Apple of Discord

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Chapter 4

The Karadžorđević Prosecution 1868–70

The period between the establishment of Prince Milan’s Regency, in July 1868, and the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, in July 1870, was when the ambiguity of Austro-Hungarian policy toward Serbia was greatest. For two years, Andrássy and Kállay exploited that legacy of the 1867 settlement: the ability of a Hungarian minister president, with strong views on foreign policy, to pursue his own agenda contrary to the wishes, and to some extent without the knowledge, of the Emperor and the chancellor. The Hungarian goal was to persuade the Serbian Regents of the benefit to Serbia in keeping close to the Habsburg Monarchy. This in itself was broadly in line with Beust’s own policy toward Serbia, but Hungarian policy differed from that of the Ballhaus in two respects.

First, the emphasis in everything Andrássy and Kállay said to the Serbian government was firmly on the closeness of relations with Hungary, rather than Austria-Hungary, and whatever advantage Serbia derived from the relationship was claimed to be the result of Hungarian friendship. It was an essential part of this stratagem to maintain that it was the Hungarian government alone which protected Serbia from the nastier elements in the Monarchy, particularly the Vienna military.

Second, the means by which the Hungarian government sought to exert this control were seriously at variance with traditional Habsburg policy toward Serbia. Whereas Vienna relied on straightforward diplomatic and military pressure to keep Serbia in line, Andrássy and Kállay intervened in detail in Serbian domestic affairs, or tried to. They took sides in obvious fashion by trying to secure the conviction of Prince Alexander Karadžorđević. Most drastically, Andrássy’s Bosnian scheme stood the Monarchy’s proclaimed policy on its head, and introduced an unrealistic note into relations with Serbia. But it still took two years for the illusions fostered by this Hungarian foreign policy to break down.
Blaznavac was the key to this exercise in mutual self-deception. For an ambitious political soldier like Blaznavac to have come out so openly against the Russians was akin to burning his boats behind him, and Kállay was particularly conscious of the need to safeguard this rarity on the Serbian scene. He kept in close touch with Blaznavac, and continued to promote him, to Beust, as the man most likely to keep Serbia on a peaceful course, favorable to Austro-Hungarian influence and the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans. To Andrásy, he reported gleefully on Blaznavac’s interest in the Bosnian scheme and his professions of solidarity with the Hungarians. The more Kállay saw of the first Regent, the deeper grew his conviction that, barring the sort of nationalist upheaval in the Balkans which would compel any Serbian politician to commit himself, Blaznavac was the ideal instrument for attaining Hungarian aims in Serbia.

How real this picture was, however, is a different matter. In the aftermath of Prince Michael’s assassination, Blaznavac’s attitude may well have owed more to an opportunistic disposition to see how far the pro-Hungarian line took him, and what profit it brought Serbia, than Kállay in his enthusiasm was willing to admit. The little that can be gleaned on Blaznavac’s thinking, from sources other than Kállay’s own records, suggests both a cynical readiness to gamble, and a man doing his best to persuade himself that the Hungarian assurances, especially in the crucial matter of Bosnia, were really worth something.

The Italian consul in Belgrade found Blaznavac’s estimation of the entente with the Hungarians less than convincing:

As for me I doubt whether the cause of the Slavs is so far advanced, and especially, that the Magyars and the Croats have so easily adopted the position of leaving the Serbs free to annex the provinces in question [Bosnia-Hercegovina] and even to assist in this annexation.

The whole thing, Scovasso suggested, was a ruse by the Hungarians to keep the Serbian government quiet. Blaznavac, however, devoted considerable effort to convincing the Italian that the Hungarians’ friendship must be genuine. According to Blaznavac, it was in Hungary’s interests to see the creation of a greater South Slav state, especially if such a conglomeration were still formally within the Ottoman Empire. Linked to Hungary by a treaty of alliance, the Ottoman Slavs would be a barrier to Russia, which would thus be excluded forever from the Near East.

Blaznavac may have believed this improbable scenario at the time, but his later willingness to turn against the Hungarians suggests he was simply exploring the possibilities. The Prussian consul, while sympathetic to Blaznavac’s anti-Russian stance, was sure that it did not correspond to popular sentiment in Serbia. Blaznavac himself was well aware of this. The question, from the Hungarian point of view, was how far he would be able to take Serbia on a course so
contrary to the natural tendency of Serbian national feeling.

The answer to this question depended to a great extent on Jovan Ristić, the enigmatic second Regent. Ristić, as a champion of constitutional reform, and committed to the cause of national liberation, inclined personally more toward Russia than Austria-Hungary. The exigencies of the situation which caused Blaznavac to seek him as a partner demanded that Ristić play down his Russophilia. Nevertheless the suspicion remained that his heart was not in the pro-Hungarian policy adopted by Blaznavac. He was especially cautious, Kállay discovered by the beginning of September, about clever schemes like Andrássy’s Bosnian plan, and doubted whether Andrássy could deliver, given Beust’s known opposition. “I don’t know what to think of Ristić,” Kállay complained; “he is very suspicious.”

With both the prosecution of Alexander Karađorđević and the Bosnian question Andrássy and Kállay were pursuing objectives which were questionable, if not downright irresponsible. There is thus a certain irony in the fact that it was the Hungarians’ failure, in each case, to make good their promises which hastened the end of Serbo-Hungarian friendship in 1870–71. Both questions kept popping up throughout the period 1868–70. Each was a product of the attempt to bind Serbia firmly to the destinies of the Monarchy, especially its Hungarian half; each was characteristic of the essential futility of such an entreprise, at least as conceived by Andrássy and Kállay.

