“Cap” Cornish, Indiana Pilot

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Keeping the Home Skies Safe

In May 1941, Cornish returned to Fort Benjamin Harrison, where he had often attended annual reserve training, but this time he was there for a physical exam. If found to be fit, he would be required, “without delay,” to report for duty to Barksdale Field in Shreveport, Louisiana, with the Air Corps Advanced Flying School, where bomber crews trained for war. Having passed his physical, Cornish was reactivated, but he cheekily requested assignment with the 46th Air Base Group, to be located at the new Baer Field in Fort Wayne. “Not favorably considered” was the military’s response—and in July, Captain Cornish was on his way to Louisiana. He left with the blessing of Fort Wayne’s Board of Aviation Commissioners and a “leave of absence for the duration of the emergency,” and with assurance from the military that he would “be relieved from duty in time to enable him to arrive at his home on 7 July 1942, on which date he will revert to inactive status.” That was a promise the military did not honor, as it turned out that he would be needed for the duration.

Barksdale Field, where Cornish was headed, had risen from cotton fields in the early 1930s. Home to pursuit and attack groups, its immense acreage was ideal for honing gunnery and bombing skills. While there, Cornish was executive officer of the 6th Air Base Group; he soon found that he enjoyed working with the ground crews who were supporting the simulated European combat operations. He first flew a Douglas B-18M powered by two Wright R-1820 radial piston engines and then an AT-6A (North American Aviation T-6 Texan), a blunt-nosed,
shiny metal advanced trainer with a single prop powered by a Pratt & Whitney R-1340-49 Wasp radial engine. Flying those aircraft must have been a thrill for him.

But Cornish’s time at Barksdale Field would be brief. In October he was abruptly relieved of the assignment in Louisiana to begin a new one in Washington, D.C. It was a call from an old acquaintance, Major A. B. McMullen, that initiated this second move in four months for Cornish and his family. McMullen and Cornish had first met in 1938, when “Mac” was with the Civil Aviation Administration and “Cap” was running things at Fort Wayne’s primary airfield. Their paths crossed again when McMullen and the media went to Barksdale Field in October to observe a bombing demonstration put on by members of the U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF), Navy, and Marines. Two days later, McMullen, who served as the AAF’s representative on the Interdepartmental Air Traffic Control Board (IATCB), called Cornish. McMullen needed him to serve as chief of the Flight Operations Division, Air Staff, putting Cornish in a position to act as McMullen’s alternate on the IATCB, which also included representatives from the Navy, the Civil...
Aeronautics Administration (CAA), and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).

In volume 6 of their seven-volume history *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate cite two reasons for the IATCB’s formation—complaints about “operational hazards caused by unskilled civilian flying” and “the growing problems of congested air traffic.” The board’s mandate was to oversee and set rules for civilian and military air traffic and to control and coordinate the use of navigable airspace over the continental United States. Eventually all decisions about site locations for military air installations would be funneled through the IATCB. But despite the interesting aspects of this and other responsibilities offered to him by McMullen, “I didn’t like any part of it,” Cornish would say later of this move to Washington. But at least one associate, Irv Baldwin from Fort Wayne, thought that he was the ideal person for the task. As he wrote to Cap: “I can see that your new work, along with Major McMullen, must be extremely interesting, and work for which only a very few people in the country are qualified. I mean that direct experience in both military and commercial aviation is required. There are plenty of individuals who have a wealth of experience in one field or the other, but there are not many like
yourself who understand both.” Putting his personal wishes aside, Cornish assumed his new position around the time of his fifty-third birthday, November 10, 1941.

The United States was unprepared for the horrific event the next month when on December 7, Japan bombed U.S. naval ships at Pearl Harbor. The tasks ahead were monumental. While Japan and Germany had begun to build up their war personnel and materials years earlier, in 1931 and 1933, respectively, the United States had remained an outside observer, maintaining a comfortable distance from the hostilities while providing material support to others who were beginning to suffer as Hitler advanced through Europe while Japan ravaged portions of China. With astonishing swiftness, the United States was at war on two fronts. The nation would have to move quickly to overcome the lead of its enemies and implement a significant buildup of its armed forces. Within a year, the Army alone grew to more than 4 million officers and men, with a planned strength of 7.5 million by the end of 1943.

