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SHIFTING TELEVISION NEWS VALUES IN CABLE AMERICA

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On February 27, 1984, Ted Turner sensed an opportunity as he walked into a congressional hearing in a three-piece navy suit (C-SPAN, 1984b). He sat at a long table with executives from the news divisions at the Big Three networks—Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), National Broadcasting Company (NBC), and American Broadcasting Company (ABC). Turner was determined to distinguish his business—Cable News Network (CNN)—from their operations, which increasingly were under scrutiny that day by a panel of legislators. On Turner’s left side, George Watson, the vice president of ABC News, spoke of the responsible coverage of the Iowa caucus happening at that very moment, and he assured the congressional committee that the network would not project any winners in the upcoming New Hampshire primary until all polls had closed.

Such a pledge spoke to the very issue being discussed that day: election news coverage. The four men were on Capitol Hill to testify about the controversial projection of Ronald Reagan as the winner of the 1980 election before polls had closed on the West Coast. The panel of legislators did not challenge the credibility of the information that the broadcasting networks delivered that year. But they did question the timing. By reporting a presidential victory for Reagan before the polls closed, “early projections result in voters feeling like their vote, the lynchpin in this democracy, is worthless,” Rep. Timothy Wirth (D-CO) contended as he opened the hearings. He professed a deep concern that the drive for ratings and the push to be first “may be ruining the good news judgement while
alienating voters by telling them what they have done before they have done it” (C-SPAN, 1984b).

On Turner’s right-hand side, Ralph Goldberg, an executive at CBS News, addressed this broader question during his opening remarks. He defended the network’s history of tabulating votes—increasingly with more sophisticated computers over the past three decades—as well as its more recent use of exit polling to help understand voter turnout and demographics (Chinow, 2010). He highlighted the “outstanding record” of CBS with its “accurate and timely news reporting.” Rather than apologizing for projecting Reagan’s victory before polls had closed, he announced, “We believe it is our role as journalists to report and not withhold information” (C-SPAN, 1984b).

Once all three of the network vice presidents had stated their case, Wirth turned it over to the man known as “Captain Outrageous.” Turner leaned into the microphone and unleashed his fury on the men sitting just inches away from him, assailing the networks for abusing their power in society. “Study after study [has] criticized network television for its banal and harmful characterization of women and minorities, for the lack of quality children’s programming. For sensationalism and lack of objectivity in news reporting and generally making a mockery of all the institutions that have made this country great, including the military, business, family, religion, government, and so forth.” He declared that the “networks remain insensitive to the public interest and these social interests in their uncontrollable desire for ratings and revenue.” For Turner, the discussion of election coverage was “just one more example of their network arrogance,” and it revealed the deep need for an alternative, which, he noted, the cable dial provided (C-SPAN, 1984b).

Significantly, Turner was not alone in his criticism of the networks that day. Al Swift, a Democrat from Washington, became visibly agitated as he complained that the “Big Three” have become “insensitive” to their viewers, who were upset but had “no means to express that dissatisfaction to you through the marketplace” because of the network broadcasting oligopoly—upheld by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulatory policies. “How in the world is the American public going to get your attention and express something to you in clear cut terms to which you would respond?” (C-SPAN, 1984b).

Ted Turner relished this criticism and the national spotlight of a televised congressional hearing. “You hit on it,” he told Swift, shaking his head. Then he held up a hand-written dollar sign as he called out “all this B.S. about journalism.” To
Turner, “journalism isn’t what carries the day, it’s dollars, and dollars translate with ratings” (C-SPAN, 1984b).

Concerns about election projections generated a discussion of the role of television news in American political life more broadly. For Turner, and many others in the cable industry, portraying the broadcasting industry as elitist and arrogant had become central to promoting cable television as an essential alternative to advance both democracy and consumer choice—two things they argued would reinforce one another. Years later, Wirth recalled Turner’s performance as “hilarious” because it so powerfully pierced the network executives’ argument about “the public’s right to know.” Instead, Wirth remembered how Turner exposed the economic factors shaping “what you decide the news is” (Wirth, 2000). Over the next decade, cable television’s rapid expansion—made possible by politicians like Wirth and entrepreneurs like Turner—would deliver an expanded and segmented television marketplace, ultimately generating tremendous debates about how growing market diversity and consumer demand influenced the polity and the political process, for better or worse.

