Apple of Discord

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Chapter 3

The Obrenović Assassination

In the early evening of 10 June, Kállay went for a drive with the Romanian consul in Topčider Park, on the outskirts of Belgrade. His account of what followed is one of the most graphic to have survived. It is also correct in most of its details, although Kállay was not an eyewitness to the central events he describes:

As soon as we had left the town, we saw old Garašanin, who was tearing along towards us at top speed in a carriage. He only gave a wave of the hand. Not knowing how to account for this, we proceeded to go further, when we came upon Mrs. Marinović who called to us from her carriage that the Prince was murdered. We stopped the carriage and, having stopped a horseman who was in full gallop, asked him what had happened. This person, in a great hurry, told us only that persons unknown had killed the Prince and his kinswoman, who was with him, with revolvers in Topčider. At this news we at once raced back to town and went to the central government offices, where all the ministers were already gathered. They were extremely alarmed and it seems that they didn’t know what to do. Only Garašanin had not lost his presence of mind, although, according to the reports which had been brought in, his own son was killed. Soon the Prince’s servant Mita arrived, with a shattered arm, and related what had happened.

The Prince with Anka and Katarina [Konstantinović] had gone on ahead, with Tomanija [Obrenović, Anka’s mother], on the arm of young Garašanin [the Prince’s aide-de-camp], some 20 yards behind them. The servant Mita accompanied them as well. The other attendants, as usual, had spread out and been left behind. The company was strolling along the Košutnjak and had already passed the Hajduk fountain. All at once, they saw ahead of them 3 men sitting among the trees. Tomanija asked who these people might be. Garašanin replied, promenaders. Suddenly these persons jumped up; two started to run towards the Prince, one towards Garašanin. They fired on the Prince. Garašanin tried to draw his saber but
a bullet smashed his right arm and he dropped to the ground. Tomanija started to run as well as the servant, Mita, who had taken a bullet in the arm. He saw them riddle the Prince with bullets, and the latter fall to the ground. Two bullets hit Anka, who was trying to help the Prince, and she fell. Katarina remained on her feet, but two bullets hit her in the back and she threw herself on the ground and played dead. The murderers completely mangled the Prince’s face and head with cutlasses. The Prince and Anka were already dead, but Garašanin and Katarina were still alive. I also went along with Ionescu, through the horrified, silent multitude to Topčider, and viewed the corpses laid out in Miloš’s old palace. The mangled head of the Prince was terrible. They had riddled his breast with 4 bullets . . . The murderers have fled and are being hunted high and low. The town is completely quiet, there is not the slightest noise or disturbance; after 8 o’clock the streets were just as deserted as they usually are.

The government declared a state of emergency and wheeled its troops into place to protect itself. For this ministers had Garašanin to thank, who was not even in the government but whose sense of public duty prompted him to swift action in defense of it. The conspirators had in fact planned to slaughter leading ministers and officials and place their own friends in power. Garašanin not only got back into town ahead of them, but by sheer force of personality dragooned the panic-stricken ministers into standing firm. Faced with this solid front, the conspirators’ ramshackle plot simply collapsed. They were rounded up by the authorities within a couple of days, and most of them met the firing squad a few weeks later.

Garašanin, though the savior of the situation, nevertheless did not take over the direction of affairs. Instead, the war minister Milivoj Blaznavac, once he recovered his nerve, acted swiftly to establish his own ascendancy. In accordance with the Constitution of 1838, the automatic head of the provisional government was the president of the Council, Jovan Marinović, who also happened to be a member of Garašanin’s conservative faction. This provisional government decreed the convocation of a Skupština to elect a permanent Regency, and an Extraordinary Skupština to choose Michael’s successor. The Garašanin faction would in all probability have favored Nikola of Montenegro as Prince, the latter being a candidate considered acceptable to Russia. Blaznavac, however, summoned the officers of the army the day after Michael’s assassination, and proclaimed an oath of allegiance to the dead Prince’s cousin, fourteen year old Milan Obrenović. Having appointed himself first Regent for the duration of Milan’s minority, Blaznavac then despatched one of Serbia’s leading politicians, Jovan Ristić, to bring the young Prince back to Belgrade. At five in the morning on 23 June, Milan arrived by Danube steamer, to be greeted by Blaznavac and the roar of saluting cannon. Despite the hour there was a huge crowd present, who acclaimed Milan with enthusiastic shouts of “Živio!” (Long life).

Blaznavac’s move was one that the Hungarian government had every reason to welcome. The war minister counted as a “Hungarophile,” or at least a man
opposed to Russian influence in Serbia. The proclamation of allegiance to Milan, whose title to succeed was unimpeachable, thus shrewdly steered around the threat of a Russophile head of state, and at the same time put Blaznavac in a position to influence affairs during the inevitable period of minority rule.\(^8\)

Kállay, who considered Michael’s death “a great calamity for us,” was at first inclined to despair. “Now I have to start all over again, only there’s nothing to start with,” he lamented in his diary.\(^9\) He soon realized, however, that Blaznavac would in many ways be just as suitable. Apart from anything else, Blaznavac himself made the first move to reassure the Hungarians, by sending Orešković, on 12 June, to make clear to Kállay what his position was, and to ask Kállay to come and see him. Blaznavac also wanted to know if he could send Orešković up to Pest again, for further talks with Andrássy, since Orešković had told him of the Bosnian negotiations which had been going on up to the time of Michael’s assassination.\(^10\)

Kállay came away convinced that, as he put it to Andrássy, the war minister was “a clever, cunning, bold, energetic man.”\(^11\) Blaznavac wanted to have the deciding voice in government by having himself appointed de facto head of the three-man Regency. “From our point of view,” wrote Kállay,

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\ldots \text{the main thing is that the tripartite government should follow policies which are in harmony with our own.} \ldots \text{Milivoj [Blaznavac] offers us more guarantees than anyone else. He is an enemy of Russian influence and is looking to Hungary’s help for the prosperity of Serbia.} \]

To underline the fact that the interests under discussion were first and foremost Hungarian ones, Kállay also pointed out the “peculiar circumstance” that

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\text{towards Austria the greatest antipathy prevails, whereas towards constitutional Hungary there is much sympathy, and everything which Serbia hopes for from Austria’s support is attributed solely to Your Excellency’s influence.} \]

Figure 6. Prince Milan Obrenović with Regents Jovan Ristić and Milivoj Blaznavac, 23 June 1868
To Beust Kállay merely repeated the fact that Blaznavac had emerged as a strongman in his own right. Kállay offered Beust no advice whatsoever as to who he thought should succeed Michael. Nor did he make any allusion to Blaznavac’ explicitly pro-Hungarian attitude. Instead, he explained the provisional government’s anxiety to proclaim Milan Prince as due to their fear of Ottoman interference in the succession. Blaznavac, in fact, had specifically requested Austria-Hungary’s assistance in preventing this, a request which Kállay endorsed. Kállay might also have calculated that, for the moment, Andrásy could be relied upon to promote Milan as Austria-Hungary’s choice at the highest levels. In this, Kállay’s confidence was perfectly justified, even if Andrásy did not have everything his own way.

