Apple of Discord

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Chapter 11

A Problematical Relationship
1871–78

The acrimonious exchanges over the Livadia trip, at the end of December 1871, closed a peculiar chapter in relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia. For four years the Hungarian minister president, an influential new force in the shaping of the Monarchy’s foreign policy, tried to exert control over Serbia, using tactics which, whatever their shortcomings, were based on a genuine desire for political cooperation. But Andrássy alone could not determine foreign policy toward Serbia, and the inevitable result was simply to muddy the waters and create further confusion and suspicion. With Andrássy’s abandonment of this strategy, Austro-Serbian relations could return to what passed for normality.

Yet the Andrássy experiment left its mark on subsequent policy, if only in a negative sense. In the four decades remaining before the Monarchy committed the supreme blunder of attacking Serbia in 1914, a policy was pursued which sprang directly from the experiences of 1867–71, and which owed much to the fact that those experiences were largely Hungarian ones. The fundamental tenet of this policy was that if Serbia would not willingly be tied to the Monarchy, then it must be forced to accept satellite status. It took a decade for this policy to be implemented; the final touches were completed in 1881.

It is not the purpose here to analyze Austro-Hungarian policy toward Serbia after 1881; a follow-up volume, currently in preparation, will cover the period of full economic and political domination down to 1903. What is intended rather is to summarize the fateful policies adopted after 1871, and which culminated in the treaties of 1880–81. The effect of this settlement, in which Andrássy’s policies were brought to fruition by, among others, Kállay, can hardly be exaggerated.
There is a direct connection between the relationship forced on Serbia in 1881, and the breakdown in relations which set in after 1903, events which in turn had a direct bearing on the outbreak of the First World War.

After 1871 the Monarchy reverted to a more traditional policy of trying to control Serbia by outright coercion. It took another decade for the necessary apparatus to be locked into place, but by 1881 Austro-Hungarian control over Serbia’s economic and political development seemed as absolute as could be wished for. By coercion is not implied military force, even if that was the ultimate sanction. Rather, control over Serbia was achieved through a combination of personal diplomacy and treaty obligation. Specifically, the personal influence was exercised by means of Prince, later King Milan Obrenović; the treaties in question were the commercial and railway conventions of 1880–81, and the secret political alliance of 1881. For the next twenty-five years Serbia remained a satellite of the Monarchy.¹

Andrássy, as foreign minister from 1871 to 1879, was chiefly responsible for laying down the Monarchy’s new policy toward Serbia. All his utterances with regard to Serbia, in the first few months after taking over at the Ballhaus, indicated that he had completely abandoned his four years’ patronage of Belgrade, and swung over to an exaggerated supportiveness for the Ottoman Empire. If Serbia should threaten Ottoman rule, Andrássy told the British ambassador on taking office, the Ottomans should “crush her the moment she moves.”² At a secret military planning conference in February 1872, far from airing his previous plans for handing Bosnia over to Serbia, Andrássy actually conceded that the annexation of the province by the Monarchy would be desirable, even if current conditions made it impracticable. The only objection raised to annexation by Andrássy, at this February conference, was that it would needlessly unite the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Serbia against the Monarchy. Instead, he continued, it must be Austria-Hungary’s principal object in the Balkans to divide the smaller states from one another, and prop up Ottoman rule. The main danger, as always, was from Russia, and in this, Andrássy stressed, the Monarchy must now reckon with the hostility of both Serbia and Romania as well.³

Andrássy’s attitude toward Serbia was part of an important shift in his views generally by 1871, one of those occasions where a politician implicitly acknowledges that he has changed his mind. In the period between 1867 and 1871, the Hungarian minister president had agreed with neither of the two main, but competing, traditions in Habsburg policy in the Balkans. He rejected both the dynastic standpoint, which saw the Balkans as a suitable field for expansion, preferably with the cooperation of Russia, and the conservative belief, inherited from Metternich, that only a rigid adherence to the status quo could preserve the Monarchy from the dangers of nationalism and Russian interference in the region. Against these views, Andrássy had opposed a distinctly Hungarian preference.
He stressed the paramount threat from Russia, resisted the idea of incorporating extra nationalities, especially Slavs, into the Monarchy, and took a relatively liberal attitude toward the national development of the Balkan peoples. The Bosnian plan had represented this Hungarian approach to relations with the South Slav world quite accurately.

Now, at the conference of February 1872, it was clear that Andrásy had finally adapted his thinking to what was in essence the dynastic tradition: the Balkans were a legitimate, indeed a vital concern of the Monarchy, and one where expansion could not be ruled out. Far from accepting that the corollary of this might have to be collaboration with Russia, however, Andrásy laid greatest emphasis on the need to combat Russian influence and to prepare for conflict with Russia. It was to this end, and to safeguard the Monarchy’s own expansionist goals, that the Ottoman Empire was to be revived and the Balkan nationalities divided and weakened. As Diószegi remarks, this constituted “a peculiar interweaving of Austrian dynastic traditions and Hungarian national aspirations, in which the Hungarian component was undoubtedly the stronger.”

Nor did Andrásy make any secret of his change of mind as far as Serbia was concerned. When a dispute developed between Serbia and the Porte over possession of Mali Zvornik, an Ottoman-held enclave on the Serbian side of the border with Bosnia, Andrásy made clear his lack of sympathy with the Serbian side of the argument. Writing in April 1872 to the new Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople, Count Ludolf, Andrásy announced that “we do not perceive, in our current relations with the Serbs, any reason which might cause us to support their interests.” At a common ministerial council in mid-May, Andrásy described the Ottoman Empire as the Monarchy’s “strongest and most reliable ally” in the region, an opinion he repeated to Kállay a few days later. In August, Andrásy told the British ambassador that the Ottomans should be left by the powers to crush any uprising of the Balkan Christians, and indeed, that Austria-Hungary supported a policy of “holding the ring” while this was done. As late as November 1872 he was advising the Ottoman government that maintaining the divisions among the Balkan peoples offered the Porte “its safest and cheapest protection.”

Kállay, too, determined to escape to the more promising world of Hungarian domestic politics, made his disdain for the Serbian government fairly obvious. The British consul in Belgrade was undoubtedly carrying coals to Newcastle when, in February 1872, he warned the Serbs that Hungary had flattered us [the Serbs] with tall stories and strung us along with promises that it would gladly agree to Bosnia and the Hercegovina falling to Serbia, but in the recent past had changed its policy, and now makes the same promises to the Croatian aristocracy, doubtless to bind it closer to itself.

Ristić himself acknowledged, in March, that Kállay hardly ever visited now.
A few weeks later, the Regent put his finger on an important element in the new Austro-Hungarian policy toward Serbia. He knew for a fact, he told Hristić, that Kállay’s instructions were to show indifference toward Serbia’s improved relationship with Russia, and to wait until Prince Milan attained his majority that summer. The Monarchy’s future attitude toward Serbia, Ristić believed, would depend very much on what line Milan took. That this was no fantasy on Ristić’s part emerges from Andrássy’s instructions to Kállay in August, on the occasion of Milan’s coming of age. Kállay was to show “neither a demonstrative reticence nor the opposite,” and to let it be known thereby that

just as our relationship with Serbia was conditioned hitherto by the attitude of the Regency, so our future relations will be conditioned by that of the Prince.

