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THIRD-PARTY ACTORS AND THE QUESTION OF GENOCIDE

Imperialism and the Question of Genocide in Colonial-Era Africa

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INTRODUCTION

I explore two overarching questions in this chapter. Why are the terms genocide and cultural genocide so infrequently applied to African experiences in colonial-era Africa, as compared in particular to Australia and Native America? Is there a meaningful connection between genocide, variously defined, and settler colonialism, as distinct from other forms of imperialism? The historical record provides few easy answers to these questions. It does show that a number of regions of colonial Africa were subject to many, if not most, of the same cultural, political, economic, religious, and biological forces that could be found in Australia or North America, which scholars have described in those contexts as genocide. These experiences, however, have much more infrequently been described as genocidal with respect to colonial Africa, even with a broadened version of the United Nations (UN) 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide definition, which locates genocide less in the intentional development of a campaign of systematic or bureaucratized slaughter and more in the long-term processes that were nevertheless imbued with a “racial eliminationist ideology.” Discussions of genocide and Africa are typically limited to instances of mass violence in contexts like German Southwest Africa, Rwanda, or Sudan.

This chapter is not a historical overview of all genocides that have happened in Africa. Rather, what follows is a review of pertinent literature on the subject of
European colonialism and the question of genocide. First, I conclude that within the broad field of African studies, historical analysis has tended to prioritize African agency, as opposed to making arguments about classifying the kinds of violence experienced by Africans under European imperial influences. Second, I question the preoccupation with settler colonialism as a rubric for assessing the genocidal character of European imperialism in colonial-era Africa.

IMPERIALISM, COLONIALISM, AND GENOCIDE

The scholarship on imperialism or colonialism is voluminous, just as the literature on genocide has expanded enormously in recent decades. Studies that connect imperialism and the question of genocide, however, are relatively new, and those that pertain to imperialism and genocide in colonial-era Africa are few. The scholarship on colonialism and genocide, however, has not only brought historiographically neglected instances and processes of violence to the fore but has also led to a vigorous debate regarding the assumptions that have been imbedded within the concept of genocide, particularly as it was defined and institutionalized in the UN Convention. Article II of the Convention states: “In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

With respect to discussions of colonial-era violence and genocide, the most relevant of these challenged assumptions has to do with the issue of “intent to destroy.” That is, if genocide is primarily a crime, then how might one locate sufficient historical evidence to substantiate the intent of Western colonists to eliminate Native or Indigenous peoples? In colonial contexts, such intent is often difficult to find because the processes and policies that resulted in excessive death do not always resemble models of criminal intent established by the Nuremberg Trials or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. It can be particularly challenging to identify eliminationist intent that constitutes the crime of genocide as defined by the UN when addressing the deadly spread of diseases due both to lack of immunity and to changed social conditions brought on by colonialism. Still, as Patrick Brantlinger has demonstrated, “extinction discourse” was pervasive and common within nineteenth-century Western literature, policy debates, and culture. In some colonial contexts, however, there might be a scant historical
record because the documents did not exist in the first place, or because they were later destroyed or concealed. Furthermore, colonial-era policies, as manifested, for example, in laws that prohibited or deeply altered rituals, marriage and family relations, planting and hunting, and so on, often blur the line that discursively distinguishes between genocide and cultural genocide.

The result of these processes, circumstances, and policies was, in many cases, the destruction or disintegration of a people “as such.” For these reasons, scholars of colonial genocides, especially in Australia, New Zealand, and the American West, have sometimes questioned the criteria of establishing clear criminal intent on the part of colonists or colonial bureaucrats in order to describe these catastrophically deadly histories as “genocidal.” In some modern colonial contexts, therefore, the concept of genocide as a historical descriptor would appear to conflict with the notion of the crime of genocide. While the concept of genocide grew out of Western modernity, including its political, anthropological, legal, and moral sensibilities, Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term, insisted that it was a recurring feature of human societies, one that was frequently associated with imperial expansion. His development of the concept, how that concept was codified in the UN Convention, and whether there is a substantial gap between the two have been the subjects of a recurring historiographical debate.