Prokesch-Osten, for instance, Kállay’s immediate superior at Constantinople, argued that Austria-Hungary should support the claims of Serbia’s ex-Prince Alexander Karađorđević. For Prokesch, viewing the situation through the eyes of a professional, habsburgtreu diplomat, the primary interest to be safeguarded was that of the Habsburg Monarchy. Prince Michael, who until recently had pursued policies detrimental to the status quo, was not necessarily to be mourned; Alexander Karađorđević, by contrast, had a proven history of amenability to Habsburg influence. That Prokesch’s views did not prevail was partly due to the energetic intervention of Andrásy.

From the moment Kállay wired the news of Prince Michael’s murder a lively tussle had been going on between Beust and Andrásy as to what attitude Austria-Hungary should take in the question of the succession and how far, if at all, the Monarchy should try to influence the results. The fact that Andrásy immediately entered the lists, with the suspicion that not only the Karađorđević family, but also the Hungarian Serbs under Miletić, were implicated in the assassination, might have given pause to any thoughts Beust may have had of supporting the rival dynasty. Andrásy claimed to have information, from a source in Paris, that “Karađ[orđević] has been in contact with the Miletić party and with Moscow,” and called on Beust to have both Prince Alexander and his son Peter shadowed. Andrásy was not alone in his suspicions: it turned out that the Emperor himself was reluctant to endorse Karađorđević, another factor which would have influenced Beust. In the circumstances, Andrásy’s fears that the ex-Prince had “friends in the foreign ministry,” because of his compliant role during the 1848–49 revolution, might have been true, but did not count for much in view of the general assumption of his guilt.

The real conflict of views between Vienna and Pest was over how the Monarchy could ensure that its preferred candidate, Milan, was chosen. On 12 June, Andrásy staked out the high ground for a policy of intervention and control. He informed Beust that, the day before Michael’s murder, warning of a plot against the Serbian government had been received from the deputy lord-lieutenant of Bács-Bodrog county. According to Andrásy’s information, this conspiracy was known
to both Karadorđević and Miletić. Since Miletić was, in Andrássy’s words, “well known to be completely under Russian influences,” the fact that Karadorđević was much influenced by him made a Karadorđević restoration highly inadvisable.21

In a revealing passage Andrássy spelt out why the way the choice was made was almost as important as the choice itself:

Above all I am convinced, that a Prince of Serbia has to be chosen by the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary just like the lord-lieutenant of a county. . . . A weak Prince would be little inclined to precipitate the resolution of the Eastern Question through adventurous undertakings.22

The Monarchy’s influence would be further consolidated, Andrássy felt, by the deployment of a couple of armored warships on the Danube, a move which he had been urging on Beust since the previous year.23 It would help, too, if troops could be moved into Syrmia, and if Kállay could be instructed to ask the provisional government in Belgrade not to issue passes to Serbian subjects wishing to attend a forthcoming nationalist festival in Austro-Hungarian territory.24

Beust’s answer showed how much more aware he was than Andrássy of the wider implications of Austro-Hungarian involvement. He had already received a fairly clear intimation from the Prussian embassy that, in view of the alarm any unilateral action would cause in Russia, the Monarchy would do well to maintain a neutral attitude and do nothing without consulting the other signatories to the Treaty of Paris.25 Since the French and British governments shared this view, Beust knew that his hands were tied.

The chancellor agreed with the desirability of Milan as Prince. The acceptance of Milan would solve the question of the succession, and would clearly not be a triumph for Russian influence. But Beust was convinced that a completely passive attitude, in the period leading up to the meeting of the Skupština, was Austria-Hungary’s only feasible option. He made it clear he believed the principle of non-intervention applied to the Ottomans as well, and he had instructed Prokesch-Osten to make representations to this effect.26 It was equally important, however, to avoid anything, “that, in the present situation, could be construed as provocation or interference and, as such, exploited against us.” In line with this resolution, he would not risk moving more troops into Syrmia, and he would ask the Serbian government simply to exercise caution as to whom they issued passes to.27

The larger view of the affair was for Beust decisive. The Monarchy, two years after Sadowa, simply could not afford to indulge in provocative gestures like troop movements or sending gunboats to breathe down the neck of the new regime. Beust’s reference to the “sensitivities of the Serbs” reveals, on the contrary, his awareness that such heavy-handedness might actually make things worse.28 In the question of who became Prince of Serbia in 1868, the Ballhaus could afford to sit back and let the Serbian scenery sort itself out.
Andrássy, however, confided to Kállay that “I cannot share this view and hope that I can induce Beust to drop it, by means of His Majesty if by no other.”

He left Kállay in no doubt that some sort of positive intervention on the side of Milan’s candidacy was preferable to inaction. “Your task,” he wrote on 14 June, “will be to judge how far you can step into the foreground. . . . If you are sure that Milan’s party really has as much chance as you report, then I shall assume responsibility in advance for any and all activity.”

Andrássy claimed that the foreign ministry would “later reconcile itself to success” in the matter; but there was no indication that this was likely in the letter he received from the Emperor that same day. Francis Joseph, on the contrary, showed no deviation from Beust’s already expressed policy.

To this Andrássy replied that he still thought the Monarchy should exercise its influence on the elections “in decisive fashion.” He also renewed his assault on Beust, pointing out that “history” showed how the influence of France in the Danubian Principalities dated from its active role in elections there. The same involvement in princely elections explained Russian influence in Serbia, in Andrássy’s eyes. And in a frank evaluation of Serbian autonomy, he pointed out that “History demonstrates, furthermore, that the right to elect one’s own Prince has shown itself to be just as disadvantageous for the country in question, as it is advantageous for neighbouring states.”

For Andrássy, of course, there was an additional reason for treating Serbia as if it were already a province of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Exerting an influence on the election of the Prince is to be judged, in my opinion, not only from the standpoint of advantage, but also of necessity, with regard to the effect on the nationalities within the Monarchy, . . . the sole means of counteracting Serbia’s influence on our own Serbs consists of exercising our own influence over Serbia.

For this purpose a Regency would be ideal, “because its members . . . will have no time to concoct plans against us.” Finally, helping the side most likely to win the election in any case would give Austria-Hungary a leverage it had not previously possessed.