In other words the Prince, who occupied such a crucial position in the Serbian political world, was potentially an equally important figure in the development of Austria-Hungary’s future relationship with Serbia. It was a trite observation, but one which foreshadowed much of subsequent policy.

Relations sank to a new low in the summer of 1872, precisely because of the celebrations in Belgrade of Milan’s majority. The city of Belgrade sent out invitations to South Slavs within the Monarchy, an act to which the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry took exception but which, since the invitations were not made by the Serbian government, Andrássy decided to ignore. The Hungarian government, however, took a different view, and promptly banned Hungarian subjects from attending the festivities, a measure which Andrássy undoubtedly welcomed.

The subsequent junketings in Belgrade were likely from the start to be an occasion for nationalist oratory and demonstrations and, given the current state of relations, it was all too likely that the Monarchy would be criticized both by Serbian citizens and by its own subjects. The visa ban, however, imposed at short notice and with limited effect, only exacerbated relations and led to fresh abuse. According to the British consul, the Austro-Hungarian government as a whole was deemed to have sought to prevent a Pan-Slav demonstration, and to have failed miserably. Visitors from the Monarchy were estimated to have exceeded six thousand, although Kállay disputed this. “Nothing in short could be more ill judged and untimely than this attempt to interfere with what was felt to be a national holiday.” Matters came to a climax on the night of 26 August, when a torchlight procession attempted to parade outside the Austro-Hungarian consulate: “the police interfered with a strong hand in dispersing the mob, which had assembled for the purpose of insulting Mr. Kallay.”

Another indication of the extent to which Andrássy and Kállay had abandoned their policy of courting Serbian goodwill, and were capable of envisaging an expansionist policy in the Balkans, was the journey through Bosnia which Kállay made in the summer of 1872, shortly before the celebrations of Milan’s
majority. Traveling up the Sava as far as Bosanski Brod, he then struck inland, up the Bosna River valley, to the heart of the province, arriving at Sarajevo on 16 July. Here his former deputy, Theodorovics, gave Kállay a thoroughgoing introduction to the complexities of the Bosnian scene, with visits to leading figures in the Ottoman administration, the consular corps, and all three communities. Of particular significance were the visits Kállay paid to the Catholic monasteries in and around Sarajevo, since the existence of a sizeable Catholic minority in Bosnia-Hercegovina was later to be one of the pretexts for the Monarchy’s intervention in 1878.

Leaving Sarajevo on 3 August, Kállay returned via the Vrbas River valley in western Bosnia, emerging on the Sava once more at Bosanska Gradiška on the twelfth. He had thus inspected the main river axes of the country and, especially by his contacts with the Catholic community, sent out a strong signal that the Habsburg Monarchy had interests of its own in Bosnia. At the monastery of Fojnjica, for instance, Kállay assured the gratified Franciscans that “our All-Highest Master [Francis Joseph] will protect and defend their interests in future, as he has up to now.” Kállay’s biographer, writing thirty-seven years later, was even more forthright. The Bosnian journey, Thallóczy believed, was “the starting point of the policy which took shape seven [sic] years later, which drew Bosnia and the Hercegovina into the Monarchy’s immediate sphere of interest.” It was not a gesture which passed unnoticed in Belgrade.

Matters remained at this level of scarcely veiled hostility for much of the next year. Early in 1873, for example, the Austro-Hungarian government banned the Danube Steamship Company from calling at Serbian ports, a practical annoyance which the Serbian government felt keenly. By the end of 1873, however, an alternative strategy for relations with Serbia had emerged. Andrássy and Kállay both, on the basis of their increased contacts with young Prince Milan, had come to the conclusion that he was someone with whom they could do business. For one thing, Milan himself clearly wished for a better relationship. As Kállay reported, after his first serious conversation with Milan since his majority, the Prince “declared quite frankly, that Austria’s good will was an absolute necessity for Serbia, since the country’s material prosperity was to a large extent dependent on its neighbor state.” This was no less than the truth, and for the rest of his life Milan was to remain consistent in this belief.

The problem with relying on Milan for the implementation of the Monarchy’s policy, however, was that the very fact of his personal preference for the Monarchy distanced the Prince from the Serbian political world and Serbian public opinion. To begin with, Milan was happy to continue, after August 1872, with Blaznavac as his minister president and Ristić as foreign minister. Blaznavac died suddenly in April 1873, and Ristić took over; at this stage Ristić, no less than Milan, was concerned with repairing the breach with Austria-Hungary, for
practical reasons if nothing else. More important was the clash of temperament and underlying objectives between the Prince and Ristić. Ristić, though authoritarian by nature, wished to govern with the aid largely of the Liberals, which meant a constitutionally elected Skupština. Milan, like his cousin Prince Michael essentially an autocrat, resented being saddled with this relatively mild constitution while still a minor.\textsuperscript{25} From an early point in his reign he aimed at building up a professional army with an officer corps which would owe its loyalty primarily to him, its commander-in-chief. In the long term, Ristić’s insistence on governing by parliamentary means, however rigged, made him less than welcome from the Monarchy’s point of view. His nationalist sympathies, as well as those of successive Skupštinas, were well known; certainly neither Andrássy nor Kállay trusted Ristić to maintain an Austrophile course, if public opinion in Serbia seemed against it.\textsuperscript{26}

By the time of a much publicized visit by Milan to Vienna in the autumn of 1873, and which, ironically, Ristić had done much to promote, the division between the Prince and Ristić was obvious. Andrássy, who had lengthy talks with the Prince, and confirmed the sincerity of his desire for better relations, could see the difficulty himself. As he put it to Kállay,

\begin{quote}
Whether he [Prince Milan], in view of the low level of popularity which he appears to enjoy in the country, and in view of his apparently more indolent than energetic nature, will be able to maintain his position for long, I would not like to hazard an opinion.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

Milan, contrary to these expectations, remained on the scene for some time to come. Despite the risks attendant on putting all their eggs into one basket, therefore, the Monarchy’s policy makers continued thereafter to place much of their reliance in the Prince personally. This obvious identification of Milan with Austro-Hungarian interests, in turn, contributed substantially to his general unpopularity in Serbia.\textsuperscript{28}

There was another problem with relying so much on the ruler, and this was Milan’s personality. Milan was very much the product of a broken marriage, and his behavior even before attaining his majority reflected this. His parents, Miloš Obrenović and Maria Catargiu, had split up even before Milan was born in 1854, largely because of the father’s spendthrift and philandering ways; Milan’s mother, however, then went on to become the mistress of Prince Alexander Cuza of Romania, and until his ninth year Milan “grew up in the shadow of one of the most corrupt courts of Europe.”\textsuperscript{29} Although Prince Michael then removed his heir from Maria’s control and sent him to school in Paris, Milan’s character was already largely shaped. The Regents, Blaznavac and Ristić, continued his education, but failed to provide him with suitable companions or role models; instead, they saw fit to “complete” this education by providing him with another
man’s wife as a mistress. Emotionally neglected and solitary as a child, Milan grew up with an inbred mistrust of human nature and a cynical and self-indulgent outlook on the world generally. Highly intelligent, he was also manipulative and temperamental. Even before Milan’s majority, Kállay noted in March 1872, the Prince was noted for his boorish manners, fondness for gambling, and a tendency to drink more than was good for him, even though he was also already attending cabinet meetings regularly. It was a pattern that Milan exhibited throughout his life, a combination of shrewdness and immaturity.