The C-SPAN Video Library provides insights into these conversations. Indeed, from the beginning, C-SPAN founder Brian Lamb wanted the public affairs network to bring transparency to the workings of Congress and the media landscape—something he had done in his earlier career by launching a newsletter, The Media Report, and working as a columnist for Cablevision (Brownell, in press). Along with covering congressional proceedings and hearings, C-SPAN featured call-in programs where journalists and pollsters discussed the nuts and bolts of their jobs. Indeed, many call-in shows had a specific format that taught media
literacy. The host would pull out a newspaper and encourage viewers to look at their local paper and call in to discuss how stories were positioned and framed. During the 1984 New Hampshire primary, Susan Swain took viewers on a journey through a day in the life of the conservative *Manchester Union Leader* newspaper (C-SPAN, 1984a). Later that year on Election Day, Lamb provided a tour of the production facilities of *USA Today*. “Our objective is to watch this newspaper being put out, not to bring you election results,” he emphasized (C-SPAN, 1984c). Lamb wanted to show the public how journalists gathered and reported information, demystifying the process of election coverage by the media.

As the cable dial expanded over the next decade to bring new sports, entertainment, and news options, C-SPAN remained committed to programming that discussed the changing media landscape—and these programs illuminate the ways in which journalists, politicians, and media consultants adapted their practices to the opportunities and challenges of the 24/7 news cycle. By the late 1990s, extensive programming delved into the issue of television news and its economic and civic role, ultimately providing a window into the shifting cultural values underpinning the news as profits and the public interest intersected in ways that frequently advanced the former at the expense of the latter.

Ted Turner’s very operation challenged a fundamental belief that had upheld the broadcasting television regulatory system over the previous three decades: that news programs cost the broadcasting networks money. Network executives prided themselves on the high price tag of their news productions—it was hard evidence of their commitment to the civic good and helped justify the tremendous profits their entertainment divisions raked in as a regulated monopoly. And so, these ideas appeared regularly in advertisements, congressional testimony by network executives, and hearings with FCC commissioners. As historian Michael Socolow (2010) argues, “The idea of a charitable news service has served to deflect attention from the accumulation of corporate profit” (p. 676). During the 1960s, as reporters covered controversial issues like the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War, this perception also helped to bolster the prestige and credibility of television journalism by advancing the notion that a commitment to balance and fairness—not a desire for ratings and revenue—drove the functioning of newsrooms (Bodroghkozy, 2013; Goodwin, 2022).

In reality, however, network news did make money, something Turner reminded legislators repeatedly during the 1984 hearing. In fact, CNN’s very oper-
ations had also punctured this myth. Launching in 1980 with just a $20 million investment—which Turner obtained by selling his local broadcasting station in Charlotte, North Carolina—Turner refused to pay celebrity anchors (Napoli, 2020; Parsons, 2008; Ponce de Leon, 2015). He promised to make “the news the star” and celebrated CNN’s accessibility and adaptability to cover unexpected political events, including offering live coverage of events like the death of John Lennon in 1980 and the assassination attempt on President Reagan the following year (Applebaum, 1981). But it also emulated the fiscally lucrative strategy deployed by local news programs over the previous decade: including softer news like weather and sports into their reporting (Allen, 2001). And it did so unapologetically, first introducing segments—and then eventually entire programs like Moneyline, Showbiz Today, and Larry King Live—dedicated to business, sports, and entertainment news (Ponce de Leon, 2015, pp. 176–177). In the process, CNN reshaped the very definition of what national news could be—that is, whatever viewers wanted.

