INTRODUCTION

"Our consuls... have to lead the whole Mohammedan world... to ferocious insurrection." On the eve of hostilities, Emperor Wilhelm II issued this order at the end of July 1914 to defeat the enemies of the German Reich. The emperor believed that “England, Russia and France have agreed... to begin a war of annihilation against us.” By embracing the “whole Mohammedan world” Wilhelm explicitly considered transnational spaces that he wanted to transform into terrorscapes to harm his adversaries. Brand-new geopolitical concepts considering large spaces were combined with new military insurgency strategies supposed to support traditional military action on battlefields. War began to change into its “modern version” of the twentieth century, which included large-scale atrocities against civilians as well as total war. Germans thus connected terrortimes and terrorscapes and created an entangled history of violence.

This chapter examines the development of terrorscapes by using the example of German warfare in the so-called Orient. This term was used in Europe to describe a space comprising not only the Middle East but sometimes even South Asia and North Africa. It has to be used very cautiously because it conveys specific European colonial images of this region, ranging from irrational longing for the sweetness of the “Orient”
to racist notions of superiority. This term is nevertheless employed in this chapter to capture the spatial notions used by Europeans to describe Northern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia and to show how his term was weaponized to create terrorscapes.

When the First World War broke out, German officials started considering how to set on fire the highly sensitive region at the interface between the British, French, and Russian spheres of influence to inflict damage upon their enemies. The Germans identified a continuous area extending from Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt to the Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan, and India. This space should be transformed into a terrorscape by instigating the local Muslim population to rise up against the British, French, and Russian rulers. The Islamic tradition of holy war was used to fan the fire. Here, the Ottoman Empire, which was a German ally, held all the cards. Sultan Mehmed V, caliph of Islam, was the nominal head of Muslims worldwide. Only he could proclaim the global jihad. Using the concept of jihad, the Germans wanted to establish an identity-creating narrative to encourage the disparate local groups in the region to take joint action with Germany.

By using the selected example, this chapter examines the theme “Asymmetric Power Relations” identified in the introduction to this book. It therefore asks how the German Reich resorted to asymmetric forms of violence—in this case jihad—as a means to fight more powerful adversaries in the Orient, like Britain, France, and Russia. What was the impact of the German external actor coming into a region that had a years-long experience of violent suppression of the local population by European colonial powers? In which way did this experience facilitate the creation of terrorscapes? By using this example, the chapter illustrates the impact of actions of state or nonstate actors in certain terrorscapes during extraordinary terrortimes. Furthermore, the it shows to what extent this constitutes a transnational entangled history of violence.

The chapter also explores how the concept of inciting popular uprisings became part of German military planning before 1914, and how this tactic took shape after the beginning of the First World War. The following section examines which actions the Germans took in the first months of the war to realize their jihad planning. The last section is devoted to one of the key terrorscapes: the region comprising Afghanistan, India, and Persia, which was of central importance for the Germans.

THE CONCEPT OF INCITING POPULAR UPRISINGS AND GERMAN MILITARY PLANNING THROUGH FALL 1914

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, military planners recognized the full significance of popular uprisings when they realized how much difficulty the French army
encountered with the Spanish independence movement and its guerrilla tactics during the Peninsular War between 1807 and 1814. Prussia first thought of implementing this new military strategy in its war against the Habsburg Empire in 1866, as France had done in its conflict with Vienna in 1859. In the following years, Prussian and German militaries discussed how to direct the insurrection strategy against Britain, France, or Russia by abusing independence movements in their spheres of influence. Emperor Wilhelm II was notably enthusiastic about the idea of using the military potential of colonial, particularly Islamic, insurrections for German warfare. For this purpose, he successfully presented the German Reich as a power protecting the Islamic world, for instance during his journey to the Orient in 1898. For the emperor, insurgencies of apparently fanatical Muslims seemed to be particularly advantageous for Germany, a country that did not rule over followers of Islam, while most Muslim subjects lived in the British, French, and Russians empires. Considering the constant Muslim uprisings in the these empires’ spheres of influence—the insurrections in the Caucasus against Russia in the 1820s, the Mahdist War against Britain in Sudan (1881–99), and the continuous rebellions in French Algeria, to name just a few—a jihad seemed highly promising in times of war. One region in particular stood out: the seemingly conflict-ridden Islamic world from Northern Africa through the Middle East all the way to India. At the beginning of the war, the emperor’s appeal to “the whole Mohammedan world” was further specified. On August 5, 1914, German chief of staff Helmut von Moltke stated in a memorandum for the Foreign Office: “The insurrection of India and Egypt . . . is of utmost importance.” A war alliance with the Ottoman Empire, which remained broadly neutral until November 1914, would allow Germany to “realize this idea and to arouse Islamic fanaticism.” Shortly afterward, Wilhelm II took the initiative and cabled to the Ottoman war minister, Enver Pascha: “Turkey has to strike out. His Majesty the Sultan has to call Muslims in Asia, India, Egypt, Africa for Jihad for the caliphate.” The propositions of the German emperor fell on understanding ears. On August 18, the German ambassador in Constantinople, Hans von Wangenheim, reported Enver Pascha’s response: “His Majesty’s wish to revolutionize the Islamic world has already been prepared for some time.” A few days after the British, French, and Russian declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Mehmed V called for jihad, on November 11, 1914. In his appeal he accused the three European powers in the Orient of suppressing “millions of Muslims.”