Lemkin’s use of historical examples involving imperialism and genocide suggests complex (if not entirely consistent) interrelations among them. On the one hand, Lemkin condemned forms of colonial violence that later scholars and activists would identify as being “genocidal” (such as enslavement or the removal of Native and Aboriginal children and placing them in boarding schools). But he also held out the possibility of a beneficent, civilizing end of Western imperial expansion. Still, Lemkin’s formulation and use of the concept of genocide seems to be more expansive and less particularly legal, when compared with the UN Convention. In this sense, many of the studies that use the term genocide to describe colonial policies, outcomes, and violence can often be termed “neo-Lemkinian.” As the term is generally used within this literature, it is inclusive of both intentional actions (i.e., massacres) and broader structures (i.e., laws, education, and public policies) and processes (i.e., spread of diseases). It is within this framework, represented most clearly by A. Dirk Moses, among others, that I raise the historiographical question pertaining to the classification and description of colonial-era violence in Africa.

An early exception to the relative paucity of studies examining genocide and imperialism is Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism. Arendt argued that imperialism provided many of the ideological roots for the racist bureaucracies that developed in twentieth-century Europe. The Holocaust could then be understood as the outworking of European presumptions about dominating a globe populated with non-European peoples and the machinations by which Europeans accomplished that dominance. Stated more tersely: subjugation overseas led to slaughter in Europe. For
Arendt, the imperial impulse fomented the final solution, as both were inherently dependent upon the supremacy of the white man—specifically, the Anglo-Saxon.\textsuperscript{11}

Generally speaking, it took some time for historians to take up Arendt’s hypothesis and draw connections between Europe’s larger imperial projects and genocidal violence. Attention instead was often directed toward understanding the Holocaust with respect to continental European history, as the subsequent Nuremberg Trials kept attention focused squarely on Europe. The scholarship that followed in the mid-twentieth century often examined the structural elements of German society that were contextually important: the legal proscriptions placed on Jews, the history of European antisemitism, German nationalism, and World War I and its aftermath, to name a few. These histories were often developmental, with occasional focus being given to Jewish or Christian resistance to Nazi policies, followed then by increased attention given to bystanders and the complicit majority. By the late twentieth century, Holocaust research had become voluminous and enormously diverse. Comparative perspectives on the Holocaust, however, including perspectives from outside of Europe and those that examined the role of imperialism and its history in the development of the Holocaust, were not in the mainstream of Holocaust research, nor are they today. Some exceptions here include works that examine World War II as an imperialistic war within Europe. These works still tend to be less interested in connecting the Holocaust to European imperialism overseas, though they have, as in Carroll Kakel’s case, established an association between imagined geographies and the perpetuation of mass violence.\textsuperscript{12} In general, however, the Holocaust was described as a unique event, or a “uniquely unique” event, but mostly a European event, nevertheless.\textsuperscript{13}

Some historians of genocide have searched for precursors to the Holocaust in Germany’s colonial history, particularly in the German genocide of the Herrero in German Southwest Africa (present-day Namibia) in 1907–8 and the massacres during the “Maji Maji” Rebellion in German East Africa between 1905 and 1908.\textsuperscript{14} These scholars see in these events a German military culture that permitted bureaucratic decisions toward elimination before the Holocaust, with the implication that these African massacres impacted in some way German responses to the “Jewish question” during World War II.\textsuperscript{15} (Germany still officially denies that the massacres of the Herrero constituted genocide, in part because German officials say that the term did not exist in 1908.)\textsuperscript{16}

Thomas Kühne, however, has argued that there is no “unique German colonial path to the Holocaust,” given the similarities between how Germany and other European powers treated their colonial subjects.\textsuperscript{17} Here, one sees evidence emerging that not only problematizes the Holocaust’s historiographical uniqueness but also questions the uniqueness of any European power’s treatment of its subjects. Decades earlier, Aimé Césaire observed more tersely than Arendt or Kühne: “Hitler did to Europe what Europe did to Africa.”\textsuperscript{18} For Césaire, not only was there nothing new about what
Germany did in the Holocaust, there was nothing unique about it because such tactics defined Europe’s interactions with colonial Africa.¹⁹