Turner also celebrated a concept that network news operations had long been reluctant to highlight: the money made from advertising. He charged cable operators 15 cents per subscriber to carry CNN (if they also carried WTBS—20 cents if not), and similar to the broadcast networks, both CNN and local operators also made money by selling advertisements (Schwartz, 1980). CNN also held advertising seminars for local cable operators and pushed for an industry-wide collaboration to conduct market research about its subscribers (Brownell, in press). Turner did not resort to creative tactics to obscure his profits. He had no need to lend the appearance that the news was corporate philanthropy, as broadcast networks did (Socolow, 2010). Making money was openly discussed and celebrated. By the end of the 1980s, Turner had fought back against potential competitors—notably ABC’s effort to partner with Group W Cable and launch the competitor Satellite News Channel (Parsons, 2008). He forged strategic partnerships with cable operators to become “the little network that could,” as one 1988 New York Times profile put it—turning a consistent profit each year (Leiser, 1998).

The following year, as the business practices of the entire cable industry came under scrutiny, cable industry leaders pointed to CNN as proof that deregulated market competition could also enhance civic life by providing more information and choice for viewers. During a 1989 Senate hearing, Senator Albert Gore Jr. (D-TN), publicly attacked the cable providers for engaging in monopolistic behavior to the detriment of television consumers. In Gore’s eyes, cable companies had become the new threat as they were “hell-bent on domination,” and regularly would “fleece the consumers as much as they possible can” (C-SPAN,
In response, John Malone, the president and CEO of TCI, defended his company and the cable industry, celebrating the “quality and diversity of the programming” they could “bring to the American public.” Malone argued that the explosion of programming demonstrated that deregulation—brought about by the 1984 Cable Communications Policy Act—worked. He noted that the “industry has been very, very successful” in providing programming diversity with “over one hundred twenty national and regional cable networks” (C-SPAN, 1989).

Gore disagreed, and over the next three years led the legislative push to reregulate the industry. It culminated in the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, which passed over a presidential veto that October—a huge financial defeat for the cable industry (Robichaux, 2005). But the presidential campaign that same year also signaled just how integral cable television—and CNN in particular—had become in the political process. Both Ross Perot and Bill Clinton made its *Larry King Live* talk show a central part of their bids for the presidency (O’Mara, 2015). Journalists covered the rise of what they called “the new media,” debating extensively the impact of talk shows, tabloids, and local media on the political process that year (C-SPAN, 1992). Hosting a forum, *New Media in the 1992 Election*, Ellen Hume, the executive director of the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center at Harvard University, questioned a panel of journalists, editors, and talk show hosts about how the turn to cable talk show hosts like Larry King shaped the ongoing election. “Is this trend good or bad for the public?” she asked. “Does it make any difference?”

After winning the presidency by prioritizing a cable television strategy, President Bill Clinton acknowledged just how much the news landscape had shifted. During his first White House Correspondents’ Association Dinner he teased journalists about his ability to go on CNN, bypass the networks and mainstream press, and “speak directly to the American people” (C-SPAN, 1993). Although delivered as a joke, Clinton’s comments reflected a serious discussion happening in newsrooms, press offices, and campaign headquarters alike: What did the future of television news look like as cable television became the dominant way people received information about the world around them? What happened to the news itself when the veil of the corporate good had been lifted and marketplace achievements were widely celebrated?

These debates intensified over the next few years with creation of two alternative 24/7 news networks: MSNBC and Fox News. In 1994, NBC had started its move into cable news with a network called America’s Talking. Developed by Roger Ailes, the short-lived network emphasized commentary and engagement
with viewers through call-in programs (Sherman, 2014, pp. 141–157). The network struggled, with Ailes increasingly sparring with NBC executives. And so in May 1995, when NBC announced plans with Microsoft to embark on an interactive 24/7 news venture, Ailes was purposefully excluded. On July 15, 1996, MSNBC took over the America’s Talking spot on the cable dial.

When Ailes angrily left NBC, Rupert Murdoch—who had launched the Fox Broadcasting Company as an audacious challenge to the Big Three a decade earlier—saw an opportunity to tap into the growing world of cable news. Eager for the prestige that he believed came with entering the television news industry, Murdoch put Ailes in charge of a network designed to appeal to conservatives by promising “fair and balanced” coverage—an explicit nod to the growing belief in conservative circles about the problems of liberal media bias (Hendershot, 2010; Hemmer, 2016; Rosenwald, 2019). He also shocked the television industry by offering to pay $10 a subscriber for operators to carry the channel—an announcement that scared off competing programming ideas for 24/7 news at ABC (Sherman, 2014, p. 183).

