Chapter 1

Austria, Hungary, and Serbia in 1867

The Habsburg Monarchy in the year of the Ausgleich was still, in terms of territory and population, a great power. By commercial, financial and industrial standards, however, it was weak. Most debilitating of all, with its eleven different ethnic groups, the Monarchy faced a dilemma far more complex than that confronting other multinational empires. No other state in Europe found its foreign policy options so severely limited by nationality problems.

It was precisely this question of nationality, at least in its Hungarian form, which demonstrated the need for some lasting constitutional settlement. Constantly obliged to guard against a renewed revolt in Hungary during the absolutist period, the Monarchy could not pursue an effective foreign policy. Even during the Austro-Prussian War, when negotiations between the Emperor Francis Joseph and the Hungarian leadership were already under way, this interconnectedness of foreign and domestic policy was illustrated anew. Forced to cede Venetia to Italy, and to abandon the leadership of Germany to Prussia, Francis Joseph was finally brought to see the necessity of Hungarian cooperation, if he was to recoup these losses. Exclusion from Germany also meant that the position of the German element within the Monarchy was bound to be reduced substantially, while the position of the Hungarians was correspondingly enhanced. Hungarian leaders like Deák and Andrásy, for their part, knew all along that Hungary was too weak to stand on its own, and had to be part of a great power in order to have any influence over its own fate at all.

As far as foreign policy was concerned, the provisions made by the Ausgleich were straightforward. It was the differing emphasis on them subsequently by particular statesmen which produced much of the ambiguity in Habsburg foreign policy toward Serbia, as well as in other areas. As Louis Eisenmann pointed out,
strictly speaking there was no text of the Settlement: “Dualism is regulated by two laws, analogous or identical in content.”¹ The Hungarian Law XII of 1867, as the senior of these two laws by some six months, deserves to be regarded as the original version, the model of the subsequent Austrian law, and, on the subject of foreign affairs, the more unambiguous. Paragraph 8 stated that

The effective conduct of foreign affairs is one of the instruments of the common and joint defence which derives from the pragmatic sanction. The effectiveness of such conduct demands common treatment in respect of those foreign affairs which concern jointly all the lands under the rule of His Majesty. For this reason, the diplomatic and commercial representation of the empire abroad, and the measures that may arise as regards international treaties, shall be part of the tasks of the common minister for foreign affairs, [acting] in agreement with the ministries of both parties and with their consent. Each ministry shall inform its own legislature of the international treaties. Hungary, too, therefore considers these foreign affairs to be common. . . .²

This seemed at least to guarantee the right of the Hungarian government to be consulted in the formulation of foreign policy. Andrássy, as Hungarian minister president between 1867 and 1871, certainly believed in his right to be consulted, and even, on the evidence available, to make initiatives in foreign policy on his own.³
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The discrepancy between the Hungarian Law XII and the Austrian Statute 146 in fact had little significance. “In practice, this omission [in the Austrian version] was disregarded, and the Ministers Presidents of both halves of the Monarchy were consulted equally.”\(^5\)

In both the Hungarian and the Austrian laws the dominant role of the Emperor in foreign affairs was indisputable. Francis Joseph’s conception of his duty and prerogatives as a monarch was based on his position as supreme commander of the armed forces and overseer of the Monarchy’s relations with foreign powers. Control over both these spheres was regarded by him as the *raison d’être* of the 1867 Settlement in the first place. Thus whoever the common foreign minister might be, his appointment as well as his continuance in office remained absolutely a matter for the Emperor’s judgment, and in this

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sense both Beust and, after him, Andrásy were executing the Emperor’s personal policy.

In practice, however, Francis Joseph was bound to rely to a considerable extent on the advice of his foreign minister, and both Beust and Andrásy were generally intelligent and adroit enough to tailor their policies in such a way as to ensure the Emperor’s endorsement. What was more, the situation after the Ausgleich meant that a forceful personality as either Austrian or Hungarian minister president was equally capable of exerting an influence over the Emperor. Andrásy, in the period 1867–71, made full use of this opportunity in matters relating to Serbia, as in other, larger foreign policy issues. The Hungarian minister president could, and did, raise foreign policy in private audience with the Emperor, and in the so-called crown council (the common ministerial council).

The crown council was where, if anywhere, influences outside the foreign ministry might be brought to bear on foreign policy. This body, however, met only on an ad hoc basis, and its agenda was variable, often not even touching on external affairs. And although, in addition to the Emperor and the common ministers, the army chief of staff, the Austrian and Hungarian ministers president and, as occasion required, ministers from their governments could all attend such councils if invited, a great deal once again depended on how forcefully they presented their case against this or that policy. In practice, there was little active interference in foreign policy from this quarter. “It was exceedingly rare that a foreign minister found himself overruled and forced to accept a particular positive policy.” Even here, the Emperor and foreign minister were free to ignore the council if they so chose, because it was a consultative body only.

The overall authority in foreign affairs remained the Emperor, and the common minister for foreign affairs was largely responsible to him. Parliamentary control over the policy of Emperor and foreign minister, in the sense of direct answerability to the Delegations, or indirectly to the Austrian or Hungarian parliaments, was notable by its absence. The principal task of the Delegations, elected by the two parliaments, was to vote the budget for the ministry of foreign affairs, and they had the right to discuss foreign policy. In practice this did not amount to anything, since delegation debates “were usually retrospective, and could in no way be said to determine foreign policy.” On occasion a delegation or parliament could give a foreign minister such a rough ride as to provoke his resignation, or cause the Emperor to dismiss him as an embarrassment. This was still a far cry from full public accountability in foreign affairs, and in the early years of the Dualist period what little outside influence was brought to bear on Francis Joseph and his foreign minister came almost exclusively from the office of the Hungarian minister president.

Any consideration of Francis Joseph’s personal role in foreign affairs has to take account of the fundamental change in his attitudes wrought by the defeat of
1866. However much he might have burned privately to avenge the humiliation of Sadowa, Francis Joseph made it clear to his ministers, at least, “it is Austria’s duty, for a long time to come, to renounce any idea of war.”9 The Habsburg Monarchy’s task for the immediate future must be to rebuild its shattered prestige and to hinder, by every peaceful means, the further aggrandizement of Prussia. In western Europe this meant a close relationship with France. In the Balkans it meant détente with Russia, reform in the Ottoman Empire, good relations with the Balkan principalities and vigilance against the spread from Serbia into the Monarchy of what Francis Joseph himself referred to as “Slavic agitation,” which “must be carefully watched.”10 It was a conservative policy, for which the Emperor found the ideal advocate in Beust.

The one area where Francis Joseph showed any inclination to abandon his new-found quietism was the question of territorial expansion. For the dynast’s wounded self-esteem the acquisition of new provinces, if this could be accomplished without war, offered important psychological compensation for 1859 and 1866. This had its bearing on relations with Serbia, since the only direction in which the Monarchy could hope to expand, after 1866, was southeast; and the main candidates for takeover were Bosnia and the Hercegovina. As we shall see, Francis Joseph, in common with many of the army leadership, was interested in the acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina from an early date, even if the
idea was not a policy agreed on with the foreign minister. Instead, the Emperor was encouraged to think along these lines not by Beust but by Andrássy, whose dabbling in the Bosnian question served to keep it at the forefront of the agenda throughout 1867–71.

Beust came to office with the same policy priorities as Francis Joseph. As he was at pains to stress to the rest of the ministerial council the day before his appointment, “The possibility of getting involved in a war must be avoided.” To some extent this renunciation of a war of revenge, reiterated in public, was tactical, since it is clear from subsequent events that both Beust and his master were counting on a French victory over Prussia in 1870, and would probably have been glad to reassert Austrian primacy in Germany in this case. But for the present, as was only sensible in view of Austria’s defeat, peace must be the first priority. The object of Beust’s German policy, therefore, was to hold Prussia on the Main.

Beust’s policy toward Russia and the Balkans was conditioned from the start by this imperative. Indeed it would not be too much to say that his first major initiative in the Eastern Question was an attempt to open doors in western Europe. In an effort to win French support he decided to propose a major reevaluation of the status quo in the Near East.

In a dispatch to his ambassador in Paris on 1 January 1867, Beust gave expression to concerns which had already begun to affect Austrian foreign policy before his accession to office. What gave Beust’s démarche point was the revival of the Eastern Question in acute form with the uprising in Crete, which raised once again the issue of the Ottoman Empire’s viability. If there were a general revolt against Ottoman rule in the Balkans, involving the great powers, the Monarchy could hardly afford to defend its interests by military means, since it was in the midst of reorganizing itself. On the other hand, the Monarchy’s interests as a great power made it impossible to contemplate a reordering of the power balance in southeastern Europe from which it was excluded, particularly if such an upheaval resulted in a Russian preponderance.

