New Perspectives on Kristallnacht

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CHAPTER 7

What Did Soviet Jews Make of Kristallnacht?
The Nazi Threat in the Soviet Press

by Jeffrey Koerber

On November 11, 1938, the Soviet Yiddish newspaper Oktyabr (Minsk) published a front-page photo of Stalin and the Soviet leadership gathered on the platform atop Lenin’s Tomb. They were there to review the parade on Red Square marking the anniversary of the October Revolution. Below the photo ran a startling news item: “Jewish Pogroms in Germany.” Nazi Stormtroopers had beaten Jews in their homes and in the streets, it reported. Many were killed. Synagogues had been vandalized or destroyed by fire. The story noted the unprecedented scope of these actions.1 More reports in the following days gave specific details of attacks in Berlin, Frankfurt, Vienna, and other cities, as well as the arrest of tens of thousands of Jewish men and their imprisonment in concentration camps.

News items like these of what later became known as Kristallnacht were readily available in the Soviet press under Stalinism. Indeed, Jewish readers had long been able to follow developments in Nazi Germany. Whether they interpreted this news as presenting any specific danger to their lives is another matter. This chapter explores the content of the Soviet news stories that examined the unfolding stages of antisemitic persecution in Nazi Germany, and it begins to assess what meaning these reports had for Jews living under Stalinism. Perspectives from the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, one of the western border regions to completely fall under Nazi rule in 1941, are the
focus. In addition to the Yiddish- and Russian-language press originating from Minsk, the Belarusian capital, it examines the recollections of witnesses from across Soviet Belarus and Ukraine.

BACKGROUND: SOVIET JEWS’ SHIFTING FORTUNES

During the 1920s, the Bolsheviks sought to advance Jews from an oppressed minority to equal status alongside other Soviet nationalities. Antisemitism was denounced as “anti-Soviet.” Jews and Gentiles increasingly lived side by side in communal apartments as crowded cities rapidly industrialized under the Five-Year Plans during the following decade. Leading the political and cultural campaign was the Yevsektsiya, the Jewish section of the Communist Party, which dismantled Jewish communal institutions, seized synagogues, and promoted anti-religious propaganda. Among the institutions that took their place were Yiddish-language theaters, publications, and school systems promoting a constructed Soviet Jewish identity. Although distanced from their heritage, many young Jews plunged ahead into the opportunities on offer. Hirsh Reles (1913–2004), a young writer mentored during the 1930s, remembered the decade as “a glittering epoch” for Soviet Jewish intellectual life.

By the mid-1930s, the Communist Party’s support for Yiddish-language institutions waned considerably as minorities in the Soviet borderland regions came under suspicion of disloyalty. The Yevsektsiya had already been disbanded in 1929. During the Great Terror of 1937–38, wave of purges targeted perceived “enemies and wreckers” within the ranks of the Communist Party, Red Army officer corps, intelligentsia, and industrial sector management. Purges extended to ordinary citizens, bringing the numbers of arrested and executed to more than one million. The purges of the late 1930s also attacked ethnic minorities residing in the Soviet borderlands under the guise of the NKVD’s “national operations.” Tens of thousands of ethnic Poles, Germans, and Latvians were arrested and either executed or imprisoned. Although Jews fell victim under the same program, they were not explicitly cited in NKVD decrees, probably to avoid outward appearances of antisemitism. Tens of thousands of Jews were arrested under charges of counterrevolutionary conspiracies, alleged ties to Polish or German intelligence services, or both. Several of the leading Yiddish writers in Minsk were among those who “disappeared” during these years.
The era’s oppressions further shifted the identities of Soviet Jews. Many Jewish families already wanted their children to use Russian, not Yiddish, in their daily lives to access the best education and employment opportunities. In Soviet Belarus, decisions made concurrently with the Great Terror accelerated the abandonment of Yiddish. Party leaders in Minsk closed the Yiddish-language schools in the summer of 1938 and reopened them in the fall as Belarusian-language institutions. Soviet Belarus retained its Yiddish newspaper, Oktyabr, which continued circulating from Minsk up to the German invasion in June 1941. Several members of its editorial staff fell victim to the Great Terror. My research found that after the Great Terror the paper varied little from the Russian-language Sovetskaya Belorussiya, also published in Minsk, and even promoted Russian- and Belarusian-language culture.