From the Emperor, all this won Andrássy was a terse reiteration of what he had already been told: “a real influence” in the choice of Serbia’s next Prince was not to be thought of. From Beust, Andrássy received a further patient exposé of the arguments in favor of neutrality. Beust pointed out that, while the Monarchy was in a unique position to influence events, it was also uniquely exposed to Prussian and Russian insinuations that it was aiming to annex Serbia. Non-involvement did not mean indifference to the results. The Monarchy could do no less than voice its “open sympathy” for Milan; but it dare not do more without endangering what influence it already possessed, or hoped to possess, and might in fact harm Milan’s chances.
Kállay’s official instructions reflected this balance to a nicety, enjoining him to endorse Milan by all means, but “not to go beyond those boundaries, where our partisanship for the candidate’s cause . . . easily makes him appear as an especially Austrian candidate.”

They can have given no comfort to Kállay himself, who had done what he could to convince the chancellor to deploy all means to ensure that, if Milan should be elected, Regents should be chosen who intended continuing Serbia’s foreign policy in the spirit of the late Prince Michael.

In a parallel letter to Andrássy, Kállay was even more explicit: “We can perhaps take the fate of Serbia and the East into our hands if we are capable of making financial sacrifices.” He had mentioned the matter to Beust, he confided, but “not so explicitly.” For Andrássy, Kállay was prepared to fill in the blanks: “Who knows, the question perhaps turns on only a couple of 100,000 forints, and perhaps only because of this Russian influence will triumph.”

The clearly expressed desire of both the Emperor and Beust to remain on the sidelines, however, did not prevent Andrássy and Kállay from trying to put some of their ideas into practice. Indeed, they appear to have made ready to do so in open disregard of the official foreign policy laid down by Beust, as if confident that the latter’s objections could be overturned, if not simply ignored. The result, before the end of June, was an ignominious climb-down by the chancellor.

The crucial role here was played by Andrássy, who went up to Vienna in person to pursue the matter. It is not clear whether Andrássy also appealed to Francis Joseph although, in view of his earlier threat to involve the Emperor if necessary, this seems more than likely. What is clear is that, face to face with Andrássy, Beust’s reasoned opposition crumbled:

. . . after I had later contacted him personally in Vienna, he changed his point of view, and himself admitted that, in the present circumstances, he would bear the responsibility for the loss of the initiative.

Beust, for his part, had some success in persuading Andrássy that money was perhaps not the only way to influence the election result.

I received the answer that I should find out from you [Kállay] roughly what sort of sum would be needed, and whether it would not be possible to achieve the same sort of success by handing out orders and decorations.

For Andrássy this had a certain appeal: his earlier proposal to deploy monitors on the Danube had been just such an attempt to exert influence on the cheap. Beust did not mention any figures, but Andrássy was aware that “under the present set-up, there cannot be a great amount at his disposal.” Since Kállay obviously trusted Blaznavac, Andrássy suggested, “perhaps through him you
can get some idea of what sort of sum might be effective in the last moments of the election.”

Kállay, however, already knew of Beust’s climb-down, and might even have made his own contribution to resolving the argument. He did this not just by reiterating his belief that the Monarchy might have to pay for the success of its preferred candidate, but also by putting forward an idea which complemented Andrásy’s views on the desirability of a Regency in Serbia.

Andrássy’s conviction was that a Regency would be too preoccupied with its own domestic vulnerability to take an active role in foreign affairs, particularly the fomentation of further unrest among the Balkan Christians. Kállay’s idea was in some respects more subtle, and occurred to him on 19 June after a conversation with his Romanian colleague, Ionescu. The latter informed him that the Omladina and Serbian liberals preferred Jovan Ristić over Garašanin as a member of the Regency. Some form of constitutional and political reform was at least a possibility with Ristić, whereas Garašanin was notoriously authoritarian.

As Kállay recorded that evening,

This gave me an idea: we must try to get the new government to embark on a course of liberalism and constitutionality. In consequence of this would come the formation of parties in the country, and such a country cannot be very strong as far as foreign affairs are concerned. A state can be strong in foreign affairs only under an absolutist concentration of powers. With this alone we would put a stop to [their] expansionist aims.

In a report to Beust on 22 June, Kállay developed this theme in a way that would make the idea of flooding the Serbian election with cash more acceptable. Serbia’s government was essentially autocratic, and public opinion, unable to concern itself with domestic affairs, was all the easier to inveigle into nationalist frenzy and foreign wars. The introduction of “progressive institutions” would change all this.

. . . thus the plans for conquest of the Greater Serbs would be, in not completely annihilated, nevertheless pushed into the background. I have spoken with several Greater Serbs. . . . They all perceive that a more liberal system of government would restrict Serbia’s power to act to a large degree.

Of the two chief rivals for the post of Regent, Garašanin and Blaznavac, it was the latter, Kállay told Beust, who was the more likely to make this sort of development possible, because he had expressed a wish to have Ristić as his principal associate. It was only at this point that Kállay plainly stated that “a considerable sum” would be a good way of setting Serbia on its liberal course.

Beust never replied directly to this, so it is impossible to say whether Kállay’s appeal fell on fertile ground. Yet not only the subsequent course of liberal nationalism in Serbia, but also its previous history, shows how flawed was
Kállay’s analysis. Serbian liberalism was by definition strongly nationalist, and notoriously committed to the cause of national liberation. The bitterest criticism of Prince Michael by the *Omladina* and Miletić was that in 1866 he had not involved Serbia in war; and it was under a succession of Liberal cabinets that Serbia stampeded into war against the Turks in 1876. Neither the unpreparedness of the country for any sort of sustained hostilities, nor the acerbity of political life in the period following the introduction of Serbia’s liberal constitution of 1869, offered any impediment to this Gadarene plunge. A Serbia with more liberal institutions was, if anything, more likely to be a firebrand of nationalist emotions.

Whatever the reasons for Beust’s change of tack, Kállay received a telegram on 25 June, asking him what sort of sum he thought would be necessary for “secret expenditure.” By this time, however, the situation had changed so much that Kállay no longer saw the need for direct intervention. Blaznavac was so clearly the only serious contender for power that “Now any expenditure . . . would be a waste of money.” Kállay was at pains to point out that the situation might change once Blaznavac was firmly in the saddle. Then he might be exposed to temptations from “various sides,” and Austria-Hungary might be obliged “to preserve his friendship in a palpable fashion as well.” And to make sure Blaznavac knew who his real benefactors were, Kállay informed him personally that “if he should need money after the election, I will be able to dispose of certain sums.”