The Karađorđević case started with the issue of whether Serbia’s ex-Prince, who had been living in Pest since his deposition in 1858, should be extradited to Belgrade to stand trial for Prince Michael’s murder. Blaznavac and Ristić realized that by concentrating on Alexander, they could divert attention from the role of the Liberals, whose support they needed. At the same time the destruction of the Karađorđević family (it was assumed that Alexander’s son Peter was equally involved) would also eliminate the only serious rival of the Obrenović dynasty.

Throughout the summer of 1868, the evidence against Karađorđević accumulated. The documents found on Pavle Radovanović implicated two of the ex-Prince’s closest associates, Pavle Tripković and Filip Stanković. Other seemingly damming evidence continued to emerge, to the point where Kállay felt sure that Karađorđević “not only knew about the murder but also planned it.” On 13 July Ristić formally notified Kállay that the Serbian authorities had issued a
summons to Karadžorđević, requesting him to appear at the trial of the conspirators in Belgrade later that month, or name his defense counsel.\textsuperscript{16}

By the time of Ristić’s request Kállay and Andrássy were already debating the pros and cons of extraditing not only Tripković and Stanković, but also Karadžorđević. The Serbian government applied for the extradition of the first two at the end of June, but it was clear that a similar application for Karadžorđević himself was only a matter of time.\textsuperscript{17} The Hungarian government, upon Prince Michael’s assassination, placed Prince Alexander under police surveillance, and at Andrássy’s request the foreign ministry started monitoring the movements of Peter Karadžorđević.\textsuperscript{18} It was one thing, though, to take these elementary precautions against the charge of having harbored a conspiracy against the Serbian government on Austro-Hungarian soil. It was quite another to hand over the former ruler of Serbia, with his associates, to the uncertain justice of a Serbian court.

Kállay was acutely aware of the political capital the Hungarian government stood to gain in Serbia by acceding to this request.\textsuperscript{19} The awkward truth, however, was that no treaty of extradition existed between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and in the absence of such an agreement the Hungarian government could only be guided by its own laws and whatever precedents the Habsburg Monarchy had already set by diplomatic practice. But established practice, Kállay pointed out, was clear only in cases involving common criminals.\textsuperscript{20}

The question immediately arose of whether the murder of Prince Michael was to be regarded as a criminal matter, or whether it was political. “It must be noted,” Kállay reminded Andrássy, “that nobody has been extradited for political offenses on either side, although up to now no political offenders have committed murder.”\textsuperscript{21} And even if the murder itself was purely a criminal matter, could the same be said of its planning, by individuals who had no physical hand in it, but whose motives were more likely to have been political? Kállay concluded:

\begin{quote}
if the persons in question can be proven to have any hand at all in Prince Michael’s murder, and our laws can brand them as common criminals, then they should not be judged by us, but extradited to Serbia. Conversely, if their complicity is not completely proven, or if our courts pronounce the deed as only a political offense, then extradition is impossible, because in this case, according to our laws, they would not be punishable.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

A few days before, when asked by Blaznavac whether the Monarchy would extradite Karadžorđević, Kállay had gone so far as to assure him “that it would probably do so if his participation could be proven.”\textsuperscript{23} Within days of making this remark, however, Kállay was obliged to admit that, according to what he was reading in the Pest newspapers, “the Hungarian government will not extradite the person in question, but has already delegated the Pest civil court to try him.”\textsuperscript{24} Blaznavac might claim to be satisfied, as long as Karadžorđević was convicted somewhere;\textsuperscript{25}
but in view of the Regents’ anxiety to ensure that the political threat he posed was eliminated, it is hard to believe they would not have preferred to have the ex-Prince safely in Serbian, rather than Hungarian, custody. Kállay’s initial blithe assurance that extradition was a possibility sowed the seeds of future mistrust: it suggested to the Regents that the Hungarian government had an ulterior motive in promising what it patently had no intention of delivering.

Formal confirmation of what Kállay already knew arrived on 17 July, in a despatch from Andrássy setting out the arguments against extraditing Karadórdjević and his associates. Andrássy’s letter showed the extent to which the whole question had become a matter simply between Hungary and Serbia, with the imperial foreign ministry effectively sidelined. Andrássy had as a matter of course consulted Beust for the foreign ministry’s expert opinion on extradition, but under the 1867 settlement any prosecution on Hungarian soil was strictly a Hungarian affair, and appears to have been treated as such by Beust, provided there were no serious diplomatic repercussions.

Enclosing a copy of Beust’s reply, Andrássy informed Kállay that, according to international law, political offenders were not normally extraditable. Since it was “undeniable” that the involvement of Karadórdjević and his associates was for political reasons, it followed that they were political offenders, and “their extradition . . . cannot be regarded as practicable.” All of them, however, could reasonably be suspected of having known of the plan to commit the outrage. They could thus be regarded as having committed a crime in Hungary, “hence their extradition for this reason would not be justifiable.”

The Hungarian government, Andrássy protested, would like nothing better than to comply with the Serbian request, and it is with genuine regret forced to report that it cannot carry out the extradition of the individuals in question. . . . It has however seen to it that the said individuals should not remain without a deserved punishment.