In this context, news reports arrived describing events in Nazi Germany. Soviet Jews had experienced two decades of shifting fortunes, from marginalization to equality tempered by the embargo of their religious and cultural heritage. The purge period saw the status of Jews shift once again, as elements of the constructed Soviet Jewish identity came under attack. The Party’s open expressions of antisemitism emerged later under wartime conditions, but Jews in the prewar years faced a dynamic situation with mounting bias. Still, most Jewish families had to remain focused on daily life in the Stalin era, aware of the concessions and compromises that the Soviet system demanded but deeply absorbed in the challenges of making a living. Little wonder that in this context news from Nazi Germany seldom penetrated into an awareness that Soviet Jews could use to perceive the potential dangers that lay ahead.

NAZI ANTISEMITISM IN THE SOVIET PRESS
Soviet Jews could read international news drawn from Reuters and other western wire services, albeit chosen with editorial selectivity to highlight the failures of the capitalist world. Many stories focused on the west’s economic depression and resulting political turmoil. The crises of 1931 and 1932 had led the Communist Party in Moscow to believe that Germany in particular was headed for proletarian revolution. Even after Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor and the Reichstag Fire in the first months of 1933, newspaper readers were assured that German Communists presented a formidable challenge. As the Nazis consolidated power and successfully suppressed all opposition
(not clearly depicted in the Soviet press), the narrative soon shifted to tales of Nazi brutality. A serial in Oktyabr later in 1933 told of a German Communist’s experiences in the “protective custody camp,” in reality an early concentration camp, at Leipzig Police Prison.\(^\text{10}\)

Actions targeting Jews also appeared in the Soviet press. Oktyabr told of the Nazi Party’s plans for a boycott of Jewish businesses across Germany on Saturday, April 1, 1933.\(^\text{11}\) The same newspaper gave details the next day of the actions of the April Boycott. Groups of Stormtroopers stood outside Jewish stores to warn away prospective customers. Some shops closed that Saturday, typically the busiest shopping day of the week.\(^\text{12}\)

Over the following years, sporadic news items kept Soviet Jews up to date. In July 1935, Nazi hooligans vandalized Jewish-owned stores in Berlin, Augsburg, and Breslau.\(^\text{13}\) Readers learned not only about attacks on property but efforts to forcefully isolate German Jews from “Aryans.” Der emes, the Communist Party’s Yiddish newspaper in Moscow, reported on July 24, 1935, on the arrests of Jews accused of miscegenation with “arishe” (Aryan) women.\(^\text{14}\)

Indeed, this wave of violence coupled with efforts to prohibit marriage between Jews and Aryans motivated the Nazi leadership to codify new legal measures. These were the Nuremberg Laws, issued on September 15, 1935. Oktyabr reported briefly how these were enacted by Hitler in the presence of Reichstag deputies during the Nazi Party’s annual rally at Nuremberg. The Reich Citizenship Law declared that a citizen can only be “‘a German with German or similar blood.’” The Law for the “protection of German blood and honor” forbade marriage between Germans and Jews.\(^\text{15}\)