When Kállay assured Beust that Blaznavac “wants not only to preserve the friendly relations achieved with Austria up to now, but to consolidate them even further,” he of course meant Hungary rather than Austria, as his correspondence with Andrássy attests. Kállay’s diary also shows how much of an anti-Austrian tinge this collaboration with Blaznavac could assume:

> He [Blaznavac] claimed that he wants to conduct the friendliest possible policy towards Hungary, and in such a way that there develops between the Hungarian nation and the South Slavs the most intimate alliance, so that if need be each would defend the others, on the one side, from Russian and Turkish influence, and one the other against Austria.

Other subjects discussed between Kállay and Blaznavac were equally unlikely to find their way into the dispatches Beust received. Blaznavac claimed to want to preserve the Ottoman imperium, but was naturally interested in assuming control of Bosnia. In this case he was willing to concede some territory to the Monarchy “in the interest of rounding out our Croatia.” Once Serbo-Hungarian friendship was on a firm footing, he thought customs barriers between the two countries should be abolished. Blaznavac even, much to Kállay’s delight, expressed an interest in some form of larger southeast European union, either “a great republic or a monarchical confederation of small states,” which would embrace the Hungarians, South Slavs, Greeks, and Romanians.
Kállay was quite excited at this reappearance of his “dear old ideas,” or what he described as

The great Danubian confederation on democratic foundations, which unites the different but roughly equal nations, each of whom has reason to fear that foreign powers will repress its nationality and individuality. However, gathered together in amicable alliance they can all preserve their individuality and protect one another from any and all foreign influence.64

“It would,” he concluded, “be a strange twist of fate if I were able to contribute to the realization of this idea.”65

In the end Beust’s initial assumption, that there was no need to intervene in support of a faction which already held all the cards in its favor, was justified by events. The Serbian Skupština convened on 2 July, and acclaimed Milan as hereditary Prince the same day.66 The deputies also had to decide which team to approve as Regents, but the result was a foregone conclusion. Blaznavac was elected first Regent by an overwhelming majority. As co-Regents he had already announced he would choose Jovan Ristić, the diplomat and vaguely Liberal politician, and the colorless Jovan Gavrilović.67

The Skupština might have been content to rubber-stamp both Milan’s succession and a Blaznavac Regency, because these appeared to be popular choices. It was, however, more than just a rubber stamp. Michael’s assassination had undoubtedly encouraged expectations, at least among the Liberal intelligentsia and what little urban middle class there was in Serbia, that his repressive police state would now be dismantled. The Liberal element of the Skupština were also eager to see the blame for Michael’s death fixed firmly on the Karadordevići, but were just as insistent on constitutional reform.68 The Blaznavac Regency appealed to both these factions: both Blaznavac and Ristić found it politically convenient to use Alexander Karadordević as a scapegoat, and each, for his own reasons, could see advantages in a limited liberalization of the regime.

Even after the Skupština’s public endorsement of Milan and his Regents, there was still uncertainty as to whether the Sultan’s government would ratify the assembly’s acclamation of Milan as hereditary Prince of Serbia. Milan was undoubtedly Prince Michael’s closest surviving male relative, which satisfied the requirements of the Serbian law of 1859. He was not, however, the “direct male heir” specified by the hatti şerif of 1830; and it was the latter which, in the Porte’s eyes, was the legitimate instrument of succession in Serbia. By sticking to the letter of the hatti şerif, the Turks might seek to maintain that Milan had merely been elected, which implied that any other Serbian subject might conceivably be put in his place, whereas the Serbian government wished above all to establish the Obrenović family as the sole dynastic line.69 Resolving this arcane but important difference gave the Habsburg Monarchy a renewed opportunity to demonstrate its support for the Blaznavac regime.
On 8 July Kállay saw Ristić, who formally requested Austro-Hungarian help in securing a *berat*, or imperial decree, from Constantinople which explicitly recognized the Obrenović as hereditary rulers. Failing this, he told Kállay, it would be better to have a *berat* which simply recognized Milan as Prince, rather than one which included the word “elected.”

Kállay threw his weight behind the request, but Beust did not need persuading of its merits. He immediately instructed Prokesch-Osten to back the efforts of Serbia’s agent in Constantinople to obtain the desired *berat*. Blaznavac, he told Prokesch, “inspires our confidence”; furthermore, he would serve as a useful brake on the more overtly nationalist Ristić. Refusing the Serbian government’s request would create bad feeling; granting it “could produce considerable advantages.” And in view of Kállay’s apparent enthusiasm for Danubian confederation (of which Beust was quite unaware), the main advantage adduced by the chancellor was an interesting one:

> We ought to attach a high price, and the Ottoman government’s interest seems to us as identical to our own in this regard, to the countries bordering our Empire not being able to merge into a single political unit, whose existence obviously would constitute a permanent threat to us. Now, by rendering the principality hereditary in the Obrenović family, the Sultan would establish a barrier well-designed to prevent for all time the union of Serbia with Moldavia-Wallachia. . . .

Beust also pointed out that both the Viceroy of Egypt and the Prince of Romania enjoyed hereditary status, and that the Porte could maintain it was simply reaffirming the spirit of the 1830 *hatti şerif*.

This at least was language that Prokesch-Osten could understand, both in its cold consideration of the Monarchy’s own interest and in its use of legalistic loopholes. The ambassador reported by 14 July that the Grand Vezir had been won over. The Sultan’s chief minister had to agree that the principle of hereditary succession had already been effectively conceded by the Porte. Even more decisive was the consideration that an undisputed succession offered the best chances of stability in Serbia, and hence the Ottoman Empire. A *berat* was subsequently issued in accordance with the Serbian request.

Kállay, upon receiving Prokesch-Osten’s news, could not resist claiming this as a triumph for Austro-Hungarian influence in Serbia. The Serbian government was all the more thankful, Kállay claimed, because it knew the Russian and Italian agents in Constantinople had done what they could to hinder the Sultan’s recognition. As a consequence, and bearing in mind the markedly anti-Russian tendencies of Blaznavac, Kállay felt that Russian policy in Serbia had suffered a considerable setback. The Monarchy should hasten to express its support for the Regents’ reform plans, in order not to lose this advantage.
Political reform in Serbia, however, was intimately bound up with the question of complicity in Prince Michael’s murder, for many of the people who came to prominence under the Regency were tainted by, if not directly involved in, the June conspiracy. In backing the cause of reform, therefore, Kállay, and behind him the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry, were inevitably drawn into supporting the cover-up over who was responsible for the assassination. The Hungarian government went even further: by helping the Serbian Regents in their attempt to fasten the blame for Prince Michael’s death exclusively on Alexander Karadžorđević, the Andrássy cabinet exposed itself to a moral ambiguity which was to rebound on it in the end.

