharchides could only compose this simile because the presence of the snakes in the incense forests struck him as a paradoxical juxtaposition of good and evil, which he felt the need to comment on. It is safest to assume that he does not intend his reader here to understand tyche as a divine power, but that he does want us to notice the paradox and pause to realise that nothing in life is perfect; and this is a moral lesson on its own. This thought occurs also in F 91a, which deals with another area of Arabia which is infested with wild beasts.\textsuperscript{109} But

\textsuperscript{108} Woelk (1966: 247) argues that Agatharchides has exaggerated the need to burn spices in order to create an example of tryphe.

\textsuperscript{109} Τούτοις δὲ τοῖς εὐκληρήμασιν ἀντικείμενον παραπέλεκται κακόν (F 91a = Phot. Bibl. cod. 250 457b).
however we interpret tyche in the passage, the message that one should stay humble in good fortune echoes Polybius and Diodorus.

The fact that fortune in Agatharchides seems to have been sometimes randomly unequal (F 103) and at other times consciously jealous (F 100a) points to an inconsistency in the use of the concept akin to the one found in Polybius. Ultimately, tyche, if it was presented as a real superhuman power and not simply used for rhetorical effect, does not seem to rule the world of Agatharchides, but rather to have sporadic influence.

In conclusion, Agatharchides seems to have promoted the staple virtues of moderation and self-discipline, but also less common ones such as pity and solidarity with suffering. We have no examples of what an exemplary good or bad man looked like in his work, but it does seem as if his narrative world was ruled by human rather than divine forces, perhaps with the destabilising factor of tyche thrown in. As for moralising techniques, the long text preserved by Photius and Diodorus allows us to say for certain that Agatharchides used evaluative phrasing and moralising conclusions frequently, but that his most striking technique is moralising through pathos.

POSIDONIUS OF APAMEA (FGrH 87)

Posidonius lived c. 135–45 BC and so was Diodorus’ older contemporary. He was a renowned Stoic philosopher who taught Cicero, and an extremely prolific writer: more than thirty titles of works by him are known, in fields as diverse as astronomy, zoology, ethics and history. The Histories was in fifty-two books; it took over where Polybius had left off and covered the time from 146 BC to probably the mid-80s. It was probably a universal history and was in antiquity recognised as a work springing from Posidonius’ Stoic ethics, that is, a work of explicitly moral history. This understanding of the work was probably based on Posidonius’ now lost preface, and it is a great shame that we do not have an articulation of his moral-didactic programme in his own words. Scholars of the fragments generally agree that Posidonius regarded history as an auxiliary discipline to philosophy, and intended his Histories both to show the organic unity of the world and to present moral paradeigmata in accordance with his

110 The fact that tyche in F 103 is said to act ‘unequally’ has led Fraser (1972: 539–50) to interpret it as the Peripatetic tyche. The interpretation offered in the present study is more in agreement with Burstein (1989: 51 n. 2). For tyche in Polybius see Hau (2011).

111 Malitz (1983: esp. 70–1), Kidd (1999, 2003), Dowden (n.d.). Jacoby (1926b: 156–7) and Laffranque (1964: 118–22) agree on the start date, but argue that the terminus for the work was the mid-90s.

112 Ath. 4.151e = T 12a.

Stoic teachings. It should be clear from our discussions of Polybius and the fragments of Posidonius’ other predecessors that this did not mean doing violence to the genre of historiography and bending it into a new and contorted shape; rather it meant continuing the tradition of already moral-didactic historiography, but with a more explicit commitment to one particular school of philosophy than had been the case in any of his predecessors.

The total number of fragments in *FGrH* (which includes both the fragments assumed to come from the *Histories* and an ethnographical work, *On the Ocean*) is 123, in *BNJ* 124. Of these, the final sixteen were relegated to Jacoby’s *Anhang* as they do not mention Posidonius by name, and they will largely remain unmentioned here. Edelstein and Kidd, who have collected all the fragments of Posidonius across genres, include four historical fragments which are not in *FGrH* or *BNJ*. One of these, labelled F 284, will be discussed below. By far the most prominent covertexts for Posidonius are Strabo (fifty fragments) and Athenaeus (thirty-nine fragments). Third is Plutarch with eight fragments. It is therefore not surprising that most of the moralising fragments of Posidonius are focused on the evils of wealth and luxurious living and the virtue of moderation. Clarke has argued convincingly that Athenaeus and Posidonius shared many interests, including luxury and slavery, and that Athenaeus used references to Posidonius to make himself look like a more serious philosopher. It was therefore in Athenaeus’ best interest to make it look as if he and Posidonius agreed on such issues even if they did not. The upside of this is that Athenaeus often purports to quote Posidonius verbatim, and, if nothing else, these quotations show that Posidonius was sharply critical of luxurious habits. An example is this passage relating to the outbreak of the Sicilian Slave Revolt:

Ποσειδώνιος δ’ ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ τῶν Ἰστοριῶν περὶ Δαμοφίλου λέγων τοῦ Σικελιώτου, δι’ ὅν ὁ δουλικὸς ἐκινήθη πόλεμος, ὅτι τρυφῆς ἦν οἰκεῖος, γράφει καὶ ταῦτα· τρυφῆς οὖν δοῦλος ἦν κακουργίας, διὰ μὲν τῆς χώρας τετρακύκλους ἀπῆνας περιαγόμενος καὶ ἵππους καὶ θεράποντας ὡραίους καὶ παραδρομὴν ἀνάγωγον κολάκων τε καὶ παίδων στρατιωτικῶν. ὕστερον δὲ πανοικίᾳ ἐφυβρίστως κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν περιυβρισθείς.

114 Laffranque (1964), Malitz (1983), Kidd (1999, 2003), Dowden (n.d.). *Contra Jacoby* (1926b: 160–1), who argues obscurely that the work was full of ‘ethical reflections’ without being moralising in nature. Laffranque has argued that Posidonius’ moralising partly took place on the macro-level of the structure of the work, which she sees as a form of objectivity. 115 Edelstein and Kidd (1972). Their decision is explained on p. xxii with n. 2 and 3. 116 Clarke (2007). 117 Fragments on luxury and wealth: F 1, F 6, F 7, F 9a and b, F 10, F 11, F 13, F 14, F 18a, b and c, F 20, F 21a and b, F 25, F 26, F 27, F 36 (among other topics), F 47, F 51, F 68, F 108 (among other topics).
Posidonius, speaking in the eighth book of his *Histories* about Damophilus the Sicilian, because of whom the slave war broke out, says that he was addicted to luxury and writes also this: ‘He was a slave to luxury and villainy, driving four-wheeled coaches through the land accompanied by horses and young, lovely servants, a swarm of flatterers and soldier-like slaves. But later, along with his whole family, he met an ignominious end abused by his household slaves.’ (Posidonius, F 7 = Ath. 12.542b)

This is a piece of moralising effected by evaluative phrasing of a particularly scathing kind. Calling Damophilus a slave to decadence and vice is not just derogatory, but also darkly ironic in this narrative of the inception of the Sicilian Slave Revolt, particularly as his flatterers and the slaves who are going to rise up against him are called soldier-like. The concluding line reads like a compression of a longer Posidonian narrative, probably reproduced more or less closely by Diodorus 34/35.2.12–13 (F 108). The scornful description of Damophilus' elaborate travelling style will then have functioned in the original *Histories* as the depiction of success which preceded his *peripeteia*, and there was almost certainly a causal connection between his arrogance and his downfall (which were both symbolic of the condition and fate of his entire society, to judge from F 108 = Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.12–13).

Numerous other fragments preserve only the detailed, and often derogatory, descriptions of extravagant lifestyles or parties, and may or may not originally have functioned as signals of impending disaster.118 Thus F 9a on the banquets of Antiochus VII Sidetes, F 10 on the public wealth of Syria, and F 21 a and b (= Ath. 12.540a–b and 5.210e) on the lavishness of Antiochus VIII Grypus’ entertainment together point to a discourse on the decadence of Syria in the second century BC, which may well have been connected with its loss of territory to the Parthians and descent into civil war.119 This interpretation is supported by F 11, which records a saying of Arsaces VI Mithridates of Parthia over the dead body of his enemy Antiochus Sidetes – no doubt originally part of a moralising vignette – attributing his military defeat to heavy drinking and overconfidence.120 It is also, perhaps, revealing that none of the Posidonian fragments betray

118 In addition to those discussed in the main text: F 1 on the feasting habits of the Romans and Tyrrenians (probably combined from two different passages in the *Histories*; see Kidd 1999: *ad loc.*); F 13 on the entertainment of Himerus, tyrant of Babylon and Seleucia, by Lysimachus the Babylonian (probably under duress; see Dowden n.d.: *ad loc.*); F 14 on the over-the-top funeral held by Harpalus for the *hetaira* Pythionice; F 25 on varieties of beautiful cups; and F 68 on the preferred wine of the Persian king.

