12.
The 1960s: Transition to an Industrial Society

At no other time in its history did Yugoslavia change as much as it did in the twenty years following 1945. The socialist transformation completed the far-reaching industrial reshaping of social conditions that had started before the Second World War. It left no area untouched. Everything changed: social and occupational structures, urban environment and architecture, family structures and gender roles, attitudes, norms, and customs. The 1960s marked a phase of transition in which the society could no longer be characterized as a rural-traditional one, but at the same time it had not yet fully become urban-industrial. At this point, tradition and modernity neither ran parallel nor directly conflicted with each other. Instead, they mutually penetrated each other. All aspects of life that were age-old, well established, and customary no longer found socially relevant niches in which to flourish. The economic miracle, greater intellectual liberties, and international exchange sparked an impressive heyday in art, culture, and consumption and opened up unprecedented opportunities in the lives of a large segment of the population, which is why this period was later known as the “golden years.” Critical self-reflection and the desire for change and advancement grew from being an elite phenomenon to a mass one—perhaps the decisive characteristic of this decade.

**An Industrial Society, Finally!**
The absolute size of the rural population in Yugoslavia did not begin to drop until 1948, decades later than in most European countries. Once it started to decline, it decreased at the annual rate of 1 to 2 percent on average. The former upper-middle classes and the large landowners vanished, while peasants and the landless became industrial workers and service providers. The share of those working in the agrarian sector fell from 75 to 57 percent in the years between 1945 and 1965. Twenty-one percent were employed in the industrial sector, 22 percent in the tertiary sector. Compared with 1947, industrial production in 1965 had risen more than sixfold and now made up over a third of
the country’s gross national product. The number of men and women working in industry and mining totaled 1.375 million (rising to 2.625 million by 1986). Still, the socialist modernization of the country had not been able to sweep aside all relics of traditional agrarian society. Every third industrial worker did not work on a conveyor belt or at a machine but produced goods by hand.1

The expansion of industry and mining ensured a continued influx into this class of peasant-workers, which had been forming even before the war. In many regions, such as Kranj, Zenica, Leskovac, and Trepča, thousands of peasants never fully abandoned farming. Instead they commuted daily or seasonally between farm and factory for years, often covering great distances on foot. “Throughout the entire country many men and women make their way each workday from the village to the factories and mines. Entire processions of people are underway who arrive by foot, cart, bus or train.” Many factories sent buses to pick up the so-called polutani—the name given to this “hybrid” type of worker—from collection points. The worker from the village “usually does not pay much heed to his appearance: he is dirty, dusty, and unshaven, and most of his clothing is locally produced and made out of wool, cotton, or hemp.” He carried his snack in a wrapped bundle to the factory, just as he had before the war. He owned no workwear.

Even in Slovenia and Croatia, large extended families could still be found who worked together, now under industrial conditions. A peasant-worker from the area around Samobor near Zagreb talked about his nineteen-person zadruga, which owned five acres of land: “If we would split up, we would all certainly be worse off. . . . I would only get a couple of patches of land and no more. And how could the house be divided up? This way we manage to live somehow, thanks to the work in the factory. We all pay into the family coffer, according to how much a person earns, and don’t worry about each and every penny.”

Those who moved close to the factories were quick to adopt the industrial lifestyle. This was particularly true for women, who were usually looked upon disapprovingly in the patriarchal village community if they worked as wage laborers. Once they started working in factories, they switched their peasant opunci for sandals, went to the movies, and took liberties previously unheard of. At home they were first viewed unfavorably, but only until their families learned to appreciate the advantages of female wage income.

**Life in the Village**

The structural change brought about by industrialization eased but did not satisfactorily solve one of the most pressing problems of this society in transition: agrarian underemployment. Because of inefficient methods of production, the Yugoslav peasant in 1960 still only worked 140 days a year on average. The different levels of productivity caused this figure to vary regionally: in
Slovenia it was 160 days, but in Kosovo it was only 108. Every third agrarian laborer was redundant, statistically speaking. For this reason, farmers remained poor. Their income was only about half as much as the average incomes of the wage-earning population as a whole.9

Despite and even because of agrarian reform, land ownership remained primarily in the hands of peasants. This had a negative effect on agricultural yields. In 1960, the average farmstead consisted of about ten acres, leaving most peasants dependent on earning extra income outside of farming, just like before the war. As it was, nearly 40 percent of the farmers earned their living entirely or in part outside of their own farms.

In most rural regions, tending the fields was still bone-breaking work. Farm machinery made headway into peasants’ lives only at a slow pace. In the 1960s, there were about 3,000 privately owned tractors in all of Yugoslavia. Men and women sowed, plowed, and harvested their crops by hand or tilled the soil with an antiquated span of oxen or horses. It was not until the next decade that a significant boom in mechanization occurred in agriculture. In 1971, statistics reported more than 52,000 tractors in the country, a number that rose to more than 200,000 by 1975. Only then were the majority of Yugoslav farmers using modern technology.10

The new era not only accelerated the use of technology and the intensification of agriculture, it also gave the rural population access to education and mass media and increased their physical mobility by way of public transportation. Schools, cooperatives, sports clubs, cultural institutions, administration, and health services arrived in the villages, which caused them to lose their former sociocultural and economic self-sufficiency.

In places where industry provided jobs, people changed the ways in which they built and furnished their dwellings, and lived their daily lives. Ovens, beds, and other types of furniture were purchased, as were bicycles and alarm clocks so as to ensure the timely arrival at work each day. Suddenly, people had to work not only more than before, but on a regular basis and within clear hierarchies. Hygiene and health were more highly valued. New demands for individual qualifications and achievement became the vital categories for functionally defined social relations, but the formerly existential solidarity found in family networks was not eliminated completely. For example, every fifth migrant found his new workplace in the city with the help of a family member, and in the realm of public services nothing ever got done without the magically effective relations on a personal basis known as veze.11

All of this drew the village, the most robust bastion of traditional ways of life and social interaction, into the vortex of the dynamic processes of transformation. This became glaringly evident in social structure. The massive migration to the cities caused the village to experience feminization and
senilization, meaning that women and the elderly remained in the village, while the youth fled. The previous unification of production, reproduction, and lifeworld embodied by farming families dissipated, as did the traditional division of labor between the sexes.