For a brief period, in 1873–74, it appeared as if the presence of Milan alone would return Serbia to the Monarchy’s sphere of influence. The rift between the Prince and Ristić led to the latter’s dismissal in November 1873, and his replacement by Jovan Marinović, close associate of Garašanin and one of those reviled by Kállay back in the 1860s as the “Russian party.” By late 1873, however, Kállay had come to appreciate Marinović for what he was: a conservative patriot who was essentially above, not to say indifferent to, party politics. Cultured, rich, and reasonable, Marinović deplored the dismantling of the old oligarchical system by Ristić in 1869, but was not reactionary or aggressive enough to wish to turn the clock back. Instead, as Milan’s closest adviser, he represented a belief in the need for government above party factionalism, and in pursuit of consensus secured the appointment of several Liberals to his administration. In foreign affairs, too, all Marinović’s instincts were conciliatory: he wished to see Serbia on good terms with all the powers, including even the Porte. Kállay already counted Marinović as a personal friend, and while Marinović remained in power the Austro-Hungarian consul was once again a frequent visitor at the minister president’s office. Unfortunately for the Monarchy’s cause, however, Marinović’s style of government, on both the domestic and the foreign fronts, soon got him into difficulties.

The early 1870s in Serbia, as Gale Stokes has shown, were a period of genuine political development. Despite the restrictive terms of the 1869 Constitution, political debate was gradually widening and deepening, with the emergence of rudimentary party organization. Above all, elections and regular Skupština sessions were becoming a forum for real political controversy, which even the masterful Ristić had found hard to manage. Where Ristić had dominated the Skupština, Marinović permitted it far more freedom to discuss and criticize than it had ever exercised. The result was constant opposition and disruption, which brought Marinović down in December 1874.

Even Marinović’s accommodating approach to foreign affairs, which Andrásy and Kállay so much welcomed, proved to be a liability, since it created the impression in Serbia of a weak government, truckling to the country’s enemies. The intimacy with Kállay, for a start, did Marinović no service in the nationalist press and opposition. Worse was the effect produced by the decision, in June 1874, for Milan finally to journey to Constantinople and pay formal homage to
the Sultan. Done reluctantly, under the joint pressure of Austria-Hungary and Russia, this was inevitably unpopular, and the fact that Marinović in return secured nothing by way of concessions over the Mali Zvornik and railway questions did not improve matters. Shortly after, Marinović let Milan talk him into an extended three-month tour of Europe, with the minister president in tow, an indulgence which confirmed the reputation of Milan as a spendthrift idler, and heightened the sense of a government out of touch with public opinion.\(^{36}\)

Long before the Marinović government was replaced by an even more unstable one under Aćim Ćumić, then, it was clear to Andrássy and Kállay that their hopes of maintaining a friendly regime in Belgrade were misplaced.\(^{37}\) On the contrary, the opposition to Marinović assumed an ominous form from the Monarchy’s point of view when, in mid-1874, Ristić put himself at the head of what he claimed would be a “national-liberal party.” Through a new journal, \emph{Istok}, Ristić started agitating for Serbia to assume once more the role of Balkan Piedmont. He explicitly criticized the government’s failure to promote revolution in the Ottoman provinces, and its excessive willingness to do Austria-Hungary’s bidding.\(^{38}\)

For Andrássy and Kállay this only confirmed all their suspicions of Ristić; it also made their dilemma the more acute. If Prince Milan’s goodwill alone was not sufficient to ensure a reliable Serbia, or if those leaders, like Marinović, who were well-disposed toward the Monarchy, were too weak, then some other means of securing the Monarchy’s interests in Serbia was essential.

As it happened, Andrássy had one instrument ready to hand, in the shape of the Three Emperors’ League, even before the formation of Marinović’s government. In the great irony of his tenure as foreign minister, Andrássy found himself driven by the logic of grand policy toward a \textit{détente} with Russia, which took its first tentative form in 1872, and was then formalized by the Schönbrunn Convention between the two empires in June 1873. With Germany’s accession to the pact in October, the conservative alliance of earlier in the century was partially restored. The result was the first of several periods of wary, but nonetheless basically effective Austro-Russian cooperation in the Balkans, in the interests of stability and the sharing of influence. A natural consequence of the League was that Serbia’s interests were among the first to be set aside, by Russia no less than by Austria-Hungary.\(^{39}\)

The other, increasingly apparent, means open to the Monarchy of controlling Serbia was the economic one. If the Monarchy could only impose on Serbia the sort of economic discipline which Andrássy and Kállay had dreamed of for so long, then surely the Principality would prove more biddable politically as well. Serbia must be drawn into the Monarchy’s railway network; a satisfactory trade relationship must be achieved; and some form of treaty assurance of all this must be reached.\(^{40}\) The difficulty, however, lay in finding a Serbian government
which would be willing to agree to such a program in the face of the Skupština and public opinion.

Serbia’s domestic political situation at the start of 1875 made this unlikely. Čumić’s government lasted a mere two months, largely because the egregious Čumić soon antagonized everyone, including the Prince, his cabinet colleagues, the Skupština, and the Austro-Hungarian government. Andrássy was so alarmed at the growth of nationalist agitation in Serbia that, in mid-January 1875, he issued a not-so-veiled warning to Milan. If the Prince could not keep a ministry about him which refrained from encouraging such agitation, Andrássy wrote, “we would reach a point where we would have to consider protecting our interests unilaterally.” When Čumić resigned in a huff early in February, Milan seized the opportunity to appoint a ministry of faceless bureaucrats headed by Danilo Stefanović. In as much as most of Stefanović’s colleagues were allies of Jovan Marinović, who continued to advise Prince Milan, the new government was at least marginally more acceptable to the Monarchy. It still, however, had to contend with a Skupština which was increasingly vocal and self-confident, and with the presence of Ristić in the background.

Faced with the prospect of continuing uncertainty on the Serbian scene, by 1875 Andrássy was in no mood to rely on any Serbian government. It was in January 1875, for instance, that the foreign minister made his most explicit statement yet as to the need for the Monarchy eventually to take over Bosnia-Hercegovina. As the protocol of a secret council of the Emperor’s military chancellery, held on 29 January, shows, Andrássy by now was clearly for a takeover, given certain conditions, although the precise reasons for his conversion are not obvious. On no account, at any rate, could Austria-Hungary tolerate the occupation of any part of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Serbia or Montenegro. The mere threat of this, Andrássy assured the council, would justify the Monarchy in sending in its own troops. It was the final proof that Andrássy had quite abandoned the views he held up until late 1871 and, in part, for some time after that.

The inability of Serbian governments to control nationalist agitation was underlined in the most unmistakable way in July 1875, when a revolt against Ottoman rule broke out in the Hercegovina. The Near Eastern crisis which developed out of this, and which occupied the attention of the great powers for the next three years, showed the truth of Kállay’s repeated warnings since 1868. Confronted with a genuine uprising in the Balkans, no Serbian government could afford to ignore popular sentiment in favor of war with the Turks. The first proof of this was the collapse of the rootless Stefanović ministry in August 1875, and the appointment by Milan of a government under Stevča Mihailović, based on popular support in a newly elected Skupština, and with Jovan Ristić as foreign minister and dominant personality.