119 F 9a = Ath. 12.540b–c, F 10 = Ath. 12.527e–f, F 21a = Ath. 12.540a–b, F 21b = Ath. 5.210e. For the historical context see Dowden (n.d.: *ad F 10*).

120 ἔσφηλέν σε, Ἅντιοχε, θάρσος καὶ μέθη· ἥλπιζες γὰρ ἐν μεγάλους ποτηρίους τῆς Ἀρσάκου βασιλείαν ἐκπεινεῖ.: F 11 = Ath. 10.439d–e.
any admiration for a ruler’s – or any other party host’s – generosity despite detailed descriptions of lavish entertainment and take-home presents of considerable value.\footnote{E.g. F 9a and b (= Ath. 12.540b–c and 5.210c–d) relate that Antiochus Sidetes held daily receptions in which he gave out whole cooked animals, honey-cakes and gold-threaded garlands, and F 21a and b (= Ath. 12.540a–b and 5.210d–e) that Antiochus Grypus during feasts gave out to participants whole joints of meat as well as live animals, gold and silver, and a camel and its groom per guest.} It is, of course, possible that such praise has been lost as Athenaeus focused on the extravagant details, but considering Posidonius’ Stoic credentials it is more likely that no praise was there to begin with because such extravagances were negative rather than positive paradeigmata.\footnote{See the interesting discussions of the role of tryphe in Ptolemaic court propaganda in Heinen (1983) and Ager (2005: 22–8).}

Part of tryphe is immoderate eating and drinking, and some memorable fragments of Posidonius deal with this theme. A good example is this description of Alexander, son of Ptolemaeus Physcon:

\begin{quote}
εἰς πάχος δ᾽ ἐπεδεδώκει καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ᾽Αλέξανδρος, ὁ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μητέρα ἀποκτείνας συμβασιλεύουσαν αὐτῷ. φησὶ γοῦν περὶ αὐτοῦ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῇ ἐβδόμῃ καὶ τεσσαρακοστῇ τῶν Ἰστοριῶν οὕτως· ‘ὁ δὲ τῆς Ἀιγύπτου δύναστης μισούμενος μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ὄχλων, κολακευόμενος δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν, ἐν πολλῇ δὲ τρυφῇ ζόν, οὐδὲ <ἀπο>πατεῖν οἷός τε ἦν, εἰ μὴ δυσὶν ἐπαπερείδόμενος [ἐπορεύετο]\footnote{On the conjectures enabling this surely correct reading see Dowden (n.d.: ad loc.).} εἰς δὲ τὰς ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ὀρχήσεις ἀπὸ μετεώρων κλινῶν καθαλλόμενος ἀνυπόδητος συντονωτέρας αὐτὰς τῶν ἥσκηκότων ἐποιεῖτο.
\end{quote}

His (Ptolemaeus Physcon’s) son Alexander also gave himself up to obesity, the one who killed his own mother when she was his co-regent. At any rate, Posidonius in the forty-seventh book of his Histories says thus: ‘The king of Egypt hated by the masses, flattered by his entourage, and living in great luxury, was not even able to withdraw to relieve himself unless he leaned upon two [slaves]. But leaping into dances at the symposium from high couches he would perform them barefoot and more eagerly than the professionals.’ (Posidonius,F 26 = Ath. 12.550a–b)

Like the passage on Damophilus, igniter of the Sicilian Slave War, quoted above, this is a description dripping with moralistic venom. Alexander’s tryphe, the very thing on which he presumably prided himself,\footnote{This, however, does not prevent him from engaging in embarrassing and unkingly pursuits such as dancing. The fact that he, like any tyrant, is hated by his people and has flatterers instead of friends follows directly from his ignominious behaviour, rather than from, say, any cruelty or tyrannical acts (although, of course, Posidonius may well have discussed such addi-} debilitates him to the degree that he cannot even go to the toilet without assistance.\footnote{123 On the conjectures enabling this surely correct reading see Dowden (n.d.: ad loc.).}
tional vices in now lost passages). A very similar and equally morally disgusted passage deals with the obesity and consequent physical lack of ability of Alexander’s father, Ptolemaeus Physcon (F 6 = Ath. 12.549d–e).