To realize the German insurrection plans, the Foreign Office established the Intelligence Agency for the Orient. Max von Oppenheim, head of this new service, was a famous expert on “Oriental affairs” and had excellent contacts due to his many trips to the region and observer status at the German consulate general in Cairo between 1896 and 1909. The object of the Intelligence Agency was to coordinate German
propaganda activities in the Islamic world. This seemed to be necessary to break the British news monopoly, which London used to spread false information or half-truths about the Central Powers in its sphere of influence. Berlin had a clear idea why the British acted this way: “The Oriental peoples under British domination and occupation like Indians, Egyptians etc.” Oppenheim wrote to Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg on August 15, 1914, should be prevented from “taking advantage of the world war to shake off the yoke.”

In fall of 1914, Oppenheim submitted a memorandum, “Revolutionizing the Islamic Territories of Our Enemies,” to present concrete guidelines on how to proceed. To establish successful counterpropaganda, newspapers and pamphlets were to be provided. These printed materials should be brought to the region by using intermediaries like German missionary stations or schools, banks, and merchants on-site, but also Islamic religious brotherhoods, Muslim merchants, and owners of firms with a large network of branches. In addition it was planned to build up a wireless telegraphic net, which should encompass the entire Orient, all the way to Persia and Afghanistan. Thus, the whole region, including the “enemy Islamic territories” like India, should be flooded with German propaganda.

In addition to the intended propaganda, Oppenheim planned the “direct incitement and support of insurrections against our enemies.” For this, he concluded, Germany needed to provide “humans, money and materials”: “Only with very much effort satisfying results can be achieved.” Nevertheless, the effort seemed worthwhile, because “if the Turks invade Egypt and insurgencies are spreading in India, England will be worn down.” Oppenheim calculated that the German insurrection strategy would cost 100 million marks. All in all, the Germans tried to create terrorscapes via propaganda, bribes, transfer of arms and military equipment, and the deployment of German officers to train rebels and to coordinate local uprisings. Was this enough to establish terrorscapes? How successful were these efforts?

INSURGENCY AND JIHAD “MADE IN GERMANY” IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE WAR

Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the concrete implementation of the elaborated plans started. On August 14, 1914, Enver Pascha rejoiced: “Preparations made for insurrections in Caucasus, Bagdad, Bengasi, Egypt, Jerusalem.” Berlin and Constantinople agreed “that the success of the operations to revolutionize the Islamic world essentially depend on the supply of arms and munitions to the different insurgent
Yet Berlin deplored that it had not reacted to Arabic requests for help against Britain and France in the previous years based on the consideration that a mutual understanding remained possible. Therefore, at the outbreak of the war Germany wanted to act as quickly as possible. On August 6, 1914, only a few days after the German declaration of war against its enemies, Ambassador Wangelheim requested the following from Berlin: “Supply of as many rifles and munitions of any kind and quality as possible necessary to intensify insurrections in Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, Persia, Afghanistan, India. Uprisings are breaking out in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan.” Through a variety of channels, weapons and funds reached the areas to be incited, sometimes directly via the Ottoman Empire. At the end of November 1914, to cite one example, twenty-six railway wagons filled with weapons and munitions left Germany heading toward Constantinople. They contained, among other things, twenty-three thousand rifles, thirty machine guns, and ammunition. The weapons were mostly smuggled into the Caucasus and Persia. In January 1915, after various individual payments, 2.9 million gold marks were brought to Constantinople to have enough money at German disposal to bribe local chieftains and eminent personalities. In February and March 1915, the Foreign Office provided first another 2 and then another 8 million marks for insurrections. Further sums followed.