One of the most far-reaching upheavals during these years of transformation was that even people in the most remote locations began to see their lives in a more critical light. Hard living conditions and backwardness were no longer accepted as fate. People talked at school, in the media, and with acquaintances about having a better future, one that the majority of the population now claimed for themselves as a matter of course. Patriarchal attitudes, values, and social relations eroded, the first of these being the strong emotional tie to one’s own land, the socially paramount importance of family relationships, the unwillingness to consider any form of innovation or risk, and the preindustrial attitude toward work with its lack of emphasis on efficiency, discipline, and profit.

In Orašac, a small village in the Serb region of Šumadija, ethnologists were surprised to find the inhabitants suddenly talking so much about education, technological progress, and civilizing developments, as well as their own individual advancement and occupational success. In other places, too, the younger generation expressed no desire to follow in their fathers’ footsteps as farmers. Life in the village was thought to be too miserable, backward, boring, and depressing, whereas the city enticed them with its higher standard of life and greater freedoms. With the exception of a few elderly inhabitants, men and women strove to break the chains of tradition. Every second farmer declared that he would very gladly sell his land; most hoped that their daughters and sons would attend middle school and later work in an occupation not related to agriculture—preferably as a medical doctor, business manager, or engineer.

Urbanization and Socialist Urban Culture
In no other European country did the cities grow faster after the Second World War than in Yugoslavia. Between 1945 and 1970, roughly 5.5 million people left the villages, half of them during the 1960s. Underemployment, poverty, the lack of educational and occupational opportunities, and the rigid social corset of rural life drove masses of jobseekers to the urban centers, causing the urban population to double. In Belgrade, whose population size surpassed the one million mark in 1969, two out of three inhabitants had migrated there from the countryside. Yet it should not be forgotten that this process started from a very low level of urbanization. Like Albania, Portugal, and Malta, Yugoslavia was one of the least urbanized countries in Europe. In 1960, less than 20 percent of the population lived in places with more than 20,000 inhabitants.
In the minds of many, not just of communists, industrialization and urbanization were the cornerstones to building a modern society. The socialist city was not only the embodiment of the progressive socialist society, it also served as a showcase for Yugoslavia’s modernity. This introduced a new influential field after 1945: socialist city-planning modeled in a style of architectural modernity. One of the first projects was to build large-scale neighborhoods of functionally monotone apartment blocks in spacious environments surrounded with large swaths of green space in order to provide the urban masses with hygienic and affordable dwellings. Monumental Stalinist buildings, long and expansive thoroughfares, and futuristic skyscrapers signaled cosmopolitan attitudes and an urbane lifestyle. This monumentality and generosity in the use of public space was thought to herald a new, progressive order. Architectural symbols of modernity and statehood sprang up in all regional centers: hospitals, universities, libraries, hotels, broadcasting stations, and sports arenas. Socialist urban development created a thoroughly new environment for public life.

The symbol of this new Yugoslavia was its metropolis, Belgrade. Across the Sava River in the former Habsburg town of Zemun, the urbanists planned a model socialist city, a type of Yugoslav Washington, D.C. Artistically designed representational buildings, functionally Le Corbusier–style high-rises, broad boulevards, and open green spaces were to make New Belgrade (Novi Beograd) the political and administrative center and the poster city of a progressive and cosmopolitan Yugoslavia. Prestigious building projects sprang up in the 1960s, including the parliament building, the Ušće Tower as the headquarters of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and the Hotel Jugoslavija.17

Visitors landing at the capital’s newly built airport in the late 1960s were amazed by its modern, even futuristic ambience. “Belgrade is a lively, frivolous, noisy, jam-packed city compared with the one I remember from twenty years ago,” noted a correspondent from the Washington Post. The larger-than-life images of Marx, Engels, and even Tito had disappeared. In their place, gigantic and colorful billboards lined the city’s new thruway with ads for Coca-Cola, Pan Am, Siemens, and Volkswagen. In the city center, the dingy Balkan provinciality of earlier years had given way to a Western European look. Belgraders were fashionably attired; women were seen with bleached blonde hair and a great deal of makeup. A vibrant hustle and bustle prevailed in the streets, squares, and numerous cafés.18

To walk down one of the broad boulevards from the center of the city to its outermost neighborhoods was to discover the growth rings marking the historical layers of the city’s history. Starting at Marx-Engels Square, designed in 1956, past imposing parliament and university buildings built during the
nineteenth-century Gründerzeit era, one would find artifacts of earlier times. Along the mighty boulevards huddled pathetic little stores selling cloth, metal goods, and dishware next to the dingy workshops of shoemakers, silversmiths, and candle makers. At the periphery of the city, the density of buildings diminished, giving it a rural appearance. Cows and chickens wandered along the unpaved streets, occasionally startled by the rattling of wooden horse-drawn carts. Since there was not yet enough work for everyone, people eked out a living by turning to the age-old occupations of traveling panhandler, peddler, wandering musician, scissors grinder, rag picker, shoe shiner, lottery ticket seller, corn cob roaster, and casual laborer for cash-in-hand work.

Despite intensive construction activity, all of Yugoslavia was faced with a deplorable housing shortage well into the 1970s. This explains the major architectural sins of the immediate postwar years: the colorless, thoroughly bare-boned and cheap mass construction that gave so many cities their shabby gray, “real socialist” appearance. As early as 1950, Yugoslav architects were officially abandoning the “socialist realism” style and striving, especially in the 1960s, to create more individual and aesthetically ambitious buildings—with mixed results. At the same time, the historic neighborhoods of the city centers, such as the Ottoman baščaršija, the bazaar in Sarajevo, were reconstructed true to the originals.