At the opposite end of the scale, several fragments are concerned with positive paradeigmata of moderation. F 24 ( = Ath. 4.153b–c) states that Heracleon, a general of Antiochus Grypus, made changes to the army’s regime by having them take simple meals on the ground; no praise for this is preserved, but it is obviously meant as a positive counter-example to the extravagances of Antiochus Grypus himself. F 59 ( = Ath. 6.273a–275b) is a long passage on old Roman virtue, which references Posidonius three times. Although it is unlikely that the whole passage is reproduced from his Histories, the implication seems to be that the passage is in general agreement with Posidonius’ work.\(^\text{124}\) This extract from the fragment is probably a paraphrase of Posidonius and perhaps uses some of his terminology:

\[
\pi\acute{a}t\acute{r}i\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\;\mu\acute{e}n\;\gamma\acute{a}r\;\eta\acute{n}\;\alpha\i\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma\;\acute{\omega}z\;\phi\nu\zeta\;\Pi\omicron\sigma\epsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\dot{\iota}d\omicron\nu\omicron\varsigma,\;\kappa\alpha\acute{r}t\epsilon\kappa\acute{e}\iota\alpha\iota\rho\varsigma\;\kappa\acute{a}t\acute{e}r\omicron\iota\acute{a}\iota\varsigma\;\kappa\acute{a}t\acute{e}\nu\;\dot{\delta}\acute{i}a\acute{i}t\acute{a}\;\kappa\acute{a}t\acute{e}\nu\;\dot{t}o\nu\;\acute{\alpha}l\acute{l}o\nu\nu\;\dot{t}o\nu\;\acute{p}r\acute{o}z\;\dot{t}h\acute{e}n\;\kappa\acute{t}\acute{e}z\acute{i}n\;\acute{\alpha}f\acute{e}l\acute{e}\acute{h}\varsigma\;\kappa\acute{a}t\acute{e}\nu\;\acute{\alpha}p\acute{e}\dot{t}r\acute{i}e\acute{r}\acute{g}\acute{o}z\;\chi\acute{r}\acute{h}\acute{e}z\acute{i}z\acute{e};\;\acute{e}t\acute{i}\;\acute{d}e\;\epsilon\nu\acute{e}\acute{s}\acute{e}b\acute{e}i\acute{a}\;\mu\acute{e}n\;\theta\acute{a}w\acute{a}m\acute{a}st\acute{h}i\;\pi\acute{e}r\acute{i}\;\dot{t}o\;\dot{d}a\acute{m}\acute{o}\acute{n}\acute{i}o\nu\nu,\;\dot{d}i\acute{k}a\i\acute{o}s\acute{u}n\acute{h}i\;\acute{d}e\;\acute{a}\;\kappa\acute{a}t\acute{e}\nu\;\pi\acute{o}l\acute{l}h\acute{i}\;\dot{t}o\nu\;\dot{p}l\acute{e}m\acute{e}l\acute{e}i\nu\nu\;\acute{e}u\acute{l}\acute{a}b\acute{e}i\acute{a}\;\pi\acute{r}o\nu\;\acute{p}\acute{a}nt\acute{a}z\acute{a}z\;\acute{a}n\acute{t}r\acute{h}\acute{r}\acute{o}p\acute{u}z\omicron\upsigma\;\mu\acute{e}t\acute{a}\;\dot{t}h\acute{e}\;\kappa\acute{a}t\acute{a}\;\gamma\acute{e}\acute{w}r\acute{g}\acute{r}ι\acute{a}n\;\acute{u}\acute{s}k\acute{h}\acute{i}ς\acute{e}w\acute{z}\acute{e}w.\]

Their ancestral ways, as Posidonius says, consisted in endurance, frugal lifestyle, and, in other matters concerning possessions, simple and unelaborate practice – also, amazing piety concerning the divine, justice and a great awareness of trespassing against other men, together with discipline through farming. (Posidonius, F 59 = Ath. 6.107; translation modified from Dowden n.d.)