Which immediate measures were taken in the various regions to create terrorscapes in Northern Africa and the Orient? The Mannesmann brothers, who had founded the Mannesmann-Marokko Kompanie in 1909, were responsible for “inciting natives in Morocco with pamphlets etc. against the French rule.” They had close contacts with the famous rebel leader Mulai Ahmed er Raisuli, who was in command of an army of insurgents of the Rif tribes, who fought the Spanish and the French in 1909 and 1921. Weapons organized by the German consulate general in Barcelona, the center of arms smuggling to Africa at that time, reached Morocco via intermediaries. One of the brothers, Otto Mannesmann, was sent to Tripoli to incite uprisings in French territories in Algeria and Tunisia. He was equipped with printing machines to duplicate pamphlets and appeals in Arabic. To distribute them, he was given a large number of balloons: “With the help of these balloons it will be intended to distribute appeals among the Arabic population in Tunis and Algeria to create unrest in the French North African territories.” His contacts with the Senussi, a Sufi Islamic brotherhood, were expected to support his propaganda activity. The son of the famous Algerian freedom fighter Abdelkader El Djezairi, Emir Said, promised to “take action against the French with 500 horsemen, if the necessary funds would be provided.” Berlin immediately made available a larger sum.

In Egypt, Max von Oppenheim reactivated his long-standing contacts and dispatched confidants to “incite unrest among the natives.” The Egyptian National Agitation Committee in Geneva planned to interrupt the water pipe to Port Said to
The presence of thousands of pilgrims in Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah on the occasion of the autumnal pilgrimages was used to spread pro-German news in the Orient all the way to Afghanistan and India. Therefore, the Germans especially provided the sacred sites of Islam with propaganda material and let Muslims carry out the distribution. On the last day of the religious celebrations in Mecca and Medina in fall of 1914, all believers received a pamphlet “which called for struggle against the oppressors of Islam and for support of Germany.” Berlin’s hope for close cooperation with the Muslim faithful was not in vain. On August 29, 1914, Ambassador Wangenheim received the sharifs of Mecca and Medina, that is, the descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. They congratulated him on the German victories and stated: “All Muslims see in Germany the saviour from the English and French yoke. In all mosques of Arabia, but also in Mecca and Medina, people pray for the German victory day-to-day.”

All in all, diverse actions, individuals, and tribes in various regions were supported. Taken together, all these measures aimed to create interconnected terrorscapes. However, the German insurrection strategy in the Orient was only an additional element of warfare, as the Foreign Office stated as early as September 1914, because it
largely “depends on victories in Europe and the intervention of Turkey”\textsuperscript{16} the different terrorscapes in Europe and the Orient were thus closely entangled. Without the propaganda effect of a predictable German final victory over its opponents, the hesitant leaders in the Orient would not dare to wage open war against Britain, France, or Russia. Moreover, direct German potential influence was naturally quite limited because the German military command wanted to use all available funds for the European battlegrounds. Therefore, Berlin depended on the Ottoman Empire to remain cooperative and militarily successful, with German help. In the event of Ottoman defeats in the Orient, the entire German insurrection strategy would be worthless.

**THE GERMAN INSURRECTION STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN, INDIA, AND PERSIA**

India seemed particularly prone to a revolution incited by German action that could have a devastating impact on Britain. Max von Oppenheim therefore stated: “If the domestic stability of this region was deeply disturbed, England would be forced to send a major part of its fleet to India to protect uncountable British interests, the numerous Britons and the British international standing. The British public opinion would add another piece and soon England would see the necessity to conclude a peace agreement with us that suits us.”\textsuperscript{37} The German administration consciously considered large geographic spaces where violence should be sparked, especially Afghanistan and Northern India. Or, as Oppenheim put it, the “most dangerous for the English” would be these “mountain people, mostly Muslims.” They were “the only ones who are well armed.”\textsuperscript{38} The British were also aware of this danger. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Archer, chief commissioner of the Indian region of Balochistan, stated in August 1916 that uprisings had occurred on the frontier from India to Afghanistan “that may be charged up directly to the account of England’s enemies,” that is, Turkey and Germany: “Should such efforts succeed, there is no doubt that Afghanistan could make us a certain amount of trouble.”\textsuperscript{39}