Kállay was accordingly authorized to inform the Regents that the minister of justice, Horvát, had already instructed the Pest civil court to start collecting evidence. Horvát also asked for a Serbian official to be sent up from Belgrade to assist in the investigation. It would help if the subjects of the Hungarian investigation could at some stage be confronted with those already charged in Serbia; and any executions, upon conviction in Belgrade, should be delayed until this standard element of Hungarian justice had been completed.

Kállay hastened to carry out his instructions, but the response his news elicited, and his own expressed opinion, give some idea of how he and Andrássy were to get themselves into such difficulties over the Karadórdjević prosecution. Ristić was visibly annoyed. Kállay explained the difficulties faced by a responsible government, obliged to respect the rule of law, but although Ristić admitted
the justice of these objections, and readily agreed to send an official to Pest to assist in the investigations, he adamantly refused to put off the trial of those held in Belgrade, or the executions which were likely to follow. “Because of the indignation of the people,” the trial of the Belgrade conspirators would go ahead, and Ristić expected it to be over by 27 July.\(^{34}\)

It must remain a moot point whether the Regents’ determination to press on with the Belgrade trial was due to a genuine respect for “the indignation of the people,” or a baser desire to put Radovanović and his cronies safely underground before they produced any more evidence implicating the Regents’ new Liberal allies. Ristić himself showed some awareness of the obstacles such haste would put in the way of convicting Karadorđević.\(^{35}\) But Kállay was so convinced of the guilt of Karadorđević and his associates as to discount the importance of this consideration. It is clear from his correspondence with Andrássy that, for Kállay, the political utility of conviction obscured the need for elementary justice.

With regard to Stanković and Tripković, for instance, Kállay thought their complicity “beyond doubt.” He implored Andrássy to be so kind as to exert your influence so that a really harsh punishment be meted out to them. I can strongly recommend this proceeding from the viewpoint of maintaining the good relations which are being strengthened more and more between us and Serbia.\(^{36}\)

The complicity of Karadorđević, too, “can scarcely be doubted.”\(^{37}\) In a revealing passage, Kállay set forth what were for him the overriding considerations:

there are convincing reasons why we should make him [Karadorđević] feel the rigour of the law. . . . If we don’t do this we expose ourselves to the suspicion that we are showing a partiality for him. We would only have to spare him if any political reason required it; but our interest, from the point of view of maintaining peace and consolidating the Obrenović dynasty lies in making Karadorđević as harmless as the boundaries of the law permit.\(^{38}\)

Enough evidence was already to hand to make Karadorđević’s involvement seem a foregone conclusion, but this was not the verdict eventually reached by the Hungarian courts. Kállay was assuming Karadorđević’s conviction before he had even been interrogated, let alone tried.

The result was to make Kállay apparently indifferent to the dangers of letting the Serbian government go ahead with the trial and subsequent execution of the Belgrade conspirators, in late July. The trial began on 23 July and concluded the next day; on the 28th Radovanović and thirteen others were executed.\(^{39}\) They had already made depositions, copies of which were duly forwarded to the Hungarian authorities. Most of the conspirators, however, stubbornly refused to admit Karadorđević’s involvement; while the depositions of those who did incriminate him were suspected all along of having been extorted. A face to face confronta-
tion between these individuals and Karadorđević, at a later date, and in the relatively less constrained atmosphere of a Hungarian court, might conceivably have consolidated the case against the ex-Prince beyond all reasonable doubt. Instead, the possibility of such confrontation was let slip.

Kállay, through his preoccupation with the political aspects of prosecuting Karadorđević, was imperilling the very outcome he considered most essential. The importance of a painstaking accumulation of evidence was perhaps better appreciated by the justice minister in Pest, who telegraphed on 28 July asking Kállay to get the executions postponed. Kállay could only reply that the accused had been executed that same day. In any case, he argued, Belgrade had already provided ample evidence; the vital thing now was to make sure Karadorđević was convicted, lest “Russian influence” in Serbia recover the ground it had lost.

The proceedings in Belgrade on 23–24 July were also a trial in absentia of Karadorđević, Tripković, and Stanković. Kállay, however, took steps to ensure that Karadorđević’s legal counsel was prevented from attending the trial. As a result, Karadorđević’s counsel was nominated by the Belgrade court, and then promptly withdrew from the case; his telegraphed challenge of their right to represent him was ignored. The ex-Prince’s chances of receiving a fair trial in Belgrade were slim to begin with; Kállay’s intervention reduced them still further. Karadorđević and Tripković were each sentenced to twenty years in prison; Stanković to twenty years with hard labor. On 4 August the Serbian government formally applied for Karadorđević’s extradition, although resigned to the fact that the Austro-Hungarian authorities were bound to refuse. Karadorđević was duly taken into custody in Pest on 8 August.

The day Karadorđević was arrested by the Pest police, Kállay received another intimation of the difficulties he and Andrássy were preparing for themselves by undertaking to prosecute Karadorđević at all. Kállay’s assurances to the Regents had clearly created the impression in Belgrade that Karadorđević’s conviction was a certainty. From a conversation with Colonel Orešković, Kállay learned that Blaznavac thought “it would be a bad thing if those arrested by us [the Hungarians] were not convicted, this would do a lot of damage to his efforts to achieve friendly relations.” Orešković himself thought this “stupid, because he [Blaznavac] knows that the government can’t influence the verdict”; and Kállay urged Orešković to keep stressing this to the Regents. How much impression such caveats were likely to make, however, was another matter. Ristić at least could appreciate Kállay’s points about the importance of “the rule of law”; to the soldier Blaznavac, by contrast, this apparently meant very little.