Nevertheless, in 1961, the average number of people sharing a room was 1.6; in Belgrade there were 2.5 people to a room. In addition, there were innumerable and statistically unrecorded subtenants. In 1965, there was a shortage of at least 50,000 housing units in the capital alone. Many dwellings were occupied by several families, which is why many people made make-shift homes for themselves in shops, basements, laundry rooms, and even elevator shafts. In the outer districts, the migrants began to construct huts, barracks, and cottages. Sooner or later, communities were forced to give in to the rank architectural growth because they could no longer tear it down fast enough. “In the last seven or eight years, 20,000 to 30,000 people have come to Belgrade each year,” explained Mayor Branko Pešić in 1965. “That equals an entire small town. . . . And all of these people find shelter somewhere, hole up someplace. Some get an apartment, but that is the smallest percentage of them. A great number however are forced . . . to house in basements, in unhygienic apartments and barracks. And whoever has not yet seen this should definitely once examine what this looks like. . . . Something like this doesn’t even exist in Africa.”

Long-time city residents viewed the onslaught of so many rural people with skepticism. They found it almost embarrassing when the newcomers celebrated their village festivals in the middle of the city and clasped hands for a round dance (kolo) to the music of accordions, basses, fiddles, clarinets, and
trumpets. There was endless joking about the problems of the backwoods villagers in adapting to contemporary city life. Generations of Yugoslavs laughed over the bumbling of “Haso and Mujo,” distant Yugoslav relatives of Laurel and Hardy, whose simplicity left them all too often defeated by the modern world. “‘Hey, Haso, what date do we have today’—‘No idea, Mujo!’—‘But you have a newspaper tucked under your arm!’—Haso: ‘That’s no help, it’s from yesterday!’”

**Media, Mobilization, Migration**

By this time, Yugoslavs had become well interconnected through means of mass communication, even though the reach of print and electronic media differed greatly from region to region. In the early 1960s, only about three million inhabitants living in remote locations still had no access to printed press. Radio had been spreading rapidly throughout the country since the late 1950s. While an average of 70 inhabitants shared a radio in 1947, this number had dropped to only seven by 1965. Likewise, circulation of print media grew exponentially. Domestic publishing houses introduced over 13,000 new book titles to the market each year, just under 2,000 different newspapers and magazines, and 1,150 periodicals. In the early 1970s, there were nine television stations and 190 radio stations.

Deficits in the technological infrastructure meant that television was still not widely available. Only every other person lived within the transmission reach of a television station in the early 1960s. Once again, the decade would witness a breakthrough in this respect: whereas about 30,000 television sets existed in all of Yugoslavia in 1960, that number had grown to over 440,000 by 1964. On average there had been one television for every 618 people in 1960, yet this ratio had dropped to one for every 6.2 Yugoslavs by 1976. In addition to broadcasting news, information, and cultural events, television programs also featured quiz shows, satire, and entertainment series.

Since the mid-1960s, Yugoslavs were allowed to watch foreign television broadcasts unimpeded, preferably programs from Italy and Austria. The new media habits also changed leisure time activities in the villages. People were now gathering at their neighbors’ homes in the evenings to watch television, while traditional social activities, such as the evening get-together of *sijelo*, faded out of existence.

Yugoslavia was the only socialist country to expressly forbid any advance censorship in 1960. Violations of the press laws could only be prosecuted following the appearance of a publication, and even this occurred fairly seldom, whether out of tolerance or overwork on the part of the public prosecutors. Far more widespread was preemptive self-censorship. In principle, the respective republic could confiscate a publication thought to be subversive, meaning
antisocialist or nationalistic. However, the publication could continue to be sold in all other parts of the country until it was also forbidden there. This protracted and bureaucratic process created some leeway in the media landscape that enabled the Yugoslav press to become colorful, multifaceted, and relatively outspoken.\textsuperscript{27} It was also possible to buy foreign press publications like the \textit{New York Times} or the \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung} at the newsstand.

Besides this more extensive access to information, the outstanding privilege that Yugoslavs had over other East Europeans was the unimpeded communication with the West and the East made possible by the freedom to travel. Starting in the early 1960s, nearly everyone was allowed to travel to the West without a visa. Each year, over 300,000 Yugoslavs took advantage of this opportunity, many as vacationers.\textsuperscript{28}

Close ties to the West were created by way of the hundreds of thousands of guest workers who left the country starting in the 1960s during the phase of market-economy reform. Since the right to work was part of the canon of basic rights in socialism, the official language regime described migrants as “workers temporarily employed abroad.”\textsuperscript{29} However, many of them settled abroad permanently, and their children grew up identifying with their new homeland. In 1971, nearly 775,000 migrants (3.8 percent of the total population) lived outside Yugoslavia, a large share of them in West Germany. Every third Yugoslav came from Croatia, every fifth from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Later the Yugoslav government realized what a loss of human capital this migration represented and tried to entice people to return. In fact, several hundred thousand Yugoslavs did answer the government’s call in the 1970s when jobs in their host countries again became scarce due to the global recession.\textsuperscript{30}

Guest workers were lured by higher wages to the host countries, which enabled them to enjoy a higher standard of living and send part of what they earned back home. The industrious and frugal Yugoslavs dreamed of expensive status symbols like cars, electrical appliances, and agricultural machinery. In places where neighbors were working abroad, one could often observe a domino effect. In the race for higher social prestige, no one wanted to be left behind, and so more and more people emigrated. The transfer of guest worker incomes back home changed hierarchies of respect in the village. It was no longer the wealthy peasant or the village schoolteacher who stood on the top rungs of the social ladder, but families with members working abroad. Many of them donated to the community and financed public buildings, fountains, and streets.\textsuperscript{31} However, in general, relatively little money flowed into areas of production; instead it was spent, quite obviously, on housing and private consumption. The appearance of once destitute rural areas completely changed
as massive, flamboyantly decorated, and often thoroughly tasteless houses sprung up, with German cars parked in the garages.\textsuperscript{32}