Endurance, frugality, simple lifestyle, piety, justice and consideration are all virtues consistent with the moral outlook displayed by the fragments of Posidonius, as well as – except for piety – by all the other historiographers we have so far encountered in this and previous chapters. ‘Discipline through farming’, however, is a peculiarly Roman virtue, much propounded by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, but not prominent in the Greek moralising tradition. If it accurately summarises what Posidonius described, his portrait of the Roman good old days must have been based on and influenced by Roman sources, perhaps Roman acquaintances. The other possibility is that Athenaeus, even in this short passage, has conflated several sources, at least one of them Roman.\(^\text{125}\)

\(^{124}\) For various views on how much of F 59 comes from Posidonius see Malitz (1983: 90–4), Kidd (1988: 913–14), Dowden (n.d.: ad loc.). All three mentions of Posidonius in this passage come at heavily moralising moments.

\(^{125}\) Dowden (n.d.: ad loc.) argues that the entirety of F 59 ultimately goes back to Fabius Pictor, but that Posidonius has developed it to fit in with ‘a neo-Polybian picture of the
The complete opposite to the degenerates Ptolemaeus Physcon and Alexander is the Ligurians, presented by F 57–8 as hardened by their rugged homeland and lack of commodities into a supremely strong and enduring people.\textsuperscript{126} F 58a and b are renderings of an exemplary story of a Ligurian woman who takes a break from her work to give birth and then returns to it, thus making her an example of the key qualities of her entire people in the same way that Damophilus the extravagant slave owner stands in for his whole decadent society.

The mention of Damophilus leads us to the moralising topic of how to treat one’s inferiors, that is, one’s subjects or slaves. The key passage(s) here is clearly F 108 (divided into 108a–w in the BNJ). This is in reality a collection of extracts from Diodorus’ *Bibliotheke*, the longest by Photius (= *FG* 87 F 108a), the rest out of the Constantinian compilations *De Virtutibus et Vitiis* and *De Sententiis*, all of them on the Sicilian Slave War, and presumed by most scholars to be a close approximation of what was in Diodorus’ source, Posidonius.\textsuperscript{127} The passage is a detailed account of the beginning of the Slave War, which is shown to arise because of the arrogance and extravagance of the slave owners and their inhumane treatment of their slaves. None of the extracts mention Posidonius by name, but the close similarity between Posidonius F 7 (= Ath. 12.542b) on Damophilus (quoted above) and Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.34 means that the identification of Posidonius as Diodorus’ source for the Sicilian Slave War is certain. How much Diodorus changed what he found in Posidonius is, as always, contentious, and we cannot know for certain whether Posidonius ascribed the revolt only to the masters’ tryphe, or also to their mistreatment of the slaves.\textsuperscript{128} Equally frustratingly unclear is the short F 38 (= Ath. 6.266e–f), which gives Posidonius as the authority for the information that the Chians were enslaved by Mithridates and then handed over to their own slaves in fetters. It ends with a sentence which interprets this fate of the Chians as divine punishment for having been the first to use bought slaves at a time when most people did their own work, but it is impossible to see whether this sentence derives from Posidonius or is an interpretation by Athenaeus.

Finally, F 8 (= Ath. 6.263c–d) gives an indication that Posidonius also offered examples of ‘good’ master–slave relationships. In this passage Athenaeus states that Posidonius says that ‘many of those who are unable

\textsuperscript{126} F 57a = Strabo 5.2.1, 218C; F 57b = Diod. Sic. 4.20.1; F 58a = Strabo 3.4.17, 165A–B; F 58b = Diod. Sic. 4.20.2–3.

\textsuperscript{127} The passage is Diod. Sic. 34/35.2 in the Loeb, 34.1–20 in the Belles Lettres edition.