The brevity of this news story raises a significant issue. How well did the Soviet press educate its readers on the basis for these laws—Nazi racial theory? How were ordinary readers of Oktyabr supposed to interpret what “German blood” meant? Bolshevik ideology rejected biological determinism, making the new German laws all the more obscure to Soviet Jews. While a close reading of reports coming out of Germany might have revealed the irrationalism inherent in Nazism, detailed Soviet analyses of racial antisemitism appear to have been reserved for academic journals. Even here, Bolshevik polemic framed explanations. “The race propaganda of fascism has a goal to justify ‘biologically’ the warlike nationalism of dark capital,” argued one researcher in a Yiddish-language journal put out by the Belarusian Academy of Sciences in 1934.\(^\text{16}\) Little wonder, perhaps, that the Soviet press in Minsk failed to report on the “First Regulation” of the Nuremberg Laws (November 14, 1935), which advanced a legal definition of Jew based on the individual’s grandparents with “Jewish blood.”
REPORTS OF KRISTALLNACHT

While the editors of the Party newspapers avoided discussion of racial classifications, they could not ignore the widespread violence of November 9–10, 1938. We know, although Soviet readers could not, that the chain of events leading to Kristallnacht began with the Nazis’ expulsion of thousands of Polish Jews at the end of October. The Russian-language Sovetskaya Belorussiya reported on the first days of November that Germany had deported thousands of Polish passport holders, almost exclusively Jews.\(^17\) Marooned in fields near border posts, the deportees had no access to food, clean water, or medicine. Some had already died. Another report on the crisis appeared ten days later giving further details.\(^18\)

Hershel Grynszpan’s name remained unknown to readers in Minsk, but not his actions. Oktyabr for November 11 explained the pogrom as a disproportionate act of retribution for the shooting of Ernst vom Rath. “The German fascists have exploited the dispatches about the attack on the Third Secretary of the German Embassy in Paris into a drastic intensification of the terror against Jews,” opened the account originating from Geneva on November 10.\(^19\) The scope of violence was unprecedented, reported the newspaper. Jews had been beaten in their homes and in the streets. Horrible scenes unfolded in the streets of Berlin, as “fascists” vandalized Jewish stores. A nearly identical account ran the same day in Sovetskaya Belorussiya.\(^20\) Both Minsk newspapers closed their reportage with the descriptions of merchandise scattered over Friedrichstrasse, as Berliners stood by in silence.

More details emerged in the November 12 issues of Oktyabr and Sovetskaya Belorussiya. In a Reuters story relayed from London, police in Berlin were observed standing by as attackers ransacked Jewish stores. Similar scenes occurred in Munich, Nuremberg, Frankfurt, and Cologne. Damage to synagogues was widespread. In Vienna, regular police aided Stormtroopers in arresting adult Jewish men. Not fewer than ten thousand were rounded up across Greater Germany.\(^21\) Within days, Oktyabr elevated the figure to not fewer than 35,000, as reported in the English press.\(^22\)

Oktyabr and Sovetskaya Belorussiya also carried reports (November 14) about new laws banning German Jews from engaging in private enterprise, part of the effort to “Aryanize” the economy. In addition, Jews were forbidden from collecting on insurance policies for property damage. The German government confiscated all payouts, leaving Jews to pay for repairs themselves.\(^23\)

Readers of Oktyabr also learned about the pogrom’s impact in Western Europe. Oktyabr reported on November 14, “The English press is full of
communiques from their correspondents in different German cities describing the details of the bloody slayings of the defenseless Jewish population.”

As before, Sovetskaya Belorussiya printed a nearly identical story on the same day. The French paper Ce Soir told of sixty suicides among Jews in Munich and Vienna. A Swiss news report reprinted in Oktyabr ascribed the organizing role of the pogrom to the German government, contradicting the Ministry of Propaganda’s assertions of a popular uprising. Sovetskaya Belorussiya printed a similar news item relayed from Paris.

The flurry of reports highlighted other difficulties that German Jews faced. The London Daily Telegraph and Morning Post reported that six thousand Munich Jews were ordered to leave the country in twenty-four hours, the rest to be gone in forty-eight hours. Although the order was not carried out, it revealed to Soviet Jewish readers that would-be expellees lacked visas to enter another county. Ce Soir also reported that the German government intended to create a ghetto to confine remaining Jews. This was not implemented by the Nazi security services, but it revealed to Soviet audiences the possibilities for the future.

