The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space,” the French philosopher Michel Foucault stated in 1987. He added: “The anxiety of our era has to do fundamentally with space, no doubt a great deal more than time.”¹ By privileging space over time—unthinkable for many historians who by definition considered time the most important variable—Foucault became an important voice of the so-called spatial turn in geography, social sciences, and history in the 1980s. The focus on space was also adopted by German historians, albeit with a little more caution. Reinhart Koselleck made the case in 1987 that “space as well as time are, categorically speaking, part of the conditions of potential history.”² For Germans this connection seemed obvious: the German language even linguistically links space and time in the word Zeitraum (space of time). Following this line of thought, this volume argues that all history comes with a geography. A sense of space is inevitably linked to a sense of time.³ Such a sense of space is imagined and reimagined based on tangible materialities of geography whose intangible meanings change over time, interpreted and reinterpreted in myriad ways. Likewise, our sense of time is subject to similar imaginations based on past material and textual evidence coupled with new interpretations. Space and time are thus not a repository of the past that can be replayed at leisure but are reimagined every time we revisit the past.⁴ Imagination also shapes our ability to remember or forget the past as individuals, communities, or nations. Memory is thus alive in the present as constructions of past time and space contracting toward the future.
with ever-new possibilities of imagination of space, time, and memory. This book rests on an understanding of memory as highly dynamic and subject to societal negotiation of time and space, enabling many different readings about the possibilities of the past. Investigating such continuities of ideas of space, time, and memory with respect to violence is at the heart of this volume.

The map in figure I.1 illustrates these continuities of notions of space, time, and memory. Printed for a Frankfurt-based shipping company, its representation of completed German highways versus those shown as under construction reveals that the map dates from 1936. Although very much an object of everyday use, the map contains a host of clues to how its makers thought about space and national belonging. After all, German borders from before World War I are still indicated, and place-names are mostly rendered in the German form, sometimes with Polish names underneath. This kind of irredentism is not surprising for maps of the interwar period even before the Nazi takeover. Yet its owner—Wilhelm Benkert, grandfather of one of the authors of this chapter—felt the need to update the borders on the map. It is not difficult to imagine that the Wehrmacht soldier who first took part in the occupation of the Sudetenland and later marched into what remained of Czechoslovakia felt pride and glee as he redrew the borders to indicate the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938, the German dismantling of Czechoslovakia, and the forced cession of Memel from Lithuania in March 1939. The impromptu updates on the map seem to echo the triumphalist fanfare of Nazi propaganda. As if to give the new borders a sense of authenticity and permanence, he even used blue crayon to match the color of how borders were represented on the map. Still, the blue crayon cannot hide the fact that the map shows three versions of Germany while hiding another. The borders of Imperial Germany until 1918, the early Nazi state of 1936, and the soldier’s updates on Nazi expansions made under the threat of war until March 1939 are visible, while the memory of Weimar is erased. The stroke of the blue crayon also sought to erase the memory of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The curious overlap of different spatial imaginations of different Germanies corresponds with different temporalities of German history whose memory traces can still be found on the map.

If the blue crayon marked the annexations on the previous map in an improvised fashion, the map in figure I.2, from between March and September 1939, already incorporated these forced border changes at the time it was printed in 1939. The annexation of Austria, the establishment of the Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, and the forced cession of Memel all blend into the German-dominated landmass indicated by the same color. The borders of Imperial Germany are still marked, but they seem to matter only with respect to Poland, yet to be conquered. After the German invasion of Poland, Wilhelm Benkert also marked the new borders, first on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939, largely following the Vistula River.
Later he updated the map again, now in accordance with the German-Soviet Frontier Treaty of September 28, 1939, which also entailed a secret addendum concerning the borders, whose implications, however, became clear very rapidly. The “twin faces of totalitarianism” had carved up Poland, and not only did Wilhelm Benkert take part in the actual invasion, his markings on the map echo the very map used by the dictators. This goes to show how easily many ordinary Germans like Wilhelm Benkert adopted the regime’s expansionist goals. Yet the map also reveals how quickly Nazi ideas of space sparked the imagination of ordinary Germans, even if they went well beyond the most irredentist notions of the borders of Imperial Germany still included on the map. Wilhelm Benkert’s blue crayon thus helped to create a Germany based solely on Nazi imaginings. Finally, the map’s updates suggest at least wholehearted agreement if not complicity, understood as “degrees of involvement, degrees of knowledge, degrees of intention, and degrees of agency,” all of which apply to a soldier decorated for his efforts during the campaign. Such complicity, however, stands in stark contrast to family lore that highlighted noninvolvement (he was not in the party, he was not a Nazi), blissful ignorance (he was a frontline soldier unaware of what was happening around him), lack of intention to go to war (he only signed up for the army because the family business went bankrupt during the Great Depression), and passivity (as a soldier in the Weimar Reichswehr, he could not vote and therefore had no part in the Nazi takeover). Memory and map thus seem to contradict each other. Entangled notions of space, time, and memory are imprinted on this map—a document whose abstract colors hide the violence behind it—and inform today’s decisions to remember or forget. Taken together, personal photos of his time in the army, family lore, his service records, and the maps offer a mix of experience tainted by narrative repetition, selective archival material, and spatial visualizations that shape a contradictory historical record. To explore such entangled notions with respect to violence is the purpose of this book.

TIME AND SPACE AS MODES OF HISTORICAL INQUIRY

Describing change over time is the historian’s creed, and arguing on the basis of historical evidence is the historian’s craft. Yet change over time is always related to place, space, and sources that cannot be interpreted outside of the context of their temporal, spatial, and social conception. Edward W. Soja, who in 1989 coined the term “spatial turn,” added only seven years later: “Contemporary critical studies have experienced a significant spatial turn. In what may be seen as one of the most important intellectual and political developments in the late twentieth century, scholars have begun to interpret space and the spatiality of human life with the same critical insight and emphasis...
that has traditionally been given to time and history on the one hand, and to social relations and society on the other.”