Kállay himself contradicted his own warnings about the need to follow due process, by the zeal with which he threw himself into the job of ensuring that Karadorđević really was convicted. In response to the accusations in the Vienna
newspapers that torture had been employed in interrogating the Belgrade conspirators, he inspired a number of *démentis* which appeared anonymously in the Austrian and Hungarian press. Kállay hoped these would convince the Regents that the Hungarian government, unlike the Vienna establishment, did not question the validity of the judicial findings in Belgrade; and that they would dispel any idea that such findings might not be admissible in the Hungarian courts.

Most striking were Kállay’s efforts behind the scenes to ensure that the Hungarian judicial system delivered the kind of verdict he, and the Serbian Regents, wanted. This went beyond mere exhortation: from first to last Kállay displayed a reluctance to let judicial officials make up their own minds, reflecting a recurrent fear that, without constant reminders of the political importance of securing a conviction, the courts would let Karadžorđević slip through their fingers.

Kállay’s first exercise in judicial wirepulling came with the preliminary hearing of the case against Karadžorđević in October 1868. This involved the confrontation of Karadžorđević with both the evidence collected at the Belgrade trial in July, and the witnesses held in Serbia. Proceedings were to be held on Hungarian territory at Zemun, across the Danube from Belgrade. Well before the confrontation Kállay was trying to influence the way it was conducted. He had hoped to give evidence in person at the hearing, but De Pont, head of the political section of the foreign ministry, thought it “inadvisable.” Instead Kállay was allowed to make a written deposition. In Pest, at the end of August, he made a call on the chief public prosecutor, who told him that “in his opinion, the delegated court is in favor of Karadžorđević.” Kállay at once hurried to the ministerial councillor in the ministry of justice and asked him “to stop this prejudice, because if as a result of it Karadžorđević is freed, it would have very bad consequences. He promised he would investigate this.” Back in Belgrade, Kállay did what he could to reassure the Regents, who had already got wind of the rumored predisposition toward Karadžorđević on the part of the Pest judiciary.

When Karadžorđević, Tripković and Stanković were eventually brought down to Zemun on 9 October, on board the steamship *Maximilian*, Kállay immediately repaired on board to see the presiding judge, Titusz Pajor. Kállay found his worst fears confirmed. Pajor raised objections to the presence of both the Serbian public prosecutor and Kállay himself. The chief prosecutor, Sztrokay, by contrast, turned out to be an ally: he “strongly” approved Kállay’s presence, since Pajor was “extraordinarily prejudiced with regard to Karadžorđević, because of this he might be more restrained.”

The hearing took place on 10–13 October. Kállay remained personally convinced of Karadžorđević’s role as the instigator of the whole conspiracy, although, given the steadfast denials of the three accused, even Kállay had to admit in his report to Beust that he could not swear to the factual value of such a confrontation. What caused Kállay most concern was the attitude shown by the presi-
dent of the court. During the interrogation of Filip Stanković, for instance, Pajor “clearly tried to help the accused and he grasped with great enthusiasm at every circumstance which worked in his favor.” Kállay could not let Pajor’s conduct go unchallenged. On a flying visit to Pest after the hearing, he made a point of visiting the ministry of justice again, and saw Horvát himself:

I called his especial attention to the bias of Titusz Pajor, asked him to ensure, if it is possible, that Karađordević is convicted. He promised he would do everything in his power.

It was the first of a number of direct appeals Kállay was to make to Horvát and his officials over the next two years.

Bringing Karađordević to trial at all was in fact a matter of years, not months. This was a circumstance which caused Kállay repeated embarrassment with the Regents. If, as Kállay kept telling them, Karađordević’s conviction was virtually certain, then why should trying him take so long to arrange? And might not the Hungarian government’s delay in doing so be due to a desire to retain Karađordević and his family as potential tools against the Obrenović dynasty? The longer Karađordević’s prosecution dragged on, the harder it became for Kállay to counter these suspicions.

Simply assessing the evidence, and deciding whether to commit Karađordević for trial, took several months. The trial began on 8 February 1869, but within ten days had run into difficulties with the evidence supplied from Belgrade. Proceedings had to be halted completely while the Serbian authorities were asked for fuller details. There was then a lengthy dispute over whether the ex-Prince should be granted bail or not. The formal indictment was not renewed until November, and appointing a new judge took another nine months. It was not until July 1870 that Karađordević, together with Tripković and Stanković, was finally put on trial again.

The longer the whole process lasted, the greater was the nervousness on each side as to whether the other side could be trusted. The Serbian Regents, for example, wanted Karađordević to be tried in public, so that maximum damage should be done to his public image in Serbia. Kállay duly wrote to Sztrokay, the Pest public prosecutor, and to justice minister Horvát, urging a public trial. On the Monarchy’s side, there were signs by early 1869 of a certain impatience with Serbian demands, not just in Vienna, where such a reaction was to be expected, but in Pest as well. This emerges from the somewhat defensive tone of Kállay’s letter to Andrássy of 24 January, which sought to explain the attitude behind a recent article in the Serbian semi-official Jedinstvo.