It was essential, therefore, to forestall an explosion by improving the lot of the Balkan Christian
population, without at the same time impairing the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman administration would have to be reformed, and certain long overdue tactical concessions made, such as the evacuation of Ottoman garrisons from Serbia in May 1867. For this, however, it was equally essential for the powers to act in concert, as they were entitled to by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and since the Ottoman government was unlikely to respond to anything but collective pressure. Here, Beust reasoned, was the ideal occasion for the Austrian government to win some sort of control over Russian policy in the region, by inducing the Russians to work with the other powers; here, too, was the opportunity to associate France with Austria in a common diplomatic objective.

As far as the Eastern Question was concerned, the significance of the Beust démarche of January 1867 lay not in the fact that Napoleon III, for a variety of reasons, turned it down. What was revealing was Beust’s readiness to revise the Treaty of Paris in order to secure Russian cooperation, in particular to free Russia from the clauses which forbade it a military and naval establishment in the Black Sea.

Certainly one should not make too much of Beust’s apparent willingness to work with the Russians in the Near East, and to buy their collaboration by a revision of the Treaty of Paris. The Russians had already, late in 1866, noted with approval what Beust himself saw as a “new era” in Austria’s eastern policy, by which was meant the understanding of the Balkan Christians’ predicament, and the readiness to seek reforms in Ottoman administration. But this was not some attempt on Beust’s part to resuscitate the old conservative community of interests between the Russian and Habsburg courts. Beust, like Francis Joseph, was far too suspicious of Russia’s suspected role in stoking the fires of Balkan discontent to envisage Russia as a close working partner. Rather, his initiative showed an awareness of both the limitations and the possibilities open to Austria. If the Monarchy were to realize any of the potential which southeastern Europe offered for a great power role, including the possibility of territorial expansion, then this could only be done in agreement with Russia.

In the event, the Beust initiative came to nothing, because both France and Britain, as signatory powers, flatly vetoed the idea. Yet the thinking behind it shows the essential pragmatism of Beust’s diplomacy. The Habsburg Monarchy needed friends in Europe. It did not necessarily need military alliances, since it had no interest, in its weakened state, in provoking a war. Thus the suggestion of the Near East, as a field where France and Austria could work together, was a reasonable one. By the same token Russia, because of its community of interest with the Slavs, could never be an entirely reliable alliance partner, nor did Beust envisage it as such. Yet there existed a sufficient conservative identity of interests between Vienna and St. Petersburg for a loose working partnership in the Balkans to be a possibility. Beust, in short, was from the start a proponent of
the traditional Habsburg policy of remaining vigilant against Russian encroachments, while seeking agreement where possible, as the likeliest means of averting conflict between the two empires.\(^{19}\)

Beust’s policy on one other matter was also affected by a traditional, cabinet-style outlook. This was the Bosnian question. Here Austrian policy had always been divided, with a minority opinion opposed to the Metternich principle of preserving the status quo in the Balkans at all costs.\(^{20}\) The minority group, which included Field Marshal Radetzky and the internuncio (ambassador) in Constantinople from 1855 to 1871, Baron Anton von Prokesch-Osten, argued that the Monarchy should pursue a more forceful line in southeastern Europe if it wanted to counter Russian influence. Their advocacy of territorial expansion was strategic: the Monarchy’s long strip of Croatian and Dalmatian territory was regarded as militarily untenable, as long as its hinterland, Bosnia-Hercegovina, was in foreign hands.\(^{21}\)

What gave these annexationist projects an additional importance, after 1848, was the presence of Francis Joseph on the throne. The fact that the young Emperor habitually surrounded himself with military advisers undoubtedly gave him his subsequent interest in this particular idea. His belief in its feasibility can only have been enhanced, in the early 1850s, by the fact that most of his conservative advisers, such as the foreign minister, Buol, the ambassador to Paris, Hübner, and the interior minister, Bach, were not only anti-Russian but firm advocates of Austria’s expansion into the Balkans.\(^{22}\) The territorial losses of 1859 and 1866 only confirmed Francis Joseph’s inclination to look upon Bosnia as a field for compensation. In February 1861, foreign minister Rechberg reemphasized this aspect of Austria’s eastern policy:

> It is of the greatest urgency to form, through satisfaction of the Slav population of Dalmatia, a point of attraction for the Christian population of these hinterlands, which will make possible and facilitate Austria’s old policy with regard to this part of the Near East.\(^{23}\)

Francis Joseph may not have believed annexation of Bosnia was an urgent necessity, but there can be little doubt that he would welcome annexation if it should prove politically practicable.

Beust’s own policy with regard to Bosnia was flexible, and the fact that it could be so proves that the Emperor, too, was not committed to any one option. Beust’s views differed from the military, in that he was not of the opinion that the Monarchy needed Bosnia for its own sake; the military usefulness of having the provinces could not justify upsetting the precarious status quo in the Balkans. On the other hand, on no account could the Monarchy tolerate an occupation of Bosnia by Serbia. What had hitherto been a relatively weak principality would double in size and resources, and could with time pose a real threat to the Monarchy.
The strength of Beust’s opinion in this matter is worth considering, in view of subsequent claims, from Wertheimer on, that Beust and Andrássy were essentially in agreement on the Bosnian question, or that Beust had no clear-cut ideas on eastern policy and weakly followed Andrássy’s lead.24 The subject was given renewed life in the fall of 1866, when a French memorandum openly suggested that the Monarchy should pursue its destiny in eastern Europe.25

Not surprisingly, this document, communicated to all the chancelleries of Europe, gave the South Slav principalities of Serbia and Montenegro the impression that an Austrian move in the Balkans was imminent. In October 1866 the French consul in Belgrade reported that to the Serbian government this seemed “an invitation for Austria to seize provinces belonging to Turkey, and Bosnia and the Hercegovina have seemed especially threatened.”26 Serbian suspicions were just as strong by January 1867, when French as well as Austrian “representatives reported a sudden build-up in military preparations.”

Beust’s principal reason for espousing the cession of the fortresses to Serbia in 1867 was to forestall an explosion in the European provinces of Turkey and the consequent disturbance of the status quo in the Near East, which would lead to unwelcome Russian interference and an active Austro-Russian clash of interests.28 Allied to these calculations, however, was the additional hope that, if the Monarchy helped procure a settlement of the fortress question, Serbia’s sensitivities on the subject of Bosnia might be blunted, if not ignored. For in the matter of Bosnia, Beust had no intention whatsoever of yielding to Serbian sensitivities.

Beust believed that, even if Serbia did win cession of the fortresses, such a settlement would probably have only a provisional value for the Serbian government.29 On the other hand, he had indications in December 1866 that Prince Michael might pursue a more moderate policy if he could point to tangible success in the fortress question.30

With this, Beust contended, the Serbian government would have to be content; there could be no question of the Monarchy tolerating Serbian expansion into Bosnia. As the French ambassador to Vienna reported on 2 March 1867,

M. de Beust observed to me that the independence of Bosnia and the Hercegovina could only be the prelude to their annexation by Serbia. . . .

Now, this aggrandizement of Serbia would constitute a real danger for Austria, and it was easy to foresee that a Serbian state, thus enlarged by two important provinces, would not be slow to draw into its orbit Dalmatia, the Austrian Serbs of the Border included in the military districts, and Slavonia.

Austria had lost too much up to now for it to be possible for her to allow a source of permanent danger to be established in her neighbourhood, and a state of affairs which must fatally and necessarily lead to new conflicts and new sacrifices for her.

Bosnia and the Hercegovina must therefore stay with Turkey or belong to Austria.
Furthermore, Beust concluded, “if Bosnia and the Hercegovina ceased to belong to the Porte, Austria would soon take the necessary military measures to ensure that these provinces did not belong to anyone else.”

The extraordinary thing about the constitutional settlement being reached within the Monarchy, however, was that even as Beust stated his Balkan policy in such uncompromising fashion, his efforts were being undermined by the dynasty’s new partner in foreign policy, the Hungarian government. Even before the Ausgleich was concluded, contacts between Serbia and Hungary’s political leaders were tending in quite a different direction from that conceived in the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry.

Within Hungary, the way in which the Hungarian political elite handled the nationalities question acquired a wider significance once Hungary achieved self-government. Relations between the Magyars and the other nationalities threatened to deteriorate, as the realization sank in that the Monarchy and Hungarian leaders had made a deal at the expense of the nationalities. After 1867, as far as the nationalities were concerned, there was no longer anyone else to blame for their problems but the Hungarian government. For the latter it became more than ever important to acquire an influence over those aspects of foreign policy—in particular relations with Serbia and Romania—which might affect nationality issues within the Kingdom of Hungary.

The new leader of the Deákists, in 1867, shared the attitudes toward nationality issues of his senior colleagues, Deák and Eötvös; he also brought to the job an interest in foreign policy which was something unusual in Hungarian politics. Andrásy was a good example of the liberal aristocrat: cosmopolitan, politically adroit, genuinely broad-minded in matters of religion, a sincere, even pedantic champion of the Rechtsstaat, who nevertheless despised what he termed “the ideal” in politics and vaunted his sense of the art of the possible.