**DID SOVIET JEWS PERCEIVE ANY DANGER?**

What impact did these reports have on Soviet Jews? This is difficult to assess. In the USC Shoah Foundation Institute’s collection of testimonies, few mention Kristallnacht by name compared to Holocaust survivors raised across the border in the Second Polish Republic. Then again, Soviet Jews were not exposed to postwar remembrance of the Holocaust and so lack the vocabulary possessed by Polish Jewish survivors, many of whom migrated to the west.

Some interviewers asked Holocaust survivors and other witnesses about their recollections of Soviet media, while others volunteered this information. Aleksandr Lyubich, born in Minsk in 1928, recalled that he learned about events outside of the Soviet Union by following reports in the newspaper. “I don’t know why,” he reflected, given his youth in the late 1930s, “but I happened to be interested in that.” He also remembered learning about the 1938 pogrom in Germany, but not fully understanding its meaning. “We cannot—uh—know what has happened, how it happened,” Lyubich admitted, his hesitation a further indication of his past incomprehension. Alexander Feldman, born in 1929 in Vinnitsa oblast, Ukraine, shared this perception. Single copies
of newspapers circulated hand to hand in his shtetl and their contents spread by word of mouth. By such means his family learned about Kristallnacht and other events across Europe. Still, he and his family did not quite understand the broader ideological motivations for Nazi antisemitism.32

Many Soviet Jews did not appear to have the luxury to devote much attention to events in Germany. Bronia Gofman (born in 1918), deeply engaged in her studies at the Jewish Pedagogical Tekhnikum in Minsk, read reports from across the western Soviet border but did not have the time to fathom their meaning. “We read newspapers, we listened to the radio, but we didn’t take it seriously,” she remembered. The German invasion of Poland changed her perspectives.33 Pesia Aizenshtadt, born in 1921, remembered hearing from a Minsk newspaper about Mein Kampf and Hitler’s plans for Eastern Europe. Still, she felt secure. “We were all sure that Stalin would protect us.”34

When asked about fears of a German invasion, many former Soviet citizens, Jews and Gentiles, remembered their sense of security. “I didn’t think that the Germans will come to us!” Elizabeth Bershad, a Jew born 1923 in Vinnytsia, Ukraine, admitted decades later. “We were thinking that we were very strong, and we have a lot of munitions and everything. Nobody can come to our country.”35 Some were aware of Germany’s rearmament and realized the threat Hitler posed for the rest of Europe, especially the Soviet Union. A young ethnic Belarusian émigré interviewed after the war by the Harvard Refugee Interview Project knew something about this (his statements were recorded anonymously, hence we do not know his name). He had learned about German militarization from his father’s Jewish acquaintances who tracked such reports. This young man told an interviewer, “Before the war, for example, there were conversations about Hitler’s rearmament, about the crusade against the Soviet Union, and so forth. Since my father was in contact with Jews, he got most of his information from them.”36

Instances such as this anonymous account, where information was transformed into knowledge, appear to have been few. Nazi aggression was a European affair, the Soviet press seemed to imply. Despite the rhetoric building up to war with the capitalist world, including daily coverage of the Spanish Civil War, nothing pointed toward the possibility of German conquest of Soviet territory. The Third Reich was a remote land and the Soviet frontier was well guarded—or so newspapers asserted repeatedly. Frequent newspaper reports during the 1930s touted the strength of the Red Army and its border defenses. This posturing filtered into many media. Soviet Yiddish poet Zelik Akselrod
penned a verse in 1939 titled “Lager” (camp), recounting the thoughts of an alert border guard. He closes with the lines:

For bold Red Army fighters,
For bravery,
For clearheaded judgment,
For secure borders of our land,
To the last battle,
For life and for death!
We are ready!
We are vigilant!  