The Jedinstvo article, which bore all the hallmarks of Ristić’s authorship, was largely concerned with the idea of a Serbian administration of Bosnia and, as such, was the direct result of Andrássy’s and Kállay’s own activity. It was
attacked by the *Neue Freie Presse*, which took its lead from Beust, for even suggesting such a scheme. As Kállay put it, the *Presse*

has taken in very bad part the passage [in *Jedinstvo*] on how the Serbs are anxious to see positive signs of friendship from Hungary, and against this alludes to the cession of the fortresses and the Karadorđević affair.\(^{65}\)

Kállay attempted to deal with Beust by pointing out that *Jedinstvo* was only saying what he, Kállay, had been reporting to Beust ever since his arrival in Belgrade.\(^{66}\) To Andrássy, Kállay complained that

In Vienna . . . they are always forgetting that we are dealing here with a very small nation, and that in this regard we cannot be the sensitive ones. Furthermore they don't want to see that the Serbs’ principal aspirations are directed towards Bosnia, and that in comparison with this everything else is pushed into the background. . . . The Karadorđević affair falls rather under the heading of provision of justice.\(^{67}\)

He concluded with a reminder that “we are acting not in Serbia’s interests but for our own purposes.”\(^{68}\)

It would not have been surprising for Andrássy, even at this early stage, to be showing signs of impatience with his own policy of cultivating good relations with Serbia. The changeability of Andrássy’s ideas was always remarkable, and with regard to Serbia he had hoped for quicker results, and was correspondingly annoyed at the time it was taking to get them. Kállay received a clear indication of Andrássy’s disquiet in May 1869:

He [Andrássy] advised me especially to try to induce the Serbs at long last to declare decisively whether they are to be openly on our side or not, because they only want to derive advantage from our friendship, but not to do anything for it.\(^{69}\)

This may have been an accurate description of Serbian policy, but it was also a classic example of the pot calling the kettle black.

When at length the Karadorđević trial opened in February 1869, only to collapse almost immediately, it was an ominous sign of the difficulties ahead. The evidence collected from the Serbian authorities, it was found, was critically patchy.\(^{70}\) It has been suggested that the Serbian government, well aware of the damage a full revelation might do them politically, deliberately withheld evidence.\(^{71}\) This did not necessarily mean Karadorđević was innocent; but it did mean that the Hungarian authorities were likely to have a hard time trying to prove otherwise. The Regents were definitely defeating their own object of eliminating Karadorđević. They also, however, continued to urge a speedy and unambiguous conviction, which in view of this non-cooperation seems disingenuous at the very least.

The Karadorđević prosecution then produced yet another reason for the Serbian government, as it thought, to mistrust Hungarian motives. Late in May the
Royal Hungarian Court of Justice decided that Karadorđević was eligible for bail, to the consternation of the Regents. Kállay was told that Blaznavac “regards it as all the more alarming, because it only serves to bolster the intrigues against the good relations which exist between us.”

Kállay accordingly wrote to Horvát on the 28th, pleading that he “try to ensure that the High Court of Justice doesn’t uphold the verdict of the Royal Court of Justice, by which Karadorđević is permitted to defend himself in freedom.” He followed this up with a further appeal to Horvát’s ministerial councillor, Dezső Szilágyi, in June. By now, Kállay must have wished very much indeed that the affair would lose its significance, but instead it threatened to become more and more of a liability. When the news of Karadorđević’s definitive release on bail reached Belgrade in September, Kállay learned that Ristić “very much regrets that Karadorđević has been set free. I tried to explain to him that this is bound up with the forms of our judicial system.”

Matters improved slightly in November 1869, when Karadorđević was again formally indicted. According to Kállay, the wording of the indictment by the Pest public prosecutor, Sztrokay, “in which he asks for the head of Karadorđević, has created a very good impression here.” Kállay promptly renewed his assault on the Hungarian ministry of justice, imploring Szilágyi “to throw all his influence into the balance to get Karadorđević convicted, we now need this very much as one of the conditions of Serbian friendship.”

Even as Kállay stepped up his efforts to harness the judicial process to his political agenda, however, he began to receive the disquieting impression that Karadorđević and his supporters were pulling just as hard in the opposite direction. Blaznavac, in a conversation with Kállay at the end of November, told him that “Karadorđević has promised someone in Pest 1,000,000 piastres if he is acquitted.” Kállay learned nothing further about this; but the suspicion now became rooted in his mind that the Hungarian judiciary was not only biased but corruptible. Kállay’s suspicions might have been unjust, although he was not the only observer to conclude, when Karadorđević was finally cleared, that money had been at work behind the scenes. The possibility that it was the paucity of evidence supplied by Belgrade, which prevented the courts from convicting, does not appear to have suggested itself to Kállay.

In the months that elapsed between Karadorđević’s indictment and the appointment of a new judge, Kállay maintained his vigil against what he perceived as the laxity and possible venality of the courts. In May 1870 he started making what he believed was headway against the inertia of the system. During an interview with Andrássy,

I . . . mentioned that the judges, it seems, have been bribed. . . . He [Andrássy] promised he would have Sztrokay in and confer with him on the state of affairs and the modalities by which it might be possible to ensure the bringing in of a conviction.
This at least appears to indicate that Andrássy, too, thought that somehow a verdict acceptable to the Serbian government could be guaranteed. That at any rate was the impression Kállay relayed to Blaznavac, when he told him “that now Andrássy himself is going to interest himself in this affair.” And late in June Kállay saw Sztrokay once more, who informed him that “he hopes they will convict him, the government takes a great interest in this respect.” It was a message, as usual, which Kállay made sure was conveyed to Blaznavac, who received it “with great satisfaction.”