Men and women from myriad occupations willingly answered the call to serve their country in the military. Hundreds of thousands were recruited to work behind the scenes in administrative positions to support the combat troops and to protect the homeland. Cornish was among the latter. He made the transition from managing a busy municipal airport in the Midwest, to coordinating pursuit and bombing practice in the South, to protecting U.S. citizens from coast to coast against enemy air attacks and internal disasters.

History understandably gives maximum attention to the drama of combat, where men and women literally risk life and limb as well as sanity to defend their country. However, attacks on the United States from enemy forces were real, and they would have been far worse had it not been for President Franklin D.
The Interdepartmental Air Traffic Control Board met for the first time on April 7, 1941, and was abolished on May 31, 1946. The minutes from April 11, 1942, state the following:

The primary duty of the Board shall be the coordination and adjustment of the various activities conducted in the navigable air space above the continental United States, and such other areas as may be designated by the Secretaries of War, Navy and Commerce and the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, in order to assure the efficient and safe operation of military and civil air traffic.

In obtaining the above object, the Board shall consider the interests and requirements of military, commercial, civil and private establishments and individuals.

The Board shall conduct or direct such studies, research and investigations of the present or proposed uses of the navigable air space as may be necessary in the performance of its duties.

The Board shall recommend such standards, rules, regulations and restrictions as may be considered necessary to obtain the coordinated, efficient and safe operation of military and civil air traffic and the use of the navigable air space by other activities.

The board shall submit such recommendations as it may find necessary to appropriate agency.

All proposed changes in existing policies, regulations, etc., affecting the use of airways, airports, air navigation aids, serial bombing and machine gun training areas, flying schools and other activities taking place in the air space normally or occasionally utilized by aircraft shall be submitted to the Board for comment and recommendations before being adopted.

The general plans for the construction, development, location or relocation of all airways, airports, air navigation aids, aerial bombing and machine gun training areas, military and civil flying schools, barrage balloon, search light training areas, etc., and all other facilities or activities that may effect the navigable air space, shall be submitted to the Board for review before construction or use is authorized, in order that activities of the various governmental agencies concerned may be more closely coordinated, and overlapping or interference of activities avoided insofar as possible.

The members of the Board, as representatives of the respective Secretaries of War, Navy, and Commerce and Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board are authorized to secure from their respective departments such assistance as may be necessary from time to time to process efficiently and expeditiously matters referred to the Board.
Roosevelt and the military forces (and civilians) charged with keeping the skies and land safe from hostile infiltration. Besides conducting operations outside the United States and its overseas possessions, the AAF was charged with preparing for and executing air operations in defense of the continental United States. Cornish was a part of that security team, one that took some time to get up to speed.

The nation’s lack of preparation is well described by Craven and Cate. “The United States in 1940 possessed only a few elements essential to air defense; it had neither a system nor a single agency responsible for protection against air attacks. By 7 December 1941 the AAF emerged as the military agency responsible for that defense.” The AAF developed “a system of unified air defense for cities, vital industrial areas, continental bases, and armies in the field” and “was concerned only with the problem of protecting important areas and installations by interception and destruction of attacking enemy forces,” according to Craven and Cate. “The success of the attack on Hawaii had put the United States on the defensive and suggested that the homeland itself was not beyond the range of similar carrier-borne air assaults. For the first time since the War of 1812, the country faced a serious threat of attack.”

Oregon was the only one of the forty-eight states to suffer civilian casualties during the war. On a May day in 1945 near the town of Bly, a strange object caught the attention of Elsie Mitchell, a church pastor’s pregnant wife, and five children as they were enjoying a Sunday school picnic. When they went up to see what it was, it exploded, killing them all. What they had found was a balloon bomb; launched from Japan, it had floated across the Pacific on a jet stream. The Japanese hoped that once these hydrogen-filled paper balloons reached the United States, the explosive devices they carried would ignite, causing massive forest fires that would kill civilians. Japanese records indicate that approximately 9,000 balloon bombs were launched; it is believed that approximately 1,000 made it all the way to North America, although fewer than 300 have actually been documented. Of course, there were other war-related deaths within the United States. Thousands of AAF pilots, personnel, and airplanes were lost between December 1941 and August 1945 in more than 52,000 accidents. An estimated 1,700 deaths of non-military U.S. citizens were also attributed to the war and occurred abroad.