There was no problem as to who had committed the actual murders of 10 June. It was Pavle Radovanović, a Belgrade lawyer of frustrated political ambition, who organized the killing, carried out by one of his brothers and two associates. What the conspirators steadfastly denied, however (except under torture which, to the consternation of Kállay and other diplomatic representatives, the Serbian authorities proved all too willing to employ), was any involvement by the Karadžorđević family or leading Liberal politicians. Pavle Radovanović went to the firing squad repudiating these charges.78

Yet the evidence for the involvement of the Karadžorđevići and the Liberals was considerable. With regard to Alexander Karadžorđević and his followers, not only the Serbian government, which had a vested interest in blaming them, but also foreign observers like Kállay, were convinced of their guilt.79 Despite the conspirators’ denials, it was easily proved that Alexander’s secretary and relative, Pavle Tripković, had met them on various occasions and had supplied them with arms and money.80 Karadžorđević, who lived in exile in Pest but who still had property interests in Serbia, paid Radovanović a retainer to act as his lawyer. The chief beneficiary of a revolution, however, was to be not Alexander but his son Peter. The Karadžorđević family were the likely replacement for Prince Michael’s dynasty, and they must have known a revolution was in the offing, if not an assassination.81

The extent to which Serbian Liberals were privy to Prince Michael’s murder, by contrast, was never satisfactorily cleared up. This was for mainly political reasons, not for lack of at least circumstantial evidence. The Liberals, in fact, because of their opposition to Prince Michael and the latter’s repression of the Omladina, had every reason to hope for a change of regime.82 What saved the Liberals was the purely political need which the new Regents had of their cooperation. For Blaznavac in particular it was essential to have the support of more than just the army, and since the conservatives would not work with him, the alternative had to be the Liberals. Hence Blaznavac’s insistence on choosing Ristić as a partner. Ristić, though hardly a Liberal by conviction, had earned himself something of a reputation as a constitutionalist, and was thus the link between Blaznavac and the Liberals.83
Essentially, Blaznavac and Ristić did a deal with the leading Liberals. The Liberals' blatant foreknowledge of the assassination was to be skated over, and the Regents would take steps to introduce a constitution. In return, the Liberals would give the government their support, and some of them would even join government service. After first pressing for Liberals on Habsburg soil to be prosecuted or extradited, therefore, the Serbian government quietly let its own investigations drop. The Andrásy government, which had responded willingly by rounding up Vladimir Jovanović and the Bulgarian nationalist Ljuben Karavelov, in Novi Sad, found itself acting alone. In the end Jovanović and Karavelov had to be released for want of evidence, not least because the originators of the action against them, the Serbian government, would not pursue the matter. There was also the ticklish question of whether such persons, charged with what could be described as political crimes, could legally be extradited to Serbia. As Kállay reminded Andrásy on 10 July, there was no treaty of extradition between the Monarchy and Serbia, and in any case if the offenses were to be regarded as political, then Jovanović and Karavelov could not be prosecuted for them under Hungarian law.

There remains the possibility of foreign involvement in Michael’s assassination. Suspicion was inevitably directed at Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire.

The Russian government might have been thought to have a reason for wanting Michael removed, since it thoroughly disapproved of his dismissal of Garašanin, in late 1867, and the turn toward Austria-Hungary. Andrásy certainly thought a link existed. So did the Prussian consul in Belgrade, although the Prussian government was not convinced by this. But despite the bad feeling which still prevailed between Belgrade and St. Petersburg no one else seriously considered the idea of Russian responsibility, nor did any evidence emerge at the trial of the murderers to suggest it.

The charge against Austria-Hungary is also easily disproven, and had its origins in the generally bad relations between the Monarchy and Serbia for most of the nineteenth century. In support of the suspicion of Austro-Hungarian involvement, however, there are only three considerations worth citing. One was the fact, generally known, that the Monarchy opposed Prince Michael’s plans for a Balkan alliance and general uprising against Ottoman rule. Another was the past willingness of the Monarchy to intervene in Serbian affairs and to influence the choice of Prince. The Monarchy’s record in this type of interference was irregular; but the willingness was there, and was alive and well in 1868, as Andrásy’s correspondence with Beust demonstrates. Third, there was the initial enthusiasm of Prokesch-Osten, the ambassador in Constantinople, for a Karadordević candidacy in 1868.

Against these points must be ranged the whole trend of Austro-Serbian relations in the year leading up to Prince Michael’s murder. Naturally Beust opposed
Michael’s Balkan alliance schemes; but for both him and Andrásy this was if anything an additional reason for trying to improve relations with Serbia, the better to exercise a restraining influence. Beust differed from Andrásy as to the means to be employed. But there can be no doubt that in Vienna, as much as in Pest, Michael was by and large regarded as an asset, whose replacement would have been not only fraught with risk but unnecessary.93

Another proof of the Monarchy’s non-involvement was the zeal with which the Hungarian government, with the tacit approval of the Ballhaus, pursued Alexander Karadžorđević through the Hungarian courts in the course of the next three years. On Kállay’s recommendation, and after a formal request by the Serbian Regency, the Hungarian authorities placed Karadžorđević under arrest on 8 August.94 At the special request of Belgrade, the Hungarian government arranged for this part of Alexander’s arraignment to be held in public.95 The saga of the Karadžorđević trial, and the way in which it became the litmus test of Serbo-Hungarian relations, will be treated at length later. Here it is worth pointing out that, if either the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry or the Hungarian government had been behind a conspiracy designed to put Alexander Karadžorđević on the Serbian throne, then Andrásy would never have put so much time and energy into this prosecution. On Andrásy’s behalf Kállay, over the next few years, was repeatedly to protest the government’s determination to secure a conviction to the increasingly sceptical Regents.

Finally there is the conclusive evidence of Kállay’s own diary and his correspondence with Andrásy. Kállay’s expressions of regret at the passing of someone he had personally liked, as well as found useful in furthering Hungarian interests, are too numerous and unqualified to be feigned.96 Andrásy, too, confessed himself “shaken” by the news.97 It was only in the weeks following the assassination that Andrásy and Kállay began to appreciate unforeseen advantages in the new situation.