Far from their home, Yugoslavs abroad experienced the growing need to cultivate community among themselves, a need best met at the workplace, in clubs, and in pubs.\textsuperscript{33} The Yugoslavs in the “diaspora” thus developed their own culture, tastes, and political orientations. The Yugoslav state tried to maintain contact with its citizens abroad by way of a complicated bureaucratic structure. It brokered jobs, supported guest worker clubs and organizations, and financed language instruction in the schools. Because the connections of guest workers to their homeland remained strong, a dense network of interrelations and transfers developed, and the overwhelming majority of workers actually did intend to return some day. As a rule, the emigrants also maintained close personal ties and family contacts in their homeland. They transferred money, visited regularly, and at some point fulfilled a life dream by building their own home.\textsuperscript{34}

\textit{Tourism and Transformation}

Yugoslavs and other Europeans became acquainted with one another not only at the workplace but more and more often during vacations. Each year, the new, highly subsidized tourist trade attracted millions of foreign vacationers to Yugoslav beaches. The tourist resort business did not start in Yugoslavia until the 1950s, which is much later than in Spain and Italy. In 1966, the government recognized tourism to be a motor for development and social change and therefore designated it as a priority for investment. Tourism became a recognized discipline for research and study within economics. In 1967, the year declared by the United Nations as International Tourist Year, Belgrade unilaterally abolished visa requirements for all states worldwide.\textsuperscript{35}

Yugoslavia’s attractions were its 745 miles of beautiful coastline, more than 1,000 islands, its Venetian heritage and Italian flair. It was not hard to reach the country, the people were friendly, and the campgrounds, accommodations, and boarding were inexpensive. For Germans, the added attraction was that German was spoken nearly everywhere. In 1965, over three million foreign guests vacationed on the Adriatic; by 1970, the figure had risen to 4.75 million and by the end of the 1980s to about ten million. Nearly every third tourist came from West Germany, many by car.\textsuperscript{36} Initial ideological reservations soon gave way to pure pragmatism: “The sea doesn’t care what political system rules on its coast,” said one of the first tourists from Austria. “We go to be at the sea and not to communism.”\textsuperscript{37}

Huge hotel resorts and private bed and breakfasts also hosted tourists from the Eastern bloc countries, particularly from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These tourists came not only to enjoy the scenery but also to take advantage
of the better shopping opportunities and sources of information. Although the quality standard was often low and the service somehow typically socialist, the Yugoslav tourist industry generally tried to serve foreigners well, an effort that was rewarded with return visits by their guests. In this way, Yugoslavia gained the reputation during this decade of being a friendly, inexpensive, and cosmopolitan tourist country.

Above all, the Yugoslav system sought to ensure that its people profited from the leisure and vacation opportunities of their own country. On the coastline and in the mountains, publicly financed lodges and guesthouses for workers and schoolchildren popped up everywhere. Thanks to subsidies, vacation spots received annually more than 6.6 million domestic guests for their annual vacation (godišnji odmor), one of the most important social achievements of workers’ self-management. The hiking, swimming, and grilling peasants and workers were considered pioneers of the leisure industry and the most exalted representatives of the new era.

At the end of the 1960s, the government was earning about $275 million—10 percent of all foreign currency—through tourism. The industry developed into the strongest branch in foreign trade and simultaneously benefited numerous other economic sectors. The construction, hotel, and souvenir businesses and every possible service industry profited, and other sectors such as the food industry also geared their business toward providing for foreign guests vacationing on the Adriatic, where the climate made agriculture difficult anyway. Tourism had an especially welcoming effect on education and employment, which in turn enhanced greater domestic demand.

Consequently, tourism acted as a catalyst for immense social change. Hotel building and management, road construction, private bed and breakfasts, shops, restaurants, and cafés generated above-average increases in income, especially in what had previously been the poorest regions of Yugoslavia: Istria, Dalmatia, and the Adriatic islands. Whereas these areas had experienced waves of migration abroad caused by a lack of jobs before 1960, the trend suddenly reversed itself. Cities like Split began to grow significantly, more people were finding employment, the job structure changed, and the entrepreneurial middle class became larger. In the main centers of tourism, 10 percent—in some places 30 percent—of the total labor force worked in the tourism industry, while at the same time, agriculture and fishing died out. So “we saw the houses get bigger, the trees grow, and the dusty country road become asphalted over the course of a summer. Now even my small village Svib wanted to belong ‘to the world.’ . . . The road was to connect us again, the first travelers with foreign license plates arrived. . . . The church and the chapel of Saint Anthony were the places that were asked about most often in connection with Makarska Rivijera. ‘Yes, yes, straight ahead,’ the locals
would say, and it always sounded as if they were delighted anew, as if experiencing a type of awakening by the description itself.\footnote{41}

**Yugoslav Double Identity**

In the 1960s, socialist modernization, work and education, the freedom to travel and access to information, consumption and culture were the pillars supporting a sense of community and self-confidence pertaining to Yugoslavia as a whole, through which the social barriers between the nations and nationalities melted away. This is not to say that ethnic identities and otherness were no longer present in everyday life. They certainly were, such as in the preference of a partner or in dealings with a neighbor. Especially in rural communities, less often in the city, ethnic-religious identities continued to affect social relations, thus perpetuating social distance between different groups. Yet at the same time, the relations between the peoples had never been as amicable as they were then. In 1964, one poll reported that 73 percent of those questioned found relations to others as good, another 8 percent found them satisfactory. Only 5.3 percent expressed a negative opinion, and the rest were undecided.\footnote{42}

In 1969, an empirical study showed that most people actually perceived themselves as having two identities and two loyalties: as citizens of the Yugoslav state and as members of their respective nation or nationality.\footnote{43} As a rule, such dualism appeared thoroughly unproblematic.