Exploring the connection between time and space, however, is not as new as the advocates of the spatial turn would have us believe. The German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, for instance, asserted in 1830: “The truth of space is time, and thus space becomes time; the transition to time is not made subjectively by us, but made by space itself. In pictorial thought, space and time are taken to be quite separate: we have space and also time; philosophy rights against this ‘also.’” Martin Heidegger
went even further than Hegel, arguing that space and time had to be thought of together in one “Zeit-Raum.”17

Following Hegel, geographers and historians began studying the effects of geography on politics and international relations in the past and present around the turn of the twentieth century. This sudden relevance of space had much to do with the process of industrialization. Already at the end of the nineteenth century the world was interconnected through modern railways and telegraphs.18 The time needed for people and information to move across vast spatial distances was reduced considerably. In 1870 most parts of the world were connected by commercial telegraphy.19 Space and time seemed to contract, as much by means of faster travel as by means of quicker communication. People therefore observed what the anthropologist David Harvey called a “time-space compression.”20 The literary expression of this feeling is the obsession with temporality that can be observed in Marcel Proust’s *À la recherche du temps perdu.*21

The fact that space seemed to shrink throughout the nineteenth century had the effect that space was given more thought than before. Academics like the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, and the American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan began to study the effects of geography on politics and international relations as well as history. Their concepts can be subsumed under the term *geopolitics,* which was introduced by Rudolf Kjellén.22 These theories were first tested on the periphery, in the colonies, the Middle East, and the Balkans, but in World War I these theories led to ethnic cleansing in large parts of Europe and from there beyond Europe. Ethnic cleansing as a geopolitical tool informed not only German fantasies of victory but also British, French, and Italian ideas about the actual postwar period.23 Yet after the “golden age” of geopolitics in the 1920s and 1930s, the concept was heavily discredited by the National Socialist idea of Lebensraum and the unprecedented atrocities in its wake. Especially in Germany, historians lost interest in political developments linked to space, a development that was intensified by the shift to social sciences.24

The late 1980s saw a sudden renaissance of spatial concepts freed from their problematic geopolitical heritage. In 1991 the American literary critic Fredric Jameson wrote: “A certain spatial turn has often seemed to offer one of the more productive ways of distinguishing postmodernism from modernism proper.”25 How can this sudden renaissance be explained? Two factors seem crucial for an understanding of the comeback of space. One concerns the disappearance of borders, at least if seen through a European perspective. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was the most palpable event, inviting spectators to participate in physically destroying a border. The effect was surprising: when the Iron Curtain was finally lifted, people discovered the lost space in Eastern Europe, which for a long time had remained forgotten in the shadow of the border. Similarly, the process of European integration—only dimly reproduced by the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—following the inception of the Schengen Convention brought the elimination of border controls in parts of Europe from 1990 onward.\textsuperscript{16} However, the dissolution of inner-European borders was paralleled by a stricter enforcement of European external frontiers—not always successfully, as the immigration wave of 2015 has shown, and surely not fairly, as the burden rests mostly on states bordering countries outside the European Union (EU).\textsuperscript{17} The dissolution of borders corresponded to the second factor, explaining the return of spatial approaches: historical inquiry changed to concentrate less on the nation-state and more on transnational and global history.\textsuperscript{18} The nation-state, which since the nineteenth century had seemed the most important point of reference for historians, appeared fragile, even—in the case of the states of the EU—outdated; postnationalism reigned.\textsuperscript{19} Only in recent years has nationalism regained strength through a host of populist movements in Europe and the United States, though scholarship so far seems to be very reluctant to focus on the national paradigm again.

Not only did borders seem to disappear from the 1980s on; apparently space itself also vanished due to the internet revolution. Comparable to the period around 1900 with its travel and communication advancements, another compression of time and space following the spread of global interconnectedness occurred. Space no longer mattered in Marshall McLuhan’s interconnected and real-time “global village.”\textsuperscript{20} Yet, analogous to the emergence of geopolitics at the beginning of the twentieth century, space also suddenly returned to the center of attention at the turn of the twenty-first century. Spatial concepts flooded social and cultural studies as well as geography and history.\textsuperscript{21} In history, Karl Schlögel’s book \textit{Im Raume lesen} especially popularized the “spatial turn” as much as it saw it from an ironic point of view.\textsuperscript{22} Most importantly in this ebb and flow of space as a mode of inquiry, it seems that space cannot be disentangled from time. After all, history always “takes place.”

**TERRORTIMES AND TERRORSCAPES: VIOLENCE, SPACE, TIME, AND MEMORY AS INTERWOVEN FABRICS**

Adding to scholarship linking time and space, this volume suggests describing continuities of violence as overlapping fabrics woven together from notions of space, time, and memory. Such an approach helps us highlight continuities of violence and avoid describing violence as limited to a certain space and time. As Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz stress, regions of bloody conflict—\textit{terrorscapes}, as we call them in this volume\textsuperscript{23}—are larger and more ambiguous than clearly defined bloodlands.\textsuperscript{24} Similarly,
Jürgen Zimmerer has shown with respect to continuities between Germany’s colonial genocide and the Holocaust that *terrortimes* are longer and endowed with less clear temporal boundaries than common periodizations of war and peace suggest. Our probe highlights such continuities, but as Thomas Kühne suggests, ambiguities and complexities are never far from such an endeavor. On continuities between Germany’s genocide of the Herero and Nama and the Holocaust, he warns that “instead of relying on vague, generalized and abstract concepts of colonialism and imperialism on the one hand, of the Holocaust, the Nazi empire, Nazi violence on the other, the diversity, shades, peculiarities and antagonisms of either case should be taken into account.” This, he continues, will “identify which part, type or aspect of colonialism or imperialism is linked to, or can be compared with, which part, type, or aspect of the Holocaust, the Nazi empire and Nazi violence.” Memory, too, is woven into this fabric of notions of time and space, and here too complexities abound. As Georgi Verbeeck has shown with respect to Germany’s colonial genocide, Germans reflect on their colonial past very differently than other former colonial powers do, because Germany had already lost its colonies in the wake of World War I, and memories of the colonial space and time are overshadowed by the paradigm of coming to terms with the Holocaust and its European and midcentury locus. Our probe shows that notions of time, space, and memory thus reinforce and mesh with each other, which leads us to explore continuities rather than to accept neat categorizations of time and place in this volume.