By 1867, Andrásy was, more than ever, obsessed with the danger to Hungary from Pan-
Slavism, and considered it vital for Hungary to be part of a great power which could resist this pressure. The installation of constitutional government in both halves of the Monarchy, coupled with the means of influencing foreign policy, were essential prerequisites for Hungarian security. Once in place, the 1867 settlement would enable Austria to fulfil its mission as “a bulwark against Russia.”

The sheer strength of Andrássy’s preoccupation with the threat of Russia and Pan-Slavism is hard to ignore. Throughout the period in which he was minister president he made this clear to all and sundry. In August 1868 Andrássy considered “a triumphant war necessary for the empire; we cannot wage this war against anyone but Russia.” Later that year he expressed his conviction that an active German policy was futile, “when we are threatened in the East.” In April 1869, he wanted “to turn the Empire’s whole attention towards the East.” The Italian embassy in Vienna, when the Franco-Prussian War began, reported Andrassy’s fear of Russia’s “secret dealings among the Slav populations of the Danube,” and that the Monarchy faced dying “like a scorpion surrounded by glowing coals.” That fall, Italy’s consul in Pest recorded Andrássy’s reaction to the Russian renunciation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. Andrássy, the consul said, considered Serbia “the center of vast and formidable intrigues”; but “What seemed to me to upset my interlocutor most was fear of Russia.” Ten days later, the Italian summed up the mood of both Andrássy and his countrymen:

Russia has always been, and is, the obsession, the bugbear, of the Hungarians. They . . . fear that Russia, relying on the Slav populations in Hungary, is trying to annihilate the Hungarian nation and to pass over its body in order to take possession of Serbia and Croatia and secure itself the domination of the Danube.

A year later, the Prussian consul commented of the new foreign minister, “Russia is on his mind day and night.”

It is not difficult to see how this Russophobia shaped Andrássy’s domestic policy as well as his attempts to influence Habsburg foreign policy. The Slav and Romanian populations of Hungary were treated from the start as subversives, disaffected by the propaganda of the power Andrássy habitually referred to as “Muscovy” (Muszkata), as if to emphasize Russian barbarism. The Military Border in Croatia and southern Hungary, still under the direct control of the common war ministry in Vienna, was regarded as a standing threat to Dualism, a willing (because largely Croat and Serb) tool in the hands of what Kállay called “the Vienna reaction.” In the Balkans, Andrássy began his minister presidency determined somehow to bind Serbia to the Monarchy, or at least to Hungary, and thus neutralize the threat he considered it to pose.

Andrássy and the Deákists represented mainstream opinion as far as the treatment of Hungary’s nationalities was concerned. They rejected the idea of a Danubian confederation, which Kossuth eventually accepted in exile.
importance of schemes for confederation was rather in the reactions they elicited. The news of Kossuth’s conversion in 1862 seems to have convinced Deák of the need to make the final concessions required to reach a compromise with the Monarchy. More intangible is the legacy such projects seem to have left in the minds of the younger generation: as late as 1868 Kállay could refer to confederation as “the only possibility for us and for the Christian nations in Turkey.” In view of Kállay’s subsequent career it can only be assumed that his conception of confederation involved an unequivocal Hungarian, or rather Austro-Hungarian hegemony. This was also the position of Zsigmond Kemény, a leading Déákist who, in a pamphlet of 1851, recommended the Monarchy’s abandonment of its pretensions in Italy and Germany. Strengthened by accommodation with Hungary, Kemény argued, the Monarchy had to pursue outright hegemony in southeastern Europe. This would fulfil the dual function of frustrating South Slav and Romanian nationalism, and preventing Russian domination of the Balkans.

Kemény appears to have been unique in putting forward these ideas so early, and so frankly. Virtually all Hungarian politicians took it for granted that Balkan nationalism constituted a threat to Hungary and the Monarchy, and that Russian hegemony in the Balkans must somehow be prevented. Yet even Andrásy, at the outset of the Dualist era, still thought that these goals could be reached without the territorial involvement Kemény implied was necessary. Austria-Hungary’s mission was certainly in the East, but its security there could be assured by the creation of client states, by a possible territorial douceur to one of these states, Serbia, in the shape of Bosnia, and by political and economic domination of the area. It is a measure of the distance Andrásy had traveled that, by 1875, he was disposed to accept the Kemény thesis in its entirety. In this process of conversion Kállay, in Belgrade, played a vital role.

Hungary’s Croats and Serbs were naturally of importance in the context of relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia. The Croats in particular were a potential disruptive element since, in addition to the ethnic affinity between Croat and Serb, their open disaffection from both Vienna and Pest seemed to make them natural allies of Serbia.

In fact the reverse was the case after 1867. The Ausgleich, and the Croat-Hungarian compromise or Nagodba which sprang from it the next year, put the Hungarians between Croatia and the dynasty in a way that had not been possible before. Croatia retained its own administration and diet, or Sabor, but control of the provincial executive was firmly in the hands of the Hungarian government. With the exception of the so-called Unionists, whose manufactured majority in the Sabor ensured the passage of the Nagodba, virtually all shades of political opinion in Croatia rejected this state of affairs.

The most extreme of the political movements which existed in Croatia was the Party of Rights, which was not only anti-dynastic and anti-Hungarian, but
also virulently anti-Serb, claiming that the Serbs were nothing more than degenerate Croats who had embraced Orthodoxy. More complex was the movement known as Yugoslavism. Largely the inspiration of Franjo Rački, with the Bishop of Đakovo, Josip Juri Strossmayer, acting as political standard bearer, Yugoslavism aimed at an independent South Slav state, and at its most ambitious called for the union of all South Slavs, from the Slovenes in the north to the Bulgars in the south. It sought to bridge the vast differences which existed, and saw Croatia merely as part of a larger, federal state.

In the context of the 1860s, Yugoslavism had little chance of practical realization. Those of its advocates, like Strossmayer, who hoped to achieve anything in the shorter term joined the Croatian National Party. The National Party had its origin in the opposition to the Nagodba, and continued to press for greater substantive Croatian autonomy as well as the union of Dalmatia, which was still administered from Vienna, with the main body of Croatia-Slavonia. In doing so, however, the National Party never entirely shut the door on good relations with either the Hungarian government or the imperial authorities in Vienna. By the same token its leaders showed considerable interest, in the period immediately preceding the Ausgleich, in cultivating links with Serbia. Strossmayer, in particular, was of the opinion that the creation of any form of South Slav state inevitably involved the use of force, and that the role of “Piedmont” for the South Slavs could only be filled by Serbia.

All these visions of Serbo-Croat cooperation, however, ignored a fundamental reality. This was the enduring antagonism which historically divided the South Slav world. Moreover, the Serbo-Croat antagonism was reflected in two questions which both the Habsburg Monarchy and the new Hungarian government knew all too well how to exploit. One was the status of the Military Border in Croatia and southern Hungary. The other was the Bosnian question.

The Border was divided into territorially based regiments, the so-called Grenzer, and was populated by both Croats and Serbs. Its dissolution was one of the principal objectives of the Andrassy government, and was also desired by Croat nationalists, since the territories in question, apart from those in southern Hungary, would augment Croatia-Slavonia. In their attitude toward the substantial Serb minority within the Border, however, some Croat leaders betrayed an insensitivity that played right into the hands of successive Hungarian governments. In the years immediately after the Ausgleich, with dissolution clearly on the agenda in Budapest, the general mood among the Serb Grenzer was one of disillusionment and resentment that the Emperor should have handed them over in this fashion to a Croat administration in Zagreb. The whole issue was one that naturally divided Croats from Serbs.

Bosnia-Hercegovina was an even more divisive issue. Both Croats and Serbs laid claim to these Ottoman provinces; each side was represented there
by a sizeable minority; and each side ignored the fact that there was also a large Bosnian Muslim population.\textsuperscript{52} There was, however, no easy way of disentangling these groups from one another for the purpose of territorial division; yet neither Croat nor Serb nationalists would admit of any concession.\textsuperscript{53} The exception in this respect was Strossmayer, who reasoned that, if Serbia were to act as the Piedmont of the South Slavs, it made little sense for the rest of the South Slav world to dispute its claim to Bosnia. In the summer of 1866, with the agreement of his principal associates in the National Party, Strossmayer assured Prince Michael of his commitment to “common action between the Triune Kingdom [Croatia] and Serbia for the foundation of a Yugoslav state independent of both Austria and Turkey.”\textsuperscript{54} The Bishop even offered to serve Michael as a minister in such a state.