Other postcolonial critiques emerged in the 1960s and 1970s that lambasted European presumptions of racial, cultural, religious, and political supremacy.²⁰ They assailed Europeans’ dismissal of non-Western cultural, social, religious, and political complexity and the discursive methods Europeans employed to enact and ensure their hegemony around the globe in the age of empires.²¹ While postcolonial scholars critiqued the forms of imperial structural power, only occasionally did they use the language of genocide to frame their critiques with respect to Africa. They spoke of complicity and collusion; the creation of the feminized, demonized, and subhuman “Other”; and the political and cultural turmoil that followed in the wake of colonialism. Violent, destructive, alienating, and humiliating, yes, but rarely was the term genocide used as such. Though Fanon termed the transatlantic slave trade the “bloodless genocide,”²² colonialism in Africa was not described as genocidal tout court.

More recent studies by David Stannard, A. Dirk Moses, and others on Australia or North America have fostered a historical interest in the genocidal character of colonialism, specifically settler colonialism.²³ These scholars argue for a correlation between settler colonialism (as distinguished from imperialism in general) and genocidal violence. While they describe European settlers’ eliminationist imaginings and actions, they often focus on the long-term effects of settler societies on indigenous populations in Australia and North America. This emphasis stands in contrast to early scholarship on the Holocaust, which largely focused on the systematic intent and attempt to eradicate Jews from central Europe. As a result, the new literature on settler colonialism and genocide has challenged the notion of the Holocaust as the paradigmatic genocide. This is evinced in part by the fact that Stannard’s American Holocaust seems to be more interested in using the provocative cultural capital of the term Holocaust than it is in drawing meaningful comparisons between European Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe and Native Americans.²⁴

These studies help constitute the “new genocide history.” Indeed, this history has often highlighted the problems surrounding the issue of intent, as conceptualized in the UN Convention and in legal formulations of the crime of genocide. Work in this literature remains divided, both over where one might locate intent in colonial violence and in the general importance given to this criterion. William Galois observes that the new genocide history has moved away “from the commonplace that genocides must necessarily be rigorously planned exercises.”²⁵ Some scholars have attempted to get around intent by coining terms such as “indirect genocide.”²⁶ It is this sort of framing of colonial atrocities, however, “as happenings rather than actions,” argues Tracey Banivanua-Mar, that allow colonial peoples to be washed away by history, regarded as the “byproduct of a misguided benevolence” rather than as the intended victims of violent regimes.²⁷
Central to understanding genocide as it is used by new genocide scholars who expound the connections between settler colonialism and genocide seems to be a different model than that codified currently under the UN Convention and international law and focused on the intent of the actors involved in the planning and enacting of genocide. Instead, the focus of the scholarship on genocide and settler colonialism generally has moved from the intention to systematically eliminate a people to a focus on the effects and outcomes of settler colonial societies. How intent is understood in defining genocide and the crime of genocide, however, remains an essential analytical element within this literature. In discussing colonialism and genocide in Indonesia, Remco Raben cautions: “Historians tend to assess processes of genocide in quantitative terms – the killing should be massive — and in terms of intent — the killings should be based on an ideology, or planning or premeditation. Both conditions are problematic in colonial situations, but less so than may be thought at first sight.”

On the notion of intent, A. Dirk Moses responds that the likely harmful effects of European settlement on Aboriginal peoples in Australia were known to colonialists. Moses maintains that while the Australian outback did not resemble Auschwitz, one could still identify historical evidence that indicates a willful, knowledgeable acceptance of an eliminatory process that created a modern settler colony. Similarly, Patrick Wolfe argues compellingly for the genocidal logic of settler colonialism itself. William Galois made the case for the genocidal nature of the colonial encounter, justifying this terminology by arguing that French colonial violence had been “annihilatory in its aims” and “often had the destruction of whole tribes as their explicit rationale.”

This trajectory of scholarship has focused increasingly on settler colonialism as a foundational category of analysis. The application of this category is of limited use when one considers colonial violence in Africa, as there were relatively few settler societies along the lines of Australia or North America present on the continent. Violence in colonial Africa, therefore, was often manifested under different social and political conditions; the results, however, were not entirely different in some areas from processes one observes in settler colonial societies. When many scholars consider colonialism and genocide in Africa, they have almost uniformly done so with respect to clear genocidal incidents in which lethal force was used to attempt to physically eliminate a defined religious or ethnic group or “tribe” — either during colonial rule, as with the Herero, or afterward, as in Rwanda or Sudan. This is also to say that compared to scholarship on North America and Australia, relatively few studies of colonial Africa have described the colonial experience tout court as “genocidal,” even if genocide is taken to include what is referred to as cultural genocide.