\textsuperscript{128} For different views on how close Diodorus’ account is to Posidonius’ original see Dowden (n.d.: *ad* F 108a) and Wozniczka (forthcoming).
to look after themselves because of their weakness of intellect’ (πολλούς τινας ἑαυτῶν οὐ δυναμένους προϊστασθαι διὰ τὸ τῆς διανοίας ἀσθενές) of their own free will put themselves into the power of a more capable people in order to have their ‘needs’ (τὰ ἀναγκαῖα) taken care of. He then offers as an example of this the Mariandynoi, who are said to have given themselves over to the Heracleians on the one condition that they could not be sold abroad. This second half of the passage, which may be a brief quotation from Posidonius, is introduced by καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ Μαριανδύνοι μὲν . . . , showing that it was only the first in a pair or series of examples of such mutually beneficial master–slave relationships.129 Apparently, Posidonius did not condemn slavery in itself, only, perhaps, mistreatment and exploitation of slaves. This ties in nicely with F 284 in Edelstein and Kidd (= Sen. Ep. 90.5–13),130 which tells of a Golden Age when people were ruled by philosopher kings. The subjects not only submitted to these philosophers voluntarily, but also refrained from wrongdoing entirely: cum bene imperanti bene pareretur (Sen. Ep. 90.5). Posidonius, then, like Polybius and Diodorus, propounded the moral-didactic theory that the behaviour of ruler and ruled were mutually dependent.131

The final question that needs to be asked of the Posidonius fragments is whether there is any evidence of divine justice enforcing morality. On the basis of Posidonius’ philosophical views it would be a natural assumption that his Histories showed a world ruled by benevolent Providence. However, the only explicit reference to divine justice in the fragments is F 38 on the Chians, which has just been discussed. The comment in this fragment that the fate of the Chians was due to ‘the wrath of the divine’ (τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐμήνισε) may equally well be Athenaeus’ interpretation as Posidonius’.132 F 29 (= Ath. 8.333b–d), on how the army of the Syrian pretender Tryphon was overwhelmed by a tidal wave and drowned to a man, may narrate an instance of divine punishment, but does not explic-

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129 The idea that some peoples are better off as slaves or subjects of others is often attributed to both Posidonius and Panaetius, his predecessor as leading Stoic, and assumed to have formed the basis of a justification of Roman Imperial power which they passed on to Cicero and other Romans. See Strasburger (1965: 40), Walbank (1965: 13–15), Franklin (2003: 104–6), Dowden (n.d.: ad loc.).

130 This fragment is not included in FGrH; Jacoby presumably believed that it came from one of Posidonius’ philosophical works rather than the Histories. Edelstein and Kidd (1972) include it under ‘History.’ It is mentioned by Dowden (n.d.: ad F 8).

131 The more philosophical version of this, which Posidonius most probably propounded and which is discernible in F 8, namely that the best constitution is the rule of the wise over the unwise, is not reflected in any of the other historians discussed in this study.

132 F 108w (= Diod. Sic. 34/35.9) ascribes the death of someone who had eaten sacred fish to to daimonion, but it does not mention Posidonius by name, and even if the passage goes back to him, divine punishment is such a key theme for Diodorus (as we have seen) that he may well have added or altered the interpretation.
Itly ascribe the event to supernatural causes. F τος (= Strabo, Geography 7.3.1–3, 295a–298b) rationalises the Getan belief that their king communicates with a god in a cave into a deliberate exploitation of popular gullibility for political purposes, but as we have seen in Polybius, such cynicism about popular superstition does not preclude religious belief and piety on the part of the author. On the basis of this evidence we have to accept that we cannot say anything certain about the role of the divine in Posidonius’ supposedly Stoic Histories.133

In conclusion, it seems likely that wealth fulfilled a similar function in the moral didacticism of Posidonius to military success in that of Polybius, as a dangerous trap which lures most men into arrogance. In Polybius the arrogance is primarily expressed through mistreatment of the defeated; in Posidonius it seems to have been overwhelmingly expressed through extravagant and immoderate lifestyles. In both authors, however, such arrogance most often leads to disaster. Dowden (n.d.) has recently offered a persuasive interpretation of the fragments as showing that Posidonius’ Histories were intended as a continuation of Polybius’ Histories not just chronologically, but also morally: where Polybius showed the rise of Rome, Posidonius showed the degeneration of Rome – as well as the rest of the world – due to wealth and extravagance, and Rome’s descent into civil war. This is a very attractive hypothesis, but keeping in mind the fact that Athenaeus was supremely interested in examples of luxury and decadence and much less in other moral issues such as cruelty and piety, we must not trust too much in such reconstructions. In fact, if we look at the picture we got of Posidonius’ work from Diodorus’ moralising in books 32.37–37.30, fragmentary though they are, it was of a work preoccupied with decadence, but equally so with greed and cruelty, and in which divine justice played an important part. It is possible that these themes were modified and amplified by Diodorus, but they are, I would claim, unlikely to have been added out of thin air. In other words, Posidonius supplied the basis for the moralising, even if he did not moralise explicitly on all of these topics himself.