Kühne’s reminder to not ignore complexity and ambiguity in exploring continuities is thus well taken, yet we argue that its complexity and ambiguity often strengthen such overlapping fabrics of time, place, and memory. Terrortimes and terrorscapes sometimes cloak violence by seemingly relegating it to a bloody but distant past or bloodlands far away. However problematic such constructions are, past terrortimes and distant terrorscapes can thus also serve to legitimate a hopefully more peaceful era and space, as the Holocaust, for example, serves as a “negative founding myth” for the EU and an argument for further European integration, hoping to immunize Europe against future violence. If such myths stress a break with a violent past and a reimagination of space beyond bloodlands, reference to terrortimes and terrorscapes can also be used to incite new violence by stressing continuities of violence. In this reading, the here and now is hanging by the threads of long-worn memory fabrics calling for irredentism to restore old borders and past greatness. Violence is thus conceived by actors and states who imagine often contested and heterogeneous spaces to fit their ideology in order to envision an allegedly brighter future after its application. Facilitated by asymmetrical power relations and colonial powers, who as third parties played colonized groups off against each other, violence is then both gratuitous in the region and absent among those who hope to benefit from its use. These spatial notions are accompanied by ideas about the temporal use of violence allegedly becoming obsolete once the utopian vision,
Introduction

for example in its Nazi or Stalinist form, is reality. Even as such utopian visions crumble, echoes of terrortimes and terrorscapes reverberate back to us today, often altered or amplified by memory narratives. What emerges is an image of violence that must be thought of in thick yet flexible and fragile liaison to the space and time in which it is exercised and its overlapping, threaded, and torn relationship to memory. This volume probes these overlapping fabrics, following their threads and open seams to explore continuities in how communities understand violence spatially and temporally and how they remember the past to fit contemporary needs.

Understanding violence in this overlapping manner adds to scholarship that often has compartmentalized its study by wars, nations, theaters, dates, and atrocities. On the basis of diverse theories on violence, space, time, and memory, this volume identifies themes of violence that probe established spatial or temporal boundaries while also delineating dynamics common to diverse instances of violence in the twentieth century. These themes rest on spatial conceptions, states, and actors who envision and enforce these spaces; the imaginations and emotions with which they mobilize people; and the temporal and memory continuities that echo them. Linking themes to the texts included in this volume, each theme is then explored through the particular focus chosen by the contributors to this book.

Theories of Violence: Space, Time, and Memory

This volume understands violence and nonviolence as situational options of human behavior embedded in overlapping temporal, spatial, and memory contexts. Such violence-enabling situations have been theorized in a host of different ways, ranging from situations that normalize violence, processes of barbarization among perpetrators, and organizations spurring on violence, to affectual interactions driven by ideology and propaganda. Their underlying spatial, temporal, and memory connotations are what this volume hopes to investigate.

Reflecting on the situational metamorphosis of ordinary men into killers, Christopher Browning acquaints us with normal middle-aged policemen from Hamburg who became murderers when called upon to kill the Jews of Józefów even though they had a credible chance to opt out. Worse still, among those few who refused to participate in their baptism of brutality in Józefów, some later changed their minds and accepted the horrific murders they committed as normal in that situation and that place. If situations change men in a short period of time, an encounter with violence over a longer period will also lead to barbarization of men who otherwise show no particular inclination to violence. Observing processes of barbarization of
regular Wehrmacht soldiers—draftees with a propensity for or aversion to violence no different from those of average Germans—Omer Bartov argues that the war turned men “into both highly professional and determined soldiers, brutalized instruments of a barbarous policy, and devoted believers in a murderous ideology.” As such, the war “made the Wehrmacht into Adolf Hitler’s army, the Germans into Hitler’s people.”

Enhancing this brutalization, organizations such as the Schutzstaffel (SS), the Einsatzgruppen, and the police battalions developed “an organizational culture of brutal attacks” that included torture and humiliation in their murderous task. This organizational culture strengthened unit cohesion, making skeptics overcome their reluctance and identify with the organization’s goals and creating a comradeship among the murderers that caused “direct pleasure.” Such group violence almost always takes on institutional forms, if only to condone and legitimize it, but Gewaltmassen (violent masses) can also have a more temporal character, for example in pogroms and lynch mobs. Group members then derive self-assurance and pleasure from exercising violence, because membership serves both their professional goals of advancement and their personal goals of emotional belonging. Such an attachment to a group can also be aroused by emotional investment in a cause. Belonging and fear of the “other,” who is often ridiculed and denigrated while also being declared a powerful threat to the entire group, go hand in glove. Belonging and fear thus reinforce ideologies of hate often delivered by powerful propaganda.

Even if violence-inducing situations are triggered in very different ways, they are defined by the space in which they emerge. After all, ideology-driven utopian visions of space of the Nazi and Soviet persuasions created the “Bloodlands” that Timothy Snyder describes. As German soldiers set out to conquer the East, they brought with them ideas of geopolitics long harbored by German intellectuals, generals, and politicians. These ideas were grounded in the desire to reorder and homogenize the East. With the reconfiguring of space came notions about its inhabitants that ultimately led to genocide and mass murder, particularly of Jews and others deemed inferior. Joseph Stalin too had ideas about space and people. These ideas were not informed by race but by class and power, and they also led to horrific violence in the form of deliberate mass starvation and shootings in Ukraine and elsewhere on an unimaginable scale. “The bloodlands were where most of Europe’s Jews lived, where Hitler and Stalin’s imperial plans overlapped, where the Wehrmacht and the Red Army fought, and where the Soviet NKVD and the German SS concentrated their forces.” Borderlands thus are often the place of interethnic coexistence or clashing conceptions of space and time and thus are particularly prone to violence.