As a result, by the end of 1996, the expanded news options on the dial escalated commentary about the values and practices of newsrooms operating 24/7 and the flood of information this nonstop coverage created. The Close-Up Foundation tackled the issue in a 1997 conversation with high school students televised on C-SPAN (C-SPAN, 1997a). During the discussion, USA Today correspondent and media critic Matt Roush explained that all news operations—both cable and broadcasting—were “fighting for an identity in terms of filling all this appetite for news programming.” But he also raised a concern about the kind of news people were getting. Particularly, he expressed concern about the “tabloidization of the news,” even as he recognized that “important stories are being covered.”

During the program, CBS News Washington Bureau chief Al Ortiz acknowledged that cable news had reduced the audience for the networks’ flagship broadcasts, but he also celebrated the expansion of access to information that the news landscape now provided. He answered a firm yes to the question Is more better? He anticipated that the network news role in the future will be to “explain the events, and [try] to give it the kind of perspective and thoughtfulness that you can put in with a few hours of work that you can’t do with the covering of fast-breaking news” (C-SPAN, 1997a).

Ted Koppel presented a similar view while accepting the Fred Friendly Award for journalism later that year (C-SPAN, 1997b). The anchor for the ABC News program Nightline firmly rejected the notion that “television news as a whole is
diminished,” even as the competition intensified and increasingly “anyone can be a journalist” with portable cameras and access to the internet. Indeed, he saw the moment as the “greatest opportunity” the networks faced “in our collective history.” The American public, he anticipated, “is going to be inundated by gibberish of thousands of anonymous voices in the hundreds of chat rooms” and the hundreds of cable channels. “Some of that information may be brilliant, but how will anyone know?” he asked. “Whose version of the news can you trust?” But, Koppel stated, the networks have built up “more credit, more familiarity, more trust than any of our new competitors can possibly hope to accumulate,” and maintaining this required a programming commitment to quality, rather than becoming too “frivolous” and avoiding pressures “to sink into the swamp.”

And yet, over the next year, the constant coverage of the Monica Lewinsky scandal pushed all news organizations into the tabloid waters as the line between entertainment and politics—and public and private—disappeared. David Halberstam called it “the worst year for American journalism,” as the fast-paced news cycle and constant chatter allowed partisan punditry, rumors, and conspiracy theories to generate tremendous ratings while also alienating the public and undermining the very credibility of the news industry (Greenberg, 2015, p. 423).

An event held by the Hollywood Radio and Television Society addressed these developments directly, bringing media consultants, political advisers, journalists, producers, and news executives into a conversation about press excesses (C-SPAN, 1998a). Los Angeles radio talk show host Michael Jackson led a conversation about the question How much is too much? Dee Dee Myers, who had worked in the Clinton war room during the 1992 campaign and as a press secretary for the administration, lamented the rapid spread of lies and the challenge of distinguishing “misinformation from real information.” Lisa Caputo, the former press secretary to the First Lady, agreed, explaining that the growth of 24/7 news, in combination with the internet, had made the news cycle itself disappear, with journalists struggling to keep up on what events to even cover and report. “It’s created a sort of . . . centrifuge of news coverage to the point where the press are finding it difficult to keep up with the story and for competitive purposes, they’re trying to outdo one another.” Rather than corroborating sources, she emphasized, news divisions just would go with a story, and apologize later if the facts were wrong.

Vice president of news for WCBS-TV in New York and former New York Post editor Jerry Nachman called attention to the sensationalized content of the stories: how Barbara Walters talked about the “potential forensic value of dried
semen stains” on 20/20 and Ted Koppel discussed “oral sex, whether it’s sex or whether its adultery” on Nightline. Such approach to the news, Nachman, argued, constituted a “paradigm shift” over what stories got on the air and the “semi-serious conversations” offered as “commentary” about them. But he also called attention to a fundamental paradox of the media landscape that he and so many others on the panel criticized. Ratings on shows related to the Clinton scandal skyrocketed, even as the majority of Americans responded in polls that coverage of it was excessive. “What do you do with a public that keeps saying, you rotten pieces of shit, but give me more?” he asked (C-SPAN, 1998a).