In the German view, Afghanistan had to fulfil a particular role. This country under British influence owned a relatively well-equipped army of fifty-thousand fighters. In Kabul there were even factories to produce rifles and cannons. Everything seemed to fit perfectly: “The intervention of an Afghan army, especially with Turkish and German officers would make a great impression on India and would represent a fundamental danger for the British rule there. . . . Already for a long time England fears that Afghanistan could intervene during a world war.”\textsuperscript{40} This would allow Kabul to get rid of the factual British dominance over the country. Therefore, Arthur Zimmermann, undersecretary of state at the Foreign Office, opined that “influencing the Emir of Afghanistan
would be the best way to achieve the objective of an insurrection in British India.” The Germans had already sent a former employee of the Indian government and others into the region to support German propaganda efforts. At the same time, Constantinople had a permanent link to the Muslims in India at its disposal.

On August 14, 1914, Berlin received a long-awaited message. Enver Pascha informed them that his emissaries had told him that the emir of Afghanistan was “ready for any hostile action against England and Russia.” Now it seemed possible to realize the German plans and to create terrorscapes in the Orient to harm the enemies of the Reich. Detailed preparations for a revolution in India immediately started. Enver Pascha asked to dispatch twenty to thirty German officers to Constantinople. They were supposed to be assigned to an Ottoman military mission tasked to persuade Afghanistan to take up the fight against Britain. The officers had to provide military assistance and training to enable the Afghan army to invade its neighboring country. At the beginning, the “secret mission to the Emir” should only “carefully provide information,” but at a chosen point the officers were authorized to promise British and Russian territories to the emir. To prepare the ground for the expedition, emissaries were sent to Western Afghanistan to build up an “intelligence and spy network.” However, when the first German advance party arrived in Constantinople in September 1914, it quickly came to the sobering conclusion that Berlin had been dazzled by the alleged Ottoman preparations for the Afghanistan expedition. The head of the German delegation, Wilhelm Wassmuss, bitterly remarked that Constantinople “has not yet been concerned with the question how the plan could be realized.” This turned out to be even more frustrating since “the Foreign Office had already spent a considerable amount of money” for the realization of the expedition. Furthermore, more than twenty officers and experts, followed by weapons, equipment items, and gifts for the emir, were underway.

As a result, Wassmuss accelerated the preparations. It was planned that the expedition should be accompanied by an Ottoman military unit of one thousand soldiers when crossing Persia to reach Afghanistan in case the Persian tribes gave them an unfriendly welcome. If some of the tribes seemed hostile, “a Turkish division” should clear the way. Yet the Ottoman invasion of Northern Persia and the Caucasus in November 1914 changed priorities. From now on Constantinople’s interest in the expedition was nil. The Germans had to try to “achieve their aim on their own.”

In January 1915 the expedition traveled to Baghdad. Shortly afterward the Persian border was crossed. The Germans actually felt much safer without Ottoman accompaniment because according to the new head of the Afghanistan expedition, First Lieutenant Oskar von Niedermayer, “the Germans were met with more sympathy than the Turks” in Persia. He added, in view of past Ottoman assaults against Persian tribes, “Our task is not to constantly make up for Turkish mistakes.” For the time being, the Germans had to stop in Persia because as Christians they needed the permission of the
emir to cross the border into Afghanistan. The resulting downtime was to be used to promote the insurrection of Persia, a semiautonomous country dominated by Britain and Russia. The Germans planned to weaponize internal conflicts between the central government in Tehran and local chieftains, who enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. Money and delivery of arms were intended to incite tribes against the British and Russian troops in the country. Yet the main target was to take over the Persian gendarmerie, which was commanded by Swedish officers. This armed force had not received its pay regularly because of empty coffers in Tehran. Furthermore, the Swedish officers and their Persian crew were glad to be able to fight the much-hated British and Russians. The Germans promised regular pay as well as future employment in the German colonies, generous pensions, and German nationality. From January 1915 on Berlin spent 100,000 to 120,000 Persian toman monthly for the troop of ten thousand soldiers and provided 206,000 toman for credits. With the help of the gendarmerie the Germans were able to temporarily gain control over large parts of Middle Persia, especially the region around Kermanshah, Isfahan, and Tehran.