Ideas of space echo temporal conceptions of how this space was defined in the past as well as giving voice to utopian notions of future use. Violence becomes a means to redeem past claims to space as well as to realize future conquest.
continuities of violence, some scholars have observed a decrease in violence due to the “civilizing processes” enabled through early modern state formation. In this reading “violence disappears, when the conditions that cause it (lust, want, aggression) disappear,” as powerful states tame lust, decrease want, and sanction aggression. Following Norbert Elias’s lead, Heinrich Popitz also argues that violence will decrease. Though always a possible option of human behavior, intrinsically linked to power and thus needed for any societal organization, the increase in social and moral norms will help to bind the power of violence and channel it into acceptable norms. The latest, and probably the most widely recognized, contribution to this school of thought comes from the American scholar Steven Pinker. Using a quote from Abraham Lincoln’s first inaugural address in 1861, Pinker maintains that violence is not an innate condition of mankind but environmentally triggered. By training the equally situationally invoked “better angels of our nature,” like empathy, self-control, moral sense, and reason, we can contain violence. Past horrors can also have a civilizing character, as states renounce past violence on moral grounds as well as for strategic and diplomatic gain. Arguably, a nationalist backlash to justify and relativize German aggression in World War II would have eliminated all hopes for future unification of the two German states, which is why—except for the quickly defeated conservative position in the Historikerstreit—there was no concerted effort by German conservatives in this direction. If those arguing in support of civilizing processes see the formation of the state coupled with an Enlightenment “humanitarian revolution” in the eighteenth century or the strategic concerns of states as civilizing forces, other scholars point to the state as the very catalyst for violence. After all, it was state violence that transformed the “short 20th century” into the “Age of Extremes.” The crisis of the state gave way to historical processes that far from exercising civility resulted in a “century of genocide” in which “ideologies of race and nation, revolutionary regimes with vast utopian ambitions, [and] moments of crisis generated by war and domestic upheaval” spurred on unprecedented violence. The focus on nation-states, ideologies, and revolutions as modern phenomena has also suggested a particular connection between violence and modernity. Considering the “rationalizing, engineering tendency of modernity,” grand social designs of racial and ethnic homogeneity become possible, especially if powered by science and enabled by modern bureaucracy.

Spatial and temporal notions of violence are deeply ingrained in communicative and cultural memory and thus inform group and cultural identity. Maurice Halbwachs points to the social construction of memory in interactions between members of a group linked to a specific place. This social embeddedness validates individual experiences and adopts them into or rejects them from a diffuse canon of collective memory. Interwoven into the canon of collective memory are notions of time and place. German collective memory on flight and expulsions, for example, favors memories of
German victimization over earlier memories of mass murder and genocide committed by Germans. By the same token, in accounts of expellees collected by Theodor Schieder, a vaguely defined East emerged as the site of German collective martyrdom in which the wartime enemies easily morphed into new Cold War enemies. In contrast to collective memory’s reliance on social negotiation of memory, cultural memory relies on the interpretations of elites in politics and culture, such as politicians, scholars, curators, editors, writers, and so forth. It also differs from collective memory in its mediation in texts, rituals, performances, and formalized language. Not even the cultural formations representing an event as incomprehensible as the Holocaust have “avoided the pitfalls of routine reproduction and effortless consumption.” Yet here too space and time are negotiated. Theodor Schieder, the aforementioned collector of accounts of expellees, who had previously advised the infamous Gauleiter Erich Koch on deportations of Poles and Jews after the German attack on Poland in 1939, carefully edited the accounts to highlight German victimization and renew claims to lost territories in the East.

In this reading, violence triggered in a host of different situational contexts also has underlying notions of space, time, and memory, which together form a deep fabric of interwoven meanings difficult to disentangle.

THEMES AND TEXTS IN THIS VOLUME

Based on the conceptual framework linking notions of time, space, and memory, we developed nine general themes that help to explain why violence occurred or was stimulated in certain spaces at a given time. On the basis of these themes, which are open to further extension, we solicited articles grouped them into four categories. The first section explores spatial and temporal continuities with a particular focus on the themes “Contested Spaces” and conflicts based on “Space and Ideas of National, Ethnic, or Religious Homogeneity.” Fears concerning territorial boundaries and identities are often stoked by states and actors, which informs the second section around the themes “States as Contributors to or Enablers of Violence,” “Asymmetric Power Relations,” and “Third-Party Actors and the Question of Genocide.” States and actors also fuel imagination and emotions, the focus of the third section, through “Utopian Ideologies and Their Limits” and “Emotion, Hope, Fear, and Belonging.” Memory of terrortimes sometimes triggers new terrortimes, which is why the fourth and last section is devoted to temporal and memory continuities and their impact on violence. This section revolves around the themes “Crafting the History of Terrortimes” and “Terrortimes in Transnational Perspective.”
SECTION 1: SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL CONTINUITIES

This section explores two themes, “Contested Spaces” and “Space and Ideas of National, Ethnic, or Religious Homogeneity.” The term contested space can refer to borderlands or regions disputed by two countries or different social or religious groups. Bukovina, a region divided between Romania and Ukraine, can be taken as an example. Romania, as a German ally, invaded the Soviet part of Bukovina in June 1941. In just a few weeks, tens of thousands of Jews were killed by Romanian troops in the newly annexed territory of Bukovina and in Bessarabia and Dorohoi, which were also seized from the Soviet Union. In part Romanian forces were joined by the German Einsatzgruppe D of Otto Ohlendorf, and in part they were supported by local Romanians and Ukrainians. More than 150,000 Jews were deported into the Transnistria Governorate under Romanian rule. Thousands died during transport. In September 1943, only around 50,000 had survived in ghettos and camps. Between October 1941 and March 1942 Romanian troops killed most of the Ukrainian Jews in Transnistria. In this case, German and Romanian antisemitism joined to form a murderous coalition, but in contested spaces such as Bukovina this coalition was particularly heinous, spurred on by Romanian interest in laying claim to the region and underlying historical notions of space, ethnicity, and religion. Ethnic cleansing and genocide were the consequence. A similar dynamic web of entangled notions of space, temporal belonging, and memory of the past can also be observed in other contested regions. In Alsace-Lorraine, contested by France and Germany for centuries, in the 1920s and 1930s antisemitism was much more pronounced than elsewhere in France. The same goes for Southern France at the border with Italy, contested by both countries. This region was the homeland of the extremist and anti-Semitic French Militia, which from 1943 on supported German troops against insurgents and often ended up being among the approximately 7,500 French who made up the French SS-Division Charlemagne. Here too a contested space fostered violent behavior, because national belonging after centuries of conflict seemed endangered.