In the case of the Ottomans, by contrast, a number of clues point to some form of involvement, although in view of the paucity of evidence it is unlikely that these will ever be substantiated. Of all the powers only the Ottoman government had the sort of motivation that would have made an incitement to murder explicable. Prince Michael had been a thorn in its side throughout the 1860s. Far more than Austria-Hungary, the Porte had reason to fear Michael’s activity, which was aimed directly at Ottoman rule in the Balkans. The recent reconciliation between Prince Michael and Ilija Garašanin may also have caused alarm in the Ottoman government.98

An important domestic consequence of the Obrenović assassination for the Hungarian government was that it provided the pretext for moving against the Serbian nationalist movement in the Vojvodina. Unfortunately for the cause of Serbo-Hungarian friendship, the practical results of this purge were nugatory, in
that no evidence of serious involvement by Svetozar Miletić and his supporters was ever uncovered. Instead, the Hungarian Serbs were even further alienated from their government; and in Serbia, although the action taken was not unwelcome to the Blaznavac regime, among the population as a whole the persecution of Hungary’s Serbs was not easily forgotten.

Andrássy started from the assumption that Miletić was not only hand in glove with the Karađorđević conspiracy, but backed by Moscow as well. The first part of this assumption, if not the second, was one that Kállay shared, although he revealed an additional calculation behind it when he wrote that “It would be very much in our interest if we could render the incorrigible agitator Miletić harmless so neatly.” This would also, he added, be agreeable to Blaznavac. The problem was proving Miletić’s connection with the assassination.

To gather the necessary evidence the Andrássy government on 20 June appointed as royal commissioner Nándor Ast, with sweeping powers of investigation. The interior minister, Béla Wenckheim, advised the commissioner to suspend Miletić from his post as mayor of Novi Sad, but leave the rest of the administration and council in place if possible.

Ast arrived in Novi Sad on 26 June, and proceeded to put these instructions into effect. The royal commissioner soon discovered, however, that his task was a fruitless one. His early prediction that Miletić’s suspension would provoke “mass resignations” was proven wrong; but in the crucial matter of evidence Ast was on a hiding to nothing. By 3 July all Ast could relay to Pest was the opinion of some of his witnesses that “Miletić as mayor . . . exercises complete absolutism in administrative matters . . . and practices a genuine terrorism on the peace-loving Novi Sad community.”

Wenckheim, in reply, conveyed his wholehearted approval of Ast’s measures, and recommended suspending from office any councillors who gave him difficulties. On the basis of the material Ast had collected on Miletić, Wenckheim wrote, he too came to the same conclusions “with regard to his [Miletić’s] political character and activities.” There was nevertheless a snag:

I do not . . . consider this evidence sufficient to undertake legal proceedings against him [Miletić], . . . and for this reason I request Your Honor to carry on with your investigation against him.

By 8 July, however, Ast was compelled to admit he could find no hard evidence for a couple of secret meetings Miletić was supposed to have had, with Pavle Radovanović and his associates, prior to the assassination.

Long before that the government’s strategy for prosecuting Miletić had unraveled completely. On 15 July, justice minister Boldizsár Horvát informed Wenckheim that, on the available evidence, a case against Miletić could not be sustained. The lack of evidence did not prevent Horvát from recommending
that Miletić be kept out of office anyway. The latter, Horvát wrote, had shown “such vehement hatred of the government and such anti-constitutional tendencies,” that “in the interests of public order” he should not be allowed to resume the post of mayor.\textsuperscript{110} But the idea of a criminal prosecution remained untenable, and Ast formally advised Wenckheim to drop the case on 9 September.\textsuperscript{111}

Miletić was never reinstated as mayor of Novi Sad, and it was not until May 1869 that the constitutional administration of the town was restored. Jovanović and Karavelov, despite the failure of the Serbian Regency to pursue them, were allowed to languish in Hungarian prisons for months, and the government ignored Miletić’s parliamentary interpellation in November, demanding to know under what law they were being held.\textsuperscript{112} In fact the whole campaign against Miletić, as well as the studied neglect of Jovanović and Karavelov, was due to more than just the desire of the Andrássy government to remove these domestic thorns from its side. Action against Serbian liberal nationalism within Hungary also tied in with the Hungarian government’s policy toward the Serbian Regency.

The Regents’ need for an accommodation with the Serbian Liberals did not mean they were any more well-disposed toward the liberal movement among the Hungarian Serbs. On the contrary, the Regents feared all the more the criticism which Miletić, through his journal \textit{Zastava}, had for years directed against Belgrade governments. Blaznavac regarded Miletić with particular animosity, and was of the opinion that the Hungarian authorities should simply “string him up.”\textsuperscript{113} Ristić had hardly less reason to fear Miletić, being frequently attacked for the insincerity of his commitment to national liberation and constitutional reform. So in the aftermath of the assassination, Miletić and \textit{Zastava} were openly accused by the Regency of complicity or at the very least foreknowledge, and the Hungarian government did its best to give substance to the accusation.\textsuperscript{114} Miletić, however, not only sailed through the storm unscathed, but fought back. \textit{Zastava} raised the suspicion that the Regents themselves might have been implicated in the assassination, especially Blaznavac, who was a member of Michael’s government.\textsuperscript{115} Despite a truce of sorts in the months following the assassination, Miletić eventually concluded that the new regime was likely to prove as authoritarian as its predecessor, albeit hidden under a constitutional veneer; nor did the Regency show any interest in cooperating with the Novi Sad liberals.\textsuperscript{116}

The Hungarian government was thoroughly alive to the credit it could earn with the Regents by acting against Miletić. At the same time, Andrássy had his suspicions that the Serbian government was secretly cultivating links with Novi Sad, in a bid to raise its stock in the South Slav world generally. Kállay, therefore, was set a dual task, which became a regular feature of the Hungarian relationship with Belgrade for the next two years. He was expected to encourage the Regents, especially Blaznavac, in their apprehension of Miletić as their blackest enemy, and to keep them grateful by promising constant vigilance on the part of the Hungarian
government against the Novi Sad “Greater Serbs.” He had also to keep on the alert for any signs of a rapprochement between Mitić and the Regents, which might signify a renewal of Serbian support for subversive nationalism in Hungary itself. Any such development was to be discouraged as strongly as possible.