That the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in the person of the Emperor Francis Joseph and his military advisers, shared some of the responsibility for the
insurrection in the Hercegovina now seems a reasonable proposition. Francis Joseph’s tour of the Monarchy’s Dalmatian coastline, in the spring of 1875, and during which he gave a sympathetic reception to delegations of Bosnians and Hercegovinians claiming his protection, appears to have contributed substantially to the readiness of the Christian population to rise up. Andrásy was not in favor of the decision to make the tour at that point, and was in fact enraged at its diplomatic repercussions, but nevertheless had to accept it as a fait accompli.\textsuperscript{47} Nor could the foreign minister complain if the Emperor sought to accelerate a scheme propounded by Andrásy only the previous January, by which the Monarchy could look forward to taking responsibility for Bosnia-Hercegovina.

In the meantime the crisis in the Balkans had to be managed with due attention to the Monarchy’s interests, and Andrásy found that the surest way to achieve this was to come to a practical understanding with Russia. Despite the effect of the uprising in Pan-Slav circles, the Three Emperors’ League was still alive and well. When, shortly after the outbreak of the revolt, Prince Milan journeyed to Vienna to seek the advice of the powers, both Andrásy and the Russian ambassador, Novikov, cautioned him against any armed involvement by Serbia. Indeed, the Russians seemed even less concerned about South Slav sensibilities than Andrásy himself. Novikov immediately proposed a joint \textit{démarche} by the League in Belgrade; and Baron Jomini, of the Russian foreign ministry, described a possible Ottoman occupation of Serbia as “a punishment deserved.” “During the Turkish occupation,” he continued, “the country might be relieved of its republican socialist element.”\textsuperscript{48}

The Tsar’s government, as always, was in fact divided between an official policy toward the Balkans and an unofficial one. The official line sought to preserve the status quo as far as practicable, while providing for an amicable division of the region into Russian and Austro-Hungarian spheres of interest in the event of a general breakdown of Ottoman rule. The unofficial Pan-Slav line wanted a Russian-imposed settlement which secured Russian influence over the Balkan Slavs to the exclusion of all else. As the crisis unfolded, public opinion in Russia did for the first time begin to have an effect on government policy, in that some concessions were felt necessary to Pan-Slav and especially Orthodox sentiments. This pressure was increased when Russian officers, headed by the military hero General Cherniaiev, volunteered for service with the Serbian army in anticipation of war. The overall ambition of the Russian government, however, remained to secure Russia’s interests as a great power, rather than to gratify the instincts of Russian, let alone Balkan, nationalists.\textsuperscript{49}

For this reason Andrásy, despite his chronic suspicion of Russian motives, was able to do a deal with St. Petersburg which promised to secure Austria-Hungary’s interests too.\textsuperscript{50} The two powers pursued roughly parallel policies throughout the next year, discouraging active Serbian or Montenegrin involve-
ment in the spreading revolt, tabling one ineffective scheme of reform for the Ottoman Empire after another and, in general, as Andrásy had described his own favored approach back in 1871, “holding the ring.”

In Belgrade, however, Prince Milan was fighting a losing battle against the popular clamor for war. It is impossible not to conclude that, caught between the minatory attitude of the powers, and rising nationalist hysteria at home, Milan nevertheless judged the situation more realistically than the majority of Serbian politicians. Whether from his oft-expressed contempt for the Serbian people, with whom he felt little in common, or from that shrewd instinct for his own interests which distinguished him, Milan was convinced that war would be a disaster. “If you win, glory; if you lose, disgrace,” was his pithy summary of the dilemma facing him. Yet Milan could not ignore the possibility of deposition or assassination if he failed to reflect the popular mood. Kállay’s successor as consul in Belgrade, Prince Wrede, shared this gloomy outlook. “Whatever course events take,” he informed Vienna at the end of August, “it is very probable that the result will be fatal to the house of Obrenovitch.”

Despairing of the openly warlike measures proposed by the Mihailović-Ristić government, Milan forced their resignation early in October by making explicit his disagreement with such tactics. The Prince hoped that the new minister president, Ljubomir Kaljević, although a Liberal, would support him in a policy of moderation. Before long, however, the Kaljević ministry too felt itself obliged to bend under the pressure building up for action. The formation of volunteer units, many of whom flooded in from Austria-Hungary, to fight on the side of the insurgents, had been halted at the insistence of the powers; but the Serbian government continued to supply the revolt with funds, supplies, and arms. Nor did Milan’s high-handed methods heighten his popularity in the country.

Milan’s quandary was worsened by the fact that the policy jointly pursued by Austria-Hungary and Russia, while sternly discouraging action by Serbia, patiently held out no prospect of resolving the crisis. Andrásy’s first significant proposal for ending the revolt was the so-called Andrásy Note of 30 December. This document, drafted in consultation with the Russian ambassador, Novikov, confined itself to suggesting internal Ottoman reforms, none of which were to be enforced by the powers. Accepted by the Porte, but rejected by the insurgents and unlikely from the start to win the endorsement of Great Britain, the Note was essentially a pious exercise in window-dressing, incapable of realization. Rejection by the powers and the insurgents, on the one hand, left the Porte free to crush the revolt if it could. That the Note stemmed from the Monarchy, on the other hand, established that power in Andrásy’s eyes as the protector of the Balkan Christians and, in Wertheimer’s words, “was designed eventually to smooth the way for the future acquisition of both Turkish provinces by Austria-Hungary.”
Since the revolt continued, so did the pressure on Milan. In March 1876 he responded to more Austro-Russian remonstrance, and issued a declaration in which his government promised not to attack the Ottomans, or impede great power mediation. This only increased the Prince’s isolation in Belgrade, as Pan-Slavists here and in Russia stepped up their demands for action. The ambiguity between official and unofficial Russian policy here began to tell, as many of those Russians with whom Milan had dealings were only too eager to assure him that a war policy would have Russia’s full backing. Early in May, Milan finally decided that his personal position was too dangerous, and he resolved to lead from the front rather than risk being left behind. He dismissed Kaljević, and brought back the Mihailović-Ristić team.

From that point, events spiralled rapidly beyond the control not just of Belgrade, but of the powers themselves. In May revolt broke out in Bulgaria. On the twelfth of that month, Austria-Hungary and Russia issued from a meeting of the three Emperors in Berlin yet another anodyne proposal for reform, which this time hinted at the possibility of naval demonstrations by the powers to “enforce” Ottoman compliance. At the end of the month, however, this Berlin memorandum was rendered irrelevant by a palace revolution in Constantinople and the deposition of Sultan Abdül Aziz. The resulting power vacuum gave the powers further excuse for inaction, and at the same time tempted the Serbian and Montenegrin governments to think they could take advantage of the situation. On 30 June, Prince Milan formally declared war on the new Sultan, Murad V, and General Cherniaiev, now a commander in the Serbian army, called upon the Balkan Christians to join in the struggle. It was the confident expectation of Cherniaiev, Ristić, and others that once battle was joined Russia would have no choice but to come to Serbia’s rescue.

The gap between Serbia’s nationalist pretensions and its practical abilities proved pitiful. Within a month the ill-prepared and incompetently commanded Serbian army, supplemented by a host of Russian volunteers, had been shown up by the Turks and compelled to sue for an armistice in August. Hostilities were resumed in September but, after a decisive encounter at Đunis on 29 October, a second, definitive armistice was arranged, upon the unilateral insistence of Russia. At no stage had Serbian troops achieved any significant advantage over the enemy, nor had the fighting ever left Serbian territory for long.