Instead, scholars of colonial Africa have focused more generally on questions of agency of Africans in the midst of the colonial encounter rather than on their destruction at the hands of Europeans. Take, for example, E. A. Ayandele’s 1966 monograph,
The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria. Ayandele helped to catalyze new historiographical approaches to the study of African history by making a fundamental argument: Africans were not simply the exotic backdrop for explorers’ “discoveries” or missionaries’ heroic proselytization efforts. Writing the introduction to Ayandele’s book, K. Onwuka Dike tersely critiqued Eurocentric African histories: “Historians [continue] to write as if Africans were not active participants in the great events that shaped their continent.” This assumption shaped the methodologies of a number of major studies of colonial Africa. It is relevant to note here that Jean and John Comaroffs’ Of Revelation and Revolution, which describes the insidious cultural violence of the impact of colonialism on the Tswana of southern Africa, does not to my knowledge use the terms genocide, cultural genocide, or ethnocide. However, they do describe a colonial violence so insidious that it battled for the very consciousness of African subjects, which the Comaroffs described as a “colonization of consciousness.”

The emphasis on agency and the limits of colonial authority and violence in Africa can be shown even with respect to King Leopold’s Congo, which was the location of some of the most horrific traumas of colonial Africa and whose population may have been reduced by ten to thirty million people in the early twentieth century. Historians like Osumaka Likaka question the extent to which, even in the brutal early twentieth-century Congo, colonists were able to gain supposed control over Africans’ minds. The emphasis here is on the endurance of indigenous African agency through cultural and linguistic practices and less on their victimization by Europeans, though Likaka and others do not deny Belgian brutality.

One could also consider the Mau Mau movement in late colonial Kenya, about which British courts have ruled that Mau Mau detainees suffered crimes against humanity while they were in detention camps during the “Emergency” between 1952 and 1960. During the Mau Mau Emergency, nearly the entire Gikuyu population—around one and a half million people—was placed in guarded removal villages or concentration camps. As has come to light through the research of David Anderson and Carolyn Elkins, the British systematically inflicted various forms of severe physical, psychological, and cultural violence on the Gikuyu during the 1950s. But even here, the issue of agency has also been foregrounded. It is noteworthy that Derek Peterson did not emphasize the violence experienced by the Gikuyu under British repression, but rather focused on the intellectual autonomy and political creativity made possible through the British response to the Mau Mau Emergency. Only recently have scholars attempted to make the case for this facet of British imperialism being described as genocide.

The scholarship described here has done important work in refuting the racist colonial assumptions that Africans were uncivilized, simple-minded, quasi-human brutes inhabiting a “dark continent.” But why are the various forms of colonial and imperial violence in Africa—setter colonies or otherwise—not generally described as genocide?
The reasons for this difference are not easy to explain, but I want to explore a few points in more specific detail—specifically, religion and disease, since these are often discussed with respect to genocide in America and Australia. In the literature on genocide and cultural genocide emerging from those historical contexts, these elements are important parts of describing a larger genocidal sociopolitical structure that had devastating consequences for the Indigenous peoples there. These historical factors also illuminate both the complex processes of cultural change that impacted non-European societies as a result of colonialism and the difficulty of establishing criminal intent.

MISSIONARIES AND COLONIAL AGENTS

From the Catholic missions of present-day Mexico and the southwestern United States to the church-run boarding schools of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Australia and Canada, the relationship of Christianity to the question of genocide in North America has been closely connected. A mundane point bears noting here: that the missionaries sent to the American West were not so different than those sent to colonial Africa or Asia or the Pacific Islands. The majority of Protestant missionaries could be described as broadly evangelical, with revival and holiness movements providing the spiritual impetus for their decision to devote their lives to missions. By the 1890s, in Britain at least, many of them were educated in British public schools and had a Cambridge or Oxford degree. More could be said here, but I simply want to emphasize that there is not any evidence that I have seen suggesting a coordinated effort to send more loathsome missionaries to Australia or Canada and the more congenial ones to Congo or India.