In addition to this, some men and women were beginning to identify themselves only by their Yugoslav citizenship and no longer by their ethnic origin. These “Yugoslavs” represented 1.7 percent of the population in 1961, whereby the question arose whether these people actually represented a new nation in the ethnic sense, something the communists denied vehemently. They did not want to expose themselves to the politically sensitive accusation of creating an artificial nation, similar to the one of the interwar period. A poll taken among the readers of a weekly magazine in 1969 revealed who “Yugoslavs” were. They came from mixed marriages and listed their upbringing, their political convictions, or even both as the motive for their perception of themselves. The question of whether a person could only be a citizen of the state of Yugoslavia or also a member of a newly created community of “Yugoslavs” was one that very few of them had ever considered. Their share of the population would continue to grow, up to 5.4 percent in the 1980s.\footnote{44}

As was the case all over Europe, the trend toward secularization accelerated after 1945. Religious outlooks and practices receded into the background. While 12.6 percent claimed not to be religious in 1953, the figure had already risen to 51 percent by 1968.\footnote{45} The youth in particular distanced themselves from the belief in God and had little use for church institutions and rituals. Yet all were free to worship as they wanted. Throughout Yugoslavia there
were over 14,000 active churches, monasteries, mosques, and synagogues in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{46}

The regime had become so stable by the beginning of the 1960s that it no longer considered the churches a priori as enemies of the state. The state placed a great deal of emphasis on treating religious communities relatively liberally, because it was thought that repression would only evoke fundamental counterreactions. However, nationalism and any political ambition harbored by religious communities were not to be tolerated.\textsuperscript{47} In this new atmosphere of liberality, Cardinal Stepinac was allowed to be buried in the Zagreb cathedral in 1960 with full honors. In 1966, Yugoslav diplomats and representatives from the Holy See signed a protocol granting the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia the right to operate freely and placed its churches under the supervision of the Vatican. Full diplomatic relations were then established between Belgrade and the Vatican in 1970.\textsuperscript{48}

Despite growing social mobilization and modernization and contrary to all socialist attempts at socialization, rural society maintained its ethnocultural stratifications and communal relations, as expressed in customs, clothing, language, house construction, eating habits, folk songs, and folk dances. While 60 percent accepted members of other ethnic groups without reservation as neighbors, colleagues, and friends, only 20 percent expressed strong alienation. At the same time, 88.5 percent of marriages were between members of the same people, while ethnically heterogeneous marriages remained the exception, particularly in villages. In addition to class and level of education, the factors of language, religion, cultural tradition, and family structures were those affecting people’s willingness to accept a multicultural living community, and this acceptance was more prevalent the greater the similarity was among people. Those who intermingled the most were Croats and Serbs living in Slavonia; those who intermingled the least were Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Religious affiliation created high barriers: marriages between Christians and Muslims rarely occurred, even within the same ethnic community. It would have been more likely for a Muslim Albanian to have married a Bosnian Muslim than an Albanian of Orthodox faith.\textsuperscript{49}

Outside of the cities, it was still quite easy to identify people’s ethnicity from their appearance. Men in the western Bosnian villages all dressed similarly but wore characteristic hats: the Muslims wore the red-brown fez or beret, the Croats a black visored cap, and the Serbs the typical partisan side cap. Dialect also demarcated people. For example, the Christians did not pronounce the letter “h” and said only “\textit{odža},” instead of “\textit{hodža}.” Each people had its own greeting. Serbs and Croats wished each other a good day with the Slavic “\textit{dobar dan}” (good day), while the Muslims greeted each other in Turkish with “\textit{merhaba}” (hello), They would say “\textit{inshallah}” and the Christians “\textit{ako}
“bog da” for “God willing.” Each person understood and respected the established cultural distinctions. Certainly a Croat could have donned a beret or a Muslim could have tied a red sash around his waist instead of a green one. But they didn’t.

Population, Family, and Gender Relations

No other identifiable group profited from so many changes brought about by socialist Yugoslavia than did women. The 1946 constitution guaranteed for the first time the full legal, economic, and societal equality of the sexes. Girls had to attend eight years of school, as did boys. Women could finally inherit and own private property, vote, and hold political office. Marriage and the family were placed under state protection, and the regime initiated a campaign to popularize female employment and fight against sex discrimination.

Great progress was made in education. Whereas two-thirds of all women could neither read nor write on the eve of the Second World War, that figure was now only 25 percent. Women also began to catch up in higher education and employment statistics: a third of the student body and the labor force were now female.

Compared to standards at the time in many countries, the Yugoslavs maintained a very liberal family policy. Already in the 1950s, the regime granted equal legal rights to legitimate and illegitimate children. Furthermore, it allowed people to keep their original family names after they married and introduced a liberal divorce law. Abortions on demand were permitted (in clinics) for a limited period at the start of a pregnancy. The Institute for Family Planning, established in 1961 in Ljubljana, started an information campaign and took the government at its word concerning birth control. In 1969, parliament passed a resolution on birth control and liberalized abortion law. Men and women were free to choose either for or against having a child without any governmental interference. In other words, every newborn was to be a desired child. In 1974, planned parenthood became a constitutionally guaranteed human right.

At the start of the 1960s, 18.5 million people lived in Yugoslavia. Birth control led to a dramatic decline in natality, as it did throughout Europe. Life expectancy and the average marriage age increased, families became smaller, and there were more divorced couples and single parents. Between 1948 and 1981, the rate of population growth was cut by half from 14.7 to 7.4 percent, whereby the rate only began to drop steeply in the 1960s. At the same time, life expectancy rose from 51 years (1948) to 70 years (1981).