Just as significant for Serbia’s future relationship with Austria-Hungary was the fact that the campaign had been conducted almost exclusively on the Principality’s southern and eastern frontiers. For all the vaunted claims to Bosnia, not even a Serbian government and high command in the grip of war fever had dreamed of sending more than a token force across the Drina to the west. True, Milan’s declaration of war had been accompanied by a letter from Ristić to the grand vizier, informing him that Serbia intended entering Bosnia to restore peace
there. This revival of the Bosnian plan, however, was dependent on the success of the Serbian government’s entire war gamble. Only if Russia had intervened wholeheartedly, as expected, could the Habsburg Monarchy’s own increasingly obvious pretensions to Bosnia have been set at nought.61

Here was one of the key paradoxes of Serbia’s situation between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the 1870s. Bosnia was a principal Serbian war aim, but its acquisition depended on the armed support of Russia. And Russia, however much the Tsar and his government were spurred to action by the Pan-Slav sympathy for Serbia engendered by the 1876 war, could not intervene unless the Habsburg Monarchy were squared. The price of intervention, however, was an agreement between the two empires on their respective roles in the Balkans, and which clearly assigned Bosnia to that of the Monarchy. This, moreover, is precisely what happened, for, despite the urgings of the Pan-Slavists, Alexander II and Gorchakov were still committed to the Three Emperors’ League. Serbia had no sooner declared war on the Porte when, on 8 July 1876, the Monarchy and Russia hastened to come to an agreement at Reichstadt which was intended to safeguard their respective interests in the Balkans.62

In essence, Reichstadt made three main provisions. First, the two powers undertook to preserve their own neutrality in the Serbo-Ottoman conflict. In the event of an Ottoman victory, matters would return to the status quo ante, although the powers proposed then trying to induce the Porte to accept the reforms originally suggested in the Andrásy Note, and the Berlin Memorandum. In the event of an Ottoman defeat, the two powers would intervene to regulate the peace settlement to their own satisfaction.

The details of this Austro-Russian settlement, should Serbia and Montenegro prevail, are of interest in view of Serbia’s later total exclusion from Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1878. It was agreed that there would be no large South Slav state permitted. Instead, Serbia would be allowed part of Bosnia, and Montenegro, part of the Hercegovina, and the two principalities might divide the Sancak of Novi Pazar between them. Austria-Hungary, however, was to take over the remainder of Bosnia and the Hercegovina, while Russia would re-annex Bessarabia from Romania, and seek further compensation in the Turkish Caucasus.63

Andrássy evidently felt obliged to make some provision here for Serbia’s Bosnian ambitions; to this extent the Reichstadt agreement retained the ghost of the old Bosnian plan of 1867–71. What motivated Austro-Hungarian policy by July 1876, however, was the need to buy off Russia, rather than Serbia. Andrásy, the eternal Russophobe, was now supping with the devil, while Serbia could look forward to, at best, certain scraps from the table. If the need to placate Russia disappeared, moreover, Serbia presumably could look forward to nothing at all.

The fact that Serbia lost its brief war with the Ottomans, in fact, only served to reinforce the Austro-Russian entente. Both powers now clearly understood
that they needed each other. The Tsar, pushed toward war by Pan-Slav frenzy and the patent inability of the Balkan Christians to save themselves, had to secure Austria-Hungary’s benevolent neutrality if he was to fight the Ottomans himself, and at the same time fend off intervention by Great Britain. The Monarchy was compelled to accept the logic of war, and its lack of effective allies for any policy which might oppose Russian action. Making a virtue of necessity, Andrássy sold the Monarchy’s neutrality at the best price he could get, which was a substantial share in the spoils.

Before the end of 1876 it was clear that no efforts on the part of the European powers were capable of improving the situation in the Ottoman Empire, and that Russia was bound to declare war. The formal pact between the Monarchy and Russia, governing Russian intervention, was therefore signed in Budapest on 15 January 1877. This Budapest Convention clarified some of the ambiguities in the Reichstadt agreement. Austria-Hungary promised not only to preserve a benevolent neutrality, but actively to impede the collective mediation of other powers in a Russo-Turkish conflict. Andrássy also reluctantly accepted that Serbia and Montenegro could be called on by Russia to assist in the campaign if necessary. In return, the Monarchy was to be free to decide on when, and how, it occupied both Bosnia and the Hercegovina in their entirety. There was no mention now of any territorial acquisitions by Serbia or Montenegro. Even in the Sancak of Novi Pazar, Andrássy held out for the Monarchy’s right to free communications through this narrow corridor between Serbia and Montenegro. Ostensibly this was to safeguard Austro-Hungarian trade via the southern Balkans, but securing communications in such terrain naturally implied the right to maintain garrisons there too. With the groundwork thus laid, Russia declared war on the Porte on 24 April.

Serbia’s role in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 was confined to a late intervention, at the belated request of St. Petersburg, and only after a good deal of argument over the need for a subsidy to finance this renewed effort. The Principality had suffered severely from the first war, since most of the fighting had been on its own territory, and the resources of the country had been strained to the utmost. In the circumstances, Russia’s initial rejection of Serbian assistance, followed by imperious demands for it as the siege of Plevna lengthened, showed how indifferent Russia, no less than Austria-Hungary, was to Serbian interests.

There had been a considerable change in Russian attitudes toward Serbia. The experiences of Russian volunteers in 1876, the lamentable performance of Serbian forces, the general failure of Serbia to make good its former claims to leadership of the Balkan Christians, induced something like contempt for the Principality in Pan-Slav circles and at the Tsar’s headquarters. The Bulgarians, it was increasingly felt, were more deserving of Russia’s support. Moreover the Habsburg Monarchy, on whose complaisance the success of Russia’s war effort hung, clearly regarded Serbia as properly within its own sphere of influ-
ence. A great shock was in the making for Serbian self-esteem and Serbian territorial aspirations.

In January 1878, the stubborn Ottoman resistance to Russia’s advance down the Balkan Peninsula finally collapsed. With Russian troops on the point of investing Constantinople itself, an armistice was concluded on the thirty-first. The peace treaty of San Stefano, which followed on 3 March, threw the chancelleries of Europe into turmoil.

The terms of San Stefano, negotiated with the Porte by a triumphant General Ignatiev, flatly contradicted the conditions agreed upon between Russia and Austria-Hungary, and which had served as the basis for the war in the first place. First of all the Russians radically redrew the map of the Balkans, creating a new autonomous Principality of Bulgaria which stretched almost to the Adriatic and was clearly intended as a Russian client state. This “big Bulgaria” was bound to unite the other powers in demanding revision of the Treaty. Foremost among them, inevitably, was Austria-Hungary, which San Stefano almost excluded from influence in the region. Even more crassly, San Stefano completely ignored the Monarchy’s hitherto admitted claims in Bosnia-Hercegovina; instead, autonomy and administrative reforms were envisaged.67

Whereas the Monarchy’s interests were blithely ignored by San Stefano, Serbia was cast off like a poor relation. In the final stages of the War, and taking advantage of the general Ottoman retreat, Serbia had made limited territorial gains to its southeast and southwest, taking Niš and advancing into Kosovo before the armistice.68 Now, at San Stefano, the Russians transferred most of these conquests to the new Bulgaria, which was also assigned territory further to the south, including Pirot, Vranje and Üsküb (Skopje), which Serbian nationalists had regarded as Serbia’s by right. In return, Serbia was to be proclaimed independent.