In the first chapter, Ursula K. Mindler-Steiner refers to the contested space Burgenland, an Austrian region that borders Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia. She examines how the special situation as a contested space and a long history of continuous discrimination had a radicalizing effect on the treatment of the minority of the Roma who, especially after 1938, were persecuted violently.

The theme “Space and Ideas of National, Ethnic, or Religious Homogeneity” discusses why certain spaces are contested. Regions with heterogeneous societies and large minorities were often ravaged by waves of violence. An example is the Baltic state of Lithuania, with its large Jewish, Polish, German, and Ukrainian minorities, which
accounted for about 25 percent of the country’s population at the beginning of the war. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Lithuanians hoped for independence for their country, which had been occupied by the Soviet Union since 1939. Therefore, Lithuanian paramilitary troops took advantage of the German invasion of their territory. Enabled, encouraged, and enlisted by the Germans, sometimes acting on their own, they murdered most Jews living in the countryside in just two months. Why did the Jews of the country become a target, and how does this relate to the ambition to regain independence? Jews were seen as a pro-communist minority that had seemingly supported the earlier Soviet occupation of Lithuania. Ethnic cleansing to create homogeneity—that is, fighting an imagined inner enemy to defend the country against an external enemy—seemed a way to support the independence of Lithuania. Even though ideas of space and time differed greatly—Germany had no plans to grant Lithuania independence, and some German officials even considered Lithuania a place for German settlement—Lithuanian ideas of ethnic homogeneity coincided with the Germans’ murderous plans. Heterogeneity was perceived as a threat to national independence and thus personal security and prosperity. To cite another example, the same applies to the city of Thessaloniki, which was annexed by Greece in 1912. Greece’s largest Jewish community of around fifty-five thousand people lived in this contested city (two-thirds of the total population). Jews had been considered a model minority and had been endowed with privileges by the Turkish government before 1912. As a result, Greeks saw Jews as pro-Turkish. The result of this perception was unexpected: while Jews were mostly able to survive in the Greek mainland, the overwhelming majority of the Jewish community of Thessaloniki was deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau and murdered. German murderers were helped by the local Greek population, which played an important role in turning over the Jews to the Italian and later German occupiers. The Greek support for the German anti-Semitic measures in this heterogeneous town—in stark contrast to Greek behavior elsewhere—can be explained by the wish to homogenize the newly annexed city behind the backdrop of a web of historical notions of space and belonging of this region. In Algeria, which was a French département until the independence of the country in 1962, antisemitism was also widespread among the European settlers and the native Muslim population. Muslims were especially antagonized because the French had accorded French citizenship to Jews in 1870 but not to Muslims. In 1932 the pogrom of the city of Constantine caused twenty-five deaths among the Jewish population. From October 1940, the Vichy regime deprived the Jews of their French citizenship in Northern Africa. More than thirty labor camps were opened in Algeria and Morocco, where about fifteen thousand Jews were detained. When the Allies took over the area in November 1942, nothing changed initially. The labor camps were not closed before April 1943, and French anti-Jewish legislation remained in force until March 14, 1943. As these examples show, heterogeneity
was perceived as a threat in many regions. In periods of crisis or veritable terrortimes, violence stoked by states and actors erupted to restore false notions of homogeneity in places that had for a long time been marked by ethnic and religious diversity.

In the second chapter, Anna Cichopek-Gajraj discusses the treatment of surviving German and Polish Jews in the newly “recovered territories” in western Poland after liberation. She shows that the “foreign” German Jews were often deprived of their citizenship rights, even though they were as much victims of National Socialism as Polish Jews were, whereas Polish Jews were more often considered as nationals with—at least in public declarations—equal rights. This stands in contrast to the officially proclaimed policy of homogenization or Polonization, which rested on two different sets of criteria: ethnolinguistic aspects that had intellectual precursors long before the war and newer ideas on behavior during the war. The fact that their Jewishness was not a safeguard against new discrimination suggests that deeply ingrained continuities of racial, ethnic, and religious belonging in the Polish nation were inserted into the newly “recovered territories.”

**SECTION 2: STATES AND ACTORS**

The next three themes presented in this volume can be summarized by the idea that actions of states, groups, or individuals can foster violence and genocide. Beginning with a focus on states, the first theme considers “States as Contributors to or Enablers of Violence.” Terrorscapes may be a result of the state abusing its monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force by imposing state terror; Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s is a prime example. Violence was a way to consolidate Stalin’s power, and the state was the agent to exercise this violence. Measures conceived earlier, such as the collectivization of the agricultural sector, which led to the subsequent famine of 1932–33, were therefore accelerated and maintained despite the horrific results. Although famine impacted various parts of the Soviet Union, it is no surprise that particular vengeance was enacted against perceived threats to Stalin’s rule. Kulaks especially were seen not only as class enemies but also as bearers of Ukrainian nationalism. Yet Stalin also feared that widespread discontent would lead to an uprising or other forms of opposition even within the party. Therefore, the Communist Party was purged of “suspicious characters” who were deemed dangerous less to the cause than to Stalin himself. In these instances, Stalin was the instigator of violence and the state his willing tool.

Bart Luttikhuis’s contribution to this volume shows that a democratic state like the Netherlands could also act to ignite violence and later suppress information about its own agency. Shaken by years of brutal German occupation during World War II and forgetful of its own divisive history of resistance and collaboration, the Netherlands set
out to reestablish its colonial empire and brutally suppress independence movements after 1945. Against the backdrop of a country simultaneously rebuilding its own ravaged cities and continuing centuries of colonial rule, Luttikhuis’s article focuses on the Dutch military campaigns in the Indonesian cities of Jambi and Rengat in 1948–49. The mission, carried out by troops of Dutch and Javanese origin, was to reinforce Dutch control over the region shaken by the Japanese occupation during World War II and Indonesian independence movements. Luttikhuis shows that even in cases when atrocities committed by the Dutch troops were discussed in public, the state that had ordered the campaigns refused to thoroughly investigate well-documented complaints from local residents of these cities. Furthermore, the state took measures to protect Dutch soldiers of European origin more than troops of Javanese origin, who on the basis of old stereotypes were seen as less disciplined. In doing so, the newly recreated Dutch state operated through a web of entangled expectations and stereotypes that fostered violence when challenged by a newly emboldened independence movement. The Dutch state also tried to shape the memory of this event while catering to much older discriminatory expectations that had long repercussions in Dutch historiography.