As the Karadordević trial finally got under way again in July 1870, the authorities on both sides, Hungarian and Serbian, seemed to succumb to a wave of self-deluding optimism, despite the straws in the wind which indicated a different outcome. Kállay was told by Blaznavac on 22 July that if Karadordević were convicted, “the Hungary can count on Serbia unconditionally and we can make a stand together even against Russia.” This was a statement which only made sense in a larger context, since the Franco-Prussian War had just broken out and the Monarchy, at that point, was still pursuing a policy of “expectant neutrality.” War was considered to be a serious option by both Beust and Andrássy, given the right conditions; but it was Andrássy who was most convinced of the inevitability, indeed the necessity, of a war with Russia. It says volumes for the sort of expectations Andrássy and Kállay had raised, to say nothing of the attractions of a Karadordević conviction, that Blaznavac was capable of even making such a remark.

The optimism was all of a sudden equally strong in Pest, where Kállay was told by Sztrokay that the case had been entrusted to Chief Justice Bogisics, and that “The minister has had a word with him and since then even the judges, it seems, are for a conviction.” Horvát, when Kállay saw him, confirmed that he had indeed spoken with Bogisics. Kállay himself met with Bogisics and Horvát on 30 July and got the impression that they shared his viewpoint. Back in Belgrade by early August, Kállay assured Blaznavac “that they will probably convict Karadordević.”

It was a disastrous prediction. Before the month was out Kállay began to receive disturbing news from his confidant, Dr. Rosen. On 16 August Rosen had just seen both Blaznavac and Ristić, and noticed a great change in them. Blaznavac especially declared that he didn’t believe the Hungarians and it may be that now they are going to turn towards Prussia and Russia. He especially mentioned . . . Karadordević. . . . Ristić talked in a similar sense.

The reason, it transpired a few days later, was that Blaznavac had a source of information whose ear was closer to the ground than Kállay’s. The Liberal politician, Jevrem Grujić, had been in Pest and “has heard from the Chief Justice that,
according to Hungarian law, he [Karadžorđević] can’t be convicted.”

Behind the scenes Shishkin, the Russian consul, was busy capitalizing on the resentment this news was bound to stir up. As Kállay glumly recorded that evening, Blaznavac was saying that he doesn’t believe the Hungarians anymore, because for two years we have kept on deluding him with fine words but in fact we don’t do anything, and he says Ristić was right when he always expressed himself in this vein.

The final indignity, for Kállay, was to learn that the newspaper Srpski narod had published an article “in which it is asserted that I myself have secretly had a hand in ensuring that Karadžorđević is not convicted.” Shishkin was distributing copies of the issue personally.

A week later Blaznavac had cooled down sufficiently, according to Dr. Rosen, to protest his goodwill toward Hungary, but mentioned “that he would like to see some action on our part, . . . otherwise and much against his will he will be forced to make a bargain with the Russians.” Clearly Kállay was being subjected to a form of diplomatic arm-twisting which he had so far not encountered in his dealings with the Serbian government. All he could reply, however, was the Pest public prosecutor’s recent assurance that sentence was now due to be passed between the nineteenth and twentieth of September. To this Blaznavac suavely replied that news of a conviction would coincide nicely with the opening of the Skupština on the twenty-sixth: “he would be able to make very good use of it and then there would be no fears for the Hungarian-Serbian alliance, which in his opinion has to be all the closer.” The latter was a reference to the offer made by Andrássy, that summer, of an offensive-defensive alliance, which had in fact been made with the object of neutralizing Serbia for the duration of the Franco-Prussian War. An inherently improbable project, it was another reason why Blaznavac felt he had been deluded “with fine words.” At any rate Kállay passed Blaznavac’ appeal directly on to Andrássy, with a final plea of his own that Andrássy “should be so kind as to ensure that the verdict is a condemnatory one.”

Kállay finally learned on 6 October that Karadžorđević and his associates had all been acquitted: “This news had an extremely unpleasant effect on me, since I can see evil consequences ahead.” The acquittal was specifically because of the inadequacy of the evidence, and the government immediately served notice of its intention to appeal. Kállay at once mobilized the journalist Miksa Falk to tell Pester Lloyd’s readership that “Hungarian public opinion is not satisfied” with the verdict, and Popović “to mitigate the bad effect” in Serbia; but privately he must have been deeply cast down. Something of Kállay’s dejection can be gleaned from the letter he sent Falk, railing against the authorities in Pest: the judgment, in his opinion, bore witness to the fact that “if it had come from a higher level, with more chances of success and less timidity, a completely
different result might have been attained.” Despite the fact that a conviction was obviously in the interests of good Serbo-Hungarian relations, at least to Kállay, the court had ignored this. Falk was asked to impress upon his readers that “the acquittal has caused great scandal” among them.