Sociocultural and economic factors continued to influence the different demographic patterns. Slovenia roughly resembled Western Europe with a low birthrate, higher life expectancy, and a strong involvement of the middle-aged
and older generations in the social pyramid. The opposite example was Kosovo, which had a record population growth and a very young age structure.\textsuperscript{56}

With great verve, the state combated what it considered to be archaic relics in the Muslim culture: veiled women, polygamy, and the “sale” of girls and women, for whom a bride-price was paid. Women activists canvassed the countryside, attempting to convince other women of the advantages of gender equality and to educate the broader public. At village assemblies and in factories, many women became caught up in the revolutionary élan of the postwar years and tore away their veils in a show of defiance. In 1950, veiling was legally forbidden, and by the 1960s it was finally very normal for a woman to show her face openly in public. A young Muslim woman recollected: “Things used to be very different. Girls were not free. . . . Today a girl . . . can choose whom she wants to be with and where she wants to go. She can go to \textit{sijelo} [evening gatherings] or \textit{teferica} [picnic] with her friends. . . . When I cut off my braids and got a permanent wave there was a lot of disapproval and gossip. I was one of the first girls in the village to stop wearing \textit{dimija} [harem pants] and put on a dress. . . . And today almost every girl . . . has modern clothes in addition to her \textit{dimija}.”\textsuperscript{57} Antidiscrimination measures and the expansion of training and employment opportunities for women created the necessary framework for more self-determination and caused a slow but profound change of attitude regarding gender relations—among both women and men.

The socialist transformation of village life also brought about decisive changes that greatly diminished the importance of a major aspect: the prevailing, male-dominated connotation of land ownership. The agricultural cooperatives calculated work in daily wages, making individual female contributions both evident and measurable for the first time. Because more and more men were landing jobs in factories, women took over the full responsibility for the farm. More than two-thirds of the entire rural labor force were female in the 1960s.

Female employment had been continually increasing since 1945 in other sectors as well at a rate of 7.3 percent and thus faster than in any other European country. In 1964, about 29 percent of all those employed were women. In Slovenia, 42 percent of the women were employed; in Kosovo, 18 percent. For the first time, they could land positions that had been seen typically as men’s work, be it as ambassador, pilot, university dean, engineer, or bus driver. However, as was happening all over Europe, women still ran up against the glass ceilings of a still quite male-dominated society. Working women continued to be eyed disapprovingly by many. The higher one climbed up the social ladder, the lower the percentage of women became. Although the productivity of women was notably higher than that of men, they earned 10 to 40 percent less. In 1968, sociologists ascertained that a clear majority still
preferred to have a son rather than a daughter, because males were thought to have greater social recognition and better chances in life. Men also dominated the Communist Party, where only 5 percent of the seats on the Central Committee were occupied by women.  

Men were not the only ones who had difficulties accepting their female colleagues as equals. Women also hesitated because it was hard for them to abandon what had been for centuries their chief responsibility: the family. Working mothers paid for their double burden with extra-long workdays, lack of sleep, chronic fatigue, and nonexistent leisure time. Women read newspapers less often, remained less well informed, and did not serve as often on political committees and self-management bodies because they still had to do nearly all family and household chores. Only every seventh man helped clean house or cook. At the same time, change was within reach in private life, even in the villages. Gender roles were no longer chiseled in stone. Absolute male authority in marital life ceased to exist as it had before the war, and marriage began to become more and more of a partnership.

Westernization and commercialization contributed to the 1950s’ socialist ideal of femininity with new postulates of attractiveness. Women were no longer just workers, peasants, partisans, and mothers, but sexual beings meant to please men. The rigid puritanism of the immediate postwar period was followed by more permissive and open attitudes toward the body and nakedness and the commercialization of these in erotic magazines, pinup titles, and juicy gossip in the yellow press. Yugoslavia also experienced a sexual revolution of its own in the 1960s. Whereas at the end of the 1950s the police had still cracked down on immoral behavior in public, now this seemed ridiculous. The Yugoslav sexologist Aleksandar Kostić gave curious teenagers scientifically coated advice. In 1965, on Student Day in Belgrad, there was even a public striptease.

Educational Revolution, New Elites, and the “Socialist Bourgeoisie”

Socialist modernization caused a gradual replacement and transformation of elites, whose younger generation had little or no biographical connections to the partisan era. Another factor changing the social structure was the educational revolution. Whereas only every second person could read and write at war’s end, by 1961 the illiteracy rate had fallen below 20 percent. An ever-increasing percentage of children aged 7 to 14 completed the compulsory eight years of schooling: in 1953, 71 percent; by 1981, 97 percent. In the same time span, the number of pupils doubled, which meant immense costs for the state. Still, it successfully invested in teacher training, a fact that substantially improved the teacher–pupil ratio. In 1945, there was one teacher
for every fifty-nine pupils; in 1975, the ratio had improved to one for every twenty-two pupils.64

Although there were only three universities and two institutions of higher learning in all of Yugoslavia in 1945, three decades later there were 158. The new state had more students per capita than any other European country, with the exception of Sweden, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union. Starting in 1945, it increased its university-trained population tenfold to about 500,000 people by 1960 and to 650,000 people by 1970. At the same time, social mobility increased. Many of those in the new technological class originated from peasant, worker, or craftsman families.65

Industrialization and modernization also increased the specialization and professionalization of occupations and thus produced a new and influential class: managers and experts. Because growing complexity needed special expertise, key positions could no longer be filled solely based on ideological aptitude. The influence of the party in recruiting elites declined, which particularly affected the middle and lower levels of administration and management.66

Since the Yugoslav system produced a proliferation of bureaucracy that was hard to control, administrative personnel grew. In 1960, more than 410,000 positions existed for office employees, finance authorities, managers, and other civil servants. Decentralization strengthened the administration of the republics and communities and bloated this class even further. In 1970, a total of 530,000 civil servants worked at the lower and middle levels of public service.67