This process of mutual reassurance and continual probing was one that enabled Kállay, in the months following Michael’s death, to consolidate his hold on the Prince’s successors. Each side was anxious to convince the other of its good faith. When Andrássy, for instance, telegraphed Kállay that the Hungarian authorities could prove Mitić’s guilt, if they arrested Jovanović, Karavelov and other intimates, and were willing to do so if Belgrade wished it, the provisional government replied with a formal request to that effect.¹¹⁷

The question of whether the Serbian government should allow Serbian citizens to attend the third Congress of the Omladina in Hungary, in September, prompted further manoeuvrings. The Regents, in Stokes’ words, “were well aware that the main tenet of the Omladina constitution . . . implied opposition to the Regency’s policy of friendship with Hungary.”¹¹⁸ At the same time, the Regents were reluctant to impugn their own nationalist credentials by identifying with the Hungarian government’s repressive policy toward the Omladina. Thus, when Kállay intimated to Blaznavac, on 14 August, that “now is the time to show that they [the Regents] are our true friends and not to permit demonstrations against the Hungarian government,”¹¹⁹ Blaznavac wriggled. He assured Kállay that the government would do its best to moderate the tone of the Congress, but that the Omladinists were in any case more concerned with literature than politics.¹²⁰

Otherwise the Serbian government did its utmost to distance itself from Mitić, in a clear attempt to please the Hungarians. In the autumn, as the pact with the Liberals started to take effect and prominent Liberals joined government service, rumors reached Kállay that the Regents were consulting Mitić himself on these changes. Both Blaznavac and Ristić strongly denied this, the former “adding that they don’t need Mitić’s wisdom.”¹²¹ The rumors, however, persisted, and Kállay’s confidant Dr. Rosen, at least, was convinced that a “secret correspondence” was going on. “By means of this correspondence,” Kállay gathered from Rosen, “the government is courting the Omladina.”¹²² As long as the Regents continued to deny these allegations, though, the Hungarians continued to profess to believe them.

The opportunity to harass Mitić and his party at home, coupled with the Serbian government’s public disavowal of the Hungarian Serb nationalists, were purely domestic political advantages wrested from the seeming catastrophe of Prince Michael’s assassination. On the broader front, there was perhaps reason to be thankful at the way things had turned out.

Serbia was now governed by a Regency, committed to internal reform and concerned more for its internal stability than for a dangerous adventurism in foreign
policy. By restraining the Porte from intervening in the succession and the choice of Regents, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy had done Serbia a real service. Then, by inducing the Ottomans to accept the hereditary right of the Obrenović family, the Monarchy earned the future loyalty of Prince Milan, arguably a factor of greater importance in Austro-Serbian relations for the next quarter century than all the schemes hatched in Pest in the period 1867–71. In the place of the potentially formidable combination of Prince Michael and Garašanin, there was now the fourteen-year-old Milan, surrounded by men whose avowed purpose was friendship with Austria-Hungary, or rather Hungary, and the repudiation of Russian influence.

Kállay was inclined to be optimistic, although he stressed the pitfalls in his reports to both Beust and Andrássy. Kállay warned Beust, in August, that the expansionist policies of the previous regime were not entirely abandoned. This was not because of a natural belligerence or overwhelming sense of grievance among the Balkan peoples. On the contrary, the Balkan peoples, in Kállay’s opinion, were simply not capable of united action, because of their differences of language, religion and culture, and would not be for a long time to come. The real threat was that one of the insurrections which occasionally broke out in the Balkans, again “for the most part due to foreign influence,” would force the Regency’s hand.

For Serbia however . . . to cleave to this prudent policy, and not let itself be swept away in the end, we must . . . offer everything we can to accustom the Serbs to seek support from us, and to see their aspirations realized through our help.

For the moment, as far as Beust was concerned, Kállay confined himself to the postal convention, and a settlement of the consular jurisdiction question, as means of attaining this goal. Behind this unobjectionable advice, however, lay the Bosnian scheme, which in the course of the autumn came out into the open.

With Andrássy Kállay could be more direct. Negotiations about Bosnia between Andrássy and the new rulers in Belgrade had been going on since June. In the context of Prince Michael’s murder, and the necessity of establishing with his successors the same good relationship that the Hungarian government had enjoyed with him, the Bosnian question was to remain of central importance. It was a question, moreover, where the recipient of Serbian gratitude was intended to be Hungary, not the Monarchy as a whole. Andrássy set the agenda, and attempted to carry it out through Kállay. The nominal shapers of Austro-Hungarian policy toward Serbia, Beust and Prokesch-Osten, were at first bypassed completely and then, when their discovery of the negotiations became inevitable, expected to acquiesce. One of the reasons this was possible at all was the ambiguous position of the Emperor Francis Joseph.

The other issue, which exercised Andrássy and Kállay far more than Vienna, was a direct consequence of the Obrenović assassination. This was the undertak-
ing to prosecute ex-Prince Alexander Karadordević for Michael’s murder, and see him convicted. At the end of July 1868, Kállay was confident about the good effect which prosecuting Alexander would have on relations with Serbia. He also made clear

what a harmful effect it would have on our, up to now, steadily improving relations with Serbia, if those detained [in Pest] were . . . not to be convicted. . . . This . . . would be capable of once again opening the way for Russian influence, which is now completely displaced here. . . . I cannot recommend sufficiently strongly . . . that Your Excellency . . . should be so good as to ensure that the persons in question are in any case convicted, the more easily . . . because their guilt is beyond doubt.\[125\]

Nevertheless this was a disastrous miscalculation. The Pest courts were eventually to decide otherwise; but in the meantime Kállay had, with Andrásy’s support, staked the Hungarian government’s prestige in Serbia on Alexander’s conviction. The result was to convince the Serbian Regents that a conviction was inevitable, and the failure to deliver was thus attributed to Hungarian ill will and deception. The relative goodwill, and the readiness to cooperate, which characterized Serbo-Hungarian relations in the aftermath of Prince Michael’s assassination, was to be dissipated as if it had never existed.

Notes

5 Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism*, 132, and note 3; Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 16 June 1868 (no. 35B), HHSA, PA XII/91.
7 Ibid., 2:362; Kállay Diary, 23 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 41–42).
8 Kállay to Beust, 13 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
Kállay Diary, 10 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 31).


Kállay to Andrásy, 12 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/95.

Ibid. Cf. Kállay Diary, s.d. (Dnevnik, 32–33).

Kállay to Andrásy, 12 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/96.

Kállay to Beust, 13 June 1868, HHSQA, PA XXXVIII/177.

Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 12 & 16 June, both in HHSQA, PA XII/91.

Andrássy to Beust (telegram), 11 June 1868, HHSQA, PA XL/13.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Andrássy to Beust, 12 June 1868, HHSQA, PA XL/128. Three paragraphs of this letter are reproduced, in German, in Andrássy to Kállay, 14 June 1868, in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 196, 455.

Andrássy to Beust, 12 June 1868, HHSQA, PA XL/128.

Ibid; also in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 196, 455.

Andrássy to Beust, 12 June 1868, HHSQA, PA XL/128.

Ibid.

Goltz to Bismarck, 12 June 1868, in Die auswärtige Politik Preußens 1858–1871: Diplomatische Aktenstücke, ed. Erich Brandenburg et al. (Oldenburg: Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands, 1933–39), vol. 10, no. 63, 78; Thile to Werther, 13 June 1868, ibid., no. 68, 81–82.