Even to Beust Kállay did not conceal his alarm. This in itself was unusual, since the common foreign ministry had not been involved in the legal battle being fought in Pest, and Beust could hardly be shouldered with responsibility for the fiasco. But in so far as Kállay saw the failure to convict Karadžorđević as primarily a foreign policy problem, he in effect dumped the “evil consequences” of his and Andrássy’s miscalculations squarely on Beust’s doorstep. He warned the chancellor that there would shortly be “an unfavorable revolution” in relations with Serbia. It was also probable that Prince Alexander’s supporters in Serbia would now come out in the open in agitation against the Obrenović regime. In this they would be able to count on the backing of both the Omladina and Russia.

Kállay was possibly overestimating the level of popular support for the Karadžorđevići. He had a point, however, when he cited Serbian history as a reminder of how ruthless contenders for the throne could be. His conclusion painted a gloomy picture of the problems now facing the Monarchy. The Serbian government,

in order not to see so many enemies united against it, will endeavor to enter into closer relations with the Omladina and Russia. In the first case we must be ready for a lively agitation, beginning among the Austro-Hungarian Serbs, and supported by Serbia; in the second case however the Slavic Near East might fall completely under Russian influence.

It was a far cry from 1868, when Kállay had prophesied the “elimination” of Russian influence.

Some of the consequences of the Karadžorđević business for Kállay personally became apparent from the reaction in Serbia to his inspired article in Pester Lloyd. On 25 October Jedinstvo, Ristić’s mouthpiece, published a leader which “thunders against Hungary, has caused a great sensation here and extinguished even the little sympathy towards us which existed.” In reply to Pester Lloyd, Jedinstvo countered that

Serbia . . . has not sought, nor seeks, in your long lawsuits, and even less in your judgments, proofs of a “good neighborly disposition.” There can be no such proof as long as the murderers of Prince Michael walk freely on Austro-Hungarian soil.

Closer to home, Srpski narod started a rumor that Kállay was to be transferred from Belgrade. The writer professed not to know
how he [Kállay] can look our gentlemen in the eye, when a Hungarian court hands down a completely different judgment and when the Hungarian government adopts a position completely different from the assurances this consul was giving in the name of his government in authoritative places.\textsuperscript{107}

Here, in fact, was the crux of the matter. What Kállay had promised, and what his master in Pest could deliver, were two quite different things. Yet Andrássy, if he had not shown the same single-minded commitment to Karadordević’s conviction as Kállay, had nevertheless allowed Kállay to mortgage his government’s good name in the eyes of the Serbs. Kállay had kept Andrássy regularly posted on all his communications to the Regents in the Karadordević affair, and at no stage had Andrássy indicated specific disapproval. He must, therefore, be accorded a major share of the responsibility for what suddenly turned out to be a serious chill in relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

To be fair, it has to be admitted that the international climate was conducive to such a drop in temperature. The decisive factor here was undoubtedly the Franco-Prussian War. By swiftly eliminating France as a serious voice in Near Eastern affairs, by exposing the essential isolation and vulnerability of the Habsburg Monarchy, and by facilitating the return of Russia as a strong regional power, the War made a \textit{volte-face} on the part of whoever led Serbia quite likely. Even Blaznavac, as it turned out, was prepared to abandon his vaunted Russophobia if it seemed the Monarchy was on the way down, and Russia in the ascendant. In these circumstances the Karadordević prosecution ceased to be something the Regents needed from the Hungarian government, and became instead yet another stick with which they could beat Serbia’s traditional enemies. But here, again, it also must be admitted that the weapon would not have been ready to hand if Kállay, with Andrássy’s implicit support, had not made such a parade of Hungary’s willingness to prosecute, and virtually promised a conviction.

The Karadordević saga was not yet over in the fall of 1870. The government appealed; and in late October Andrássy seemed hardly to appreciate the gravity of the problem. He could not understand, he wrote Kállay, how the Serbian government could possibly treat Karadordević’s acquittal as a “pretext” for rushing into the arms of the Russians. In view of the dangers posed by the Franco-Prussian conflict, he considered it “unavoidable” that the Serbs stop seeing things “in inappropriate colors.”\textsuperscript{108} In short, Andrássy was still relatively sanguine about Serbo-Hungarian relations, and went on to develop at great length his views on the continuing potential of the Bosnian question.

Kállay must have had some bitter reflections. He had been aware for some months of a growing divergence of views between himself and Andrássy with regard to South Slav affairs generally, and thought that Andrássy saw things habitually “through rose-colored spectacles.”\textsuperscript{109} He was particularly sceptical as to how far the Bosnian scheme could be pursued, when the Karadordević affair
looked set to poison relations for the foreseeable future. The events of the next year were to confirm his worst fears.