In the early months of the war, both U.S. coasts had inadequate warning systems and were truly vulnerable. German and Japanese submarines sank merchant ships along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, respectively; the Japanese submarine
I-17 bombarded the Ellwood Oil Field north of Santa Barbara, California, although fortunately it did little damage. Things improved with a developing radar network, thousands of volunteer aircraft spotters (including members of the Civil Air Patrol), civilians at thousands of ground observation posts, air raid sirens, barrage balloons, and blackouts. But citizens on both ends of the country were on high alert. In Oregon, for example, “a wartime mentality set in immediately. Coastal residents were commanded to black out their homes nightly, covering windows with shades and blankets. ‘Block wardens’ patrolled neighborhoods, looking for telltale lights and reprimanding offenders. Volunteers watched for airplanes, soldiers patrolled the offshore waters along with the Coast Guard, and coast watchers and their dogs walked the beaches, looking out to sea.”

Clearly, defense of the homeland was critical, not only from the standpoint of enemy infiltration, but also because of the conflicting uses of airspace during this frantic time. The tasks that were laid upon the IATCB weighed heavily. Decisions they made often had life-or-death consequences. As chief of the Flight Operations Division and in his other assignments, Cornish helped the board establish regulations for the control of both military and civilian air traffic and formulated plans for the War Department to control civil aviation systems. It was a complicated but interesting job that required him to deal with all branches of the War Department, the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, and the Defense Commands. His team investigated locations for airports, defense plants, gunnery ranges, and other establishments with the intention of maximizing the usefulness of airways; coordinated military, naval, and civil air traffic on those airways; and cooperated with the CAB, the CAA, and the airlines regarding airspace and with the Weather Bureau on meteorological matters. “We are in someone’s hair most of the time,” he wrote to his longtime friend Ross Parnin, “leaving us in a mental condition worse than physical fatigue.”

The minutes from the IATCB meeting on September 9, 1941, illustrate the nature of the issues the board grappled with, many of which revolved around airspace reservations and danger areas. Airspace reservations, similar to today’s no-fly zones, are areas over which aircraft are prohibited by order of the federal or a state government. As of mid-July 1942, two such areas had been established by executive order—Hyde Park, New York, the location of President Roosevelt’s home; and the District of Columbia. FDR was opposed to adding more airspace reservations than were absolutely necessary because of their effect on aerial navigation. Danger areas, on the other hand, evolved into something far more complex as the war unfolded. The initial authority for designating
Craven and Cate write: “In that headquarters there was throughout the war a willingness to experiment with administrative procedures and agencies; offices changed designations with a rapidity that was reflected in almost each new Pentagon telephone directory, and in some instances the transformation may have seemed hardly more than finding new titles for familiar officers performing familiar tasks in familiar rooms. In part the experimental mood derived from the lack of any deeply entrenched traditions, in part from the liberal use by Arnold of Civilian personnel and techniques in office management.” Perhaps that partially explains the many titles and assignments Cornish held in the military in Washington during World War II, as listed in his “AAF Officers’ Qualification Record”:

10/20/41–3/9/42
Asst. Chief, Civil Aviation [also written Aeronautics] Section, Air Staff, Headquarters AAF

3/9/42–9/15/42
Asst. Chief, Military Air Traffic Control Division, AFOCA

9/15/42–1/9/43
Director, Military Air Traffic Control Division, War Organization & Movement, Headquarters AAF

1/9/43–5/29/43
Chief, Information Division, Director of Flight Control, Headquarters AAF

5/29/43–10/10/43
Flight Control Branch, Technical Service Division, Headquarters AAF

AC/AS Operations, Com. & Reg. Washington DC

10/10/43–7/1/44
Chief, Operational Services Branch, OFS, Office Deputy Chief, Washington DC

7/1/44–duration of service
Chief, Flight Services Branch of the Flight Operations, Headquarters AAF, AC/AS, Training Flight Operations Division Responsible for Provisions of AAF Reg. 63-1 (Hazards in Air Navigation) coordinating with Navy, CAA and AGS Administration; Advisor on instrument approval procedures
Served throughout as Alternate, War Department Member, IATCB
danger areas rested with the administrator of civil aeronautics, and they were intended simply to protect personnel on the ground, not aircraft in flight, to reduce the risk from aircraft making forced landings, dropping objects, or accidentally falling on sites such as ammunition depots, ordnance plants, fortifications, and arsenals. However, once the United States had been drawn into the war, the IATCB recognized the potential danger that sabotage and subversive activities posed to high-explosive areas, such as arsenals, ammunition depots, shell-loading plants, torpedo stations, and fuel depots. Before the war, it had made sense to highlight explosive areas on aeronautical charts. A flaming bomb symbol was used to mark such locations on maps, while “Hi-X” signs and distinctive lights bordered the actual danger zones, making it easy for airmen to identify and avoid those areas.