Later that year, John Malone and Walter Cronkite—two titans of cable television and network news, respectively—directly addressed this question of market choice, viewer demands, and the civic obligation of corporate news companies (C-SPAN, 1998b). The former CBS anchor asked Malone about the tensions between the “mercenary” interests of executives and the journalists working in the newsrooms, especially with the consolidation of ownership that had happened in companies like Malone’s TCI. Diversity on television “protects our free society,” replied Malone as he, once again, pointed to the explosion of options on the cable dial, especially in regard to cable news networks. “There is no one power broker that can control the media in any market, let alone the national market, to get away with compression or slanting of the news.” When programs did this, he argued, the marketplace would serve as a corrective force.

As a counterpoint, Cronkite expressed his concern as to whether market forces could deliver on the civic function of the news, what he called the “very heavy responsibility in our democracy of keeping the people informed adequately enough so that they can perform their role in democracy at the voting polls.” While he lauded the growth of consumer options on the cable dial, he also worried deeply about the day when viewers could “punch up and get nothing but golf, for we will have a lot of really good golfers but they aren’t going to know what the hell is going on in the rest of the world” (C-SPAN, 1998b).

As New Yorker columnist Ken Auletta moderated the conversation, he pushed Malone on this very issue. “There is a belief in journalism that you have an obligation to tell the viewers . . . we think you should sit down and eat your spinach because this is important information about what happened in the world today, and even if it doesn’t earn a profit, this is part of the obligation. . . . Do you buy that?” Absolutely not, responded Malone. He called that perspective “elitist” and said that “we underrate the public.” In fact, he postured that the public was “probably more informed today than we think,” because of the innovations
brought by cable news and its “efficient” and “interactive” platforms, including those like MSNBC that worked to engage viewers online as well as on the cable dial. “Consumer is king,” emphasized Malone. “The consumer will ultimately demand convenience, accuracy . . . and quality.” The determining factor in the future of news is “what the consumer wants” (C-SPAN, 1998b).

Two year later, however, the coverage of the 2000 election made it clear that meeting consumer demands for speed and efficiency could hurt the democratic process. Political scientists, analysts, and pollsters knew that the presidential election between Vice President Al Gore and Governor George W. Bush would be a tight race—one that would come down to battleground states like Florida. Amid catchy graphics—including CNN’s “countdown to the next poll closing”—and extensive commentary with pundits predicting the outcomes, the cable and broadcast news programs focused in on the critical state of Florida (Kloer, 2000a). Between 7:50 and 8:02 on election evening, ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News all projected Al Gore as the winner. Two hours later, the call was retracted, and CNN’s Jeff Greenfield admitted on the air, “Oh, waiter! One order of crow” (Marks, 2000). Several hours later, the networks made another mistake, declaring Bush the winner of Florida between 2:16 a.m. and 2:20 a.m. before retracting that call less than two hours later.

Voters woke up confused, and over the next few weeks conspiracy theories started to circulate. Conservatives believed that the “liberal media” tried to sway the election for Gore, while Democrats saw the management of the Fox News election desk—and the first to call Florida and the presidency for Bush—by Bush’s first cousin John Prescott Ellis as a clear violation of journalistic integrity by a Right-leaning cable network (Sherman, 2014). Scholars have noted that a central problem in the 2000 coverage was not a liberal or conservative bias, but a lack of clarity about how election desks and exit polling worked, where networks actually received their information—notably that all the major TV newsrooms that year used the same data from the Voter News Service to make their projections—and the “limitations of predictive models in a close election” (Wardle et al., 2001).

The pooling of resources was not new. Since 1964, the three networks had shared election data, banding together to form the News Election Service (NES). But as the 1984 hearing on election coverage had demonstrated, the networks also all had individual exit poll operations to corroborate and help analyze the data and project winners. Such resources were expensive, however. In 1990, with election evening costs and pressures to cut budgets both rising, the networks and
CNN joined the Voter Research Survey to conduct research on elections—including exit polling, analysis, and projections—a venture that saved each of them $9 million a year. Two years later, the VRS and NES merged to form the Voter News Service (VNS), beginning what one journalist called “the age where networks artificially compete, using identical information supplied simultaneously but reaching their own conclusions on their own timetable” (Election Night Coverage, 2001, p. 150).