Soviet cinema also conveyed reassuring messages. Sergei Eisenstein's *Alexander Nevsky*, which premiered soon after Kristallnacht, told the medieval tale of Germanic defeat in the face of Slavic resistance. Director Eisenstein drew inspiration from the growing need to protect the Soviet Union from external aggression. In an English-language piece titled “My Subject Is Patriotism,” published in 1939 in the Soviet journal *International Literature*, Eisenstein warned of the dangers present outside the Soviet Union: “The suppression of the independence of the so-called small countries, blood-drenched Spain, dismembered Czechoslovakia, China gasping in desperate struggle, these realities appear like a gory nightmare.” He also connected the film's message to the events of Kristallnacht. “But every new day brings us news of greater outrages, greater savagery,” Eisenstein noted. “It is hard to believe your eyes when you read of the unbridled ferocity of the Jewish pogroms in Germany, where before the eyes of the world hundreds of thousands of downtrodden people, shorn of human aid, are being wiped from the face of the earth.” Yet this article was not meant for Soviet readers. Furthermore, what warnings for the present could theater audiences find in this medieval tale, especially with its triumphalist ending?

At least one other film released in 1938, the less cinematically accomplished *If War Comes Tomorrow* (*Yesli zavtra voina . . .*), set its story in the present day. Here too, the inevitable victory did little to alert viewers of the true dangers posed by Nazi Germany. The film's format mixed a dramatized invasion by an unnamed aggressor (wearing stylized swastikas) with existing footage of the Red Army on maneuvers. Not only were the invaders easily repelled, they were beaten back to their own territory. The counter-invasion provoked a workers' uprising in the invaders' capital city (more existing footage, this time of German Communist rallies in pre-Hitler Berlin). The film's drift into the fantastic undercuts the realities of the moment. The escapism offered
by such films, especially for young people, is reflected in the recollections of Boris Falevich, a Jew from Slutsk. “Everyone dreamed to become a tank driver or a pilot,” he remembered about how he and his friends were swept up by this propaganda.40

CENSORSHIP UNDER THE MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, announced to the world on August 24, 1939, was sold to the Soviet people as securing the Soviet Union’s western border by eliminating the threat from “fascist Poland” and neutralizing any potential one posed by Hitler. Stalin had wanted better relations with Germany since the mid-1930s, and this desire increased in the aftermath of the Munich Agreement between Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy in September 1938. In practical terms, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact gave the Soviet Union the eastern half of Poland and beneficial trade opportunities with Nazi Germany. Yet the “liberation” of “western Belarus” and “western Ukraine” meant that the western border and associated defenses had to be shifted some three hundred kilometers. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact also brought the Third Reich up to the Soviet Union’s doorstep.41

The pact also meant that criticism of Nazi Germany disappeared from Soviet public discourse to avoid angering Hitler. Alexander Nevsky and If War Comes Tomorrow, for example, were withdrawn from circulation. News of the persecution of Jews under German rule rapidly declined in Soviet media as early as May 1939 with the developing rapprochement with Hitler; it then disappeared with the signing of the pact.42 Rumors took their place, delivered by the hundreds of thousands of refugees from western Poland, most of them Jews, who fled German rule into Soviet-occupied eastern Poland to escape Nazi brutality. Unfortunately, their audience among the native Jewish population frequently dismissed these stories, despite the reports on Kristallnacht and other events they had read before the war in Poland’s Yiddish press. Older Jews in the territories newly annexed from Poland remembered the Germans to be good masters during the First World War. Why should it be different now, they rationalized. Most younger Jews were too engrossed in the new daily activities offered by the Soviets to pay attention to the refugees.43

Some of these Jewish refugees passed east of the pre-September 1939 Soviet border in fulfillment of education or labor commitments. They
encountered Soviet populations that had read the newspaper accounts outlined above. Yet again their experiences during the first months of German rule in Poland were met with disbelief. Leon Shulkin (born 1923) encountered a few of these refugees in his home city of Minsk. They conveyed the terrible things the Germans were doing to Jews. “We couldn't imagine that it's going to happen in Russia because they had a—the Ribbentrop with Molotov—to sign an agreement,” Shulkin recalled, halting phrases that seem to reflect his rationalized dismissal.