On August 1, 1941, however, aviators had been advised that the signs would be removed from Navy ammunition depots and that all lights were subject to being temporarily extinguished without prior notification, as these could “provide valuable information to subversive elements and saboteurs.” Similarly, the War and Navy Departments requested that flaming bomb symbols be removed from all aeronautical charts to prevent the enemy from using them to pinpoint vulnerable targets. These changes made it tougher for a potential enemy to identify targets, but they also posed a problem for U.S. forces, who could no longer easily identify all danger zones. Meeting minutes show that the IATCB agreed unanimously that “only areas in which it was hazardous to navigate aircraft should from all aeronautical charts to prevent the enemy from using them to pinpoint vulnerable targets. These changes made it tougher for a potential enemy to identify targets, but they also posed a problem for U.S. forces, who could no longer easily identify all danger zones. Meeting minutes show that the IATCB agreed unanimously that “only areas in which it was hazardous to navigate aircraft should now be considered or classified as Danger Areas” and that “aircraft shall not fly lower than 1,000 feet except when taking off or landing, and then in such a manner as to permit an emergency landing outside of such areas in the event of power failure.” Examples of designated danger areas were Fort Belvoir and the Dahlgren Naval Proving Ground near Washington, D.C. The board agreed that the War Department should follow the Navy in removing ground identification markers and true lights from the boundaries of high-explosive areas.

Additional minutes from the September 9 meeting attest to the complexity of the problem. Item 19 reads: “There is a decided lack of coordination within and between the various branches of the Army and the Navy, and between the War, Navy and Commerce Departments, with respect to the establishment of artillery firing ranges, aerial bombing and gunnery ranges, search light and barrage balloon areas, military and civil flight training schools, high explosive areas, etc., and no uniform procedure and policy with respect to the filing of applications and plans for, and the establishment of, danger areas or air space reservations.”
Years later, Cornish recalled one example of the tragic ramifications of unclear directives: “Industries that built goods requiring high security put machine guns on their roofs and the operators were told to shoot down anything that flew over. Two people in a small private aircraft flew over the Winchester plant [the St. Louis Ordnance Plant] and were shot down.”\(^{19}\) It was a case of misidentification and panic on the part of the machine gun operators, he concluded.\(^{20}\)

The problem extended well beyond manufacturers of armaments. Item 20 of September’s minutes reads: “This lack of coordination has resulted in the establishment of Army and Navy training areas which overlap each other; and AAA [antiaircraft artillery] firing areas, and aerial bombing and gunnery ranges being established within long established civil airways.” In the future, the board stated, “all applications for the establishment of Air Space Reservations or Danger Areas [will] be routed to the appropriate member of the Interdepartmental Air Traffic Control Board for review, coordination and recommendation by the Board.”

Cornish arrived two months later, officially reporting for duty on November 11. The following day, he sat down in an office at Gravelly Point with military and civilian officials for his first IATCB meeting, chaired by McMullen. After leaving Barksdale Field, where he had found his work with bomber crews to be immensely satisfying, he was entering an understandably confused arena, given the newness of the nation’s danger alert. After listening to the discussion of various issues and positions, Cornish perceived the difficulty of finding workable solutions to problems that existed between divergent parts of government. They sometimes worked at cross-purposes in the rush to build forces and munitions during those months leading up to the formal declarations of war in late 1941—on December 8 against Japan and on December 11 against Germany and Italy. For example, special trench mortar powder was manufactured and tested at the Radford Ordnance Works and Proving Grounds near Radford, Virginia, within the horseshoe bend of the New River at White Horne. Trench mortar projectiles on that range could reach a maximum height of approximately six thousand feet, and firing was conducted daily. At the time they did no night firing, but if production increased, that could change. The problem? Green Airway No. 4, which connected Roanoke, Virginia, and Knoxville, Tennessee, passed directly over the proving grounds; the testing of projectiles threatened safe air traffic between the two cities. The CAA contended that because the airway followed a natural valley flanked by a mountainous landscape, rerouting aircraft would force them to fly over rugged and potentially dangerous terrain. In addition, there were no funds available to relocate the lights, radio range stations, and
intermediate landing fields that served the airway. It was pointed out that neither the CAA nor the IATCB had been advised before the development of the Radford facility. The board recommended that since the activities on the proving grounds constituted a serious hazard to air traffic on this airway, no firing into low clouds or in overcast conditions would be permitted, and the grounds would need to be relocated outside the confines of Green Airway No. 4. However, the board then backtracked somewhat, having decided to allow firing pending the establishment of a new proving grounds. Until then, safety officers stationed in strategic locations would observe air traffic and communicate directly with control officers by “interphone” when it was necessary to hold fire because aircraft were within the danger area.