The negotiations between Strossmayer and Garašanin which resulted got as far as a draft agreement, in March 1867, on a “Programme of Yugoslav Policy.”\textsuperscript{55} This made clear that the initial purpose of Serbo-Croat cooperation was to free the South Slavs still under direct Turkish rule, but ultimately to prepare the ground “for the unification of all Yugoslav peoples [\textit{plemena}] in a single federal state.”\textsuperscript{56} Liberation was to be pursued gradually as circumstances permitted, but at all times Belgrade and Zagreb would be the twin “poles” (\textit{stožera}) of the movement, and complete agreement between them was essential.\textsuperscript{57} “The Croatian and the Serbian nationality is one, \textit{Yugoslav}.”\textsuperscript{58} A rising in Bosnia would be instigated jointly by the Croats and Serbia in the summer of 1867, but the latter would not openly intervene for fear of great power intervention, especially by Austria. Instead, the insurgents would form a provisional government, call an assembly, and demand administration by Serbia under the suzerainty of the Sultan.\textsuperscript{59}

There could be little doubt that the leadership of the National Party, at this point, were prepared to concede Bosnia to Serbia, in the expectation that the unification of all South Slav lands would follow.\textsuperscript{60} The \textit{Sabor} adopted a resolution, in May 1867, that “the Triune Kingdom recognizes the Serbian nation, which exists within it as a nation identical with and enjoying the same rights as the Croatian nation.”\textsuperscript{61} In reality this accord was far more fragile than its authors suspected. The single most important reason for this was the fact that Prince Michael was on the verge of changing his entire strategy in the Balkans and in particular with regard to Bosnia. The political will to work with the Croats over Bosnia was fading.

It should also be stressed, however, that the accord would probably have run into difficulties even if the Serbian government had not abandoned it. The leaders of the National Party were sincere in their goal of Serbo-Croat cooperation,\textsuperscript{62} but this goal was not shared by political opinion outside the Party. Even the National Party showed a certain nervousness at the idea of entrusting the Bosnian Croats to Serbia once it became apparent, in the course of 1867, that the Serbian government was seriously interested in doing a deal with the Hungarians.\textsuperscript{63} Andrássy’s
Bosnian initiative, when it came, was a classic case of divide and rule, because it exploited the mutual suspicions of Croats and Serbs.

Among the Hungarian and Croatian Serbs, spread across the Military Border, Slavonia and southern Hungary, the Hungarian Serbs in particular had a prosperous middle class, which by 1867 had become the bearer of national consciousness in this part of the Monarchy. Their leaders were united in rejecting direct rule from either Vienna or Pest, and demanding some form of local autonomy. The Orthodox clergy, together with state employees and officers of the Military Border regiments, represented the conservative line, which placed its trust in accommodation with Vienna, and based its claim to an autonomous Vojvodina on the ancient privileges of the Serbs. The liberal middle class and intellectuals, led by Svetozar Miletic, argued not only for a Serbian-controlled Vojvodina, but also for a redefinition of the Vojvodina itself to reduce the numbers of the other nationalities in it. Miletic’s emphasis was less on historic rights and more on democratic self-government which, to be truly democratic, had to include self-government by all nationalities. The Vojvodina liberals were convinced that cooperation with the Hungarians, not the imperial government, offered better chances for the Serbs to attain their goal. In reality the majority of the Hungarian political leadership were opposed to autonomy within Hungary for any of the nationalities. From 1859 to the Ausgleich Hungarian politicians reciprocated Serb expressions of good will, but they did precious little else.

Miletic in February 1866 founded a newspaper, Zastava (The Standard), which rapidly became, in the words of one authority, “the most powerful voice of Serbian liberalism in the Balkans.” He was assisted in his work by Vladimir Jovanovic, a leading liberal exile from the Principality of Serbia; and it was Jovanovic, with Miletic’s backing, who was the driving force behind the foundation in August 1866 of the Ujedinjena Srpska Omladina or United Serbian Youth. This was more than just a student society. Jovanovic and Miletic specifically saw it as a broad-based cultural organization for “every Serb who felt himself young in heart.” In their view the political division of the Serbian nation between several separate states made it essential to have a society which would raise national consciousness; once this was done, political unification would inevitably follow.

Both Zastava and the Omladina brought the liberals among the Hungarian Serbs into conflict with Prince Michael’s government in Serbia. Michael and the liberals were at one over the need for an autonomous Vojvodina; they were even, until the Ausgleich disillusioned the Hungarian Serbs, united in wishing to cooperate with the Hungarians. But whatever its nationalist credentials, the Obrenovic regime was not noted for its liberalism, and after the summer of 1866 there was another reason for bad blood. Prince Michael was reproached in all quarters of the South Slav world for not taking advantage of Austria’s defeat to launch the great
war of liberation on behalf of the Balkan Christians; and Zastava was among the bitterest of these critics. There was considerable injustice in this: Michael was only too aware that Serbia’s real military potential was far less than its strength on paper would suggest. None of this, however, was known outside of Serbian government circles, and the problem was compounded by the events of 1867, when the Prince, at the very time the Hungarian government was abandoning its Serb minority, showed every sign of having done a deal with Budapest. The Vojvodina became, more than ever, the center of agitation against the Serbian government. 

Serbia, in 1867, posed more of a theoretical threat to peace in the Balkans than a real one. It was small, about a thousand square kilometres, and would have
fitted tidily into the Habsburg Monarchy a score of times. Its population still numbered only a million, the vast majority of whom made their living off the land in a country with virtually no modern infrastructure. Its official military strength was a sham, rather like the frog that inflates itself to twice its size to impress its enemies. Though autonomous, its Prince was still a vassal of the Sultan.

Yet the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires feared what Serbia might yet become. A greater Serbia would be a power to reckon with, particularly since it could only aggrandize at the expense of its neighbors to north and south. Even if its expansion were prevented, Serbia’s importance from the strategic and communications point of view could only grow. Both the intended regulation of the Danube as an international waterway, and the pressure to complete a rail link between central Europe and Constantinople, made the powers all the more anxious to secure some influence over Serbia. The political and economic interests involved made Belgrade one of the diplomatic listening posts of Europe.

The country’s political institutions remained basically autocratic with a constitutional gloss. In the 1860s the practice of government under the Obrenović was laid down by a number of organic laws passed by the Skupština, or national assembly, at the behest of Prince Miloš and his son Michael. By these, effective power resided solely with the Prince and the executive agents of his power, the ministers. The Prince could select whom he pleased as his ministers, and did so. Each minister, moreover, was responsible directly to the Prince, not the minister president, who was more a coordinator of ministerial activity than a prime minister.
in the modern sense. Civil servants owed their jobs entirely to the favor of the Prince, and substantial inroads were made on local self-government by giving the state a greater say in the election of local officials.74

The *Skupština* remained the one relatively unfettered institution in Serbia, because it was more an open debating society than a genuine parliament with effective control of the executive. As a purely consultative assembly it could neither initiate legislation nor amend it. The franchise amounted to universal adult male suffrage, but since the ballot was open the government was free to use corruption and intimidation at elections. Yet the *Skupština* could still produce an opposition, as in 1867 when thirty deputies opposed to the government were returned. Their importance lay not in what they could do, but in their freedom, once elected, to speak against the government. The single most powerful domestic constraint on the Prince was the fear of an upsurge of popular opinion against him. In times of national emergency the *Skupština* was the one obvious channel for this, and the Serbian government ignored it at its peril. Both Michael, and the Regency which followed him, were acutely conscious of the need for national legitimacy, and this continued to shape their foreign policy in particular.75

The Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* began within months to exert an influence over Serbian foreign policy which was, as always, heavily constrained by the relations of the great powers to one another. In 1867 the European scene was already dominated by the Franco-Prussian antagonism, and a natural result of this was that France began seriously to explore the possibility of alliance with Austria. In the Balkans the insurrection in Crete rumbled on, raising tension among all the other Balkan Christians. Yet for Serbia the decisive factor was the arrival of a Hungarian government on the scene.

Prince Michael was personally more inclined than most of his countrymen to respond favorably to Hungarian overtures. He had spent most of his exile in either Hungary or Vienna, had married a Hungarian countess, and was the owner of an estate in northern Hungary. Unlike his father, Michael had absorbed much of the culture and outlook of a westernized central European aristocrat.76

There was more to this, however, than personal sentiment. In 1861 and 1866 Michael’s government attempted to help improve relations between the Hungarian leadership and Hungary’s Serbs. Michael saw the Habsburg Monarchy as the single most steadfast and dangerous opponent of his plans for the liberation of the Balkan Christians and the formation of a greater Serbia. It was fundamental to his conception of things that, in this struggle against Austrian interference, the Hungarians were the natural allies of the Serbs. The two peoples, in his opinion, had a mutual interest, within the Monarchy, in working together to counteract the centralizing tendencies of Vienna.77

In March 1861, talks in Pest between representatives of the Serbian government and the leading Deákists made clear enough the two sides were poles apart.
“The Serbs brought up the question of the Vojvodina restoration,” recalled Jovan Ristić in his memoirs, “but the Hungarians at once declared that there could be no talk of ‘the state within the state.’”

This was not, however, the end of the story. The Serbian judge, Nikola Krstić, suggested to the government that he go to Pest and try again to bridge the gap. Krstić was to remain in Pest until August 1861, and had a number of remarkable exchanges with the Hungarian leaders.