What is clear, however, even without looking at the Bibliotheca, is that Posidonius’ Histories was a work of moral history, and that it often taught its lessons by means of evaluative phrasing combined with biting sarcasm, and by showing how morally corrupt behaviour would lead to disaster. A few examples of moralising vignettes are also preserved F 11, F 36, F 43), and possibly one of a moralising conclusion (F 38).

133 This is also noted by Malitz (1983: 418–22), who argues that Posidonius may have preferred a secular causality in his historiography. If this was the case, that would be an intriguing sign of the importance that genre, in the concrete shape of imitation of Polybius, held for Posidonius.
Hieronymus of Cardia (FGrH 154)

Finally, we get to Hieronymus of Cardia (not yet on BNJ). Chronologically he lived and wrote earlier than Timaeus, but because of his apparent lack of moralising he has been relegated to the end of this chapter. Hieronymus wrote a history, the title of which is unknown, but which traced the events in the Greek world from the death of Alexander the Great to at least the death of Pyrrhus, much of it based on his own experiences on the staff of two of Alexander’s successors, Eumenes of Cardia and Antigonus Gonatas.  

This work was probably Diodorus’ main source (perhaps through an intermediary source) for the Greek narrative of books 18–20, and in the previous chapter we discussed the impression of this source text produced by an analysis of Diodorus’ moralising. This impression was of a text that moralised on cruelty, the changeability of fortune, and the positive effects of mildness/kindness by means of evaluative phrasing used sparingly, moralising digressions and asides, and internal evaluation, in fact much like the impression produced of Ephorus’ History. This is interesting, since most scholars who assume that the character of Hieronymus’ work is discernible from the Bibliothèque tend to highlight, alongside Hieronymus’ reliability and general competence as a historian, his ‘seriousness’ or ‘sobriety’, by which they partly mean his avoidance of moralising. Scholars who want to stress Hieronymus’ non-moralising have to argue that Diodorus added a few passages of explicit moralising on the changeability of fortune and the abuse of good fortune to a text otherwise taken over from Hieronymus. As argued in Chapter 2 and elsewhere, I find it much more likely that this moralising was already in Hieronymus’ History in a very similar form.

Any discussion of Hieronymus is hampered by the fact that only nineteen fragments of his work have been preserved in later authors. None of the fragments contain any moralising, but that is partly because most of them are bare mentions of Hieronymus’ name in connection with information about topography or numbers of dead in a battle. It would be absurd to claim that these few references are in any way representative of his original History. On the other hand, it may be significant that Athenaeus only refers to his work once (for a description of Alexander the Great’s funeral.

135 Meeus (2013) with references to earlier literature.
136 Jacoby (1913), Hornblower (1981), Knoepfler (2000). The main point of contention is his political bias: Brown (1947), followed by Knoepfler (2000), argues that Hieronymus was a biased court historian, but this is played down by Hornblower (1981), building on the arguments of Jacoby (1913: 1543–6).
cart): perhaps Hieronymus’ work was less fertile ground for passages on luxury, flatterers and false philosophers than were those of Timaeus, Duris, Phylarchus, Agatharchides and Posidonius. That, again, would bring him in line with Ephorus, as a historiographer who moralised sparingly, and preferred other topics to those of interest to Athenaeus, as we shall see in Chapter 7.