Just how greatly the elite changed in the first two decades after the war is illustrated by the social composition of the Communist Party. Of the original 12,000 party members, only 3,000 survived the war, which meant that most of the 140,000 communists joined only at the end of the war or thereafter. Every second member after the war had a peasant background, every third belonged to the working class, and every tenth was a white-collar worker. Twenty years later, in 1966, the composition looked completely different. White-collar workers were the largest contingent, representing 39 percent of the party membership, while the number of peasants had shrunk to 7 percent.68 It was in this decade that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia mutated into a middle-class party.69

During the economic miracle years, a new societal class evolved: the socialist bourgeoisie. In addition to educated elites, technological elites, and party functionaries, this new class included self-employed individuals, such as craftsmen, restaurant owners, construction and transportation entrepreneurs, and small retailers. Those who were not included in the statistics were people who lined their own pockets with profits earned in the “gray economy.”70
This socialist bourgeoisie deliberately disassociated itself from the masses by way of occupational position, income, attitudes, and lifestyles.\textsuperscript{71} It associated progress more with the Western-bourgeois ideal of prosperity and wealth than with socialist virtues. Status symbols like expensive brand-name products, car ownership, and the inevitable weekend cottage—the \textit{vikendica}—were the trappings of membership in a privileged class, one that became the subject of sociological research.\textsuperscript{72} “We go to Trieste about twice a year to buy clothes and cosmetics,” explained a contemporary. “Italian clothing is really not of a better quality than ours, but we want something others don’t have, even if it costs us a lot of money.”\textsuperscript{73}

\textit{Economic Miracle, Leisure, and Consumption}

Yugoslavs definitely had more money in their pockets in the 1960s than ever before. Between 1950 and 1965, real income grew by about 80 percent, and the wealth gap to the Western industrial nations narrowed. Whereas the national income per capita in West Germany, Great Britain, and France in 1955 was still four to five times greater than in Yugoslavia, ten years later the gap had shrunk to being only three times greater. By the end of the 1970s, it had closed even further.\textsuperscript{74} This was incredibly significant both practically and psychologically, for it meant that Yugoslavs no long lived in Europe’s poorhouse.

As early as the mid-1950s, the communists shifted the priorities of their economic planning. The highest priority was no longer given to investing in production goods, but to wealth and consumption, which were considered indicators of social progress.\textsuperscript{75} Contrary to the competition-driven greed of capitalism, they wanted to develop a democratic culture of consumption that would provide the population with modest, useful, and beautiful things. In the following decade a hybrid form of consumer society developed that embraced elements of both socialist and capitalist systems. Numerous foreign products were imported or produced under license, including Pepsi Cola and the sweet Italian chocolate-and-hazelnut spread Eurokrem. In the canon of typical Yugoslav products that became export hits were washing machines from Gorenje and especially the fabulous condiment Vegeta, popular throughout the entire realm of real-existing socialism.\textsuperscript{76}

The history of consumption in the 1960s reveals a lot about the needs, desires, preferences, and prestige in Yugoslav society. Growing wealth, more leisure time, and closer international ties created needs and influenced attitudes in favor of a higher quality of life. Industrialization, urbanization, and the educational revolution also helped differentiate ways of life, manners, styles, and desirable objects of consumption. For example, the introduction of the forty-two-hour workweek in 1965 encouraged the development of a leisure industry, about which a person could learn in the magazine \textit{Vikend}
(Weekend), among others. Consumerism created new identities that were predominantly defined by lifestyle, attitudes, values, feelings, and behavior linking it symbolically to the more advanced capitalist societies.

Fashion was the first area in which the economic miracle became evident. Yugoslavia’s opening up to the West pushed out the prudish and dully uniform socialist dress code that had dominated since 1945, when years of shortage encouraged clothing to be “uniform, practical, and modest.” Companies such as Kluz and Beko now produced affordable clothing that could be purchased in large department stores, and everyone could afford factory-made wear. Whereas the number of traditional leather sandals sold in 1958 (six million) was almost as high as the number of industrially produced shoes sold (seven million), ten years later only a small minority still wore the typical opanci. Urban wardrobes also began to be popular in rural areas, and if a woman did wear traditional dress, then she was most likely doing so as a concession to convenience rather than to tradition.

Urban women kept themselves up-to-date on the latest fashions by reading magazines like Praktična žena (Practical woman) or Bazar. The “New Look” by Dior even made it onto one of the covers in 1950. The student movement fought against the last taboos while sporting Beatle haircuts, miniskirts, and blue jeans. Pero Jurić, a delegate from Bijelovar, once sought to mollify his comrades who were concerned about the decline of socialist etiquette. He bellowed out a reminder to his dumbfounded fellow delegates that Karl Marx’s rallying cry was “Workers of the world, unite!” not “Workers of the world, shave!”

Like everywhere else in Europe, the automobile became the most prominent symbol of the economic miracle. In the late 1950s, the manufacturer Zastava in Kragujevac began producing a small car, the Fiat 600, which the Yugoslavs affectionately called fićo. Entire families with bags and baggage crammed into this indestructible vehicle with 29 horsepower. After celebrating its acquisition, the car owner would proudly present it to the neighborhood and lovingly care for it for many years. The fićo, wrote the publicist Igor Mandić in his book Mitologija svakidašnjeg života (Mythology of daily life), was the mirror reflecting Yugoslav society, “the manifestation of the dreams of an entire nation,” a “worldview,” and “a psychological state.” Indeed, by holding the steering wheel of a fićo in one’s hands, a person could literally feel progress. In 1968, about 8 percent of all households owned a car.