On 25 April he was warmly received by Éötvös who, he found, feared the Serbs’ secession, and also that “then the Vlachs [Roumanians], Slovaks and Ruthenes . . . will all demand territory.” This response was representative of most of Krstić’s subsequent contacts with the Hungarians, both in its willingness to seek some form of accommodation, and in its determination to preserve the unity of the Hungarian state. Deák, in June, said that it was “not possible to concede the political and territorial dismemberment of the country or support the demand to create even now a federal state.” At the root of the Hungarians’ response, Krstić felt, was their “terror of Pan-Slavism.” Most susceptible to this vision was Andrássy, whom Krstić met early in July:

Éötvös and Szálay have scared this man, representing to him the danger which threatens the Hungarians if they satisfy all the nationalities. He is against re-grouping the counties according to nationality, and wants to put off the Serbian question to some other time. . . .

Krstić thought Andrássy “an honourable man,” but “his arguments are not strong enough.”

In 1866, Austria’s defeat at Sadowa raised anew the possibility of the Monarchy’s disintegration. Prince Michael felt that Sadowa offered an opportunity to explore once more the idea of Serbo-Hungarian cooperation, and he sent Krstić back, this time with a letter to László Hunyadi, the Prince’s brother-in-law, proposing a “pact” between Serbia and Hungary. Krstić’s detailed report on the Hungarian response contains some radical suggestions which, if sincere, throw a strange light on Andrássy’s conception of Hungary’s future role in the Monarchy.

By this time it was clear that a major restructuring of the Habsburg Monarchy was imminent. An autonomous Hungarian government was in the offing, and Andrássy was certain to lead it. Prince Michael, Hunyadi told Krstić, could rest assured that in this case the interests of Hungary’s Serbs would be safeguarded. As for Serbia itself, a Hungarian government would assist it in gaining the cession of the Ottoman-held fortresses, by blocking the flow of supplies from Austrian territory for the Ottoman garrisons. In return, Serbia would be expected to maintain an army brigade on the Austro-Serbian frontier, ready to march into Hungary should the Hungarian government require assistance. Above all, there must be “an alliance for mutual defense and mutual offense,” formally concluded between the two governments.
Even today it is difficult to know how seriously to take these proposals. Jakšić and Vučković flatly deny the Hungarians’ sincerity. Whatever the emerging constitutional settlement, they observe, the Hungarian government would still not be empowered to conclude treaties and conduct a foreign policy. They suggest the entire incident was a ruse to keep Serbia from starting any trouble in the Balkans while the Dualist settlement was being agreed upon.87

Yet it is conceivable that Andrássy genuinely believed an alliance was practicable. Andrássy was not noted for his consistency, and in 1866 he may have ignored the necessary limitations which the Dualist settlement would impose on any Hungarian government.88 In fact the subsequent history of relations with Serbia demonstrates amply that, at least as Hungarian minister president, Andrássy continued to behave as if Hungary could pursue its own foreign policy. What is beyond doubt is the Hungarian leadership’s conviction that the Serbian connection would be an invaluable means of putting pressure on Vienna. Hunyadi made it clear to Krstić that “we [the Hungarians] have to take care that Austria is preserved as a great state.”89 But at the same time it was essential that Francis Joseph be shown the limitations of his power. “The Hungarian statesmen have in mind the idea of Dualism for present-day Austria, and by this treaty with Serbia they would show in which direction it was necessary to conduct the policy which affects Hungary.”90 As Hunyadi put it to Prince Michael himself, if the affair was kept secret until the treaty was concluded Andrássy could present Vienna with a “fait accompli.”91

True to his word, Andrássy had no sooner been appointed minister president than he invited Prince Michael, through Hunyadi, to send an emissary to Pest. This, Hunyadi intimated, would be to Serbia’s advantage, “because now the Hungarians are going to have an influence even on Austria’s foreign policy.”92 Garašanin, briefing Krstić for his third foray into Hungary, was suspicious. He wanted Krstić to impress two things on Andrássy. First, “the Hungarians must make their peace with the Serbs and Croats.”93 Second, the thing Serbia and Hungary had most in common was that they were threatened not only by the Russians but by the Germans.94

It is important to bear in mind the background to Krstić’s arrival in Pest on 28 February. The winter of 1866–67 had been dominated, as far as Serbia was concerned, by the issue of the fortresses, and by the first signs of a breakthrough in Michael’s plans for a Balkan alliance. The time, at least to Garašanin, seemed increasingly to favor action. Beust, however, lost no time in making clear to the Serbian government that under no circumstances would the Monarchy tolerate Serbia’s presence in Bosnia. At the same time, he supported Serbia’s request that the Turks evacuate the last of their troops from Serbian soil, and the need for reform in the Ottoman Empire.

This is where the role of the new Hungarian government becomes a matter for debate. What precisely, at the very moment Beust was reining in the Serbian government, was Andrássy up to with his invitation to Prince Michael? Was he
trying to exert some not so subtle pressure on Vienna, by demonstrating Hungary’s influence in Belgrade? Was he acting in collusion with Beust, in a Machiavellian bid to distract Serbia from its Balkan program? Or was he playing a game of his own, exploring the relationship with Serbia in the hope of ameliorating the situation inside Hungary, by securing Serbia’s non-involvement with Hungary’s South Slavs, and at the same time tying Serbia somehow to Hungary’s side and negating Russian influence? The evidence suggests the third of these explanations.

Hunyadi, who first saw Krstić, told him that “Andrássy wants to conclude a treaty with Serbia,” but was not forthcoming about the details. If Austria disintegrated, said Hunyadi, it would be necessary “to found a new state,” in which the interests of both Serbia and Hungary would be safeguarded. The interview with Andrássy himself was even more peculiar. Krstić was bluntly asked, “What were Serbia’s intentions and what was to be done with us?” He was told that Andrássy now had the personal confidence of the Emperor, and “was in a position to effect something with Beust via the Emperor himself.” Krstić replied that Serbia’s only goals were the evacuation of the fortresses, and the liberation of the Serbs under direct Ottoman rule. Andrássy “recognized the reasonableness and justification of the Serbian demands,” but held that “it would be a bad thing if Serbia . . . provoked by force a war over this matter.” He then warmed to his favorite theme:

“both we and you have to guard against one and the same danger . . . from Russia. In order to block Russia’s path . . . there must be a strong state in the middle of Europe. That state is ourselves—Hungary. . . . Hungary . . . must be like a wall between Serbia and the Serbian lands and Russia, on the one hand, and the Germans, on the other.”

Andrássy made a couple of promises, which are crucial to an understanding of how relations developed in the period between the Ausgleich and 1871. They also provide a fairly clear idea of what Andrássy was trying to do. The first concerned the Monarchy’s position vis-à-vis Bosnia:

Andrássy said to me . . . that Serbia had nothing to fear from any other quarter than Russia. . . . the former Austria . . . might perhaps even have had the wish to annex lands beyond the Danube. . . . But for Austria to do anything in this direction, apart from or without Hungary, to annex these lands, was not to be thought of, nor would Hungary permit it.

Krstić elicited the second promise, when he ventured the opinion that the only way to avert an uprising of the Balkan Christians would be to entrust the administration of Bosnia, the Hercegovina and Old Serbia to Prince Michael. The Sultan would continue as suzerain, and as such would receive tribute; but otherwise Serbian national aspirations would be satisfied. “Andrássy approved this, remarking that . . . Turkey cannot last, but . . . that it would be well to arrange this by peaceful means.”
Krstić received the impression that Andrássy’s overriding interest in sounding the Serbian government in this way was his fear of a Serbo-Turkish war, and the repercussions this would have in Hungary. But there was something else that proved Andrássy was acting on his own initiative and not in concert with Beust. This was the definite offer of assistance in securing the administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina for Serbia, coupled with a denial of the Monarchy’s own interest in these provinces. As we have seen, this flew in the face of Beust’s clearly expressed policy opposing a Serbian takeover, and moreover ignored the influential voices in Vienna which were anything but disinterested in Bosnia. More important, by dangling the Bosnian carrot before the Serbs’ eyes Andrássy was opening a Pandora’s box of nationalist aspirations, one that neither he nor his successors as foreign minister ever succeeded entirely in shutting again. For the carrot worked, in the short term: it induced Prince Michael virtually to abandon his Balkan program in the course of 1867, and it kept him and the Regency which succeeded him on a pro-Hungarian course for several years. At the end of this period, however, the scales fell from the Serbians’ eyes, and the resulting bitterness remained the dominant note in Serbo-Hungarian relations from then on. By then Andrássy had completely reversed his policy concerning Bosnia; but the Monarchy was to pay dearly for the thoughtlessness with which, as Hungarian minister president, he had made his first foray into the realm of foreign policy.