The only fragment of Hieronymus’ History that may conceivably be a remnant of a once moralising passage is F 9 (= Paus. 1.9.8). Here Pausanias censures Hieronymus for saying, falsely in his opinion, that Lysimachus destroyed the royal tombs in Epirus in his war with Pyrrhus and cast out the bones.\(^{138}\) It is impossible to know what Hieronymus’ narrative of this incident looked like, but judging from Pausanias’ criticism it was probably more than a bare notice. It is tempting to hypothesise that Hieronymus either wrote a detailed scene to portray Lysimachus as the immoderate victor abusing his good fortune, or explicitly moralised on the wrongness of Lysimachus’ actions; but we cannot know.\(^{139}\)

In conclusion, it seems unlikely that Hieronymus of Cardia was a lone non-moralising historiographer in Hellenistic Greece. Rather, his moralising has been lost because it happened sparingly, and because his didactic topics were not to the taste of Athenaeus. There is also the possibility that he moralised at the macro-level of structure, by means of narrative arcs, repetition, and patterning. This was done masterfully by the three surviving Classical historiographers as we shall see in Part II.

CONCLUSION

It is ultimately impossible to know what the now fragmentary works of Hellenistic historiography once looked like in all their glory. Hence we cannot know for certain whether or not they moralised, and much less whether they had explicitly moral-didactic agendas, and what their potential moralising looked like. Nonetheless, on the basis of such evidence as there is, this chapter has made the case that some of the moral messages we have encountered in Polybius and Diodorus, or moral messages very close to them, seem to have been propounded by the majority of the most influential and best-preserved historiographies of the period.

\(^{138}\) For a discussion of which war the fragment relates to, see Jacoby (1930: 546–7) and Hornblower (1981: 247).

\(^{139}\) Hornblower (1981: 104) argues that the scene in Plut. Pyrrh. 34.4 which shows Antigonus Gonatas crying for the defeated Pyrrhus comes from Hieronymus and is the first instance of the topos of the victor crying for the vanquished. This is an attractive theory, but ultimately we cannot know whether Plutarch added this detail himself under the influence of the historical tradition of Polybius and Diodorus.
The wrongness of immoderation in all its aspects seems to have been a theme of all the historiographers under consideration, apart perhaps from Hieronymus, even taking account of the skewed picture resulting from the dominance of Athenaeus’ *Deipnosophistae* as a covertext. Phylarchus seems to have propounded a causal connection from luxurious living to arrogance and impiety and onwards to divine punishment. Posidonius most probably showed a similar connection from wealth to luxurious living and abuse of others and onwards to disaster, brought on either by purely human means or by some kind of divine justice, and it is possible that such a connection was also present in the work(s) of Agatharchides. Human inability to stay moderate in good fortune seems to have been a theme of at least Timaeus, Duris and Agatharchides, and perhaps also of Hieronymus. Agatharchides alone seems to have emphasised the suffering of the marginalised and nameless and encouraged the reader to feel pity and sympathy for them.

The image of the bad man or leader seems to have been similar in all of these historiographers: he is a tyrant, or like a tyrant, immoderate in his eating, drinking and sexual habits, cowardly and effeminate. Timaeus and Phylarchus add the vices of impiety and greed. Virtues clearly attracted less attention from potential covertext authors, but moderation and courage seem to have played a part in all of the works under discussion. Timaeus seems to have added lack of greed and a shrewd ability to interpret omens to one’s advantage; and Phylarchus admired wit. At least Timaeus and Phylarchus apparently showed that impiety would be punished by divine forces, and that such divine punishment often mirrored the crime in poignant ways.

Moralising techniques are harder to discern from second-hand references, but evaluative phrasing was almost certainly used by all, in Posidonius combined with biting sarcasm, in Duris with rhetorical comparisons and juxtaposition. Moralising conclusions were used at least by Agatharchides. Most of the historiographers seem also to have used moralising vignettes, and at least Duris, Phylarchus and Agatharchides to have moralised by means of pathos. Moralising digressions seem to have been used by at least Timaeus, Duris and Posidonius. From Timaeus and Agatharchides we have evidence of moralising speeches, and from Timaeus also of internal evaluation.

In other words, although we cannot arrive at a full understanding of Hellenistic historiography on the basis of the evidence, we can gain an impression, and the impression is of a genre that embraced moralising, most probably with a didactic aim. Moreover, when compared with our analysis of Polybius and Diodorus, we see that there is a kernel of moral messages and techniques which all the Hellenistic historiographers share.