Wassmuss and a group of German and Indian companions moved on to Southern Persia to incite local chieftains against the British. The rest of the group, headed by Niedermayer, went to Tehran to create unrest in Middle and Northern Persia. All in all the Germans succeeded in arming their sympathizers. In the following months the British and Russian consulates in Western and Southern Persia, like Isfahan, Kerman, Shiraz, and Yazd, had to be abandoned. British and Russians only felt safe in those parts of the country where regular British or Russian troops were deployed. In Southwest Persia, in the region around the cities Shiraz and Yazd, Wassmuss succeeded in inciting local tribes. For several months vast areas, including the city of Shiraz, fell into the hands of the rebels. Not until the beginning of 1919 could the uprising be quashed. The British Secret Service estimated that Wassmuss, the “German Lawrence of Arabia” and “Chief German Intriguer in South Persia,” had brought together a troop of three hundred Germans and Austrians (many of whom had fled from Russian prisoner of war camps in the Caucasus to Persia), fifty Ottomans and Indians, and around twenty thousand Persians. Over time the British army had to deploy forty thousand soldiers in Persia and make use of massive repression to be able to transform the terrorscape back into a shaky peacescape.

Altogether, the German commitment largely depended on the military action of the Ottoman Empire. The Persian terrorscape was closely linked to other terrorscapes in the Caucasus or Mesopotamia. When the sultan’s army suffered several severe defeats against the British and the Russians throughout the year 1915, the Persian tribes started turning away from the Central Powers. Nevertheless, the German expedition stayed the course. The troops left for Afghanistan in June 1915 and reached Kabul on October 22, 1915. The emir welcomed the Germans kindly, knowing that he could use the delegation
as leverage against the British, who wanted to prevent an alliance between Afghanistan and Germany at any price. In the following months, the supporters of a continued pact with Britain at the court in Kabul sparred with those who preferred Germany. In January 1916, a bilateral friendship treaty in fairly general terms was signed between Afghanistan and Germany. Yet the emir did not want to commit fully as long as he was not sure which party would win the war. So far, he signalized his negotiating partners his demands to switch sides: one hundred thousand modern rifles, three hundred modern cannons including accessories, and subsidies amounting to 10 million pounds. While waiting for new instructions from Berlin regarding the emir’s demands, the Germans trained the heads of the Afghan army in general staff courses, and they taught the Afghans how to use machine guns and large artillery. However, the British did not remain inactive. They increased their subsidies paid to the emir and could thus successfully prevent an Afghan defection. The emir was also aware that faraway Germany would not be much help in a struggle against Britain. In May 1916, the German expedition left Kabul to return home. The majority of the group chose the direct way through Persia even though this seemed dangerous due to the advancing British and Russian troops. A smaller group, led by the diplomat Werner Otto von Hentig, who had worked for the German diplomatic missions in Peking, Constantinople, and Tehran, preferred the eastern route. Crossing the Himalayas, Hentig arrived in China, whence he left for the United States. There he received a very friendly welcome, which annoyed the British. The Secret Service (MI5) could not fathom how “naive” the Americans were: “It looks as though the Americans so admired von Hentig’s pluck, that they were anxious to do all they could to help him.” On June 9, 1917, Hentig finally reached Berlin.

Even if the German action in Persia and Afghanistan was rather limited, it still seemed important to London. This is evident from the way the British reacted: throughout the entire interwar period, any international letter to Niedermayer, Hentig, or others was intercepted by the British Secret Service. Furthermore, significant efforts were made to locate and punish Persian tribes as well as Swedish or Swiss accomplices of the Germans, whereby the latter only had to face expulsion from Persia. There was even more fallout from the German involvement during the First World War; some of the families of chieftains whom the British colonial power had imprisoned and expropriated received compensation payments from the German government in the 1920s. But traces of the “jihad made in Germany” can be found in the archives even for the period after the Second World War. One of the sons of a Persian chieftain who was fighting alongside the Germans in the Fars province in southwest Persia applied for asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s. He claimed that the shah’s regime had imprisoned and killed his father in 1930 as punishment for his pro-German behavior. On March 7, 1967, the son was recognized as a political refugee due to the prospect of his being persecuted by the regime; the story of his father had only marginal effects on this decision.
CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the First World War, the German Empire identified a geographical space between Northern Africa and Afghanistan/India that it sought to transform into a terrorscape. This appeared to be quite easy because the Muslim population apparently was ready to use violence when called to jihad against the British, French, and Russian foreign rulers. The traditional positive image of Germany as protector of Islam helped to support Berlin’s planning, as did the long-term frustration of people in the Orient with the European colonial powers. Berlin also benefited from the perception that the Germans were not seeking territorial annexations. Germany succeeded in turning parts of the region into a terrorscape because the strategies of domination carried out by the British, French, and Russians had long been based on the use of violence to suppress local independence movements. Violence had become the preferred strategy for the assertion of interests in the Orient. Hence little was needed for an external actor to incite insurrections and to coordinate them; decades of anger and frustration could easily be used by German officers.