Clearly, bombing and testing and artillery ranges posed a danger to aircraft within both civil and military flight paths. Surprisingly, the minutes show that civil air traffic often took precedence in the board's final recommendations. Cornish would soon become familiar with the IATCB's decisions in this regard. He would also discover that no part of the country was immune from conflict between those involved in vital defense activities on the ground and those needing to use the airspace above. For example, the Arlington Bombing Range, between Pendleton and Portland, Oregon, fell in the center of Red Airway No. 1; the Southwestern Proving Grounds were under Green Airway No. 4 between Texarkana, Texas, and Little Rock, Arkansas; the Sheep Mountain Gunnery Range was almost entirely within Amber Airway No. 2 between Las Vegas, Nevada, and Salt Lake City, Utah; the Fort Knox Armored Forces Range in Kentucky fell within the confines of Amber Airway No. 6 between Louisville and Nashville, Tennessee. Additionally, the Camp Callan Artillery Firing Range was located almost entirely within the confines of Amber Airway No. 1 between San Diego and Long Beach, California, a course used extensively by both civil and military aircraft. The IATCB minutes noted that “training at Camp Callan includes firing of small arms, antiaircraft machine guns, automatic weapons, and 3-inch guns, and 155-mm guns, and the use of antiaircraft searchlights; that searchlights and aircraft without lights may be operated within the limits of this range in connection with training at night; that trajectories of projectiles from A.A. [anti-artillery] guns fired on this range may reach an altitude of 30,000 feet; that firing on this range may be conducted both day and night from 8:00 a.m. Monday until 12:00 noon, Saturday; holidays excepted.” The board made several recommendations, including “that the activities at this Camp be transferred to other locations as rapidly as possible.”
Wartime initiatives and resulting activities across the country moved at breakneck speed, and it was important for anyone who entered the airspace to stay informed. Flight maps for pilots indicated areas that required avoidance or special attention, including “Prohibited Areas (Air Space Reservations)”; “Caution Areas . . . in which . . . there are visible hazards” such as radio towers, masts, flagpoles, smokestacks, or water towers; and “Danger Areas . . . in which there is an invisible hazard such as might exist over an artillery or bombing range.” During the war, aerial bombing and gunnery ranges and areas being used for flight training, artillery practice, and searchlight training were all classified as danger areas to be avoided by other aircraft. And according to the board, areas where barrage balloons were in use constituted “the greatest of all present hazards to aircraft in flight.” At the IATCB meeting on December 5, 1941—two days before the bombing of Pearl Harbor—one of the topics of discussion was how best to mark barrage balloons so as to warn pilots away from them and thereby prevent fatal accidents.

Having been used by the British during World War I to defend against a low-level air attack by the enemy, barrage balloons—shaped like fat footballs with fins—were redeployed over Britain by the thousands in World War II. The first American balloon was constructed and sent aloft in February 1942 at the Army’s new Barrage Balloon Training Center at Camp Tyson in Paris, Tennessee. It was hoped that barrage balloons would be an effective deterrent against an enemy invasion. With the use of a motorized winch, they could be strategically raised and lowered, and they could be moved from one place to another as needed.

The U.S. military had high hopes for the use of barrage balloons in deterring an enemy attack on the homeland, but the “fat footballs with fins” created difficult issues that Cornish and the IATCB had to resolve. (Photo by Alfred Palmer or Pat Terry, Parris Island, South Carolina, May 1942, LC-USW3-002371-E, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Washington, D.C.)
They were often grouped into a circle or used to form a “barrage battalion.” Flying into a barrage balloon or one of the heavy steel cables that tethered it to the ground was extremely hazardous—and not only for enemy aircraft. Friendly aircraft thus needed to be properly warned. But how? A single battalion might have fifty-four balloons operating in a four-square-mile area. Marking them all would not be easy.