Others gave more thought to the presence of these refugees. Raisa Gringauz (born 1932) was sent from Leningrad to her grandparents in Vitebsk in the summer of 1940. “Vitebsk started to be crowded with some strange people,” she remembered decades later, “and when I started to ask my grandparents, they told me [these were] Polish people who are running from Germany.” Their presence alerted the girl to Jews who lived outside the Soviet Union. But why were they running? Was Germany a threat to all Jews? Raisa's grandfather spoke misinformed words of reassurance. “The daytchen [Germans] are educated people, are high-cultured people—they will not do anything wrong to us;” she recalled her grandfather saying. Others retorted, what about these refugees? Has something changed?

To Irina Zhivliuk, a Gentile born in 1925 in Minsk, the arrival of refugees after the annexation of eastern Poland prompted her to think something indeed had changed. Yet where could she go to find believable information to confirm or dismiss her fears? Just as a news blackout barred any official reports about the treatment of Polish Jews, warnings of German aggression disappeared as well. This changed after the fall of France in June 1940. Thereafter oblique allusions reemerged in the press. By autumn 1940, Soviet newspapers printed short news items on the Germans’ sustained campaign of aerial bombing of London and other cities. The tone of these reports hinted at sympathy for the British. A story on the passage in March 1941 of the Lend-Lease Act in the United States was described as an example of international cooperation, not collaboration between capitalist exploiters as might be expected.

But what inferences could readers draw from such stories? Could war come tomorrow? Unlike the bellicose rhetoric shouted in the 1930s, the subtle references in the Soviet press do not seem to have caught most people's attention. Instead, rumor overshadowed official narratives. The Germans' treatment of Jews in occupied countries remained solely the domain of gossip, although most tales were too strange or horrible to believe. This left the threat posed by German aggression. “Most of the people, they felt this way, yeah, most of

them,” Eli Schupak (born 1924) remembered about the belief that war between the Soviet Union and German was inevitable. But he was also old enough to know that this commonly held notion needed to remain secret. “It was against the policy to talk about it.”49 Bella Vaysman, although only a nine-year-old child, also was aware that talk of war between Germany and the Soviet Union not only carried risk, nobody truly believed it. “Some noises we got,” she recalled, referring to a story published in a wall newspaper that she overheard some adults talking about. An alleged spy was caught spreading the rumor that Germany will attack the Soviet Union. “They called those people provokatorii [provocators],” she recalled. “That’s why we were calmly living, and we didn’t expect nothing!”50 Still others simply could not believe that the Germans posed a threat. Elena Zibert, born in 1930 in Vitebsk, recalled in a 1998 interview that her family “didn’t feel that there would be a war.”51 To put it another way, the war would not reach them, reflecting the false sense of security that many Soviet citizens continued to feel into 1941.

And the Soviets promoted such notions. “We didn’t feel that we were in jeopardy,” remembered Zelda Gordon, a native of Grodno in eastern Poland, who by June 1941 had lived under Soviet rule for only twenty months. “We never thought that Germany will attack the Russian army and we felt . . . more secure.”52 Indeed, as the Soviet media seemed to suggest, “We will protect you.” Images of happy, safe children figured prominently in the pages of Oktyabr during the first months of 1941. One photo shows Białystok school students sharing a snowball fight with their teacher.53 In another, toddlers eyed the camera as they were photographed in a Gomel crèche.54 The same issue of the newspaper carried a picture of children in Britain, hiding in a trench and looking skyward in fear of German bombs.55 To drive the point home, Oktyabr printed a series of articles on Soviet military forces in February 1941 under the bold headline “For Our Children.”56