The effect San Stefano had on political opinion in Serbia, and above all on Prince Milan and his ministers, can scarcely be exaggerated. Despite his leaning toward Austria-Hungary, Milan had been transformed by the war into an ardent Russophile, proud to consider himself the Tsar’s ally. Overnight, San Stefano reversed this sentiment all over again and convinced Milan once and for all that his own best interests, if not Serbia’s, lay in the closest possible association with the Monarchy. Milan’s embittered, and henceforward unwavering commitment to this line was the first, essential ingredient in the settlement which followed.69

For Ristić, and other Serbs who had been accustomed to place their trust in Russia, the sense of disillusionment was no less profound, even if the conclusions drawn were for the most part not so extreme as Milan’s. There was even wild talk of preparing for war against Russia, although, as Wrede cautioned Andrassy from Belgrade in February, too much reliance should not be placed on such posturings.70 The revulsion against Russia was nevertheless strong, and in Wrede’s opinion the Monarchy was well placed to take advantage of this, since “it would
need only a very small advance on our part in order completely to win over to us, above all, the reasonable and thinking part of the population here.”

Ristić certainly recognized at once that, if Serbia was to salvage anything from the events of the last three years, it would have to seek some form of accommodation with Austria-Hungary. Policy, not sentiment, dictated a deal. Given Andrássy’s determination since 1871 to impose binding controls on Serbian policy, however, the bargain was likely to be a hard one. “They are awaiting developments,” reported Wrede in April, “and contemplate only with a shudder the possible arising of a situation where they would be forced to show their colors.”

That the Serbian government had no choice in the matter was demonstrated beyond doubt by the Russians themselves in the months preceding the Congress of Berlin, which was called to negotiate a revision of the San Stefano treaty. Ever since Serbia’s failure of 1876, the Russians had made little secret of their preference for the Bulgarians; San Stefano only gave concrete, painful expression to this. The envoy who was sent to St. Petersburg, in January 1878, to present Serbia’s claims during the armistice negotiations, was told by the foreign ministry official, N. K. Giers, that “the interests of Russia came first, then came those of Bulgaria, and only after them came Serbia’s.”

In these circumstances, it was a relief to hear from Vienna that the Monarchy not only had no objections to Serbian independence, but would not oppose moderate Serbian territorial gains, provided these were to the southeast.

Faced with determined opposition from Britain and Austria-Hungary, the Russian government knew it had to make concessions to both powers if it attended an international conference, since it was not in a position to defend its terms by force. Well before the Congress of Berlin met on 13 June, therefore, Russia had agreed with Britain to reduce the size of the big Bulgaria, and conceded the Monarchy’s claim to Bosnia in accordance with the spirit, if not the strict letter, of the Budapest Convention. The concession with regard to Bosnia was crucial for Serbia’s position: Russia thereby effectively assigned Serbia to the Monarchy’s sphere of influence in the Balkans.

Ristić, arriving in Berlin in June 1878 to shadow the Congress, had the Russian abandonment of Serbia impressed upon him in unmistakable form. The Russian plenipotentiary, Shuvalov, as Ristić reported back to Belgrade, “advises me to come to an understanding by any means with Austria-Hungary.” During the Congress the Russian delegation even tried to prevent the cession of further territories to Serbia than those already offered it under the terms of San Stefano. The stage was set for the imposition of satellite status on Serbia by the Habsburg Monarchy.
Notes


2 Lytton to Granville, 23 Nov. 1871, PRO, FO 7/791; quoted in Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 62–63.

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7 The Mali Zvornik question had been an issue between Serbia and the Porte since the final expansion of the Principality under Prince Miloš in 1831–33. At that time an enclave on the right bank of the Drina, opposite Zvornik, was ceded to Serbia, but the Ottomans remained in occupation of the villages of Mali Zvornik and Sakar, on the right bank, despite Serbian protests. The matter was still unresolved by 1872, when the Regents decided to seek a confrontation on the subject. The villages were finally awarded to Serbia at the Congress of Berlin. See Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia, 1:399, and the map on 400. On the revival of the dispute in 1872: Kállay to Andrásy, 8 and 19 Mar. 1872; also 5 June 1872, which provides a long history of the question; all in HHSA, PA XXXVIII/195.

8 Andrásy to Ludolf, 26 Apr. 1872, HHSA, PA XI/99; quoted by Diószegi, Die Außenpolitik, 67, note 17. Emanuel Count von Ludolf, who took over from Prokesch-Osten at the turn of the year, was known for his Polish sympathies, another subtle indication of Andrásy’s indifference to a genuine improvement in relations with Russia at this time; ibid., 27.

9 Common Ministerial Council, 17 May 1872, HHSA, PA XI/287, quoted by Bridge, Sadowa to Sarajevo, 63; also cited but not quoted by Diószegi, Die Außenpolitik, 35 (note 23, 45). See also Kállay Diary, 21 May 1872 (Dnevnik, 470). The Ottomans, Andrásy told Kállay, “represent the stronger element.”

10 Buchanan to Granville, 29 Aug. 1872; quoted in Bridge, Sadowa to Sarajevo, 63.

11 Andrásy to Ludolf, 14 Nov. 1872, HHSA, PA XII/99; quoted by Diószegi, Die Außenpolitik, 67, note 16.


14 Ristić to Hristić, 20 Mar./1 Apr. 1872, Ristić Letters, no. 55, 112.

15 Andrásy to Kállay, 17 Aug. 1872, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/195.

16 Andrásy to Kállay, 22 July 1872, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/195. The invitation, Andrásy wrote, “violates international customs just as much as the simplest demands of propriety. If it had issued from the Serbian government itself, we would not hesitate to reject in appropriate terms so striking a disregard for the mutual consideration owed between states.” See also the initial report on the matter from Kállay’s deputy, who suggested that the least policy was to ignore the affront. A ban “which was not respected would give the matter a significance which it scarcely merits.” Cingria to Andrásy, 9 July 1872, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/195.

17 Kállay to Andrásy, 16 Aug. 1872, reporting the Hungarian government’s visa ban of 12 August; and Andrásy to Kállay, 17 Aug. 1872; both HHSA, PA XXXVIII/195.

18 Longworth to Elliot, 26 Aug. 1872, PRO, FO 78/2227. Cf. Kállay Diary, 26 Aug. 1872 (Dnevnik, 490), which however makes no mention of this incident. Kállay, like Longworth, refers to the procession which accompanied a distinguished Russian visitor, Prince Dolgoruki, back to his ship; according to Longworth, it was this assembly which then tried to demonstrate outside the Austro-Hungarian consulate.