The immediate consequences, though, were gratifying. Prince Michael was already conscious of being torn between two policies. A sombre, brooding personality, agonisingly indecisive beneath his autocratic exterior, Michael could see the advantages of heeding Beust’s advice, which would secure cession of the fortresses, at least, without a shot being fired. He could also see the disadvantage in pursuing an aggressive policy which might lose Serbia everything. Now the Hungarian government, in seeming contradiction to Vienna, held out the possibility of acquiring Bosnia. It must have seemed to Michael too good an opportunity to leave unexplored.

There were other inducements to quietism. At the beginning of March 1867, in response to the rumors about Serbian designs on Bosnia, the Austrian government ordered the concentration of troops along its southern frontier. Beust followed this up with a more diplomatic warning, and in this he was careful to involve the new Hungarian government. In agreement with Andrássy, he sent another personal friend of Michael, Count Edmund Zichy, to Belgrade in March with a letter from Francis Joseph. The idea was to warn Michael against any disturbance of the status quo, but to do so in a way that would show him that the Monarchy was not otherwise ill-disposed to him.102

Michael was ready to respond to these overtures. At the same time he stressed that the maladministration of the Ottoman Empire’s Christian provinces
remained a constant source of trouble, and brought up again the idea mooted by Krstić in Pest, that Serbia be given the administrative responsibility for Bosnia. Michael represented the project as his own, and asked Beust to treat it in strictest confidence; but it is hard not to believe that he was encouraged to make the proposal by Andrásy’s prior espousal of it. The final warning, however, came from outside, and may have been in the end the most convincing. None of the great powers was prepared to countenance Serbia’s expansion into Bosnia, not even Russia. The most decisive put-down, however, came from Paris: as far as the French government was concerned, Serbia had no business in Bosnia, and the Habsburg Monarchy had the right to make sure things stayed that way.¹⁰³

The reason for this veiled threat lay in the diplomatic manoeuvring of the powers in 1867, the principal feature of which was France’s search for partners against Prussia. Napoleon III was perfectly prepared not to oppose the Monarchy’s occupation of Bosnia, in return for a firm commitment to France. Beust, however, argued in favor of an alliance directed against Russia. It was to explore this counter-proposal that Francis Joseph and Napoleon, attended by their foreign ministers, met at Salzburg between 18 and 23 August 1867.¹⁰⁴

As a chapter in the story of Franco-Austrian alliance negotiations, Salzburg was a failure: the only formal result of the talks was an anodyne protocol on the Eastern Question, in which both states agreed to work for the preservation of the status quo.¹⁰⁵ In view of what had gone before, however, it is unlikely that Napoleon III did not raise the subject of Bosnia again, if only to make it clear that, should circumstances one day permit it, the French government would not object to the Monarchy’s presence there. Serbia, too, was undoubtedly on the agenda, since the summer had seen a steady trickle of reports from the Balkans about the Serbian armaments program, the activities of the Bulgarian revolutionary committees, and Russia’s presumed role in directing preparations for revolt.¹⁰⁶ As Beust put it in a memorandum for Francis Joseph, “The most imminent danger to Austria threatens from Russia.”¹⁰⁷

Andrássy also attended the talks in Salzburg. There is little record of his contribution, but it would have been natural for him to express his opinion on the subject of Serbia and Bosnia. In view of his statements subsequently, this opinion can only have been one hostile to an annexation of Bosnia, and in favor of winning Serbia away from its supposed thraldom to Russia.¹⁰⁸ What is really at issue, as far as Salzburg is concerned, is just how far, if at all, Andrásy was in agreement with Beust and Francis Joseph for what he did next. For Andrásy went from Salzburg direct to visit Prince Michael Obrenović at the latter’s country estate of Ivánka in northern Hungary, arriving there on the twenty-fourth or twenty-fifth of August.

The literature on what happened at Ivánka is contradictory, depending on who had access to which sources.¹⁰⁹ Basically Andrásy’s purpose was to discuss with Michael face to face the project floated in March 1867, of Serbian cooperation
with Hungary in return for a helping hand over Bosnia. The documentary evidence for this, however, is problematical, since neither of the two participants left any written account of their meeting. The accounts which do survive are all second hand, and historians have been divided ever since as to what they signify.

The first record we have is a memorandum begun, but not completed, by Garašanin in December 1867, after his dismissal by Michael.\(^\text{110}\) To this we owe our knowledge of most of the circumstances surrounding the meeting: that Andrássy arrived direct from Salzburg; that he was closeted for five hours with the Prince and left immediately after dinner to return, not to Pest, but to Vienna; that Garašanin was excluded from the conversations entirely, though he remained a guest at Ivánka throughout Michael’s stay there.\(^\text{111}\)

Unfortunately Garašanin stopped short of recording whatever he might have learned subsequently of what was actually discussed. He knew that some inducement had been offered Michael, the proofs of which were Michael’s change of course and Garašanin’s own fall from power. He also reiterated his firm conviction that

\[
\text{Hungary will never be a sincere ally of Serbia. No matter what promises she}
\]

\[
\text{makes to Serbia, and no matter what dazzling prospects she holds before her}
\]

\[
\text{eyes, all that must never be believed.} \(^\text{112}\)
\]

But beyond these general fulminations all Garašanin could add was the surmise that Andrássy must have concerted his *démarche* with Beust at Salzburg, “not to mention Napoleon,” otherwise he would not have gone back to Vienna upon leaving Ivánka.\(^\text{113}\)

Subsequent evidence comes from a letter to Prince Michael from László Hunyadi in the spring of 1868. The Prince’s brother-in-law sent him a geographical description of Bosnia, since “if we should ever have serious talks about these provinces, it will be good to have good and precise maps, on which we can easily arrange an eventual partition.”\(^\text{114}\) Much more explicit is a lengthy report to the Serbian government in July 1868 by Colonel Orešković, who was sent to confer with Andrássy by Prince Michael but only finished the talks after the Prince’s assassination.\(^\text{115}\) According to Orešković, Andrássy told him that an uprising in Turkey could only be dangerous if Serbia helped it,

\[
\text{but Serbia will not help it because the Serbian government will not allow this,}
\]

\[
\text{especially the Prince, who told him in a conversation which he had with him last}
\]

\[
\text{year that it would by no means permit Serbia to get involved in a war.} \(^\text{116}\)
\]

In return, Andrássy at least claimed that he favored a Serbian takeover of Bosnia, despite the “strong military party” in Vienna which clamored for the provinces on Austria’s behalf. Orešković quoted him as saying “we have too many Slavs in Hungary. . . . I would prefer you to take Bosnia and the Hercegovina than for them to be annexed by us.”\(^\text{117}\) And again:
... take Bosnia and the Hercegovina; we won't intervene, and we won't allow anyone else to intervene... If Russia gets involved in the least bit, you know that all Europe will be against you.¹¹⁸

Much later, the picture was complicated by Jovan Ristić and Milan Piroćanac, respectively Serbian representative at Constantinople and head of the Serbian foreign ministry at the time. Ristić claimed that Michael had often discussed with him his talks with Andrássy at Ivánka. The latter had apparently given Michael an account of Salzburg, in particular of how he, Andrássy, had opposed Napoleon III’s suggestion that the Monarchy occupy Bosnia. This was the source for Andrássy’s famous statement that “The Hungarian ship is so full that it would only need one more weight to sink it.”¹¹⁹ Andrássy had also warned Michael of the dangers of Russian “Pan-Slavist” policy, and complained of the anti-Hungarian attitude of leading Serbs like Garašanin. But Ristić denied that Michael had ever talked about being offered Bosnia. All Andrássy wanted, Ristić believed, was for Serbia to avoid stirring up the Hungarian Serbs.¹²⁰

In 1867 Piroćanac worked closely with Garašanin. He too regarded Andrássy’s appearance at Ivánka as “sufficient proof that the Emperors, at their [Salzburg] meeting, had turned their attention seriously to the situation in the East.”¹²¹ It was essential for the Monarchy to cover its back in the event of European war, hence the Andrássy mission. And Piroćanac was in no doubt that “Prince Michael must have been promised at Ivánka that France and Austria, in the event of the victory of French arms, would really help him to acquire Bosnia and the Hercegovina.”¹²² Piroćanac’ most interesting detail was the assertion that Michael could never really have believed in these promises, coming as they did from such a quarter, and in such a way; he therefore can have committed himself to nothing at Ivánka.¹²³

There are practical objections to virtually all these accounts of Ivánka. It seems easiest to dismiss Ristić’s belief that no offer of Bosnia was ever made: the evidence for the existence of such an offer, in the Hunyadi and Orešković documents, is hard to ignore, and a similar offer had been made to Krstić in March 1867.