In the long run, the German efforts failed, for a variety reasons. For the German leadership the insurrection strategy represented a minor aspect of the war. Only small sums were spent to support the uprisings, and few German officers were sent to the region. They could not count on much assistance from the Ottoman Empire and mostly had to act on their own. All in all, Constantinople was the decisive factor. The Ottomans blatantly aimed at annexing parts of the neighboring countries, which is why local chieftains hesitated to ally themselves closely with Constantinople. Political, cultural, and religious (Sunnis vs. Shiites) differences had an inhibiting effect on the unfolding of terrorscapes. The interests of the Ottomans and their neighbors were too different. There did not seem much advantage in exchanging one regime, the British and Russians, for another, the Ottomans. Furthermore, the defeats of the sultan’s army had the effect that local chieftains turned away from the Central Powers and — out of pragmatic considerations — accepted British or Russian rule again. However, the colonial powers were not able to get rid of the violence incited by the Germans in the long run. It was impossible for them to completely restore peace in the terrorscapes. In Persia, Shah Reza Pahlavi succeeded in liberating the country from British and Russian rule in 1921. The German action had shown the Persian national movement that the British and the Russians were not invincible. German propaganda efforts and measures to coordinate the actions of different tribes had long-term effects.

In Afghanistan, Emir Amanullah Khan came into power at the beginning of 1919. He had been the head of the pro-German faction at court and had been in close contact with Niedermayer and Hentig. Shortly after that he started the third Anglo-Afghan War in May 1919 by invading Northern India. In a way, he implemented the German
planning. After a month-long stalemate, Britain finally concluded a peace treaty in August 1919. Now Afghanistan was a fully independent state, and Amanullah became the first emir to modernize the country on Western designs. In 1926 he signed the Afghan-German friendship treaty, an extension of the bilateral treaty concluded in 1916 during the stay of the Afghanistan expedition in Kabul. After Britain and Russia, “there was now a third European power steadily gaining traction in Kabul, and that was Germany.” 68

In conclusion, this chapter has identified an entangled history of violence in interwoven and mutually responding terrorscapes. The actions on European or Asian battlefields had a large impact on how violence developed in other parts of the world. Victories and defeats were especially noticed in areas with smoldering conflicts between the local population and the ruling European colonial powers. Here it was easy for an external actor like Germany to incite insurrections. Transnational terrorscapes could be created with few ingredients: an oppressive power, which was not considered a legitimate ruler by the population; local personalities willing to take up the fight; an external actor who provided money, weapons, and propaganda; and finally a unique terrortime, which seemed to carry the opportunity to succeed.

The Germans, like their Allied adversaries, made use of violence to gain or regain control over terrorscapes in somewhat similar ways. 69 Especially the Allies, as seen in Persia, extensively made use of violence to suppress the uprisings incited by German insurrectionists, which threatened their power base in the region. Yet there is no evidence of a potential for mass destruction—other than in the European theater—to become actual. 70 The reason for that might be that the asymmetry of power between the small German deployment and the Allied forces was far too overwhelming to allow any hazardous German move based on large-scale atrocities to have a chance to succeed. Therefore, violence didn’t develop there as it did in other terrorscapes.

NOTES

Oppenheim, (Cologne: DuMont, 2001), 127.


15. “Cable 534, Wangenheim,” August 18, 1914, R20.936, 47.


40. “India Normal Despite German Agitators.”
44. “Cable 508, Wangenheim,” 18.
58. Cf. Majd, *Great Famine*, 21. The British and Russian War Offices mostly published positive news on the German agitation in Persia, which were reproduced in the international press. See, for example, the articles “German Defeat in Persia” and “Persia Rid of Germans,” New York Times, January 17 and August 11, 1916.
63. “Concerning Rumors That Hentig Had Returned to Afghanistan,” April 3, 1918, KV 2-394.


69. Isabel V. Hull, in *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2005), 102, states that “Western militaries fought very similar imperial campaigns guided by almost identical doctrines.” However, she differentiates for certain situations during World War I.


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