Beust to Andrássy, 14 June 1868, HHSQA, PA XL/128; cf. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 12 June 1868 (no. 34B), HHSQA, PA XII/91.

Beust to Andrássy, 14 June 1868, HHSQA, PA XL/128; Beust to Metternich, 16 June 1868, HHSQA, PA XII/93.

Beust to Andrássy, 14 June 1868, HHSQA, PA XL/128; cf. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 19 June 1868, PA XI/93.

Andrássy to Kállay, 14 June 1868, in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 196, 456.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Francis Joseph to Andrássy, 14 June 1868, HHSQA, PA XL/13.

Andrássy to Francis Joseph, 15 June 1868, HHSQA, PA XL/13.

Andrássy to Beust, 15 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/183–85 (copy); original in HHSQA, PA XL/13.

Andrássy to Beust, 15 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/183–85 (copy); original in HHSQA, PA XL/13.

Andrássy to Beust, 15 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/183–85 (copy); original in HHSQA, PA XL/13.

Andrássy to Beust, 17 June 1868, MOL, P344, 17.k., Cc/10 (copy); original in HHSQA, PA XL/128.

Beust to Kállay, 18 June 1868, HHSQA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay Diary, 21 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 41).
Kállay to Beust, 18 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
Kállay to Andrásy, 18 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/103–4. Two paragraphs from this letter, dealing with the Hungarian Serb politician Stratimirović, are reproduced in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 198, 460.
Kállay to Andrásy, 18 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/104.
Andrássy to Kállay, 28 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/113. This letter is reproduced in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 206, 473–77, but without the first paragraph.
See Andrásy to Kállay, 14 June 1868, in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 196, 456.
Andrássy to Kállay, 28 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/113.
Ibid.
Ibid., f. 114.
Ibid.
Andrássy to Beust, 12 June 1868, in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 196, 455.
Kállay Diary, 19 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 40).
Ibid.
Kállay to Beust, 22 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 43). Not preserved in HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
Kállay to Beust, 26 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; also Kállay to Beust, s.d. (telegram).
Kállay to Beust, 26 June 1868 (despatch), HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; cf. Kállay to Andrásy, 27 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/111–12.
Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 45).
Kállay to Beust, 26 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
E.g., Kállay to Andrásy, 25 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/109.
Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 44).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Kállay to Beust, 5 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay to Andrásy, 7 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/118–19.
Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia, 2:363–64; Čučković to Kállay, 5 July 1868, MOL, P344, 17.k., Cc/18; Kállay to Beust, 10 Aug. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, 1:49–50.
Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia, 2:362
Kállay Diary, 8 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 53); Kállay to Beust, 5 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
Kállay to Beust, 8 July 1868 (telegram and despatch no. 43), HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay to Andrásy, 8 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/189.
Beust to Prokesch-Osten, 9 July 1868 (telegram); and Weisung of 12 July 1868, both HHSA, PA XII/93; passages quoted are from the latter.
Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 14 July 1868, HHSA, PA XII/93.
Kállay Diary, 18 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 59); Kállay to Beust, 30 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
Kállay to Beust, 20 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay Diary, 19 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 59).


Kállay to Beust, 20 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.

Jovanović, Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila, pp. 434–36; Dukanović, Ubistvo Kneza Mihaila, 1:53–57, 125–28; Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism, 144, and note 56, citing Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, 1:44; Kállay to Andrássy, 23 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/108; Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 45).

Kállay to Andrássy, 31 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/133; Kállay to Beust, 13 Oct. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.


Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism, 135, 138.

Simits to Ast, 28 June 1868 (Serbian translation from the Hungarian, found in Serbian archives), in Petrovich, vol. 1, no. 204, 467; Kállay Diary, 8 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 52).

Ibid., Legitimacy through Liberalism, 138–41.

Kállay to Andrássy, 10 July 1868, OSZK, FH1733/121.

Andrássy to Kállay, 14 June 1868, in Petrovich, vol. 1, no. 196, 455.


Kállay Diary, 12 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 32).

Grгор Jakšić & Vojislav J. Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije za vlade Kneza Mihaila (Prvi Balkanski savez) (Belgrade: Istoriski Institut, 1963), 465.

Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 12 June 1868, HHSA, PA XII/91; cf. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 24 Feb. 1871, HHSA, PA XII/98.

Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, 1:46.


Kállay Diary, 10 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 31); Kállay to Andrássy, 12 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/94.

Andrássy to Beust, 11 June 1868 (telegram), HHSA, PA XI/13.


Andrássy to Beust, 11 June 1868, HHSA, PA XI/13; Andrássy to Kállay, 14 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/98.

Chapter 3

101 Béla Wenckheim to Ast, 20 June 1868, in Dokumenti za b’lgarskata i sr’bskata istoria iz madžarskite državni arhivi [Documents for Bulgarian and Serbian History from the Hungarian State Archives], ed. Pet’r Miiatev (Sofia: I.B.A.N., 1966), no. 2, 15–16 (henceforward Dokumenti); not in Petrović.

102 Wenckheim to Ast, 24 June 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 4, 23; not in Petrovic.

103 Ast to Wenckheim, [27–29] June 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 6, 25; not in Petrović.

104 Ast to Wenckheim, 3 July 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 211, 487.

105 Wenckheim to Ast, 6 July 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 213, 495.

106 Ibid., 496.

107 Ibid.

108 Ast to Wenckheim, 8 July 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 215, 497–99.

109 Rath to Horvát, 12 July 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 221, 504–7; Horvát to Wenckheim, 15 July 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 223, 513.

110 Ibid.

111 Ast to Wenckheim, 9 Sept. 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 246, 557–59.

112 Interpellation by S. Miletić of Minister of Justice, 19 Nov. 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 251, 564–65; Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism, 140–41.

113 Kállay to Andrásy, 9 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/81.

114 Kállay Diary, 13 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 34).


116 Ibid., 1:135; Radenić, “Vojvodanska štampa,” 88; Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism, 149–50; also Kállay Diary, 21 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, 132–33); Kállay to Andrássy, 23 Dec. 1868, in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 254, 569–70.

117 Kállay Diary, 17 and 25 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 39, 42).

118 Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism, 166.

119 Kállay Diary, 14 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 75).

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid., 2 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, 109), and 24 Nov. 1868 (118).

122 Kállay Diary, 22 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, 133); Kállay to Andrássy, 23 Dec. 1868, in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 254, 569–70.


124 Kállay to Beust, 10 Aug. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; cf. Ćučković to Kállay, 2 Aug. 1868, MOL, P344, 17.k., Cc/29; Kállay to Beust, 20 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.

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