Yet is is equally hard to believe that the Austrian chancellor, let alone the Emperor, can have been associated with such an offer, which contradicted both traditional Habsburg opposition to the expansion of Serbia, and the interest of the Emperor and the military in acquiring Bosnia themselves. Even for the Hungarians the offer only made sense on the basis of a close Serbian association with the Monarchy, which as it turns out is what Andrássy had in mind. And in any case the Hungarian government was not in a position to conclude foreign treaties of this nature on its own, and Andrássy was undoubtedly aware of this. For him to have assumed otherwise would have been remarkably naive. So in view of the fact that the authorities in Vienna were unlikely to have
supported such a project, and that the Hungarian government could not go ahead on its own, can the offer have been sincere, and how much did Beust and the Emperor know about it?

The second of these questions is the easier to answer, yet even here the evidence is inconclusive. Beust undoubtedly knew of such a plan: he even says in his memoirs that “it was communicated to me early in 1867,” which would have been at the time of the Krstić mission.\(^{124}\) There is, however, no direct or indirect record of what either Beust or Francis Joseph thought of the project, or whether they were even consulted. Yet the sheer improbability of Andrássy traveling hot-foot from Salzburg, where he had been an important participant, to the private estate of the Prince of Serbia, and then back to Vienna, and all without discussing his actions at some point with the two figures responsible for foreign policy, has only to be stated to be dismissed.

Even so, Beust at least may well have known all about the plan without approving it and, even more important, without feeling he could do anything to stop Andrássy putting it to the test. Andrássy was a personable and eloquent politician and courtier: on more than one occasion, over the four years of his minister presidency, he was quite capable of steering around Beust by confronting the Emperor personally. And Beust, for all the clarity of his thinking on the issues which faced the Monarchy, could on occasion show irresolution and a reluctance to meet opponents head-on, particularly in the case of Andrássy. There is, however, another possibility: Andrássy could conceivably have undertaken the trip to Ivánka on his own, and then reported back to Vienna with another fait accompli. He had, after all, talked of just such a coup back in 1866.

Much of the above must remain speculation. Historical opinion on the matter has tended to divide into three categories. Yugoslav historians have been apt to characterize the entire Bosnian scheme as an elaborate and unscrupulous hoax, concerted between Beust and Andrassy, whose sole object was to induce Serbia to cease its preparations for insurrection in the Balkans, thus destroying Serbia’s moral leadership of the Balkan Christian nationalities and weaning it away from Russian influence.

Vasilije Krstić is one such voice, but cites no clear evidence for his conclusions. The evidence for collusion between Beust and Andrássy, for instance, is entirely circumstantial, apart from the claim made by Garašanin in December 1867 that Andrássy’s initiative was “arranged with Beust.”\(^{125}\) On the basis of this alone Krstić concludes that “The Austrian chancellor [Beust] could not, in this regard, promise anything, because his position vis-à-vis Bosnia was well known. . . . The Hungarian viewpoint in connection with Bosnia was not known.”\(^{126}\) Krstić continues, “As far as Andrássy’s promises with regard to Bosnia were concerned, they were completely insincere.”\(^{127}\) The only real evidence cited for this, however, consists, first, of a remark supposed to have been
made by Andrássy to the Austrian ambassador to Constantinople, in the summer of 1867, that if the Serbs were to invade Bosnia, the Monarchy would be obliged to invade Serbia itself. The second proof Krestić offers of Hungarian perfidy is the guarded opinion of Benjámin Kállay in May 1868, who thought it “very probable that sooner or later Bosnia... will become part of our territory.” Yet even Krestić includes Kállay’s next sentence, which concludes “But the time for this has still not come.” Both sources merely confirm what has long needed emphasis: that Hungarian politicians were not inexorably opposed, in all circumstances, to any extension whatsoever of the Monarchy’s (including Hungary’s) Slav-populated territories.

A more subtle analysis is offered by the earlier work of Jakšić and Vučković. They rightly mention the constitutional constraints on Andrássy’s actions, as well as the absolutely essential condition of the Bosnian offer, in his eyes: that Serbia could only be allowed to take over Bosnia if it were firmly in the Monarchy’s orbit. Nevertheless, Jakšić and Vučković also conclude that Andrássy may well have been insincere; but all they adduce is a letter from him to Count Lajos Batthyány in 1849, in which the twenty-six year old Andrássy seemed to imply that promises made to the Slavs could be changed if Hungary emerged victorious.

A second, more restrained line of interpretation stresses the extent to which the idea of a Serbia closely bound to the Monarchy was at least feasible politically, and thus a sort of legitimation of the Bosnian scheme. Because of this it was something that Beust and Francis Joseph might have thought worth investigating, even if they had their doubts; and Andrássy was accordingly unleashed, on a sort of freelance diplomatic mission. This appears to be the position reached by Heinrich Lutz, for whom Beust’s position in the matter was “not clear.” The result was “a separate Hungarian policy” which nevertheless, Lutz argues, remained semi-officially linked to that of the joint foreign ministry. As evidence for this Lutz cited not only the Bosnian scheme but the later proposal in 1870 of an alliance, which was cooked up in the joint ministerial council in order to “neutralize” Serbia during the Franco-Prussian War.

Neither of these interpretations, however, seems entirely to fit the facts. Instead, the argument intuited over fifty years ago by Slobodan Jovanović, on the basis of the Serbian archives and scantly memoir literature, and only recently buttressed by József Galántai’s and Imre Ress’s studies of Hungarian archival material, makes more sense.

Jovanović, in his revised study of Prince Michael’s regime, correctly perceived the genuine duality of foreign policy in the Monarchy, from the moment the Andrássy government was appointed: “Beust was not the only maker of foreign policy.” Certainly Andrássy, on the basis of the known documentation, held out the hope of acquiring Bosnia to Prince Michael. With little hard evidence
to back up his interpretation, Jovanović nevertheless outlined what he thought must have been Andrásy’s motives:

According to his [Andrássy’s] plans, Bosnia had to be the baksheesh which would be given Michael for sacrificing Hungarian Serbdom to the Magyars, and which would finally detach him from Russia and bind him to Austria.\(^{134}\)

It would have the additional advantages of driving a wedge between Serbia and Croatia, both of whom claimed Bosnia, and destroying Serbia’s role as the Balkan Piedmont. This meant Russia, which relied primarily on Serbia as a stalking horse, in Andrássy’s eyes, would be unable to reopen the Eastern Question.

Jovanović made some other observations which, in the light of subsequent developments, seem apt. Benjámin Kállay was selected by Andrássy as his candidate for Belgrade consul because, among other attributes, he was “Feuer und Flamme” (in Wertheimer’s phrase) for the Bosnian scheme.\(^{135}\) Beust, by contrast, was most definitely against the scheme, as his official instructions to Kállay at the start of the latter’s consulship, in April 1868, amply demonstrate.\(^{136}\)

Andrássy, however, “probably hoped that, with time, his influence would triumph over Beust’s.” Thus, “alongside Beust’s foreign policy, he conducted in secret his own, ‘reconnoitering the terrain’ for those of his plans which Beust didn’t approve.”\(^{137}\) And so it proved: what amounted to a Hungarian shadow foreign policy emerged, with Kállay as its exponent in Belgrade. For the moment, in view of Beust’s obduracy, Andrássy could only ask Prince Michael to cooperate over the Hungarian Serbs, to keep the peace in the Balkans, and steer clear of the Russians. In return, Andrássy would do his level best to prevent any Austrian occupation of Bosnia.\(^{138}\)

Galántai’s recent research bears out this interpretation, despite taking up the story only after June 1868. He stresses the constitutional importance of Hungary in foreign policy after the Ausgleich.\(^{139}\) That Andrásy wished to influence policy is beyond doubt, and Galántai’s summation of his motives and goals with regard to Serbia closely resembles Jovanović’s. Andrásy’s principal object was to bind Serbia to the Monarchy, since in his view the Ottoman Empire was doomed to collapse, and in this case it was essential for the Monarchy to get in ahead of Russia. “This was feasible, if Serbia received a large part of Bosnia and [the] Hercegovina with the Monarchy’s help.”\(^{140}\) Most important, Galántai makes clear that, despite the vague approval attributed to Beust by Baron Orczy in 1869, “Andrássy did not prosper with his plan as far as Beust was concerned.”\(^{141}\) If that was the case after June 1868, it is hard to believe the plan would have found any greater favor in 1867.

Finally, Imre Ress, in the only full-length study to date of Andrásy’s Serbian policy, makes clear just how much it differed from Beust’s. Whereas the chancellor was not averse to the idea of territorial expansion in cooperation with
Russia, Andrássy aimed to recruit Serbia into an “anti-Russian coalition”; indeed, to “torpedo” Beust’s allegedly Russophile Eastern policy.\(^{142}\)

It remains, briefly, to record the effect the Hungarian minister president’s initiative had on Serbian foreign policy. For Andrássy’s scheme paid off, at least in the short term. Prince Michael, as Piroćanac maintains, may never have completely abandoned his previous strategy of Balkan alliance and insurrection.\(^{143}\) But the effect was the same as if he had.

Michael’s policy differences with Garašanin were already becoming obvious, and in November 1867 the latter was abruptly dismissed. His departure was perhaps the single most decisive signal that could have been made that the Serbian government was no longer in the business of fomenting rebellion in the Sultan’s domains. Michael was keeping his side of the bargain.