19 Lajos Thallóczy, who reproduces the diary Kállay kept of this journey, as an appendix to the latter’s posthumously published A szerb felkelés története [History of the Serbian Uprising]
“Kállay Béni naplójegyzetei első boszniai útjáról,” 27–29 July [1872], 328–36. The extent to which a desire to protect Bosnian Catholics influenced Austro-Hungarian policy is hard to define. It might have been a consideration with the Emperor, and undoubtedly was so for those of his generals, such as the Starthaler of Zara, Baron Rodich, who were Catholic Croats, in many cases from the Military Border. See, on this, Alexander Novotny, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Berliner Kongresses 1878, vol. 1, Österreich, die Türkei und das Balkanproblem im Jahre des Berliner Kongresses (Graz & Cologne: Böhlau, 1957), 16–18; C.A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire 1780–1918 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969), 588–89; Diószegi, Die Außenpolitik, 84–87, 104 (for exchanges between Andrásy and Rodich in 1875–76); and Helmut Rumpler, “Die Dalmatienreise Kaiser Franz Josephs 1875 im Kontext der politischen Richtungsentscheidungen der Habsburgermonarchie am Vorabend der orientalischen Krise,” in A Living Anachronism? European Diplomacy and the Habsburg Monarchy; Festschrift für Francis Roy Bridge zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Lothar Höbelt & T.G. Otte (Vienna, Cologne & Weimar: Böhlau, 2010), 158–62. It is significant that Kállay undertook his Bosnian journey only some months after Andrásy, at a secret conference of the Monarchy’s military leaders on 17–19 Feb. 1872, accepted for the first time the possible necessity of occupying Bosnia; Kos, Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns, 62–65.

21 “Kállay Béni naplójegyzetei első boszniai útjáról,” 27 July [1872], 333.

22 Ibid., introductory passage by Thallóczy, 310. Kállay himself, albeit retrospectively, admitted to the British consul in Budapest, in 1875, that he went to Bosnia at Andrásy’s behest “with the object of putting matters in train in view of an eventual ebullition such as has recently occurred [i.e., the rising which started in July 1875]. His dealings were exclusively with the Bosniac Catholics, who, in spite of their numerical weakness, are a not unimportant element.” Kállay also claimed that 500,000 florins of secret service money “passed, as he declares, through his hands as subventions to the Catholics of Bosnia, and he was able to report that everything was matured, as far as he could effect it, for a demonstration in favour of annexation to this Empire whenever the favourable opportunity should arise.” Monson to Buchanan (Vienna), no. 127 (confidential), 13 Oct. 1875, PRO, FO 7/858.


24 Kállay to Andrásy, 30 May 1873, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/199; see also a similar, extensive report about Milan in Kállay to Andrásy, no. 27, 29 Mar. 1874, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/202.


26 Stokes, Politics as Development, 16–18, 109–10 (on Milan’s plans for the army); also Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia, 2:372–75.

27 Andrásy to Kállay, 11 Sept. 1873, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/199.

28 Kállay to Andrásy, no. 27, 29 Mar. 1874, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/202. Milan, except during the wars of 1876–78, was never a popular ruler, but his reputation sank to a new low in the late 1880s because of his highly public rows with his wife, Queen Natalia, and reached its nadir after 1891, when the details of the secret treaty of 1881 with the Monarchy gradually became public knowledge. On this, see Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia, 2:433–40, 452–57; Stokes, Politics as Development, 191.
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30 Ibid., 421–22.

31 Kállay Diary, 11 Mar. 1872 (*Dnevnik*, 448).

32 There is a good sketch of Marinović by Stokes, *Politics as Development*, 21–22, and his government is discussed 22–39. On Marinović’s wish for improved relations, not only with Austria-Hungary, but with the Porte and Russia, see Kállay to Andrásy, no. 51, 9 Nov. 1873, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/199; and Cingria to Andrásy, 16 Feb. 1874, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/202.

33 See, for example, Kállay to Andrásy, 16 Apr. 1873, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/199, where Kállay reports Marinović’s advice to Prince Milan, that Livadia had been a mistake, and that without German and especially Austro-Hungarian friendship, “we [the Serbs] risk everything.” Kállay’s diary attests to the frequency with which Kállay cultivated Marinović after 1868, both for political inside information and for genuine friendship.

34 Stokes, *Politics as Development*, chap. 1, *passim*, is best on this subject; as he points out (23), “the introduction of a Western constitution had created a logic of its own that implied the expansion of the space in which political life occurred.”

35 Ibid., 22 ff. As Stokes remarks (41), “The skupština of 1874 was the first to bring down a government.”

36 On foreign affairs, see Trivanovitch, “Serbia, Russia and Austria-Hungary,” 423–26; Stokes, *Politics as Development*, 30–33. By late July 1874 Kállay was warning Vienna of Marinović’s possible fall; Kállay to Andrásy, 26 July 1874, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/202.

37 The Čumić government only lasted until early February 1875: Trivanovitch, “Serbia, Russia and Austria-Hungary,” 426; Stokes, *Politics as Development*, 23, 39–40, 63–64; also Kállay to Andrásy, 5 Dec. 1874, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/202. Čumić was undoubtedly one of the stranger figures on the scene in the mid–1870s. On Kállay’s long-running affair with Čumić’s wife, see above, Chapter 2.


39 Among standard works on the Three Emperors’ League, see Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 66–68; Diószegi, *Die Außenpolitik*, 36–40, 49–54. For an example of the consciousness with which Austria-Hungary and Russia worked together, see Gorchakov to Novikov, 20 Feb./2 Mar. 1874, quoted ibid., note 31 (68): “Nous travaillons alors [in Serbia] viribus unitis.” For Serbian awareness of this Austro-Russian cooperation, see Kállay to Andrásy, 29 Mar. 1874 (no. 28), and 31 July 1874; both HHSA, PA XXXVIII/202.

40 This economic programme, which was well formulated by the beginning of 1878, seems to have been still ill thought out in the early 1870s. Andrásy and Kállay, like Beust, wanted to see railways built; they also wished to preserve the favorable terms on which the Monarchy traded in Serbia. It was not until the crisis of 1875–78 had created the circumstances in which Serbia could be pressured on these points, however, that a coherent strategy for exerting such pressure was drafted. On this, see Palotás, *Az Osztrák–Magyar Monarchia balkáni politikája*, 16–23; also idem, “Die wirtschaftlichen Aspekte in der Balkanpolitik Österreich–Ungarns um 1878,” 275–80.

41 Stokes, *Politics as Development*, 62–64. Kállay actually suggested deploying artillery on the Austro-Hungarian side of the Sava, opposite Belgrade, in case there were serious disturbances there in January 1875: Kállay to Andrásy, 9 Jan. 1875, OSZK, FH 1733/40. This private letter is summarized by Radenić in *Dnevnik*, note 444a, 804–5, which in turn is cited by Stokes, *Politics as Development*, 63.
42 Andrássy to Kállay, 12 Jan. 1875, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/205. Another cause for alarm, which the Hungarian authorities believed was linked to the situation in Belgrade, was the growth in electoral support of Miletić’s National Party in Novi Sad; see Flattt (főispán [lord lieutenant] in Novi Sad) to Szapáry (Hungarian minister of the interior), 1 Jan. 1875, in Svetozar Miletic i Narodna Stranka: Grada 1860–1885, vol. 2, 1870–1875, ed. Nikola Petrović (Sremski Karlovci: Istoriji Arhiv Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine, 1969), no. 571, 603–4.