The next theme identifies “Asymmetric Power Relations” as another force that facilitates violence. Power relations are a crucial factor influencing the practice of violence against vulnerable individuals or groups. Such individuals, groups, or states then resort to asymmetric forms of violence as a means to fight more powerful adversaries, for example by using guerrilla tactics. During World War II, partisan movements fighting German occupation existed in most countries. Yet even if postwar memory presented a picture of a mass movement, actual numbers for France, for instance, show a participation of around 2 percent of the population. In order to fight the German or other Axis troops, resistance fighters resorted to violence not only against occupiers but also against collaborators in order to balance their small numbers. German troops reacted brutally everywhere; in the East they often even linked genocidal action with fighting partisans. In France the struggle between the Maquisards and the extremist French Militia, which carried out acts of vengeance against each other, including killing many innocent civilians, brought the country to the brink of civil war in 1944. Real or imagined asymmetric power relations were a contributing factor to terrorscapes.

In the fourth chapter, Michael Mayer discusses insurgencies in British- and Russian-dominated territories in Afghanistan, India, and Persia during World War I, where local groups fought the powerful foreign troops occupying their countries. These insurgencies were partly supported and sometimes incited by German intelligence officers, who also found themselves in an asymmetric power relation to the British and the Russians in territories far away from German power bases. Mayer argues that the common aim of locals and Germans was to create a terrorscape to influence the behavior of the ruling power. Local groups as well as Germans tried to offset their weak position
by using violence, triggering a violent reaction from British and Russian forces, which feared a general uprising in the area that had to be prevented at all costs in a situation of global war. Although this policy did not prove very successful in the first place, the long-term effects considerably changed the power structure between colonial subjects and colonial powers, influencing their paths to independence.

The last theme in this section focuses on “Third-Party Actors and the Question of Genocide.” A third-party actor could be a state, a colonial power, or a group intervening in a region and influencing the scale of violence. The British colonial empire, with its policy of indirect rule, used and abused local conflicts and thus became a third-party actor. The British were mostly in control of the scale of violence through the use of powerful weapons like machine guns. Whenever local conflicts escalated in a way that did not support the interests of London, British units could impose their will because they were commanding the ultimate forms of violence. The British poet Hilaire Belloc 1898 put it this way: “Whatever happens we have got / The Maxim gun, and they have not.” Other colonial powers acted similarly. The classic example of a third-party state actor is Germany trying to exploit the conflicts that great powers like France, Russia, or the United Kingdom had with ethnic and religious groups under their dominion. For instance, the independence of Ukraine in 1918 was a way to enlarge German influence in Eastern Europe and restrict Russian/Soviet influence in the region. On March 3, 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Germany and Russia was signed, granting Ukraine independence, which was supported by German soldiers who had pushed the Bolsheviks out of Kiev on March 1, 1918. Something similar happened in Georgia, which became independent of the Russian empire on 26 May 1918. German troops in Tbilisi protected this independence against the Russian and Turkish appetite to take over power in Georgia because Germany was longing for influence over the Caucasian oil fields at the same time. Both experiments in which local leaders tried to use Germany as a third-party actor to gain independence from the power that had dominated the region failed when the German army had to retreat after signing the armistice of November 11, 1918. During World War II, Ukraine and Georgia again hoped for independence through German arms, which speaks to continuities in how these countries imagined space and actors in the region. All in all, the German third-party actor, as well as local leaders, resorted to violence as a means to gain influence and met a violent reaction from the powers they sought to depose.

In the fifth chapter, Jason Bruner examines settler colonialism and the question of genocide. He asks why mass exterminations of native people in Africa carried out by colonial powers are not considered “genocide” or “cultural genocide,” whereas these terms are frequently applied to similar developments in Australia and America. Settlers and missionaries, as third-party actors accompanying European imperialism, were certainly complicit in genocidal acts, but their presence was not a necessary condition for
the occurrence of genocide in European colonies in Africa. Examining “new genocide history,” which explores the many personal, intellectual, and structural links between genocide and imperialism under the term *settler colonialism*, Bruner argues that such histories emphasize outcomes and long-term effects rather than intent to systematically eliminate people and culture. According to Bruner, this paradigm shift is problematic in two ways. First, mass violence occurred both in places with settlers present and in places where few settlers were present. Second, the focus on outcomes makes genocide a frequent and common occurrence in human history across temporal and spatial lines, which may diminish the usefulness of the term *genocide*.

Violence employed by states and actors is always informed by underlying notions of gender and thus results in particular violence levied against women. Gendered violence is often fostered by images of masculinity that are linked to violence. Social norms constructing masculinity equate it with power and dominance, whereas femininity is seen as synonymous with weakness but also with “purity,” which supposedly has to be protected by men. On the other hand, sexual violence against other men, which is less frequent, is a way to demasculinize men and to feminize them. As a result, violence in terrorscapes and terrortimes is often gendered and overcomes social norms of masculinity and femininity to contribute to violent behavior. The volume does not include a contribution specifically on the theme of gendered violence, but the theme does emerge in a variety of contributions, especially the article by Rachel Fuchs in section 3.