Such a merger embodied the demands of 24/7 news programming in an era of corporate restructuring with an emphasis on the bottom line, efficiency, and the prioritization of interpretation of the news over the reporting of it (Ponce de Leon, 2015; Pressman, 2018). In the days that followed the 2000 election, however, academics, practitioners, and the broader public reflected on what happened, and according to a man who had worked with both CBS News and Fox News, the botched coverage made clear the problems that had plagued media operations over the previous years. “It’s definitely been damaged,” explained political editor Vaughn Ververs to a student asking about the media’s reputation in the aftermath of the 2000 election. “People have suspicion of the media in a lot of ways to begin with, not that they don’t trust them, but they see them, I think for what they are, and that is becoming more publicity-driven and dramatically-driven rather than news driven” (C-SPAN, 2000).

This trend became even more pronounced during the 39-day legal and political battle to determine a winner in Florida as ratings soared and voter cynicism and partisan polarization intensified (Kloer, 2000b; Prior, 2007). One New York Times article discussed the long-term impact of what it called a “political story of a lifetime crashing through the door” (Carter, 2000). According to Bill Carter, the election dispute “created the prospect of a presidency forever dogged by questions of legitimacy and could give the political talk shows a new, richly partisan, and potentially enduring subject to mine for the intensely headed conversation they aim to sell.” While critics lamented the danger of such programs that had become “a divisive irritant in the political process,” Carter noted that Sean Hannity was “gleeful.” The cohost of Hannity and Colmes at Fox News exclaimed during one show, “This could go on forever.” Tim Russert, NBC anchor and host of Meet the Press, also saw the contested election as a “story made for television” that would play out for the next four years (Carter, 2000). But, such heightened political debate on television potentially had dangerous consequences for the democratic process. Indeed, MSNBC’s Chris Matthews expressed an unease at what he predicted would become a “government-in-exile”
mentality on political talk shows, while CNN analyst Jeff Greenfield underscored how “this is one case where the newsman’s profession is at war with other, very serious things” (Carter, 2000).

In the end, the broadcast and cable networks all apologized for their mistakes and reformed their projection practices for election night coverage even as they also tapped into ratings the broader partisan drama generated. In February, news executives once again traveled to Capitol Hill to discuss their election coverage. But the cast and conversation were very different from 17 years earlier. In 1984, Tim Wirth ended the three-hour conversation by reminding the networks of their “significant public trust responsibility,” highlighting that “it is our job to make sure that responsibility in the public trust is carried out,” and promising “to watch this issue very, very carefully” (C-SPAN, 1984b). And in fact, he even led the effort that year to deregulate the cable industry to bring more consumer choice to television viewers in hopes that an expanded media marketplace would advance the public interest.

By 2001, these ideas about the importance of market competition had become deeply ingrained in both parties, and it showed during the hearings about election coverage (Geismer, 2022). Chairman of the House Energy Committee W. J. “Billy” Tauzin (R-LA) emphasized that the hearings were not a “penalty” but rather an effort to find out how newsrooms operated and how such a mistake could have happened: to clarify the process rather than to reform it (C-SPAN, 2001). “I hope you have not felt you were here under duress. You came here voluntarily. You know that. I asked each of you to come. You came. I appreciate it, and I will give you one commitment in return. I will fight to the death to protect your right to keep doing this wrong if you really want to do it wrong. That’s the truth . . . I will fight vigorously any attempt to legislate in the area of your content. That is wrong for us to even talk about doing. We won’t do it.”

Despite the recognition of the problems inherent in cable newsroom competition and the acknowledgment that television news failed the American people, Tauzin concluded that the marketplace would motivate the necessary changes in the newsrooms. And he was half right. In the years that followed, the marketplace continued to change cable news. But, instead of pushing it toward a serious reporting-driven product, the pursuit of ratings intensified and cable news expanded commentary designed to cultivate viewer outrage. Tapping into cynicism emerged as a profitable business model (Prior, 2007; Young, 2020). This may have engrossed viewers, but at a cost to a more informed citizenry, just as Walter Cronkite feared.
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