CONCLUSION
All dismissals and delusions shattered once the bombs started falling in the early morning of June 22, 1941. As Red Army forces retreated in chaos, Jews in the western borderland regions came to the stark realization that the Soviet system was not prepared to protect them. Soviet leaders in the previous two decades labored to convince their citizens that they acted to secure their
homeland from internal and foreign attack. Newspapers kept readers informed of the growing dangers beyond the Soviet borders. Yet a certain hubris underlies these reports. Stories of the April Boycott and Nuremberg Laws told of what happened to Jews under capitalism and fascism in the west. Whether in the Yiddish- or Russian-language press, the news one column over on the page offered reassuring views of the Soviet Union as a land of opportunity. The Red Army was invincible. The high price was life under a harsh regime, compounded for Jews by emerging persecution.

Even with the extensive reportage on Kristallnacht, Soviet Jews seldom understood what specific threat the Nazis posed for their lives. Within six months, news of the persecution of German Jews declined and then ceased in the Soviet press due to Stalin’s wish to draw up a non-aggression agreement with Nazi Germany. This news embargo continued after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in August–September 1939. Only rumors of German atrocities against Jews in western Poland reached Soviet Jews, and these were seldom believed. Hints of the military threat presented by Nazi Germany reemerged in newspapers after the fall of France in June 1940, but this was coupled with propaganda reinforcing trust in the strength of the Red Army. Soviet citizens, and Soviet Jews in particular, were left tragically vulnerable.
Notes

1. “Yidishe pogromen in Daytshland” [Jewish pogroms in Germany], Oktyabr, November 11, 1938, 1.
9. “Di KomPartay rufn tsu an algemaynem shtreyk kegn der fashistisher Hitler-regirung” [The Communist Party call for a general strike against the fascist Hitler government], Oktyabr, February 2, 1933, 1; “Kryvavaya sutychka pamizh pabochymi i natsyyanal-satsyyalistami ü Breslavlī” [Crooked clashes between workers and National Socialists in Breslau], Vitsebski praletri, April 12, 1933, 4; “Ablavy, aryshty i katarzhyńnya prysudy” [Round-ups, arrests, and floods of verdicts], Vitsebski praletri, April 27, 1933, 4.


12. “Der anti-Yidisher boikot viklt zikh fanander” [The anti-Jewish boycott winds up], Oktyabr, April 2, 1933, 1.

13. “Pratim vegn der neyer pogrom-khvalie in Daytshland” [Details about the new pogrom-wave in Germany], Oktyabr, July 17, 1935, 1; “Di pogrom-khvalie in Daytshland doyert” [The pogrom-wave in Germany continues], Oktyabr, July 24, 1935, 1.

14. “Vayterdike farsharfung fun der inerlekher politisher lage in Daytshland” [Successive intensifications of the domestic political situation in Germany], Der emes, July 24, 1935, 1.


17. “Vyseleiniye Polyakov iz Germanii” [Eviction of Poles from Germany], Sovetskaya Belorussiya, November 1, 1938, 4; “Izgnaniye yevreeyev iz Germanii” [Expelled Jews from Germany], Sovetskaya Belorussiya, November 2, 1938, 1.

18. “Izdevatel'istva germanskikh vlastei and polyakami” [Harassment of Poles by German authorities], Sovetskaya Belorussiya, November 11, 1938, 1.


20. “Yevreiskiye pogrom v Germanii” [Jewish pogroms in Germany], Sovetskaya Belorussiya, November 1, 1938, 1.

21. “A khvalie fun Yidishe pogromen in Daytshland” [A wave of Jewish pogroms in Germany], Oktyabr, November 12, 1938, 1; “Volna yevreiskikh pogromov v Germanii” [Wave of Jewish pogroms in Germany], Sovetskaya Belorussiya, November 12, 1938, 1.