Missionary activities were broadly similar throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: they built boarding schools and hospitals, they translated the Bible and Pilgrim’s Progress, and they often met with relatively little success by way of direct converts. Missionary schools in colonial Africa did not operate using fundamentally different practices than those in the American West. Most required Western-style uniforms and the use of English. They learned Shakespeare. Chapel was mandatory; there were marching drills, and the British cult of athleticism was fostered through soccer and cricket. The schools, as a result, could significantly disrupt the lives of the families whose children were sent to them, as the school year usually did not necessarily correspond with their hunting expeditions, planting seasons, cattle migrations, or ritual seasons. If there was an overall goal of these colonial-era missionary boarding schools, it could have been to produce a “native Christianized elite” who would become model modern leaders. The system of mission education has been criticized by many African historians as representing the collusion of religion with empire in the undermining of
African societies and cultures. It has not to my knowledge, however, been described specifically as “genocidal” in itself; at least this is not part of the mainstream discourse in the historiography of colonial-era Africa.

Missionaries were also involved in various activities that sought to eliminate what they described as “paganism” or “heathenism” in African societies. This included spiritual destruction, sometimes accompanied by physical violence. For example, evangelical Anglican missionaries in southwestern Uganda worked with the British Protectorate government to attempt to eliminate the Nyabingi cult from the area, as it was believed to be the source of anti-colonial resistance, and they consequently imprisoned many cultic leaders. British missionaries along the Niger River colluded with Niger Delta Company boatmen, who turned their maxim guns on the famous Onitsha shrine. Or one might consider the construction of the fictional Protestant church in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart, whose location in a forest had the effect of seemingly demonstrating that the ancestors would not or could not take revenge for the affront. The examples could be multiplied ad nauseum, the point here being that missionaries in Africa, both Catholics and Protestants, were complicit or active participants in the destruction of various forms of cultural and religious life in colonial-era Africa. One could say that this was their intention: to destroy (and/or convert) those they deemed to be “primitive.”

With respect to Lemkin’s formulation of genocide, which sought to protect those things that allowed a group of people to cohere, do the episodes described here constitute genocidal destruction? Following Patrick Wolfe, are these episodes, despite the fact that they often occurred in contexts that were not technically settler colonies, imbued with the “logic of elimination” of the native, as such? One’s answer would need to factor in an important caveat: the reality that much of this destruction, in the case of Christianity, was performed by African converts themselves, who may have had tangential or even nonexistent relationships to Western missionaries. The Watchtower movement of south-central Africa, the Harrist churches of west-central Africa, and Alice Lenshina’s movement in Northern Rhodesia all engaged in similar forms of cultural and religious destruction. Can it rightfully be considered part of genocide if people destroy aspects of their own culture in order to construct a new one? Or is such a question overly focused on “African agency” and insufficiently concerned with European colonial violence? When does cultural and religious change become genocide?

DISEASE

The role of disease in decimating the populations of the Americas is well known. Smallpox and tuberculosis made their way through native populations with horrifying rapidity, often moving faster than European settlers and explorers. The spread of
diseases to which native peoples had virtually no resistance then meant that Europeans confronted populations that were far weaker politically and militarily than they would have been otherwise. In some cases, infectious diseases themselves have been described as genocidal or as tools of genocide with respect to Native America, and it seems that there is some scholarly agreement that a tremendous percentage of the Native populations in North America died as a result of these diseases rather than through direct physical slaughter by Europeans.\(^{51}\)

In colonial Africa, particularly in West Africa, the inverse narrative emerged in the nineteenth century: tropical Africa was the “white man’s graveyard.” Euro-Americans frequently succumbed quickly—sometimes within just a couple of weeks—to the environment and its new diseases. The high rate of European mortality in West Africa was a serious challenge to its settlement by Europeans up until the late nineteenth century, contributing to the establishment of schools of tropical medicine throughout Europe. This is one reason that missionary societies, both American and British, during this period favored the use of former or ransomed slaves to serve as missionaries in the region that is today Togo, Benin, Nigeria, and Cameroon.\(^{52}\) The predominant narrative, therefore, assumed that those of European descent were the most adversely affected by diseases in tropical climates during the colonial era. But this narrative occludes much about disease in colonial Africa.