43 Stokes, Politics as Development, 63–64; Trivanovitch, “Serbia, Russia and Austria-Hungary,” 426.

44 Stokes, Politics as Development, 64–74.

45 Diószegi, Die Außenpolitik, 76–81, discusses this important council, and also reproduces its protocol as Appendix 1, 321–32. With regard to Andrássy’s conversion, by 1875, to the traditional Habsburg policy of opposing the creation of a large South Slav state on the Monarchy’s borders, Diószegi makes the perceptive comment (77) that “if the Monarchy was able to bear on its borders the German national state with its forty millions and the Italian with its thirty millions, then it would also have been able to accept the eight million South Slavs of a national state.” See also Kos, Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns, 70–78.

46 Stokes, Politics as Development, 76–77. The Stefanović government in fact resigned precisely because it would not abate its support for the revolt, after Prince Milan had been warned that such a policy was unacceptable to both Austria-Hungary and Russia. Milan’s hope was that the Mihailović ministry, with greater public support, would be able to resist the pressure to act, a hope which soon proved to be misplaced. See also Trivanovitch, “Serbia, Russia and Austria-Hungary,” 426–28.

47 Rumpler, “Die Dalmatienreise Kaiser Franz Josephs,” 175–76; also Diószegi, Die Außenpolitik, 82–83, who also quotes (note 11, 94) from Novikov to Gorchakov, 30 June/12 July 1875, on Andrássy’s annoyance with General Rodich and “the ultra-Slav politics of this functionary.” A later report from Novikov, on 9/21 July 1875, pointed out that “The crude conduct of Baron Rodich, more or less sympathetic to the insurgents, has later been disavowed by his government”; quoted ibid. Compare this evidence, however, with the remarks attributed to Kállay by the British consul in Budapest, and which suggests that the Bosnian Catholics at least were primed to demonstrate in favor of Austro-Hungarian intervention as far back as 1872 (Monson to Buchanan, no. 127, 13 Oct. 1875, PRO, FO 7/858, quoted above, note 22 refers); and with Stojanović, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 26–27. Bridge, Sadowa to Sarajevo, 70, concludes that “A direct connexion between the visit [to Dalmatia] and the Bosnian revolt . . . is difficult to prove,” which is not quite what was claimed then or later. It is worth citing the opinion of a much older, but still perceptive authority: Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 71, writes that “The effect of such a demonstration [Francis Joseph’s tour] was perfectly clear to anyone acquainted with the complicated conditions in the Balkans. Austrian historians themselves admit that in all likelihood the Emperor’s visit to Dalmatia set the spark that led to the conflagration in Herzegovina.” Alan Palmer, by contrast, in The Chancelleries of Europe (London, Boston & Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), 153, specifically states that “The flame of revolt was kindled not by the Russians but by the Austrian military party [sic] who were anxious to acquire Bosnia-Herzegovina”; but cites only secondary sources for the assertion. Since Palmer, again on the basis solely of well-worn secondary sources, also repeats the standard view that Andrássy consistently opposed an increase in the Monarchy’s Slav population, as well as other interpretations no longer tenable, Langer’s more subtle judgment still seems preferable. Apart from Kállay’s earlier foray of 1872, however, the precise involvement in the revolt of Austro-Hungarian agencies, whether diplomatic or military, remains unclear.
Doria (British chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg) to Derby, 29 Sept. 1875; quoted in Stojanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, 22; see also 22–25, on joint pressure by Russia and Austria-Hungary on Serbia.


Diószegi, *Die Außenpolitik*, 91–92, is best on this; also Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 74. For an example of Andrásy’s first, suspicious reaction to Russian proposals for joint action, see Andrásy to Francis Joseph, 30 Aug. 1875, quoted at length in Diószegi, *Die Außenpolitik*, note 35, 96–97.


On Milan’s contempt for the Serbs, see Kállay to Andrásy, 9 Jan. 1875, OSZK, FH 1733/39. On the clash over the issue of war or peace in 1875–76, between Milan on the one hand, and his ministers and the *Skupština* on the other, see Stokes, *Politics as Development*, 75–81.

Quoted, ibid., 81, and referring to the situation in October 1875.

Wrede to Andrásy, 24 Aug. 1875, quoted in Stojanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, 17. Kállay had resigned the Belgrade consulship in January 1875, citing the alarming effect of the Belgrade climate on his wife’s health as an excuse; Kállay to Andrásy, 21 Jan. 1875, HHSA, A[dm]inistratue R[egistratur] F4/156. In reality, as his diary shows, Kállay’s negotiations with the faction of Baron Pál ’Sennyey, for a chance to run for parliament in the next Hungarian elections, were already well advanced; Kállay Diary, 18 Jan. 1875 (*Dnevnik*, 632–33), recording conversations with ’Sennyey in Pest. Kállay eventually left Belgrade for good on 31 May, after being appointed by Andrásy *en disponibilité* within the diplomatic service. This meant he agreed to respond if his help were required for special missions; Andrásy to Francis Joseph, 6 May 1875; Andrásy to Kállay, 16 May 1875, both HHSA, AR F4/156; also Kállay Diary, 28–31 May 1875 (*Dnevnik*, 654). According to Imre Halász, former head of Andrásy’s press bureau and also a ’Sennyey supporter, Kállay at first ran in his old 1865 constituency of Szent Endre during the elections of July-August 1875, but was rejected by the voters; he then accepted Halász’ offer of Szászsebes in Transylvania, which was a corrupt borough effectively in the latter’s gift. Imre Halász, *Egy letűnt nemzedék: Emlékezések a magyar állam kialakulásának újabb korszakából* (Budapest: Nyugat, 1911), 478.


62 It should be stressed that the Reichstadt agreement, for all its importance, was a purely verbal one, which both sides only later set down on paper, but in slightly different versions. On the first published accounts of each, see ibid., 74–77, and note 1, 75. There is a *résumé* of the agreement’s main points in *Key Treaties of the Great Powers 1815–1914*, ed. Michael Hurst (Newton Abbott: David & Charles, 1972), vol. 2, no. 103, 509–11.

63 Ibíd., 2:510–11; Stojanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, 75–77; Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 77–78; Kos, *Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns*, 141–46. One of the principal differences between the Austro-Hungarian and Russian interpretations was in fact over what the Monarchy’s share of Bosnia should be. Andrássy’s version mentioned simply “the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” whereas Gorchakov’s specified “Turkish Croatia,” and left further boundary drawing “to be agreed upon”; Stojanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, 76.


66 Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, chaps. 5 and 6, especially 193, 215; and the speech by the Tsar on 11 Nov. 1876, quoted 227. See also MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism*, 190–93, on the deterioration of the Russo-Serbian relationship.

67 The text of the treaty is in *Key Treaties of the Great Powers*, vol. 2, no. 108, 528–46; on Bosnia-Herzegovina, see Article XIV, p. 537. Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 85, points out that Ignatiev was actually unaware of the existence of the Budapest Convention at the time of the negotiations.


Wrede to Andrássy, 10 Apr. 1878, quoted in Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien 1878–1881,” note 20 refers.

Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 193, quoting a letter by the Pan-Slav publicist, I.S. Aksakov, in December 1876; and 413–15, on the negotiations of January 1878.


Ibid., citing a despatch from Cukić (Vienna) of 8/20 Mar. 1878.

Ristić to Grujić, 7/19 June 1878 (telegram), ibid., no. 5, 334. For a fuller account of this, see Ristić to Grujić, 8/20 June 1878, ibid., no. 6, 334–36.