**SECTION 3: IMAGINATION AND EMOTIONS**

The previous sections focused on continuities of spatial conceptions and the influence of states and actors in igniting violence. This section pairs research on ideology and affect with concepts of violence. The first theme covered here is “Utopian Ideologies and Their Limits.” Ideological imprinting conceived by states and actors serves as a justification to subdue society to its harsh logic and also as a “justifying” factor that helps perpetrators frame their deeds and exculpate themselves. Perceptions of cultural and racial superiority coupled with ideas on space, for example, played an extraordinary role for European colonial powers and helped to legitimize the use of violence against native people. The presence of native people was then often ignored in allegedly empty spaces. Their land was seen as ripe for reordering, since native people allegedly did not use it, an idea pertinent to American history almost from the beginning of the European presence in North America. The German war against the Soviet Union also had similar ideological underpinnings of space, and it entailed enslavement and annihilation of those conquered. From the start it was decided that the Hague Convention would not be applied to Soviet prisoners of war because of a perceived “slave brutality” and
“inferiority,” leading to the murder of millions of Soviet prisoners of war. Ideology also informed the “collective punishment” of Soviet civilians in reprisal for real or imagined partisan attacks in accordance with the criminal Kriegsgerichtsbarkeiterlass im Ostheer of 1941. Jews in particular were almost by default considered partisans and thus likely targets of violent reprisals. Ideology in the form of anti-communism and antisemitism was the most powerful tool used to incite German and other Axis soldiers in the war against the Soviet Union. On a pan-European scale this ideological tool also worked to mobilize the half a million soldiers from various European countries—sometimes following direct or indirect pressure—to join the Belgian, Danish, Dutch, French, and other SS divisions.

In the sixth chapter, Rachel G. Fuchs reminds us, however, of the limits of ideological indoctrination. Her contribution focuses on the question of the extent to which the shift from the French Third Republic to the authoritarian Vichy Regime in 1940 influenced private relationships, especially when it came to paternity suits. Fuchs cautions against attributing too much influence on ideology, pointing out that for those not directly impacted by persecution and war, it had a marginal influence on their private lives. Even terror times such as the German occupation of France during World War II, which clearly fostered collaboration and complicity among people and bureaucracies under the banner of anti-Semitic ideologies in some areas, left others unharmed. This speaks to the presence of an entangled web of ideas, laws, and perceptions from the previous Third Republic, from Vichy, and from the German occupiers, which all informed the lives of French women and men in highly varied ways. The harsh ideologies of race and gender imagined by Vichy and Nazi Germany thus found limits not only in private lives.

This section’s second theme considers “Emotion, Hope, Fear, and Belonging.” As the previous sections rested on situational aspects of violence seen through the lenses of space and actors, this part focuses on emotions fostering or inhibiting violent behavior. Spatial imagination, or the return to alleged better times, often functions as an emotional “projection screen” for people’s desires and hopes. For colonial powers just as on the American frontier, the space to be occupied was considered a space to be civilized. Settlers’ gratuitous violence was often the result of the rejection of this civilizing mission by native people. Frontier paranoia, for example, informed American responses to the Ghost Dance Movement, which not only resulted in large deployments of the US Army on reservations, but also led to the infamous massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890. Not only Native people rejected colonialism; nature itself was intimidating to settlers. Colonial settlers coming to foreign lands who perished due to different climate conditions felt weakened and degraded by the space but also when comparing themselves to the Native population. Violence was a means for enfeebled Europeans to impose their will on seemingly resistant people and nature as well as to force a quick
construction of the envisioned civilized world that would allow them to survive and exploit it. If the envisioned civilized world provided the ideological underpinnings, one of the underlying emotions of such violence was fear.

Benjamin Beresford’s chapter covers Soviet wartime jazz and emotional mobilization. His work examines how propaganda and popular culture meshed in terrortimes for the emotional mobilization of soldiers and the public at large. Jazz often reiterated the prescribed propaganda formulas of sacrifice, heroism, and Russian nationalism that overshadowed Soviet sentiment both in public opinion and propaganda. Yet as Beresford shows, jazz also operated in an entangled web of meanings that permitted it to highlight Allied contributions to the war effort, and by virtue of its American origins, also Western culture, when propaganda was less keen to mention the Allies. Furthermore, jazz songs sometimes depicted Soviet soldiers mourning regions lost to the Wehrmacht, which stands in stark contrast to the official image of stoic soldiers and the regime’s reluctance to mention its own defeats. Particularly in a song about Crimea, Beresford uncovered evidence for Soviet transnationalism, which made Odessa a stand-in for other lost hometowns, be they Russian or Soviet. Finally, jazz also acted as a projection screen for Soviet hopes for a better life without violence after the war. As such, jazz was both a propaganda tool and an expression of popular culture, whose emotional power stemmed from its ability to mobilize masses through at times matching and surprising messages.

**SECTION 4: MEMORY CONTINUITIES**

Terrortimes are distinct from more peaceful periods, and memory reflects that. World War I, for example, is widely considered an important catalyst for violence. During this war, the majority of the male population in several countries—and many women as well—experienced large-scale violence that radicalized individual and collective actors. Atrocities committed, for instance during the Russian Civil War, were informed not only by the brutality of this conflict, but also by yearlong fighting, dying, and suffering in World War I. The Age of Catastrophe, or, as we would call it, the Age of Violence, was a result of a process of mutual radicalization. World War I was therefore followed by violent action; not only the particular terrorscapes of Eastern Europe but also Western countries like Britain, France, and the United States experienced violent postwar internal conflicts. Even when terrortimes changed into peacetimes, the hidden potential of violence reemerged, spurred on by national, political, economic, or social crises. The world economic crisis in 1929 therefore led to a radicalization of the political quarrel, especially in Germany, where Communists and National Socialists engaged in street battles. Yet this phenomenon was not reserved to Germany alone; the
protests of right-wing extremists in Paris on February 6, 1934, caused more than thirty deaths and two thousand other casualties, the most violent demonstrations in France since 1891. Violent outbursts in the interwar period had much to do with the memory of terrortimes and terrorscapes.

“Crafting the History of Terrortimes” is the focus of the first two chapters in this section. Yan Mann’s contribution explores how the cult of the Great Patriotic War was crafted already during the war around topoi such as sacrifice and heroism. So powerful was this narrative that it created a bond between state and society that could not be easily altered after the war. As Yan Mann shows, Stalin tried to reinsert himself into the story after World War II war, but in the 1950s after his death, through destalinization Nikita Khrushchev worked to limit the leader’s influence and return to the familiar story of sacrifice and heroism. Even under Leonid Brezhnev in the 1960s and 1970s no attempt was made to alter this narrative, though efforts increased to pass it down to the younger generation not impacted by the war and its legacy. Such efforts only increased under Vladimir Putin in the twenty-first century, when the war morphed into a mythic event to showcase much-needed national unity, while the central tenets of the narrative changed little. Memory manufactured during the war held up with remarkable stability despite the upheaval of Soviet and Russian transitions.