There are many reasons to think that this narrative is profoundly problematic, one of which is the tremendous number of Africans who died as a result of changing health patterns in the colonial era. In Uganda, which was not a settler colony, an outbreak of sleeping sickness around Lake Victoria in the first decade of the twentieth century left the population absolutely decimated, with the population of the Buvuma Islands being reduced from an estimated three hundred thousand to under one hundred thousand. Some coastal regions in Uganda fared equally poorly.\(^{53}\)

Other regions impacted by European imperialism suffered similar outbreaks and epidemics. Yellow fever outbreaks in late nineteenth-century Senegal killed 20 percent or more of the population of multiple cities and towns.\(^{54}\) These diseases were exacerbated by colonial processes of labor conscription and urbanization or of new labor environments, like schools or mines, in which people worked together closely and then dispersed to rural areas. It is not difficult to see why many Africans viewed Europeans’ responses to these outbreaks, which could include removing people entirely from villages and burning down the affected houses, to be violent, extreme, and unnecessary.\(^{55}\) The population of certain areas was at times reduced by 50 percent or more because of illnesses or conditions created in part by Europeans. But this is not described by any scholars of colonial Africa, so far as I know, as part of genocide or as being genocidal, in contrast to similar dynamics among indigenous communities in the Americas. It is certainly very difficult, if not impossible, to locate intent in the expansion of diseases
in most of Africa, as in the Americas. It also seems, however, that a substantially larger percentage of the population survived in Africa than in the Americas, which constitutes a significant difference. Might one, as Mike Davis contends in *Late Victorian Holocausts*, be able to locate a logic of the reasoned and inevitable implications of colonial processes in these instances, at least one sufficient enough to warrant the employment of a term like *indirect genocide*?

**CONCLUSION**

What of the more fundamental question: Can we speak of Africa’s experiences of European imperialism in terms of genocide, or cultural genocide, or ethnocide? The presence of a settler society does seem to be an important historical variable in thinking about this question, at least in the new genocide historical literature. But what of cases like Uganda, which were not settler colonies but which nevertheless experienced mass death as a result of colonial encroachment, sometimes amounting to 30 percent or greater death tolls among peoples? How does one meaningfully set this alongside evidence from among the Maori of New Zealand, whose history contemporary Maori activists have described as a “holocaust” in relation to settler colonialism? I am less interested in finding a way around the question of intent as it relates to the category of genocide than I am in suggesting that settler colonialism might be a less meaningful category to use in relation to colonial-era violence than some scholars in the new genocide history might argue. Furthermore, if one follows Césaire’s contention that Hitler did to Europe what Europe did to Africa, then one must move toward an acceptance of the “genocidal” logic of imperialism more broadly. And if one does that, then one has not only undermined a preoccupation with the idea that the Holocaust is both (paradoxically) unique as well as the paradigmatic example of genocide, but also the idea that Germany was unique or exceptional in its colonial violence. Rather, one has to grapple with the realities of the genocidal nature of all imperialism. Such a turn, of course, reframes the discussion of the relationship between imperialism and genocide beyond an exclusively European imperialism.

Evidence from colonial contexts, settler colonial or not, seeks to unsettle Western formulations of the very concept of genocide away from their jurisprudential basis. If we are to reframe the scope of inquiry in this way, then genocide seems to become a common and recurring feature of human history, almost mundane. In Canadian or Australian boarding schools, it should be noted, genocidal processes were experienced as quotidian phenomena: in the prohibition of vernacular speech, in the regulation of Western dress or hairstyles. One clearly observes in such practices the active inhibition of the reproduction of group life. In light of this seemingly quotidian banality
of genocidal evil that the new genocide history has foregrounded, one is again confronted with the analytical choice of locating the intent of violence and the agency of those who found ways to survive. But just how “ordinary” are we comfortable with the concept of genocide becoming?

NOTES

8. Moses, “Antipodean Genocide?”


24. David B. MacDonald, “Daring to Compare: The Debate about a Maori ‘Holocaust’ in


48. Brantlinger, Dark Vanishings.


51. Alvarez, Native America and the Question of Genocide.


57. MacDonald, “Daring to Compare.”


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