Other earnest of what Jakšić and Vučković call “Michael’s U-turn”\(^{144}\) were already to hand. Relations with the Balkan states, and with the Bulgarian Committee in Bucharest, went into decline. Michael issued specific instructions, upon his return from Ivánka, for the cultivation of better relations with the Ottomans; by contrast, relations with Russia worsened. The war minister, Milivoj Blaznavac, who was well known for his anti-Russian politics, seemed increasingly the coming man, while Garašanin’s dismissal was widely perceived as a defeat for the Russian party.

In Serbia, Michael’s new policy meant an increased hostility toward the liberals and the newly founded *Omladina*, both of which groups were in close contact with the liberal Hungarian Serbs. The liberals, in turn, were not slow to spread the suspicion that the Prince had sold out both the Balkan Christians and the Monarchy’s Slavs at Ivánka.

Within the Monarchy, Andrássy reaped his reward in the breakdown of the relations between the Serbian government and Strossmayer’s Croatian National Party. At the time of Ivánka, Garašanin was conducting talks with the Croats on securing Prussian support for the acquisition of Bosnia for a future South Slav state.\(^{145}\) In addition the Croats hoped to receive some form of monetary assistance from Belgrade for the upcoming elections to the *Sabor*. A delegation from Zagreb actually arrived in Belgrade shortly after Garašanin’s dismissal. They were bluntly told that the ex-minister’s policy was discontinued, and returned empty-handed to Croatia, and a heavy defeat in the *Sabor* elections.\(^{146}\) More important, Croat political opinion was given a decided impression that Serbia had come to its own arrangement with Pest regarding Bosnia. It was more than enough to poison relations.

At one blow, it seemed, Andrássy had achieved everything a Hungarian minister president could wish for. Serbia’s preparations for war in the Balkans appeared to have slackened, if not ceased completely. Russia was alienated. The relations between Belgrade on the one hand, and Zagreb and Novi Sad on the other, were embittered. To consolidate these gains, however, it would be useful to establish a
permanent link between the Hungarian and the Serbian governments, a person, moreover, who could be trusted to tell the Serbs what Pest, rather than Vienna, wanted them to hear. The roots of Benjámin Kállay’s appointment as Austro-Hungarian consul-general in Belgrade lay in this outcome to the events of 1867.

Notes


8. Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 17, and 207–8, 288.


13. Ibid., 48–49.


22 Bencze, Bosznia és Hercegovina okkupációja, 16–17.


26 Botmiliau to Moustier, 1 Oct. 1866, ibid., no. 3645, 351.


28 Beust to Metternich, 10 Nov. 1866; and Stackelberg to Gorchakov, 18 Nov. 1866; both quoted by Adolf Beer, Die orientalische Politik Österreichs seit 1774 (Prague & Leipzig:
F. Tempsky & G. Freytag, 1883), 591, note 1 and 592, note 1 respectively. See also Beust to Prokesch-Osten, 27 Jan. 1867, HHSA, PA XII/90.

29  Gramont to Moustier, 2 Mar. 1867, _ODG_, vol. 14, no. 4160, 244–45.

30  Novak to Beust, 1 Dec. 1866, in Vučković, no. 123, 239.


33  There is a useful character sketch of Andrássy in Decsy, _Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy’s Influence_, 15–20, which, however, needs to be disentangled from the author’s enthusiasm for his subject.

34  Common Ministerial Council of 22 July 1870, quoted ibid., 33; original quoted in Diószegi, _Österreich-Ungarn und der französisch-preussische Krieg_, 42–43.

35  Kállay Diary, 19 Aug. 1868 ( _Dnevnik_, 78).


37  Kállay Diary, 4 Apr. 1869 ( _Dnevnik_, 169).


39  Salvini to Visconti Venosta, 3 Nov. 1870, ibid., 2nd ser., vol. 1, no. 460, 382–83.

40  Salvini to Visconti Venosta, 13 Nov. 1870, ibid., no. 524, 441–42.

41  Wäcker-Gotter to Bismarck, 23 Nov. 1871; quoted Descy, _Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy’s Influence_, 32.


43  Kállay Diary, 5 June 1869 ( _Dnevnik_, 187).


46 Kállay Diary, 12 May 1868 (Dnevnik, 18).


53 Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 270.


55 Text ibid., App. 9, 494–504; see also 361–63; Vučković, no. 144, 273–83.

56 Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, App. 9, 495: “radi sajedinjenja sviju jugoslavenskih plemena u jednu saveznu državu.” The adjective savezni, in this context, is rather ambiguous, since it can mean both “federal” and simply “united.”

57 Ibid., 495–96.

58 Ibid., 496; italics in original.

59 Ibid., 496–97; Orešković Plan for Preparations of Action in Bosnia, n.d. [March 1867], in Vučković, no. 143, 260–73.

60 Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 361; Ciliga, “Narodna Stranka i južnoslavensko pitanje (1866–70),” 86.

61 Quoted, Spoljna politika Srbije, 362; also Andrija Torkvat Brlić to Orešković, 8 June 1867, in Vučković, no. 157, 297.


63 Wagner to Beust, 8 Aug. 1869, HHSA, PA XL/129, reporting on the alarm of Matija Mrazović, a National Party leader, at the suggestion that Serbia might acquire Bosnia-Hercegovina: “we would then have no choice, but to go in there ourselves.”


67 Ibid., 75 ff.

68 Zastava, 26 June/8 July 1866, quoted ibid., 83.


74 Ibid., 302, 305; Dragnich, Development of Parliamentary Government in Serbia, 42; Kanitz, Serbien, 552–54.


80 Krstić Diary, 16/28 Apr. 1861, in Vučković, no. 28, 41.

81 Krstić Diary, 8/20 June 1861, ibid., no. 31, 46.

82 Krstić Diary, 25 June/7 July 1861, ibid., no. 35, 49–50. László Szálay was an historian and confidant of Eötvös.

83 Ibid., 50.

85 Krstić to Garašanin, 27 July/8 Aug. 1866, ibid., no. 96, 187.
86 Ibid., 188.
87 Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 269.
89 Krstić to Garašanin, 31 July/12 Aug. 1866, in Vučković, no. 106, 206; italics in original.
90 Krstić to Garašanin, 27 July/8 Aug. 1866, ibid., no. 96, 188.
91 Hunyadi to Michael, 7 Aug. 1866, ibid., no. 95, 186; Ress, Kállay Béni, 63–65.
92 Krstić Diary, 10/22 Feb. 1867, in Vučković, no. 131, 244, summarising Hunyadi’s letter.
93 Ibid., 244.
94 Ibid., 245.
95 Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 351–52; Krestić, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba, 363. There is, however, nothing in either the Austrian or Hungarian archives suggesting a preconcerted plan between Vienna and Pest, a point confirmed by Ress, Kapcsolatok és keresztutak, 190–91.
96 Krstić Diary, 16/28 Feb. 1867, in Vučković, no. 134, 247.
97 Krstić Diary, 19 Feb./3 Mar. 1867, ibid., no. 137, 248.
98 Ibid., 249.
99 Ibid.
103 Bridge, Sadowa to Sarajevo, 37; Potthoff, Die deutsche Politik Beusts, 128–31; cf. Decsy, Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy’s Influence, 46–47.
107 Ibid., 323.
108 Ibid., 322.
109 Ibid., 323.
116 Ibid., 360.
117 Ibid., 364.
118 Ibid., 365.
119 Ristić, Poslednja godina, 61. Also quoted in Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 399; MacKenzie, Ilija Garašanin, 335.
120 Ristić, Poslednja godina, 61–62.
121 Piroćanac, Knez Mihailo, 78.
122 Ibid., 80.
123 Ibid., 79, 80.
125 Krestić, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba, 368, citing Garašanin memorandum, [December 1867], in Vučković, no. 183, 323.
126 Krestić, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba, 368.
127 Ibid., 367.
128 Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 6 Dec. 1867, HHSA, PA XII/89; Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 398, cite this document wrongly as ‘PA XII/86’.
129 Kállay to Andrássy, 31 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733. Quoted Krestić, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba, 367.
130 Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 401–3.
133 Jovanović, Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila, 474.
134 Ibid., 476; ee also 373.
135 Ibid., 476; Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrássy, 1:461.
137 Jovanović, Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila, 477.
138 Ibid.
140 Ibid., 235.
141 Ibid. Cf. Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrássy, 1:461; according to Orczy’s diary, Beust said, upon being informed of Andrassy’s scheme, “Cette idée me sourit.” All the works which take Beust’s collusion for granted have been based upon this single, non-committal remark. Kállay, however, recording a conversation with Orczy, confirms the incident; Kállay Diary, 5 Feb. 1869 (Dnevnik, 151).
143 Piroćanac, Knez Mihailo, 80–82.
144 “Mihailov preokret”: Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 377.
146 Krestić, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba, 369–70.