As in the West, advertisement and marketing agencies awakened unimagined desires for consumption. The magazine Savremena tehnologija (Contemporary technology) informed its readers about the latest electric stoves, mixers, sewing machines, telephones, electric toothbrushes, shavers, televisions, and hi-fi equipment. Between 1962 and 1973, the number of
households equipped with an electric stove in Croatia increased from 19.1 percent to 62.7 percent and those with a refrigerator from 13.4 percent to 58.6 percent. In 1962, only 7.2 percent owned a television, but only eleven years later, in 1973, this figure was up to 55.8 percent. By the end of the 1980s, these useful appliances could be found in nearly every household.84

The freedom to travel and the availability of foreign currency tempted Yugoslavs with a new and nearly ritualistic cultural phenomenon: the shopping tour. Year after year, more and more shoppers set out in their search for fashionable shoes, sweaters, suits, home textiles, and Vespa scooters. As a result, the number of Yugoslavs just crossing the border into Trieste increased tenfold between 1960 and 1969.85 The new consumer culture meant more pleasure and prestige and a measurable increase in the level of contentment. Since (nearly) all Yugoslavs participated in the economic miracle, the new mass consumption had a politically pacifying and socially integrating effect. It was possible to be a part of the modern European lifestyle and to disassociate oneself from the poorer Eastern bloc countries. At the time, everyone still believed that life could only keep getting better.

Cultural Openness

In the 1960s, Yugoslavia was a culturally open and friendly country. Artists, writers, and philosophers had been enjoying considerable artistic freedom ever since Miroslav Krleža had given a sensational speech, “On Cultural Freedom,” at the third congress of the Yugoslav Writers’ Union in 1952, in which he criticized Stalin’s negation of artistic freedom. In addition, the state invested heavily in the cultural sector. Roughly eight million people visited the 371 state museums annually, and about 4.3 million attended the theater.86

Just as Stalinism was being questioned and criticized, so too was socialist realism in the arts, with its monumental, sometimes monstrous allegories of work, socialism, and progress. In 1950, the National Museum in Belgrade put on an exhibition featuring work by Van Gogh, Picasso, and other abstract artists who had been decried as decadent until then. Western influences could be found in film, theater, painting, and sculpture. Local and international aesthetic traditions mingled. In contemporary Yugoslav art, socialist realism and Western modernity existed side by side or intermingled, as the abstract sculptures of a Dušan Džamonija or the strikingly expressionistic large-scale work of Edo Murtić showed.87 In 1965, the Museum of Contemporary Art (Muzej savremene umetnosti) opened in Belgrade, modeled after the Museum of Modern Art in New York. The Belgrade International Theater Festival (BITEF) brought the most innovative international performances to the capital city every year. Since the regime was open to various avant-garde trends, lively art scenes developed in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. Artists worked
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on experimental, shocking, even destructive multimedia representations of modernity. Outside the country, they were called Neo-Dada, Fluxus, Junk Art, Arte Povera, and conceptual art.

Influences from the West also shaped popular music. One of the most popular Yugoslav singers at the time was Ivo Robić, whose hit “Morgen” (Tomorrow), written by the German songwriter Peter Moesser, sold millions in 1959. As “Mister Morgen,” Robić also pursued a successful international career as a recording artist. Pop icons like Djordje Marjanović attracted large audiences because they sang translations of catchy tunes by people like Gilbert Bécaud (“Nathalie”) or Chubby Checker (“Let’s Twist Again”). Others, like Karlo Metikoš, made rock ‘n’ roll socially acceptable in concert halls across the country.

Yugoslav youth were enthusiastic about the music of the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, the Beach Boys, and Jimi Hendrix. Despite the potentially subversive quality of rock music with its critical texts and provocative poses, the state decided against repression. Soon an independent Yugoslav scene emerged, one that imitated Western models somewhat but increasingly developed its own style: YU rock.

During the 1960s, the most popular form of entertainment was cinema. Theaters showed Soviet, American, French, Italian, and British movies, and the United States subsidized the import of Hollywood productions. In addition, considerable sums of state funds financed not only partisan epics but all sorts of mainstream entertainment movies and auteur films. Often Western companies co-produced movies. In Split, Zagreb, and Belgrade, an internationally renowned avant-garde in filmmaking developed. It brought forth artists like Dušan Vukotić from Zagreb, the first non-American to win an Oscar for his animated movie Surogat in 1962. He credited the famous Zagreb animation school for his success. In 1969, Želimir Žilnik, soon the most famous exponent of the “Black Wave,” won the Golden Bear in Berlin for his film Early Works.

During the 1960s, the majority of Yugoslavs finally arrived in the modern age. The rhythms, habits, and social practices of everyday life and generally the ways people lived demonstrated that the country had crossed the threshold from an agrarian society to an industrial one. This industrial society removed the yoke of traditional norms and legal restrictions and instilled a lively spirit of optimism everywhere. While the political system strove to enhance its legitimacy through more wealth, leisure, and consumption, socialist ideology became ever less important in people’s daily lives. Ideals like community, solidarity, and socialist asceticism faded into the shadows cast by bright ideas of competition and commodity fetishism. People’s plans for life became more individualized and values and habits were increasingly relativized, as was made evident by the more relaxed sexual morality and the advancement of
hedonism and a culture of fun. All this undermined the authority of a political system that propagated, on the one hand, seemingly outdated social ideas about morality and, on the other, a utopian model of society. Because Tito opened the country to the Western world, he made the steady transfer of goods, knowledge, and values possible by way of labor migration and tourism, for example. He even tolerated the fact that some of his fellow citizens became guest workers abroad and thus subjected themselves to the laws of capitalist wage labor. In Yugoslavia, the social, psychological, and mental differences with the West never hardened into antipathies as they did in the Eastern bloc countries. On the contrary, behind the ideological façade, Yugoslav society was becoming more and more like Western Europe, and sooner or later this would inevitably influence political thought, just as it had already affected art and philosophy.