In light of the buildup of this defensive program, the concern about warning markers was well-founded, and Cornish was asked to present ideas to the IATCB. He listed several possibilities, including positioning red rotating beacons at the corners of the area, having “beacons oscillating in a vertical plane of 180 degrees as an alternate,” using two radio ranges with the “legs” set “so as to box the area,” and “attaching streamers and warning lights on cables at the outer edge only.” By April, approximately 430 barrage balloons were in place along the U.S. coasts, protecting vital cities, factories, and harbors from invasion by German forces on the East Coast and Japanese forces on the West. Unable to reach a definitive conclusion regarding the problem, the IATCB recommended that “no attempt be made to promulgate general regulations governing the operation of barrage balloons in defense areas as tactical and strategical situations will determine when, how, and at what altitudes these balloons will be flown.”

The matter was passed along to the CAA’s Technical Development Division for further study. At the very least, barrage balloon locations would be flagged as danger areas on aeronautical charts.

The inability to make a timely determination about important matters hampered the functioning of the IATCB throughout the early days of the war. Deliberation could be cumbersome, and crucial decisions were often delayed. Different divisions and individuals in the agencies had to weigh in; papers had to be written, positions stated and debated, and territories staked out. Before taking action and making recommendations on dilemmas such as whether to mark barrage balloons with lights, staff members had to develop position papers for consideration by the IATCB. Recommendations were then taken back to various military and civilian departments in the Army, Navy, CAA, and CAB. The steps necessary for effecting change among the various bureaucracies could be frustrating and had the potential to be dangerously time-consuming.

According to a document found in one of Cornish’s AAF binders, the War Department’s job was made all the harder by the poor preparation of essential materials. In a general directive to subordinates dated September 17, 1942, Major General George E. Stratemeyer made it clear that the chief of the Air
Staff needed to be protected from “half-baked ideas, voluminous memoranda and immature oral presentations.” Staff were to do their job properly, so that all he would have to do was indicate his approval or disapproval of the suggested action.

The more difficult the problem the more the tendency is to present it to the chief in piece-meal fashion. It is your duty as a staff officer to work out the details. You should not consult your chief in the determination of those details, no matter how perplexing they may be. . . . It is so easy to ask the chief what to do, and it appears so easy for him to answer. Resist that impulse. You will succumb to it only if you do not know your job. It is your job to advise your chief what he ought to do, not to ask him what you ought to do. He needs answers, not questions. Your job is to study, write, restudy, and rewrite until you have evolved a single proposed action—the best one of all you have considered.

The rough draft must not be a half-baked idea. It must be complete in every respect except that it lacks the requisite number of copies and need not be neat. But a rough draft must not be used as an excuse for shifting to the chief the burden of formulating the action. Avoid submittal of hastily prepared inaccurate material lacking a concise, specific, workable recommendation.

Finally, when you have finished your “completed staff work,” the final test is this: If you were the chief would you be willing to sign the paper you have prepared, and stake your professional reputation on its being right?28

Considering Cornish’s lifelong attention to detail, he would surely have heartily agreed with Stratemeyer.

There was no confusion about the meaning of the following safety bulletin, which was prepared by the Civil Aviation Board and included in the IATCB minutes from July 1942, with a note that, “danger areas” should be substituted for “restricted areas”:

Don’t Get Shot Down

In these days of war, failure to read the airport bulletin board daily may prove to be fatal. New restricted areas are being established from time
Keeping the Home Skies Safe

Life may have been going on pretty much as normal back home in Fort Wayne, but from his vantage point in the nation’s capital, Cornish, who had been promoted to major on February 26, 1942, and then to Lieutenant Colonel on December 5, 1942, was well aware of the very real dangers that the country was facing.

to time and these areas are likely to be protected by anti-aircraft batteries and machine guns. The orders to the gun crews are to shoot down any civil aircraft flying over those areas, and these orders are likely to be carried out with dispatch. There has already been a case in which a pilot did not read the airport bulletin board notice telling of a restricted area. He carried sight-seeing passengers over this area, was shot at, and one of his passengers seriously wounded.

Reading the bulletin boards for these notices does not mean looking at them once a week, but before each flight the pilot should make sure that no notice has been added which he has not seen. Never lose sight of the fact that we are at war and our armed forces are not fooling when they set out to protect a defense area. They mean business!