Notes

1 Kállay to Beust, 18 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay to Andrássy, 12 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/95.
2 Kállay to Beust, 20 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
3 Kállay to Andrássy, 7 Sept. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/136; Kállay to Andrássy, 30 Oct. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/148–49.
4 Kállay to Andrássy, 7 Sept., 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/136.
7 Ibid., 323, citing Scovasso to Menabrea, 20 July 1868.
8 Ibid., 323–24, 325–26, citing Scovasso to Menabrea, 19 Aug. 1868; not in *DDI*.
12 Kállay Diary, 1 Sept. 1868 (*Dnevnik*, 83).
14 Kállay to Andrássy, 18 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/102; Kállay Diary, 28 June 1868 (*Dnevnik*, 45).
15 Ibid., 6 July 1868 (*Dnevnik*, 50–51).
16 Ibid., 13 July 1868 (*Dnevnik*, 55).
17 Ibid., 30 June 1868 (*Dnevnik*, 47); Kállay to Andrássy, 7 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/119.
19 Kállay to Andrássy, 10 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/120.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., f. 121.
22 Ibid.
23 Kállay Diary, 6 July 1868 (*Dnevnik*, 51).
24 Ibid., 13 July 1868 (*Dnevnik*, 55).
26 Andrássy to Kállay, 13 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/122–25; cf. Kállay Diary, 17 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 58).
27 Beust to Andrássy, 3 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/193, referring to a letter from Andrássy dated 29 June (not found).
28 Andrássy to Kállay, 13 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/122.
29 Ibid., f. 123.
30 Ibid., f. 124.
31 Ibid.
32 Kállay to Andrássy, 17 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/126; Kállay Diary, 17 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 58).
33 Ibid.
34 Kállay to Andrássy, 17 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/126–27; cf. Kállay Diary, 17 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 58).
35 Kállay to Andrássy, 17 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/126.
36 Ibid., f. 127.
37 Kállay to Andrássy, 20 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/129.
38 Ibid.
39 Kállay Diary, 23–24 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 61–63, 64–65).
40 Kállay to Andrássy, 31 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/132, paraphrasing a telegram from Horvát. It is a measure of the lack of urgency Kállay attached to Horvát’s response that, unusually, no mention is made of it in his diary.
41 Ibid., f. 133.
42 Kállay Diary, 22 July 1868, 23–24 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 61, 62–63); also note 72 by Radenić, 670.
44 Kállay Diary, 9 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 73).
45 Ibid., 8 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 71).
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 4–5 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 68–69, 69–70), and note 81 by Radenić, 674; Kállay to Andrássy, 4 Aug. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/135.
48 Kállay to Andrássy, 7 Sept. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/142.
49 Kállay Diary, 23 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 80).
50 Ibid., 28 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 82).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 1 Sept. 1868 (Dnevnik, 84).
54 Ibid., 9 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, 96).
55 Ibid.
57 Kállay Diary, 10 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, 98).
58 Ibid., 16 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, 101–2).
59 Ibid., 28 and 31 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, 149–50).
61 Kállay Diary, 26 May, 9 Sept., 2 Nov. 1869, and 26 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 182, 217, 240, 316).
62 Ibid., 15 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, 129).
118 ♦ Apple of Discord

63 Ibid., 17 and 31 Dec. 1868, 12–13 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, 130, 137, 143).
64 Ibid., 16 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, 145), and note 153 by Radenić, 696–97, summarizing the Jedinstvo article. Radenić’s attribution of the article to Vidovdan appears to be a mistake, borne out by neither the text of the diary nor the note itself.
65 Kállay to Andrásy, 24 Jan. 1869, OSZK, FH 1733/174.
66 Kállay to Beust, 23 Jan. 1869, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/183.
68 Ibid.
69 Kállay Diary, 20 May 1869 (Dnevnik, 181).
71 Ibid., 1:216–17.
72 Kállay Diary, 26 May 1869 (Dnevnik, 182).
73 Ibid., 28 May 1869 (Dnevnik, 183).
74 Ibid., 6 June 1869 (Dnevnik, 187).
75 Ibid., 13 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 219).
76 Ibid., 14 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 220).
77 Ibid., 2 Nov. 1869 (Dnevnik, 240).
78 Ibid., 3 Nov. 1869 (Dnevnik, 241).
79 Ibid., 30 Nov. 1869 (Dnevnik, 248). Radenić’s translation mistakenly has “100,000.”
80 Kállay Diary, 5 Jan., 4 Mar., 9 May 1870 (Dnevnik, 259, 276, 297).
81 Ibid., 9 May 1870 (Dnevnik, 298).
82 Ibid., 13 May 1870 (Dnevnik, 299).
83 Ibid., 28 June 1870 (Dnevnik, 310).
84 Ibid., 1 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 311). See also Kállay to Andrásy, 11 Aug. 1870, OSZK, FH 1733/191–92.
85 Kállay Diary, 22 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 315). The verb used (harcolni) is ambiguous, and can mean either “to fight” in a physical sense, or the less aggressive “to make a stand against.”
87 Kállay Diary, 26 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 316).
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., 30 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 317).
90 Ibid., 5 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, 318).
91 Ibid., 16 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, 320).
92 Ibid., 20 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, 321).
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid. (Dnevnik, 322).
95 Ibid., 27 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, 324).
96 Ibid., 3 Sept. 1870 (Dnevnik, 326).
97 Ibid., 5 Sept. 1870 (Dnevnik, 327).
98 On the alliance offer of 1870, see below, Chapter 8.
99 Kállay to Andrásy, 5 Sept. 1870, OSZK, FH 1733/200.
100 Kállay Diary, 6 Oct. 1870 (Dnevnik, 332).
101 Ibid., 1 Oct. 1870 (Dnevnik, 332). See also Kállay to Falk, 6 Oct. 1870, OSZK, FOND IV/442.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
105 Kállay Diary, 26 Oct. 1870 (Dnevnik, 335).
107 Srpski narod, 9/[21] Oct. 1870, quoted in Dnevnik, note 256 by Radenić, 731; also Kállay Diary, 5 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 337).
109 Kállay Diary, 28 June 1870 (Dnevnik, 310).
110 Ibid., 5 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 337).
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