22. “Yidishe pogromen in Daytchland” [Jewish pogroms in Germany], Oktyabr, November 15, 1938, 1.


25. “Angliiskaya pechat’ o yevreiskikh pogromakh v Germanii” [English reports about Jewish pogroms in Germany], Sovetskaya Belorussiya, November 14, 1938, 1.
27. “Ayntshteytn fun di Yidishe pogromen in Daytshland” [Particulars of the Jewish pogroms in Germany], Oktyabr, November 15, 1938, 1.
33. Bronia Gofman, Minsk, Belarus, April 12, 1997, interview 30315, USC SF/VHA, tape 1, segments 8–9, 6:10–7:45.


47. “Angla-Germskaya vaina—Germskiya pavedamlenni” [Anglo-German war—German reports], *Vitsebski rabochy*, September 7, 1940, 1.


53. *Oktyabr*, January 1, 1941.


55. Ibid.

56. “Far undzere kinder” [For our children], *Oktyabr*, February 18, 1941, 3.
Nearly complete print runs of Oktyabr (Minsk) on microfilm are found at the Dorot Jewish Division of the New York Public Library (late 1920s through 1935) and the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research at the Center for Jewish Research (1935 through spring 1941). The Library of Congress (European Reading Room, Thomas Jefferson Building) has microfilms of Sovetskaya Belorussiya (Minsk), also in a nearly complete print run. Very limited surviving paper copies of local Vitebsk newspapers are found at the Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Vitebskoi Oblasti (State Archive Vitebsk Oblast), Vitebsk, Belarus: Vitsebski praletarii (Fond 2285, opus 2, delo 125), in a partial print run for 1933; Vitsebski rabochy (Fond 2289, opus 2, delo 132), in single issues for 1940.

“A khvalie fun Yidishe pogromen in Daytshland” [A wave of Jewish pogroms in Germany]. Oktyabr, November 12, 1938, 1.
“Ablavy, aryshty i katarzhnyya prysudy” [Round-ups, arrests, and floods of verdicts]. Vitsebski praletarii, April 27, 1933, 4.
“Angliskaya pechat’ o yevreiskikh pogromakh v Germanii” [English reports about Jewish pogroms in Germany]. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, November 14, 1938, 1.
“Ayntslheytn fun di Yidishe pogromen in Daytshland” [Particulars of the Jewish pogroms in Germany]. Oktyabr, November 15, 1938, 1.
“Di oyslendishe prese vegn di yidishe pogromen in Daytshland” [The foreign press on the Jewish pogroms in Germany]. Oktyabr, November 14, 1938, 1.
“Di pogrom-khvalie in Daytshland doyert” [The pogrom-wave in Germany continues]. Oktyabr, July 24, 1935, 1.
“Far unzdere kinder” [For our children]. Oktyabr, February 18, 1941, 3.
“Izdevatel’stva germanskikh vlastei i polyakami” [Harassment of Poles by German authorities]. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, November 11, 1938, 1.
“Izgnaniye yevreyev iz Germanii” [Expelled Jews from Germany]. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, November 2, 1938, 1.
“Kryvavaya sutychka pamizh pabochnym i natsyyanal-satsyyalistami ū Breslaǔli”
[Crooked clashes between workers and National Socialists in Breslau]. *Vitebski praletarii*, April 12, 1933, 4.


*Oktyabr*, January 1, 1941.


“Pratim vegn der neyer pogrom-khvalie in Daytshland” [Details about the new pogrom-wave in Germany]. *Oktyabr*, July 17, 1935, 1.


“Revoliutionere protest-demonstratsies in gants Daytshland” [Revolutionary protest demonstrations in all of Germany]. *Oktyabr*, February 2, 1933, 1.


“Tsvishnfelkerlekher iberzikht” [Cooperation between peoples]. *Oktyabr*, March 29, 1941.

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