Also under the theme “Crafting the History of Terrortimes,” Volker Benkert explores German memory of World War II at a crucial point at the turn of the twenty-first century, when discourses on ordinary Germans as victims and Germans as co-perpetrators clashed with new intensity. Though both discourses have been continuously in existence since 1945, the renewed confrontation of these two discourses around the year 2000 and the inability to link them in meaningful ways without apologia has led to a situation in which Germans seem to oscillate ever more rapidly between them. As Benkert shows by looking at more recent films on World War II, the quick succession of memory acts on Germans as victims and Germans as perpetrators established at the turn of the century led to a sincere attempt to portray ordinary Germans as complicit in the regime’s crimes. In order to make the participation of these films’ German protagonists acceptable to contemporary German audiences, their complicity is cushioned by the same apologetic narratives previously established.

If the preceding theme explored memory constructions on national levels, the last theme discussed in this volume revolves around the memory of “Terrortimes in Transnational Perspective.” The central tenet of this section is that national memory does not evolve in isolation from other national narratives. For example, by founding and funding the European House of History in Brussels, the European Union has been active in creating a European identity based on the shared traumas of the twentieth century, particularly the Holocaust. Caner Tekin and Stefan Berger show that the “European Union has invested heavily in putting the Holocaust at the center of
its historical self-understanding and in influencing national understanding of the Holocaust in diverse European nation states.” The European Union’s attempt to create a transnational memory of World War II and the Holocaust has been exposed as self-serving in order to legitimize the larger project of European unification. Yet as Caner and Berger argue, it also often clashes with differences in the perception of the Holocaust in different member states, where the memory of the Holocaust often competes with the memory of the socialist dictatorships in Eastern Europe.90

Ilse Raaijmakers explores in the tenth chapter the extent to which Dutch memory of war and Holocaust was influenced by European memory narratives in the mid-1990s. She understands references to Europe in Dutch liberation commemorations—however constructed and future oriented they were—as an attempted correction to national myths that had ignored the complicity of some parts of Dutch society with the German occupiers in World War II. While acknowledging the transnational references to Europe as important memory interventions, Raaijmakers also shows that Dutch memory, not unlike that of many other states, is still largely informed by a national narrative.

Georgi Verbeeck closes out the themed sections with an exploration on the role of the Holocaust as a European identity marker. He argues that the Holocaust has the status of an indisputable moral reference point, which lends itself to politicization while requiring other horrors to be similar to the Holocaust in order to be recognized. Other unintended consequences might be that the ubiquity of the Holocaust could desensitize and saturate audiences. Verbeeck also alerts readers to a new competition between the memory of Nazi and Communist crimes that divides the continent and challenges the Holocaust as an identity-shaping narrative for the European Union. The Holocaust, though surely a transnational moral reference point, remains imbued with different meanings across Europe.

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NOTES

2. Reinhard Koselleck, Raum und Geschichte, in Zeitgeschichten: Studien zur Historik, ed. Reinhard Koselleck (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 82. Koselleck’s statement was part of a paper given at the annual meeting of German historians in Trier in 1987.
3. Doreen Massey, For Space (London: Sage, 2005), 130–42. See also J. B. Jackson, “A Sense of Place, a Sense of Time,” in A Sense of Place, a Sense of Time (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 151–63. However, the German sociologist Georg Simmel, in Space and the Spatial Ordering of Society, in Sociology: Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 543, warned as early as 1908: “If an interpretation of history presents the spatial factor in the foreground to such an extent that it would understand the greatness or the smallness of the realm, the crowdedness or dispersion of populations, the mobility or stability of the masses etc. as the, as it were, motives radiating out from space to the whole of historical life, then here too the essential spatial preoccupation of all these constellations runs into danger of being confused with their positive functional causes.” More recent sociologists have underlined the way space is being constructed by human imagination. Cf. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966).
4. The authors would like to acknowledge the input of Kevin McHugh for this article, whose unpublished “Ruminations on Space” was an invaluable source for us to link time and space.


10. The editors of *Geographies of the Holocaust* even go so far as to argue that the Holocaust was “a profoundly geographical phenomenon.” Anne K. Knowles, Tim Cole, and Alberto Giordano, eds., *Geographies of the Holocaust* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 1.


21. The novel was published in seven volumes from 1913 to 1927 by Grasset and Gallimard.
The term *terrorscapes* was coined by an international and transdisciplinary group of scholars of memory. The editors thank Georgi Verbeek for alerting us to this useful term (http://www.terrorscapes.org/).


50. “Though passion may have strained it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.” Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861, accessed April 12, 2018, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp.


Schüler-Springorum (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2016), 21.


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71. Of particular importance was the census of 1937, which showed “missing millions” of people in comparison to the census of 1926, documenting the famine and violence in Ukraine and other regions of the Soviet Union. The results were so obvious that the census could only be published fifty years later. Karl Schrögel, Terror und Traum: Moskau 1937 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2008), 163.


78. For example, John Winthrop’s writings about land use in Massachusetts Bay Colony from 1629. “And for the Natives in New England they incloese noe land neither have any setled habitation nor any tame cattle to improve the land by, & soe have noe other but a naturall right to those countries. Soe as if wee leave them sufficient for their use wee may lawfully take the rest, there being more then enough for them & us.” John Winthrop, “Reasons to Be Considered for Justifying the Undertakers of the Intended Plantation in New England . . .” in Envisioning America: English Plans for the Colonization of North America, 1580–1640, ed. Peter C. Mancall (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2017), 134. See also Alfred Cave, The Pequot War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 35f.


in Eastern Europe” (28) into a skeptic of Nazi ideology who reported on the “great dying in the camps” and who could not see “an enemy in the broad strata of millions of Russian people” (32).


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